Setting The Force: 10 Steps for Resolving The Special Forces “Identity Crisis”
If Special Forces has an “identity crisis,” it is because we misunderstood and mislabeled the problems we were sent to resolve, and applied solutions rooted in how the problems were labeled and defined, rather than for what they were. The world had changed, and revisionist actors of every ilk had stolen a march on those overly wedded to an obsolete playbook. For true change, we, as a Regiment, must first reframe the problem and then set out to reimagine more durable solutions.
The same changes fueling frustrating challenges and expanding threats reveal new insights as well. It is easy to write our struggles off as a result of complexity. It is easy to accept reactive, symptomatic measures as the best we can offer. Mitigate the violence, disrupt or defeat threats, and we’ve done our job. In addition to our own unilateral prowess, we excelled at training and equipping others to be tactically better as well. These are missions we excel at, and we are providing our nation with the special operations forces (SOF) that civilian leadership desires. But are we producing positive and enduring strategic results? Are we giving our nation the SOF it needs?
In my own experience, which includes engagements with literally thousands of senior SOF NCOs over 15 years of Joint Special Operations University Enlisted Academy engagements, I believe that a deep sense of frustration is likely at the heart of our “crisis.” With reframed problems and reimagined solutions, however, I believe strongly that the Special Forces Regiment can potentially become one of the most important tools in our nation’s policy toolkit. This is not a fix to be installed at the bottom of the formation. These are changes that demand support from key leaders at the General Officer level.
The reality is that our special operators are frustrated because we send them out year after year on infeasible operations in support of impossible policies.
Amid this chaos of rapid change and infinite variables, human nature is the one source of certainty we can rely upon. Baked into the human genome are forces we do not fully understand, but whatever it is, human nature is a virtual constant, providing a solid foundation for strategic concepts. Fortunately for us, the primary missions of Special Forces are all deeply rooted in the human dynamics of governance, conflict, and warfare. Accurately understanding these interactions of situational variables and human constants is the cornerstone of sound strategy in general and essential to the optimal employment of SOF. With my operational days behind me, I will leave the practical, tactical details for others to address. Instead, I will offer a strategist’s perspective to help guide those efforts.
To reset Special Forces for the modern world, we must first clarify our understanding of the human dynamics unique to our missions, and then ensure that our doctrine guides, rather than constrains, our actions. Unfortunately, in far too many cases, neither of those things are true. Many of the challenges we face are overly defined yet poorly understood. I sometimes quip that while we often define our way into frustration, it is incumbent upon us now to understand our way to greater success. And yet, too often the inertia of history holds us back. Too often, a bias born of situation, position, and emotion serves to cloud our understanding. Too often, our doctrine becomes overly descriptive of how some activity might look or act—or overly fixated on who might participate and why—all while losing sight of what the pure nature of an activity is once freed of these situational characteristics.
The obstacles to change are also significant. Too often, flawed definitions and overly encumbered doctrine are jealously guarded by a wide array of gatekeepers and experts—many holding key positions and serving at the highest levels. Challenges are met with resistance, and this is a form of resistance that typically prevails. But I enjoy a good challenge, so here are ten areas I would address first to help resolve our crisis. The first seven are substantive, related to each other, and fully within the control of SOF leadership. Two are procedural and demand decisions beyond our ranks. The last is simply a friendly piece of advice.
Ten Steps for Setting the Force:
- Clarify our understanding of insurgency.
- Free unconventional warfare from the burdens of our storied past.
- Shift the focus of SOF Intelligence from knowing threats to understanding grievances.
- Empower and employ ODA-level (Operational Detachment-Alpha) operators to identify and develop opportunities.
- Ensure every action is designed to convey an intended narrative through its execution.
- Center the ‘X’ on the minds of our adversaries and focus our effects on that space.
- Campaign persistently and globally, shifting focus as necessity or opportunity presents.
- Free SOF from Service personnel systems, make Special Forces joint to the ODA level.
- Make ‘SOF for life’ a well-funded reality.
- Provide the Regiment with a refined purpose and missions relevant to modern challenges.
Clarify our understanding of insurgency.
The history of insurgency showcases the tremendous diversity of ideologies, forms, and purposes this family of conflict assumes. However, once one gets past the bias of the authors and the overwhelming facts of how every insurgency is unique, a very different picture emerges. Strategy is not found in how these conflicts are all situationally unique, but in how they all rhyme in their shared human nature. In fundamental terms, insurgency is quite simple. Insurgency invariably requires only three factors and comes in two broad yet distinct types. Insurgency must be based within some population perceiving itself in conditions of legally irreconcilable political grievance. Insurgency must be political in its primary purpose. Lastly, insurgency must be illegal under the laws of the governance being challenged. If any one of those factors are missing one is dealing with a completely different form of problem, even if looks and acts in a very similar fashion. But we are not here to treat symptoms, we are here to solve problems.
