Al-Qaeda’s Growing Shadow in Africa: The Expanding Operational Reach of JNIM and Al-Shabaab
More than twenty years after the start of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), questions persist about how much jihadist organizations have actually been weakened. While the absence of large-scale terrorist attacks on U.S. soil since 9/11 is often viewed as a sign of success, this superficial calm masks the ongoing growth of jihadist networks worldwide. Al-Qaeda and ISIS-affiliated groups have not only survived but, in many regions, have adapted and expanded their operations. For example, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), linked with Al-Qaeda, remains one of the most active insurgent groups in South Asia. ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) has carried out deadly attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Syria, Al-Qaeda-linked Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has taken control of the country, aiming to present itself as a legitimate and moderate government. Meanwhile, other ISIS branches stay active in Syria, Somalia, Nigeria, and across the Sahel. Notably, Al-Qaeda’s two African affiliates—Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in the Sahel and Al-Shabaab in East Africa—continue to demonstrate operational resilience, expanding their territorial influence and tactical capabilities despite ongoing counterterrorism efforts by weak or fragmented local governments. This evolving threat landscape has serious implications for global security. As Western focus shifts elsewhere, the continued growth of jihadist groups risks destabilizing key regions and creating new safe havens for terrorism, challenges that could ultimately resurface on a global scale.
Al-Shabaab and JNIM: Origins, Ideology, and Regional Impact
Al-Shabaab, which means “The Youth” in Arabic, appeared in the early 2000s as the militant youth branch of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a coalition of Sharia courts that briefly ran southern Somalia in 2006. After Ethiopian forces and the U.S.-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) removed the ICU, Al-Shabaab grew into an independent insurgency. It first gained local support by promising stability and enforcing Sharia law during widespread chaos, then quickly expanded its operations and influence. In 2012, Al-Shabaab officially pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, aligning itself with the global jihadist movement. Despite losing territory and suffering significant leadership kills—most notably the death of leader Ahmed Abdi Godane in 2014—Al-Shabaab has proven to be highly adaptable. Retreating into rural areas, the group has adopted guerrilla tactics, enhanced its propaganda, and continued launching deadly attacks.
Al-Shabaab’s operations are driven by a Salafi-jihadist ideology that advocates a strict interpretation of Sharia law and seeks to eliminate secular and Western influences from Muslim societies. The group depicts its struggle in apocalyptic terms and enforces strict codes of conduct in areas it controls, often through public punishments and religious school indoctrination. These tactics help Al-Shabaab maintain a strong ideological grip on its members and recruits while also spreading narratives that align with global jihadist discourses.
Al-Shabaab’s operational footprint is concentrated in southern and central Somalia, where it exploits weak governance, clan rivalries, and ungoverned spaces to maintain influence. Although it has lost control of key urban centers like Mogadishu, the group continues to thrive in rural regions such as Jubaland, Bay, and Lower Shabelle by establishing shadow administrations, collecting taxes, and administering a parallel justice system. Beyond Somalia, Al-Shabaab has established a presence in northeastern Kenya and has carried out attacks in Uganda, demonstrating its ability to project power regionally. Its primary objective remains the establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia governed by its interpretation of Sharia law, coupled with the expulsion of foreign military forces such as those under the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Al-Shabaab also seeks to expand jihadist ideology across East Africa and align its regional struggle with the broader objectives of global jihadist networks, thereby justifying attacks beyond Somalia’s borders and enhancing its recruitment strategies across the region.
JNIM was established in 2017 as a coalition formed through the merger of four Islamic extremist groups: Ansar al-Din, al-Murabitun, the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), and the Sahara Emirate, a subsidiary of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Led by its founder and emir, Iyad ag Ghali, JNIM pledged allegiance to AQIM, positioning itself as the second largest al-Qaeda affiliate in Africa, after al-Shabaab in Somalia. The coalition is notable for its ethnic and geographic diversity, including militants from Tuareg, Fulani, Arab, and other groups. Since its formation, JNIM has carried out a sustained campaign of violence targeting regional governments, foreign military forces, and rival jihadist factions, consolidating its influence within the Sahel region.
