Welcome to the Western Hemisphere
Perhaps you were preparing for another round of operations in the Red Sea, or flying multinational patrols over Poland, or training with partners in the Philippines. Maybe you were a strategist who had been running wargames on defending Taiwan or Estonia. That doesn’t matter now, because the Trump Administration is now all-in on the Western Hemisphere and you have orders to US Southern Command! A few months ago in Small Wars Journal, I provided some recommendations to commanders and staff being assigned to Joint Task Force Southern Border. Now, it seems appropriate to facilitate a larger regional understanding. As of this writing, the United States has deployed an Amphibious Ready Group, a Carrier Strike Group, F-35s, and multiple other assets into the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. These forces have engaged in lethal strikes against more than 10 alleged drug boats resulting in more than 50 deaths. Effective strategy requires a detailed understanding of the operating environment. In this brief guide, I will lay out some key characteristics of the hemisphere, provide some critical homework to better understand the region, and deliver some advice to improve your chances of success.
Historical Context
As with any region, the Americas has its own distinctive opportunities and challenges. From a defense and security perspective, the development of a long-standing asymmetrical alliance and conflict management system is the region’s most vital but underappreciated characteristic. The United States has benefited immensely from its largely calm and friendly neighborhood. Realists like John Mearsheimer have pointed out the importance of maintaining an uncontested Western Hemisphere so that the United States is free to address threats globally. Certainly, the region faces issues like drug trafficking and irregular migration, but interstate conflict has been rare, and the United States has not been confronted by hostile regional powers.
Unfortunately, there is no concise history of defense relations in the region. However, there are three books that together provide a comprehensive understanding. First, L Lloyd Mecham’s The United States and Inter-American Security 1889-1960, provides an excellent survey of early regional security challenges and the structures that were created to alleviate them. Second, John Child’s Unequal alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938–1978 extends the narrative further and provides a more in-depth look at World War II and the formation of a hemispheric alliance and conflict management system. If you only plan on reading one of these three, Unequal Alliance is the most useful and succinct. Unfortunately, Child’s book is out of print, but his dissertation is available online. Rounding out the trilogy, Latin America’s Cold War by Hal Brands outlines the threats and responses posed by the US – Soviet rivalry in the hemisphere.
A historical survey of security in the region reveals a few key threads that are critical to the US crafting successful strategy and policy. First, US unilateral interventionism has a powerful influence on foreign relations in the region. Since 1810, there have been more than sixty US interventions in the hemisphere, including the Mexican-American War, the secession of Panama, multiple incursions into Central America, operation Power Pack in the Dominican Republic, the invasion of Grenada, and the removal of Noreiga in Panama.
Often used as a synonym for interventionism, the Monroe Doctrine is deeply misunderstood and few in the national security policy sphere bother to study its later evolution. In 1823, President James Monroe declared that “…we should consider any attempt on their [European powers] part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.” At the time, the policy was praised by the region’s newly established republics that were anxious about European powers claiming or reclaiming territories. However, in 1904 Theodore Roosevelt added his Corollary which instead of simply keeping European powers collecting debts out, declared a unilateral US right to the “exercise of an international police power.” The United States would act in the case of “chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society.” Of note, current US policy in the Hemisphere has strong parallels to the Roosevelt Corollary.
As the war clouds grew over Europe in the 1930s, Franklin Delano Roosevelt made a change to US policy toward the Western Hemisphere in anticipation of the coming conflict. Instead of a paternalistic policy of unilateral intervention, FDR announced the “good neighbor” policy which prioritized consultation with the countries of the region in the case of a security concern. Importantly, the Monroe Doctrine would become a multinational policy culminating in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance or Rio Treaty in 1947 and the Organization of American States Charter in 1948. These two documents established norms and structures for resolving conflict among the signatories and created an alliance committed to defending the region from outside aggression. This was a bargain in which the United States gained global legitimacy and the region gained assurances that the United States would not engage in unilateral interventions.
The immediate post-World War II period would prove to be a high point in regional security cooperation. As the Cold War unfolded, the United States was often frustrated with its partners as the Soviet Union and its Cuban ally fomented revolution and insurgency in the Hemisphere. As a result, on multiple occasions, the United States took action without a consensus or in the face of opposition from the OAS.