The two distinct types are internal revolutionary insurgency and external resistance insurgency. The first only differs from democracy in its illegality of action. Revolution is best thought of as an exercise in illegal democracy and cannot be cured or defeated through warfare. The second is the illegal efforts of a population to coerce change upon some external source of governance. This is indeed a form of warfare as it is between two actors rather than within one. Relationships matter. Both forms can, and often do, occur in hybrid form within the same time, space, and populations. Doctrine ignores these distinctions, and policy and strategy failing to account for the unique nature of each is unlikely to succeed. The days of simply suppressing the symptoms of insurgency through some blend of bribery and force (repeating as necessary) are behind us.
Free unconventional warfare from the burdens of our storied past.
In many ways, Unconventional Warfare (UW) is trapped by the exploits of Jedburgh Teams in occupied Europe. Our definition of UW is overly narrow and descriptive. By emphasizing key aspects of historic UW operations, we paint ourselves into a very tight corner of an incredibly broad playing field. We also over-emphasize the most extreme examples of why one might engage in UW. When we speak of denied areas and the overthrowing of foreign regimes, we portray a line of effort that is very easy to say “no” to. As with insurgency, when cast in fundamental terms, UW is simple, powerful, and incredibly flexible in both approach and purpose.
Maj. Gen. William “Wild Bill” Donovan when he headed the Office of Strategic Services. Courtesy CIA archives.
Fundamental UW is any action to leverage the latent or active insurgency within a population governed by another to advance one’s own interests. UW can be employed anywhere there is a political grievance and can be used to foster positive influence, create powerful new lines of deterrence, or disrupt actors like the Islamic State. Yes, it can indeed be employed to coerce or overthrow some foreign regime, but that is perhaps the worst, not best, example. For example, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have conducted UW since inception, and as such are quite resilient to counterterrorism. The credible threat of UW is perhaps the best way to deter the illicit challenges of state actors like China, Russia, or Iran. Ultimately, UW is far more than Jedburghs and Horse Soldiers.
Shift the focus of SOF Intelligence from knowing threats to understanding grievances.
For Special Forces, threats are typically problematic symptoms to manage, and not the actual problem to resolve. The energy in the system, the center of gravity, if you will, is invariably some population perceiving itself to be in conditions of legally irreconcilable political grievance. The special operations intelligence community has become masterful in its analysis of threats and in guiding the reactive, elite, counterterrorism operations that have defined the post-9/11 era. Sustain those skills. Now we need you to shift focus to identifying and understanding political grievances. This is the common operating picture (COP) we need to guide the special operations required to advance and secure our interests today. This needs to be a holistic effort, not just grievance towards adversaries we seek to deter or disrupt, but grievance towards our partners, allies, and ourselves as well.
Treat every operation as an influence operation first.
Empower and employ ODA-level operators to identify and develop opportunities.
High-risk counterterrorism operations demanding vast arrays of enabling capabilities also demanded large footprints, large headquarters, and massive bureaucracies. The insurgency-based, UW operations needed now are executed best through the actions of small teams working among well-understood populations far from bases of military support. Sometimes this will be clandestine and lethal, but most often it will be transparent and benign. Even historic mechanisms like JCETs (Joint, Combined Exchange Training) overly tie our teams to specific partners and locations. Sustain our traditional approaches, but going forward, we must evolve to accept greater risk, employ greater trust, and create innovative mechanisms allowing our forces to get to where they need to be and do what they need to do. Establish the guardrails and permissions, then step back and let our small units amaze us with their energy and creativity.
Ensure every action is designed to convey an intended narrative through its execution.
Treat every operation as an influence operation first. Both as a noun, to foster a relatively positive influence for the US, and as a verb, to clearly convey through actions taken the specific themes tied to the policy goals and strategic focus of a campaign. When we fixate on achieving tactical goals in ways that are clearly contrary to policy goals, our efforts become strategically counterproductive. In past operations, we became incredibly skilled at taking down specific targets, but those operations rarely conveyed strategic themes through their execution, such as the sovereignty of the host nation or the appropriateness of our actions in their country. Unless control of the target is essential, make the narrative the top priority. Our words should echo and reinforce what our actions already said. We burn valuable influence when they are misaligned.
Center the “X” on the minds of our adversaries and focus our effects on that space.