JNIM’s operational reach primarily covers the central Sahel and West Africa, with early strongholds in northern and central Mali. However, its influence now extends across several countries, including Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo, demonstrating how it has evolved from a local group into a widespread terrorist network with objectives across littoral West Africa. Ideologically, JNIM adheres to Salafi-jihadism aligned with al-Qaeda’s global goal of establishing Islamic Sharia law. The organization perceives Western presence and Sahelian governments allied with foreign powers as illegitimate and oppressive, opposing them as tools of neo-colonialism and moral decline. Its ideological stance also pits it against the Islamic State in the Sahel, highlighting intra-jihadist rivalry based on differing theological views.
JNIM’s main goal is to unite terrorist groups across the Sahel and create an Islamic state centered in Mali by removing Western military forces and destabilizing regional governments. This goal is achieved through both ideological unity and tactical alliances that balance the independence of different factions with shared strategic objectives. The coalition’s ability to bring together various groups with local interests under a broader jihadist framework has helped it stay cohesive while expanding its territory and influence. JNIM’s hostility toward the West is a key driver, viewing Western influence as a form of neo-colonial domination that it opposes through ongoing militant activities aimed at reshaping the political landscape in the Sahel region.
Metrics of Militancy: A Comparative Analysis of Al-Shabaab and JNIM
Al-Shabaab and JNIM have consistently ranked among the ten most active terrorist organizations worldwide in recent years. Between January 2018 and July 2025, both groups were responsible for hundreds of attacks across Africa, playing a significant role in driving regional instability, according to data from the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC), funded by the U.S. Department of State.
As shown in Figure 1, Al-Shabaab’s operational tempo peaked in 2018 with 535 attacks, then gradually declined in subsequent years. The group carried out 477 attacks in 2020, which decreased to 290 in 2021. This decline aligns with successful military operations by U.S. forces and the Somali National Army. The number of attacks further dropped to 248 in 2022 and 242 in 2023, with a slight increase to 262 in 2024.
In contrast, JNIM’s activity has shown a more fluctuating yet upward trajectory. After a relatively lower number of attacks between 2018 and 2020, the group gained momentum starting in 2021, with 177 attacks. This number rose sharply to 362 in 2022, 369 in 2023, and reached its highest level in 2024 with 474 attacks. JNIM’s expansion has been facilitated by political instability, especially in the wake of recent coup attempts in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali. These power vacuums enabled JNIM to extend its operations from Mali into Burkina Faso and Niger, where the group conducted a growing number of attacks in both 2023 and 2024.
Figure 1: Attacks by Al-Shabaab and JNIM (2018-2024)
Figure 2 displays the total casualties—both wounded and killed—caused by attacks from JNIM and Al-Shabaab between 2021 and 2024. As expected, the casualty numbers closely align with the number of attacks, showing a strong positive relationship between attack frequency and the number of people affected. Overall, the more attacks there are, the higher the number of casualties.
Al-Shabaab’s attacks from 2021 to 2024 resulted in about 2,000 casualties, showing a relatively steady but still significant level of violence. In contrast, JNIM’s growing operational capacity during the same period caused a sharp increase in casualties. In 2024 alone, JNIM was responsible for 4,609 people killed or wounded—the highest annual total for the group during this time. This spike coincides with the group’s expanding presence across the Sahel and its increasing ability to take advantage of regional instability.
Figure 2: Casualties caused by al Shabab and JNIM (2018-2024)
Figure 3 illustrates the number of attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab that targeted government and military personnel compared to those targeting civilians between 2018 and 2024. As a de facto governing entity in some of the territories it controls, Al-Shabaab operates within an ideological framework consistent with al-Qaeda’s “near enemy” doctrine, which prioritizes attacks against domestic state structures over civilian populations. Consequently, the group has consistently directed more attacks against government and military targets than civilians throughout this period. This trend reflects its strategic objective of weakening state institutions and security forces. The number of such attacks peaked in 2024, marking the highest level over the past three years and underscoring Al-Shabaab’s continued focus on undermining governmental authority and asserting control over contested regions.
