The Red Tumor: The Growth and Persistence of the Naxalite Insurgency and India’s Response
Introduction
Insurgencies have existed throughout history, shaping the dynamics of state governance and stability across various regions. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, an insurgency is a political-military activity involving the control of territory within a country through irregular forces, aimed at weakening a government’s authority while building its own. Common tactics employed by insurgent groups include guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization. The success of insurgencies requires strong morale, effective leadership, supportive infrastructure, and access to a sanctuary. In India, multiple insurgencies are currently operating at varying degrees, with the most well-known being the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) conflict since 1989.
The Naxalite insurgency, also known as the “Maoist” insurgency, has persisted longer than the J&K insurgency and still exists in central and eastern India. Specifically, the Naxals mainly operate in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand, with some presence in Karnataka, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal; collectively called the “Red Corridor.” The Naxalites structure their activities and insurgent ideology around Maoism, a subset of communism characterized by an anti-capitalist stance and a focus on armed revolution. The presence of the Naxalites is driven not merely by a desire to seize land and territory, but to increase control and engage in efforts to disrupt state authority functions. This paper will review and evaluate the effectiveness of the methodologies and strategies employed by the Naxalites in waging the insurgency, as well as the role of the Indian government in its respective counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts.
India’s Relation to Naxalites
Like most Asian states during the 20th century, communism was a growing ideology often found in a post-colonial state. Many took a liking to the ideology based on anti-imperialist sentiment and to push back against the ruling class. In India specifically, the Communist Party of India (CPI), founded in 1925, created a medium to consolidate the communist ideology in India. Peasant rebellion is a familiar occurrence in India, given its history as a colony of the British Empire. The sentiment in support of communism had already existed and persisted even after India achieved independence in 1947. In 1964, following a series of miscalculations and a lack of support from foreign states, such as the Soviet Union, the CPI experienced a schism, with the Communist Party of India (Maoist) (CPI-M) emerging.
The Naxalite insurgency began with the 1967 Naxalbari uprising, in which peasants and lower-caste groups revolted against landowners in India. Led mainly by CPI-M leaders, the rebellion was suppressed, but class tensions persisted. CPI-M leaders utilized peasant grievances to promote armed resistance, which evolved into an insurgency. The failure of the uprising and disappointment over China’s support for Pakistan led to a party split, creating the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). While there are other communist-aligned insurgent groups, the Naxalites, predominantly supported by CPI-M, are a significant group with a larger presence and cooperate with the minor communist groups to achieve their objectives. The organizational structure of the Naxalites is a mixed system, comprising a centralized committee and a localized command structure that grants significant operational autonomy. Leadership typically comes from the educated middle and upper classes, while the majority at the bottom are mostly from lower-income and caste groups.
Naxalite Strategy
As with all insurgencies, there must be some level of strategy in place, either directly or indirectly, to serve as a framework for the insurgents to utilize and follow. For the Naxals, the primary foundation of their insurgency relied upon the discontent of the tribal and lower-class population in rural areas based on their living conditions. For those from the lowest social classes of society, the Naxals were an opportunity to receive better outcomes for their livelihoods. Inspired by the Chinese revolutionary Mao Zedong, the Naxalites have incorporated his concept of “Protracted People’s War” into their doctrine, using it as a framework for their overall strategy. The Naxalites show no interest in democratic practices, preferring actions that undermine the Indian government and aim to overthrow the state to establish a Maoist regime.
Since the 1980s, Naxalite insurgents have attacked various targets, including local infrastructure, government personnel, and law enforcement. Civilians, such as landlords and villagers, are also casualties of the Naxalites under the guise of “class enemies.” The Naxalites have been able to acquire a wide range of weapons, from simple axes to automatic rifles. Other equipment used to support Naxalite operations would also include rocket launchers and homemade improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
It is crucial to recognize that the Naxalite insurgency is not merely carried out through acts of terror or guerrilla tactics against state authorities to maintain visibility. The Naxalites have garnered local support by undertaking development initiatives within the areas they control, thus filling power voids left by the state government’s lack of administrative presence. In such situations, the Naxalites have set up educational centers, community kitchens, medical clinics, and enforced labor laws in line with Mao’s principles. Given the existing burdens on the state judicial system, the Naxalites have also assumed the role of maintaining law and order through “people’s courts,” where cases are expedited with decisions made swiftly.
