From Berlin to Pyongyang: Principles for Humanitarian Influence Operations

Abstract

This article compares the environments of West Berlin in 1948 to modern-day North Korea, with a focus on humanitarian abuses and the information environment. The author posits that humanitarian assistance can be leveraged as an effective psychological influence operation, drawing on the principles and successes of the Berlin Airlift. Policy and strategy recommendations are made for applying these principles to North Korea in 2025 and beyond.

Introduction

North Korea, under the Kim family regime, has suffered decades of humanitarian abuses, with nearly half the population undernourished and millions dead from famine and starvation. Despite the crisis facing his people, Kim Jong-Un has pursued nuclear ambitions over care for his citizens and utilizes sweeping propaganda campaigns to retain his grip on power in the DPRK. The West, in response, has sought to approach the North Korean problem set in a wide spectrum of ways in recent history. For example, the U.S., South Korea, and other nations have experimented with strict approaches (sanctions and military force) and more conciliatory efforts (humanitarian assistance and the multilateral ‘Six-Party’ talks) to reign in the DPRK’s nuclear program, but to no avail. If the West seeks to make progress in stabilizing the Korean peninsula, policymakers must consider different means of applying pressure to the DPRK. One potential avenue could be through targeted influence operations aimed at the population of North Korea; specifically, pro-Western messaging delivered via humanitarian assistance.

While difficult to accomplish, the goal of influencing a starving population in a closed society is not untrodden territory for Western policymakers. For example, in 1948, the Soviet Union attempted to use hunger as a political maneuver by shutting off food, water, and energy support to the citizens of West Berlin, Germany, with the aim of turning the populace against the Western bloc. In response, Western allies, including the United States and Great Britain, airlifted humanitarian supplies into West Berlin for nearly a year, providing critical food, water, and medical aid to the struggling population. In addition to humanitarian support, the Berlin Airlift provided a unique psychological benefit to the citizens of West Berlin that had impact when reunification occurred half a century later. The integration of principles from the Berlin Airlift into modern North Korea policy offers a powerful influence tool to undermine the Kim regime while simultaneously addressing the grave humanitarian issues in the DPRK.

The Berlin Airlift: A Case Study

On June 24, 1948, the Soviet Union blockaded the land routes leading into Allied-occupied West Berlin, cutting off supplies of food, water, and fuel, seeking to consolidate power in the city and absorb it into the Soviet-occupied territory of East Germany. The crisis arose from tensions between the occupying powers and disagreement as to the implementation of post-war governance plans by the various involved parties. Recognizing that the Soviet Union sought to influence the civilian population and force them to reject the Allied occupation, the U.S. and Great Britain launched Operation Vittles and Operation Plainfare with the goal of providing humanitarian supplies to the citizenry while simultaneously showing goodwill and securing political support for the Allies. The psychological reaction weighed heavily in planning; General Lucius Clay famously wanted “assurance that the people will be heavily in approval” before launching the operation. Believing in the Berliners’ will to resist Soviet oppression, the first deliveries of the Airlift launched on June 26, 1948.

Over the next year, Allied aircraft delivered over two million tons of humanitarian assistance to West Berlin. In addition to critical supplies, the operation provided psychological benefits that benefited the Allies. First, the combined efforts of Allied forces demonstrated commitment and resolve to the citizens of West Berlin; notably, Operation Little Vittles leveraged “candy bombers” that would drop candy for the children of West Berlin, which humanized the Allied effort and presented a narrative to challenge Soviet propaganda. Moreover, memoirs from residents of West Berlin during the Airlift reflect the sentiment that the Allies stood by Berlin in a time of crisis for the sake of “freedom and democracy”. In one of the most public displays of support for the airlift, nearly 300,000 citizens gathered in protest of the Soviets’ actions, despite heavy-handed propaganda blaming the West for the blockade. The efforts of the Allied approach to the crisis – humanitarian assistance transformed into an influence operation – solidified a positive view of the West in the eyes of the Berliners and paved the way for a smoother reunification process in the 1990s. This approach contains myriad lessons that can inform a similar approach to influencing the situation on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea in 2025: Humanitarian Crisis and Regime Propaganda