This highlights a second thread in regional security: the tension between non-intervention and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The Rio Treaty and OAS Charter emphasize non-intervention as an ironclad rule in regional relations. However, the Democratic Charter signed in 2001 declared, “The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.” It goes on to outline potential actions to be taken should a government stray from the democratic standards of the region. Yet, democratic norms have been long absent in Cuba and have eroded away in Nicaragua and Venezuela.
For the United States, the inability of regional institutions to effectively confront threats and instability has been a longstanding frustration and a justification for unilateral action. After the failed Bay of Pigs landing, John F. Kennedy highlighted US restraint, but warned “should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-intervention merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction—if the nations or this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration–then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our Nation!” The most recent echo of this sentiment was provided by Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau in an address to the OAS General Assembly where he highlighted desperate instability in Haiti and festering authoritarianism in Cuba and Venezuela. He challenged the members, “this is not a time for mere words and slogans about hemispheric solidarity. It’s time for the OAS to show results.”
Yet, cooperation in a crisis can happen. Shortly after Kennedy’s warning, the Rio Treaty was exercised in response to the Cuban Missile Crisis authorizing armed force. Aside from the United States, twelve countries volunteered military forces. In support of the naval quarantine, the Dominican Republic provided two patrol frigates and Argentina deployed two destroyers and two aircraft. In addition, Venezuela employed two destroyers off its coast. In 1965, after an initial unilateral US response to instability in the Dominican Republic, the OAS deployed a combined Inter-American Peace Force led by a Brazilian commander. The IAPF was considered successful having provided stability and allowing for free elections. In addition, the OAS and Rio Treaty have a respectable, if not perfect, record of defusing interstate conflicts in the region.
A final thread that runs through the history of the region is a tug-of-war between what scholars Javier Corrales and Richard Feinberg label “Hemispherism” and division. Since the Congress of Panama in 1826, there have been two camps in the region. One would like to see a regional organization that excludes the United States and Canada. Another takes an integrative approach based on “common values and goals.” The Rio Treaty and OAS Charter marked the ascendence of hemispherism.
Unfortunately, the consensus toward unity has deteriorated over time, in part due to US unilateralism. Alternative groupings which excluded the United States have emerged and faded. However, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) is becoming a growing challenge to the OAS. CELAC excludes the United States and Canada, and importantly, it has become a welcome entry point for Chinese engagement. China has displaced the United States as the number one trading partner in South America and is only second to the United States in all of Latin America. Twenty-one countries in the region have signed on to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. While the OAS can be frustrating, its dissolution or weakening paired with a rising CELAC backed by China, would be a far worse scenario.
A failure to manage these three interlocking aspects of security relations in the hemisphere endangers vital US interests. As you navigate the new focus on the region your decisions should weigh the costs of unilateral intervention to regional unity. In addition, finding a way to untangle often opposing commitments to non-intervention and democracy will require deft and nuanced diplomacy and consultation.
Consultation Matters
These three historical threads are essential context for anyone operating in the region. Instead of engaging in balancing against the United States, the Americas turned to “republican internationalism” wherein international laws and agreements restrict signatories’ ability to take unilateral action. The use of coercion or military force requires the use of the mechanisms outlined in the Rio Treaty and OAS Charter. The more states feel that the United States is not consulting with them and is acting on its own, the more likely fracturing and erosion of the hemispheric alliance will occur. In a worst-case scenario, this could lead to true balancing with China and Russia happily supporting a new hemispheric reality.
One valuable piece of advice to those working on regional operations, strategy, and policy is that consultation is essential. A Rio Treaty or OAS resolution would be ideal in the ongoing situation with Venezuela; however, any coalition building and consultation is a chance to break the narrative of US unilateralism. SOUTHCOM maintains a number of foreign liaison officers, and service component commands likewise have FLOs (One assumes this will carry forward as US Army South transitions to Western Hemisphere Command). Another point of coordination is the Inter-American Defense Board. The IADB, while lacking the authority and structure of NATO’s Military Committee, is a venue to discuss military action in the hemisphere. In addition, multinational engagement at the service level occurs at the Conference of America Armies, the System of Cooperation Among the American Air Forces, the Inter-American Naval Conference, and the Marine Leaders of the Americas Conference. While these mechanisms are not primarily operational, they offer existing networks for multilateral coordination. Proactive diplomacy and military-to-military engagement are reoccurring elements of successful policy in the hemisphere.