Actions are local, but effects are global. Unlike the conventional force, SOF need not place the “X” on a specific piece of terrain. Ultimately, we are conducting subtle psychological warfare to create negative effects within the minds of adversary leaders. We also operate to foster relative positive influence among friendly audiences, and that too occurs within the minds of a wide range of relevant populations. Free the force from the artificial constraints of terrain. Instead, empower the entire force to pursue challenges and opportunities globally, developing a scalable array of options tailorable to a wide range of potential situations. SOF’s strategic advantage lies in these global efforts to create a thousand doubts in the minds of adversaries, and to foster friendly confidence in equal measures. If war comes, a portion of the force will ride to the sound of the guns – but most of the force should disperse to those globally distributed pockets of adversary-caused grievance, and live large in adversary minds as they wonder what trouble we might cause.
Campaign persistently and globally, shifting focus as necessity or opportunity presents.
Have each Theater SOC coordinate global campaigns for the challenges that manifest within their boundaries, but free the force from those artificial constraints to operate wherever opportunity exists. Indirect approaches and higher-order thinking should dominate SF activities. Global campaign plans and persistent efforts—even if intermittent—are necessary to optimize the efforts of our Special Forces teams. Teams should have specific areas of responsibility that they are free to visit for weeks at a time and multiple times a year, in the pursuit of understanding populations, risks, and opportunities. Ambassadors and senior Commanders around the world should view these grievance-based conversations with our teams as a routine highlight that is essential to informing their broader responsibilities.
Nigerian Armed Forces train convoy operations alongside a 20th SFG Detachment. Courtesy DVIDS, US Army.
Free SOF from Service personnel systems, make Special Forces joint to the ODA level.
Procedurally, SF, like mankind, cannot serve two masters. As the military shrinks, it makes sense to open Army Special Forces to members of every service to volunteer for assessment and selection. Then, once qualified, it also makes sense to separate those soldiers from the rules, standards, and regulations of the conventional force and to place them within full control of a Special Operations personnel system designed to optimize their talent and careers and to empower the force.
Make “SOF for life” a well-funded reality.
This is not a new idea, but it is an unrealized capability. Keep every willing former Special Forces soldier on a small retainer. Maintain a global network and be able to employ them in whatever role they are willing to play. At a minimum, this greatly expands the psychological effects of the force. We’ll let our adversaries worry about what the optimal effects might be. The regular interaction of current ODAs with former/retired SF personnel in an operational context will also help to expand appreciation of what “normal” or “real” special operations consist of.
Provide the Regiment with a refined purpose and missions relevant to modern challenges.
Special Forces work is serious business—but it should also be deeply rewarding. Everyone should aspire to earn the right to wear the Green Beret. Inevitably, some will question why small groups of Special Forces soldiers spend several months a year in relatively unfettered engagements in their respective areas of responsibility. These criticisms often come from a place of misunderstanding or are viewed through a lens shaped by conventional perspectives. Ultimately, we are not the same.
Why are these soldiers entrusted with such operational autonomy while others operate under tighter constraints? The classified answer is that information is “need-to-know.” The unclassified answer is simple: “Apply for selection, and if you have what it takes, you may one day earn the privilege to understand for yourself.”
Conclusion
In conclusion, I do not believe our Special Forces community is suffering a crisis because our soldiers are confused about their identity. I believe we are suffering a crisis of not telling our soldiers what we need them to be and then empowering them accordingly. Too often, we cast as “soldier problems” what are more accurately failures of leadership. This crisis is such a case. Good leaders armed with the certainty of experience and knowledge, and doing things right, brought us to where we currently are. It will be an uncertain path, probing the realms of possibility that take us to where we need to be. Our moral courage, patience, and risk tolerance will be put to the test. Arming leaders with concepts that pass the test of being logical, simple, scalable, repeatable, and helpful will be essential to our success. If we cannot tell our story to those who give us permission to act, we will sit idle or end up doing mundane things.
The reality is that our special operators are frustrated because we send them out year after year on infeasible operations in support of impossible policies. Their sacrifice and tactical successes are squandered. The force is frayed because there is no end to problematic symptoms, and our solutions to address those symptoms invariably serve to exacerbate underlying problems, despite our best efforts. The SOF community is not a victim. It is on us that we didn’t push back against overly conventional perspectives. It is on us that we did not offer and insist upon allowing our SOF experts on population-based conflicts to inform policymakers of what the problem was, rather than the other way around.
T.E. Lawrence famously called for operations that were “more sophisticated than a bayonet charge,” and William “Wild Bill” Donovan sought “Ph.Ds. who could win a bar fight.” From where I sit, we’ve got the right people—we just owe them a little more sophistication and a few less bayonet charges.