Figure 3: Number of Al-Shabaab Attacks Targeting Government, Military, and Civilians (2018-2024)
Figure 4 shows the distribution of JNIM attacks targeting government, military, and civilian populations between 2018 and 2024. Unlike Al-Shabaab, JNIM has conducted more attacks on military facilities and has also caused significant civilian casualties. Although the group has aimed to act as a de facto authority in parts of the Sahel, its operational strategy reflects both tactical and ideological changes. At first, JNIM followed a “hearts and minds” approach, trying to gain local support by avoiding civilian targets and presenting itself as a protector against foreign influence. However, the recent increase in attacks on civilians indicates a strategic shift. This trend may be a punishment for communities seen as unsupportive of the group, showing a broader shift in al-Qaeda’s strategy in the Sahel. The rise in violence targeting civilians highlights the difficulties JNIM faces in balancing governance goals with coercive control.
Figure 4: Number of JNIM Attacks on Government, Military, and Civilians (2018-2024)
Figure 5 illustrates the predominant weapon types used by Al-Shabaab and JNIM between 2018 and 2024, highlighting a consistent reliance on firearms, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and other explosive-based attacks. For Al-Shabaab, firearms constituted the most frequently used weapon category from 2018 to 2022, followed closely by IEDs. However, a notable shift occurred beginning in 2022, with bombing attacks—categorized under explosives—surpassing firearms as the primary method of attack through 2024. This transition may reflect a strategic adaptation aimed at increasing lethality, targeting density, or operational efficiency, particularly in urban and semi-urban environments where such tactics can produce higher casualties and broader psychological impact.
Figure 5: The Number of Attacks by Al-Shabaab Using Firearms, IEDs, and Explosives from 2018 to 2024.
Figure 6 demonstrates a distinct pattern in JNIM’s weapon usage compared to Al-Shabaab, with a clear and consistent preference for firearms across most of its attacks from 2019 to 2024. While IEDs and other explosive-based attacks were most prominent in 2018, firearms quickly became the dominant weapon type in subsequent years. This sustained reliance on firearms may be attributed to several factors, including the relative ease of access to small arms, JNIM’s geographic proximity to Libya—a known hub for small arms trafficking—and the group’s increasing use of ambush tactics targeting military convoys and installations. Furthermore, the frequent use of firearms in attacks resulting in civilian casualties suggests a deliberate choice of weaponry suited to close-range engagements and intimidation tactics. The noticeable decline in IED usage between 2022 and 2024 may reflect a tactical shift away from roadside bombings and toward more direct assaults on military facilities, aligning with JNIM’s broader strategy of undermining state security forces through targeted engagements.
Figure 6: The Number of Attacks by Al-Shabaab Using Firearms, IEDs, and Explosives from 2018 to 2024.
To conclude, al-Qaeda has greatly expanded its operational capacity in Africa through its regional affiliates—Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa and JNIM in the Sahel. These developments follow al-Qaeda’s broader ideological and strategic momentum, especially after perceived victories in Afghanistan with the return of the Taliban and in Syria through Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Al-Shabaab has kept a consistent level of activity in recent years, regularly targeting military and government personnel with IEDs and explosives. Meanwhile, JNIM has rapidly increased its operations, especially since 2021, taking advantage of political instability and weak governance in the Sahel, and increasingly attacking civilians with firearms. Despite ongoing counterterrorism efforts, both groups have shown remarkable resilience, adapting to changing conditions and maintaining their operational capabilities. Given these trends, it is likely that al-Qaeda will continue to sustain—and possibly strengthen—its presence across Africa in the near future.
It is crucial for the U.S. government to pay closer attention to al-Qaeda’s growth in Africa. This expansion is driven by the spread of Salafi-jihadist ideology, worsening political and economic grievances, and the rise of post-coup governments in the Sahel that increasingly align with Russia and the Wagner Group. As al-Qaeda deepens its roots in these regions, Africa could become a more stable base for planning transnational attacks, expanding recruitment, and undermining U.S. interests abroad.