The Naxal insurgents have, since the onset, fixated a large majority of their operations in the rural areas of central and eastern India, while maintaining an extremely low level of presence in urban environments, primarily for recruitment efforts. The Naxalites have limited sanctuary but exploit the isolation of the surrounding forests to their advantage. There have been minor instances of Naxalites receiving support, both material and funding, from foreign state actors, and as such, they are primarily self-sustaining. Financing for the insurgency mainly stems from membership fees, extortion, the seizure of assets from perceived enemies, and taxes. Naxalites have also been involved in organized crime, such as illegal opium cultivation and distribution. Another aspect of their finances comes from tolls levied against goods and services passing through Naxalite-held roadways.
Insurgency recruitment thrives on the local populace’s discontent with the state. This discontent allows the Naxalites to recruit from rural villages to join their cadre, and it has been a problem for the Indian government since the 1980s. Chronic poverty, hunger, and economic exploitation by landlords have significantly fueled support for the Naxalites. Caste discrimination has resulted in individuals from rural areas becoming marginalized by mainstream society. This ongoing issue remains inadequately addressed by the Indian government and has played a significant role in the general recruitment and provided some legitimacy for the insurgency. Furthermore, the government’s mismanagement of implementing natural resource development projects utilizes land considered sacred by the various tribes.
Reports indicated that in some regions, the Naxalites have been increasingly recruiting tribal youth to join the insurgency, in which they provide training for combat and creating IEDs. Additionally, the instructors of these camps would emphasize ideological development to supplement their training in guerrilla warfare. These young recruits would also be used for intelligence gathering purposes, given that law enforcement entities do not suspect the youth as much for Naxalite activities. In some instances, villagers in Naxalite-controlled territory are pressured by the insurgents to hand over youths, with the threat of forceful removal from their land. However, the recruitment of youths has been limited as the present environment is favorable for the insurgents to implement their recruitment strategy on a grand scale.
Indian Government Response to the Naxalites
Elements of an effective COIN strategy are categorized into two key areas: shaping the environment and defeating the insurgents. Shaping the environment involves providing a pathway to change through peaceful means, all while committing sufficient resources and isolating the conflict area to prevent spillovers. Defeating the insurgents is challenging due to various components, including maintaining pressure on the insurgents, utilizing local intelligence resources, and cutting off insurgent supply lines. What also plays a role in decreasing the effectiveness of insurgents is offering amnesty to members of insurgent groups by providing an opportunity to surrender and reintegrating them into society without the harsh punishments associated with captured insurgents.
Generally, the Indian government’s approach to COIN has varied between parties in power. Still, the overall theme revolves around an alternative perspective of COIN in comparison to the Western COIN doctrine, which emphasizes “winning hearts and minds” among the population in affected areas. As demonstrated by the Indian government, the strategy of attrition involves the use of state-to-non-state actor coercion and prioritizing enemy-centric campaigns to saturate insurgent forces. With this, the Indian government may deploy the military under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). AFSPA permits military forces to make arrests preventively, search private property without warrants, and lower rules of engagement thresholds. It is a key part of India’s counterinsurgency, militarizing local law enforcement and enabling kinetic operations in insurgent areas.
Despite India’s distinctive approach to COIN in an effort to manage the Naxalite insurgency, they have still adopted several components of Western COIN doctrine, such as winning the local support for its mission. The combination of strategies has provided India the flexibility of dealing with the insurgents while also trying to address the disenfranchisement of tribal communities. By incorporating a more holistic approach through initiatives, the Indian government can secure stability and security for the local populace. Such initiatives entail ongoing investment in development projects to sway rural communities towards the government and divert support from the Naxalites. The 2013 Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana-IV (PMGSY4) roadway project is a notable example. The rural regions have posed challenges for the Indian government in transporting resources and personnel to areas under the influence of the Naxal movement. Additionally, local populations often struggle to access nearby resources. Consequently, the PMGSY4 initiative was designed by the government to enhance accessibility to regions affected by Naxalite activity, facilitating not only the movement of security forces but also enabling rural residents to use these roadways to reach essential services.
Professional training programs that address the shortage of employment opportunities and educational resources have provided youth from tribal backgrounds with a sense of social and economic mobility. Over the course of three years, the Roshni initiative focused on cultivating essential workplace skills for both men and women aged 18 to 35 from tribal communities in Naxalite-affected areas. To boost employment opportunities, the government established around 130 residential schools for tribal children, aiming to provide better access to quality education. Another initiative aimed at youth is the Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan, which emphasizes increasing outreach and involvement in community development for tribal youth in rural areas. All these programs enacted by the central government provide a means of limiting Naxalite recruitment among the tribal youth.
State governments have established specialized paramilitary units to support the central government’s efforts against Naxalite insurgents. By prioritizing specialized units for COIN missions, states gain a strategic advantage. Specific training programs have been introduced for these units to enhance their effectiveness in fighting insurgents. Inspired by the Rashtriya Rifles of Jammu and Kashmir, the Greyhounds were formed from the police departments of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Other states formed COIN-specific units within their police departments. Odisha formed the Special Operations Group, and West Bengal created the Counter-Insurgency Force. As states incorporated COIN strategies into police efforts, the central government established a COIN unit within the Central Reserve Police Force called the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action, or CoBRA.