Akin to Cold War-era West Berlin, North Korea finds itself in a state of starvation under a repressive government and barraged by anti-Western propaganda, all for the sake of the regime’s consolidation of power. Beginning with the fall of the Soviet Union and exacerbated by a widespread famine, North Korea has faced three decades of lasting food insecurity. Estimates of North Koreans who died during the “Arduous March”, the period of famine from 1995-2000, range from 240,000 to 3.5 million and nearly half of the population in 2025 is considered undernourished. While various government and non-governmental organizations have contributed vast amount of humanitarian assistance, the regime fails to follow transparency regulations and siphons the supplies for the elites, stripping off markings identifying the assistance and claiming credit for themselves. As a result, North Koreans turn to alternative food sources or trade commodities such as rice on the black market. Even so, the regime continues to leverage larger foreign assistance shipments to extort loyalty from the populace, thus perpetuating its control over the country.

Moreover, Kim seeks to place the blame for self-imposed problems squarely on the shoulders of the West. Via propaganda, the relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons is sold as a response to imperialist aggression, and famine is merely a ‘food shortage’ resulting from improper adherence to regime doctrines. By allowing only minimal access to information through strict controls on media consumption (only state-run radio and television channels are legal), DPRK-internal internet use, and DPRK-only cell phone networks, the government can amplify its own narratives while limiting external sources of information from other countries. However, some outside information trickles in from South Korea and China via radio, foreign cell phone networks, and digital materials smuggled into the country.

Cross-border short-wave radio broadcasts have been a staple of counter-DPRK information operations for decades, with some of the most popular programming including stories from defectors sharing messages about their new lives abroad. Moreover, recent increases in access to computers, phones, and tablets have allowed for digital media to enter the DPRK. SD cards and USB sticks smuggled into the country and sold on the black market, at the rate of tens of thousands per year, are one of the most popular means of accessing Western books, movies, music, and television shows. This has greatly increased the knowledge of the outside world across North Korea, and while a TV show may not be enough to single-handedly encourage defection or revolution, it does present a unique opportunity to shape perceptions of the West amongst the populace. Leveraging digital media can be used to amplify awareness of humanitarian assistance and further shape positive sentiment towards the West while drawing the citizenry out from under the thumb of their oppressors. Despite occurring in the pre-digital age, the Berlin Airlift’s principles can still be applied in the more modern North Korea.

Comparative Analysis: Berlin Airlift vs. North Korea’s Humanitarian Landscape

Similarities abound between the current North Korean situation and West Berlin in the 1940s. Both scenarios feature an oppressive government leveraging hunger and humanitarian abuses as a means of political control, with substantial propaganda campaigns supporting the regime’s party line. Political tensions in the global arena make each situation incredibly sensitive, with escalation to nuclear conflict a very pressing risk. Finally, both scenarios include external Western actors seeking to aid the affected populace while hoping to undermine regime messaging with their own narratives.

That said, the DPRK problem set presents many differences from Berlin that make humanitarian influence operations more challenging. First, North Korea’s extreme isolation makes it burdensome to deliver supplies, ensure their delivery to the intended recipients, and to use assistance as a means of messaging to the rest of the populace. West Berlin was an area that Allied forces could easily access. North Korea, on the other hand, has exercised complete control over its borders for seventy years, all while promoting an anti-Western narrative at every possible opportunity. Coupled with the challenges of delivering assistance in the first place, strong anti-Western sentiments may present a psychological barrier to changing perceptions, even if assistance is provided and attributed to Western partners.

All considered, the following key takeaways from the Berlin Airlift could inform a humanitarian assistance-focused campaign to influence attitudes and perceptions towards North Korea:

