“Cognitive Warfare” fails the cognitive test
Access Matt Armstrong’s substack “Arming for the War We’re In” to read this essay HERE.
Summary:
Matt Armstrong critiques Frank Hoffman’s defense of the term “cognitive warfare,” arguing it adds little beyond long-standing concepts of political warfare and public diplomacy. Focusing on labels and organizational charts obscures the real problem: U.S. leaders dismiss nonmilitary instruments of power while adversaries integrate them to bypass America’s “Maginot Line” of military deterrence. Armstrong shows that what is now called “cognitive warfare” was thoroughly theorized by Kennan and others as political warfare, centered on purpose, power, and shaping will, not just “messages” or technology. Renaming the problem will not fix the strategic neglect of these tools.
Comment (from Dave Maxwell): Matt Armstrong and Frank Hoffman are two of the smartest people I know and anything they write is worth reading. This is an excellent example of how to disagree and express contrasting views. However, I think in the long run they will find more agreement, especially in the area of Political Warfare; a concept which all three of us fully embrace even if most of the policymakers, press, and pundits loathe the term. Also note there is some important background history in terms of George Kennan and also some important and useful references for those who study and research these areas.
“Cognitive Warfare” fails the cognitive test
Is anyone asking why are we trying to pattern our efforts off of those of our adversaries?
Nov 17, 2025
https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/cognitive-warfare-fails-the-cognitive
While I think we over-“warfare” far too many problematic situations these days in general, the two cases that bother me the most are “irregular warfare” as currently defined and employed by the Department of War; and “cognitive warfare” as described by Frank and others, and challenged here by Matt.
Dave Maxwell always makes strong points in his advocacy for “political warfare,” but I suspect it will also find little purchase with our civilian leaders. PW also falls into that trap of over-warfaring everything that challenges our world view or foreign policies.
I prefer to allow the Chinese to be “all warfare all the time,” and for the US to be a clear alternative that prefers peace to war, but realizes that peace is often messy and that it demands strong efforts to ensure policies remain relevant and to deter, disrupt and counter the illicit challenges of state and non-state actors seeking to advance their interests in ways contrary to a sound world order.
The myriad challenges we brand as “irregular” are all illegal under the laws of the system being challenged. Either change the rules or enforce them, but it is natural for rising powers to seek to skirt rules they disagree with and see as obstacles to their own interests. As to “cognitive,” all warfare is about changing how one’s adversary thinks. From “stop shooting at my helmet” to “surrender.” But the idea that future war will be fought with ideas rather than actions seems naive. I think our bigger problem in recent conflicts has been in not recognizing that our actions were communicating messages that were wholly inconsistent with policies we professed to advance or the narratives we released to explain ourselves.
Rather than being in an age where narratives replace actions, I believe we suffer most from not realizing that the narratives conveyed by our actions override and overrule any verbal explanations we might offer in support.
So, just as Edward Luttwak famously suggested we “give war a chance;” I suggest we would be equally well-served by giving a more practical understanding of peace a chance as well.