The Indian government, both at the central and state levels, has encouraged villagers in Naxalite-affected areas to create and join localized militias and political movements to assist COIN efforts by security forces. The government also provides financial awards for tips that lead to the arrest of insurgents. Typically, the militia is composed of former Naxalite members and individuals who harbor contempt for the insurgents, primarily due to the murders and other atrocities committed by the Naxalites. In addition to this, to reduce the number of Naxalite insurgents, the government has implemented a comprehensive strategy for offering amnesty to deserters. Typically, this involves full cooperation, providing information about Naxalite activities, providing a “way out” for insurgents, and diminishing the appeal of joining the insurgency.
Evaluation of India’s Naxalite COIN Strategy
Since the beginning of the Naxalite insurgency, the Indian central government, in collaboration with state governments, has achieved notable success. However, the overall outcomes of these efforts have yielded mixed results. The largely adversarial operations conducted by state and central authorities have resulted in significant tactical advancements, including a decline in Naxalite influence in affected regions and the elimination of key insurgent leaders. However, the limitations in coordination between state and central agencies, coupled with an emphasis on an enemy-centric approach for many years, have not provided adequate socio-economic support for rural communities. Some argue that this neglect has continued to fuel the root causes of the insurgency due to persistent local issues and grievances. After 2010, however, the central government’s commitment to implementing a holistic approach helped mitigate the worst aspects of fighting the insurgency.
Nonetheless, the number of Naxalite-affected districts has substantially reduced from 126 to about 18 between its peak in the 2000s. In 2024, the total number of affected districts further decreased to six. While the districts impacted by the insurgency have diminished, a few critical areas within Chhattisgarh remain. The Indian government has implemented additional measures to prevent the resurgence of insurgents in the cleared zones within the districts. States like Bihar, Jharkhand, and Odisha have seen a near-total elimination of Naxalite presence. Andhra and Telangana have also experienced a decrease in insurgent activity. In terms of total deaths, a 70% reduction was noted among both security personnel and civilians.
Civilian casualties have been a notable issue for the security forces, as the extrajudicial powers invested in paramilitary troops have come under intense scrutiny. AFSPA’s provision on the expanded powers has not come without controversy, as the legal framework revolving around AFSPA often protects government forces involved in civilian deaths. At times, accusations of “fake encounters” have devalued government efforts in COIN operations. Already with the grievances and difficulties the rural population faces, the abuse inflicted by government forces provides an opportunity for recruitment into the insurgency, which may hinder ongoing COIN efforts.
Decades of efforts have shown some success in government strategies, but collaboration still faces issues. The central government primarily leads COIN efforts covertly, providing resources such as manpower, funding, intelligence, and strategy to state governments. Although the decentralized approach gave states flexibility in COIN, the variability among states created challenges. For example, if state A took an extreme, hardline, enemy-centric approach, and state B, a neighboring state, did not take similar actions, the Naxalites would likely seek sanctuary in State B and continue operations from there. Although the differences between state approaches have been significantly reduced due to the measures implemented by the central government.
Conclusion
The debate surrounding the COIN strategy and pathways for addressing insurgencies has been contentious over the past few decades, with many scholars and practitioners disagreeing on the most effective methodologies for managing insurgencies. India, like other Asian countries, is currently tackling various insurgencies within its borders. Regarding the adoption of adequate COIN strategies, India has neither outrightly rejected the Western COIN doctrine nor fully embraced it. India’s efforts to curb the Naxalite insurgency have demonstrated its adaptability to deal with a dynamic environment. Naxalites have been able to exploit the discontent of low-income and low-caste populations from villages in rural settings. By seizing the power vacuum left by the neglect of state authorities, the Naxalites have been able to wage a deadly insurgency against the Indian government, with the end goal of overthrowing the state itself.
Despite the root cause affecting vulnerable populations, the Naxalites have not managed to force India to be fully present at the negotiating table. Instead, that leverage diminished following the transition from a solely enemy-centric COIN doctrine to one incorporating a population-centric component. Since implementing various initiatives and projects aimed at breaking down the isolation barriers faced by neglected communities, the Naxalites have struggled to maintain a strong level of resistance. The current COIN approach in place by the Indian government is likely to remain. However, a much stronger emphasis should be placed on encouraging more localized projects to fill in the governance gap in the Naxalite-affected areas. Specifically, projects that promote education and employment opportunities for tribal communities would further contribute to the Indian government’s success.