• The combination of logistical assistance and messaging should seek to directly address the needs of the North Korean populace. While large-scale assistance may be impossible, rice, medication, or other health or dietary supplements could provide an economical inroad to messaging opportunities. Themes to emphasize in such an operation could include the beneficence of the West and willingness to assist the people of North Korea, or how the populace can rely on each other and external actors for survival, but not the government.
• This project should be undertaken by multiple state- and non-state actors for maximum effect. Much of the benefit provided by the Berlin Airlift came from the perception of the Western bloc as an allied, cohesive conglomerate. Rather than seeing assistance from the American government alone and assuming imperialist intent, seeing a push from multiple nations and NGOs could assuage skepticism and make the messaging more palatable.
• Finally, delivery of assistance should be consistent and easily attributable to the source, which historically has been hampered by the DPRK’s unwillingness to comply with international assistance regulations. Delivering organizations should limit assistance amounts and types to those that can be provided on a regular schedule and with minimal interference by the regime. This may mean exploring nonstandard approaches to assistance delivery, such as smuggling across borders or working with other entities that have access to the country. While this will limit the overall quantity of assistance that can be delivered, that should not deter policymakers from leveraging this approach. Indeed, the effectiveness of Operation Little Vittles – in terms of psychological impact – demonstrates that even small offerings, like candy for children, can have a disproportionately large effect in comparison to their cost. In the North Korean context, deliveries of snacks or medication can have a similar impact; the Choco-Pie black market run from the Kaesong Industrial Complex is a perfect application of these principles. Moreover, the goodwill of the delivering organization must be readily apparent and the primary focus of narrative development. The emphasis must be on trust-building, rather than anti-regime messaging that could alienate the population. While some information regarding the government’s willingness to let its people starve is certainly called for, it should be delivered carefully, and only once global goodwill has been more strongly established. Simply promoting a more positive view of the West will serve to challenge Kim’s authority without the need to explicitly attack the government in messaging.

Strategic Applications for North Korea in 2025

Policymakers seeking to approach the North Korea problem-set in a way similar to the Berlin Airlift must translate Cold War lessons into modern-day solutions. Rather than an influx of military aircraft, drones and balloons can be leveraged to deliver supplies and messages to areas close to the borders, both from South Korea and China. To penetrate more deeply into the country, grassroots networks of smugglers regularly bring foreign supplies and materials to the North Korean black market and can reach otherwise inaccessible areas.

As mentioned above, the messaging that accompanies supplies should most heavily emphasize Western support for the North Korean population and provide a sense of solidarity with their humanitarian struggles. Only once a higher degree of trust has been built will the population be receptive to messaging that highlights regime failures in a more explicit light. Of course, such a campaign does not come without risk; any action by the international community that Kim perceives as threatening to the regime runs a risk of escalation and retaliation, which often comes in the form of military demonstrations or withdrawal from international discussion. However, Kim tends to take this approach regardless of whether the West concedes to his desires; the risk of inaction in this regard outweighs the risk of action. There is also a risk that the government cracks down on and punishes those who distribute and receive the assistance shipments, but historically, this approach has been minimally deterrent. The sheer number of individuals who regularly consume illegal Western media is a testament to this point.

Finally, the West should keep strategic goals in mind when approaching humanitarian assistance. As mentioned, the DPRK has historically accepted assistance while walking back on diplomatic promises made in exchange. Any assistance program should be considered for its ability to open avenues to build the population’s relationship with the West, rather than purely humanitarian reasons that the regime could exploit. The benefits of this approach are numerous; as mentioned previously, building goodwill with the citizens of North Korea offers a counter-messaging opportunity against regime propaganda and sets conditions for a more Western-friendly cognitive environment during a potential conflict or reunification. Even if tensions remain below the threshold of conflict, any societal shifts away from the Kim regime force the government to adjust their strategy, which, at the very least, could mean better humanitarian outcomes, if not larger-scale political benefits. Secondly, coordinated efforts between multiple governments and non-governmental organizations elevate readiness in the case of conflict, regime collapse, or reunification. These entities must have standing relationships to allow them to work together effectively, and cannot be expected to form them once a crisis emerges. This legwork must be done as early as possible. The best means to accomplish this is working towards smaller, more achievable targets on the way to larger goals, building coordination efforts, and developing multilateral relationships now rather than later.

Conclusion

In the 1940s, the Allied approach to the Soviet blockade presented a blueprint for the use of humanitarian assistance as a tool for influence operations. Now, the same principles present an opportunity to alleviate human suffering and degrade the iron grip of the North Korean government on its people. Kim perceives the citizens of his country as a great threat that must be contained, and by providing critical assistance alongside targeted messaging, the West can begin to slowly turn North Koreans away from their oppressors. As the population’s sentiment towards the rest of the world warms in association with the assistance, their perception of their government will cool in response. In a crisis or reunification scenario, a population that is more amenable to the West will pose less resistance, be better poised to support new governing efforts, and ultimately be a key component of the conditions required for a safe, stable Korean peninsula. While a humanitarian influence campaign akin to the Berlin Airlift will not be the solve-all solution to the North Korean problem, it will be a strategically beneficial step in a direction that makes the world safer from the threat posed by the Kim regime.