Understand Transnational Threats
The ongoing operations in the hemisphere are being justified by the threat posed by illegal drugs being trafficked into the United States. This is a serious problem. More than 80,000 Americans died in 2024 due to drug overdoses. Drug producing and transit countries have faced powerful criminal groups which have directly challenged states with terrorist tactics, military capabilities, and corruption.
If you would like to better understand transnational organized crime, there are several outstanding options. Moises Naim’s Illicit provides an excellent survey of the effect of globalization on trafficking. In Narconomics, journalist and economist Tom Wainwright provides a unique perspective on drug trafficking incentives. Paul Rexton Kan’s Drug Trafficking and International Security is a thorough examination of the effects of the drug trade on security interests. However, a short article, “The Future Evolution of Transnational Criminal Organizations and the Threat to US National Security,” by Celina Realuyo offers perhaps the best insights. Realuyo outlines eight illicit enablers which are critical components of any transnational criminal organization. For a better understanding of criminal tactical capabilities dive into the work of John Sullivan and Robert Bunker.
Pressure on the Maduro regime is largely based on the assertion that Nicolas Maduro is in fact not the duly elected president of Venezuela, but rather the head of a criminal enterprise—the Cártel de los Soles, a group of senior government officials and military officers managing the flow of drugs through Venezuela. What’s more, this criminal enterprise, has been designated a terrorist organization by the Treasury Department. In neighboring Colombia, the ELN and FARC have long carried the terrorist label. They have been joined by several Mexican cartels, Central American gangs MS-13 and Barrio 18, as well as Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua.
There are several concepts outlining how a narcotrafficking group could achieve state capture or evolve into a terrorist or insurgent organization. The case of Venezuela is an example of what Doug Farah calls a “criminalized state.” This can occur when criminals successfully coopt government officials through bribery or extorsion; or government officials can use the state’s power to effectively take control of the illicit economy for their own benefit. Tamara Makarenko provided the “Crime-Terror Continuum” on the blending of insurgent, terrorist, and criminal characteristics. Her model is especially valuable for leaders and analysts because political rhetoric that categorizes groups in support of policy can obfuscate critical vulnerabilities only identifiable when a group’s nature is decerned objectively. The overall concept of a merging of threat typologies is called “convergence.” The National Defense University published two outstanding compilations on the subject appropriately titled Convergence and Beyond Convergence.
Finally, there are several resources that are useful as reoccurring references. The National Drug Threat Assessment produced by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) describes different transnational criminal organizations and illicit drug markets. The Office of National Drug Control Strategy writes the National Drug Control Strategy, which is a comprehensive plan to address the drug problem in the United States. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime generates worldwide reports and country reports. The Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report includes a breakdown of drug issues by country. To keep up with Western Hemisphere transnational crime issues, visit Insight Crime and Small Wars Journal–El Centro.
Find a FAO
If all of this seems complicated, I implore you to find a Foreign Area Officer (FAO). FAOs are provided language training, advanced civil schooling, and in-region training to become experts in their regions. There are FAOs at SOUTHCOM, service component commands, the Pentagon, combat support agencies, and at embassies throughout the region. The Navy FAO community prides itself in leveraging its FAOs in fleet assignments. Navy FAOs with regional experience would be invaluable to the task force currently operating in the Caribbean. These officers know the hemisphere and have networks that can help resolve issues with foreign counterparts and in the US joint interagency environment.
A Final Word of Caution
The Western Hemisphere may appear less challenging than other regions. It lacks the direct threat posed by a rising competitor like China or the reckless aggression displayed by Russia. It is generally peaceful compared to the seemingly endless conflict among the countries of Southwest Asia. The nature of the region is in part due to political, historical, and cultural commonalities, but it is also the product of decades of diplomacy and military cooperation. With more US military assets in the region than have been seen in a generation, there is the potential to resolve longstanding problems. However, uninformed actions and poorly formed strategy can also undermine the long-underappreciated stability of the hemisphere.
