The Mobile Command Post: Allowing the Commander to Command

Abstract:

Military Command, Control, and Communications systems have become increasingly complex as the military has scaled its intent for increasing joint operations. While these systems have been designed with good intent, evidence has shown that too much technology and information is both difficult to adopt at scale and can slow down operational tempo when it doesn’t work properly – which is likely in conflict. To solve this, this article has defined the principles of a modular (based on mission set), light, and sustainable Mobile Command Post that leverages currently-approved communication devices and vehicles to create an edge-based tactical command node. The intent is purely to unburden the unit commander from technology complexity and put that burden on the technology itself by using AI/autonomy-infused radios, sensors, and systems in one light command vehicle. This generates speed of decision-making and operations unseen in warfare.

The Wakeup Call Was 22 Years Ago:

In March 2003, a young, inexperienced US Army company commander unknowingly veered off course. The commander’s unit was supporting the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s push toward Nasiriyah. But a wrong turn off Highway 8 placed them directly on Highway 7—into the heart of the city and into the jaws of a waiting Iraqi Army ambush.

The young officer realized the mistake only after passing the Al-Quds News Headquarters, a landmark not listed in his planning materials. Minutes later, the convoy was engulfed in small arms, rockets, mortar, and tank fire. Eleven American soldiers were killed. Six were captured. The firefight lasted 30 minutes before Alpha Company of the 2nd MEB, led by USMC Major Bill Peoples, arrived to rescue the survivors.

This wasn’t just a tragic navigation error. It was a failure of command-and-control systems—a breakdown in connectivity, interoperability, and technological readiness. The Army company was the last in a 600-vehicle convoy. Mechanical issues had slowed them down, separating them from the main force and cutting them off from higher headquarters. The Marines they were supporting operated on a different frequency and network. The officer’s only tools were a CD-ROM mission plan, a SINCGARS radio that lost power, and a handheld Garmin GPS—which was jammed as soon as contact was made.

The company was alone. In enemy territory. Under fire. And their command-and-control technology had failed them.

The systems the company commander relied on were not interoperable. They were not sustainable. And they were not intuitive enough to support him in the chaos of combat. The GPS became a glorified compass, and the CD-ROM was useless once they were lost. The fog of war descended—and the very tools meant to guide the unit became obstacles. This is not just a story from the past; it is a warning for the future.

Today’s company commander faces an even more daunting technological landscape. Instead of a handful of systems, he must manage dozens—multiple radios, mesh networks, SATCOM, GPS, CPUs running joint planning software, mobile power systems, and more. All of it must function in contested environments, under constant surveillance, and often while under fire. When it doesn’t, he’s left troubleshooting a digital maze while trying to lead troops in combat.

It takes six months—or more—for organizations to adapt to new technologies. How can we expect our commanders to remain competent in an environment that changes by the week? We must ask ourselves: Are we equipping our tactical leaders to win, or are we burying them in complexity?

This article offers two solutions, not sweeping reforms, but practical corrections:

1. Operational: A restructured Tactical Command Post (TAC) model that reduces footprint, increases mobility, and empowers commanders to lead without being tethered to fragile systems.
2. Technological: A Mobile Command Post (MCP) that is fast, modular, and software-defined—built for maneuver, survivability, simplicity, and (eventually), autonomy.

The story of the Nasiriyah ambush is not just history; it’s a mirror. And if we don’t act, it may become prophecy.

These are not radical ideas. They are necessary corrections to a system that has drifted too far from the realities of modern warfare. If we want our commanders to win, we must give them tools that work with them, not against them. We must ensure they can lead when the network fails, when the systems crash, and when the enemy is watching.

This is a wake-up call. Not just for the Army, but for every stakeholder in national defense. The tactical edge is where wars are won—and right now, it’s overloaded, overexposed, and under-supported.

The Problem – Technology Saturation and Tactical Overload in Joint Force Operations:

As mentioned, research has shown that organizations require a minimum of six months to effectively adopt new technologies—often longer when the systems are complex or the operational environment is dynamic. In today’s era of exponential technological advancement, that lag in adoption is no longer just inefficient—it’s potentially catastrophic. For the U.S. Army, particularly in the context of joint force entry operations, this delay could have existential consequences.

This raises a critical question: Are our doctrinal strategies, especially those centered on joint maneuver and force projection—becoming impractical due to the pace of technological change?

Doctrine, tactics, training, and field manuals are intended to be the strategic guideposts for commanders at every echelon. But joint operations demand joint interoperability, and in practice, this means a reliance on a vast and ever-evolving connectivity framework. The Army’s Integrated Tactical Network (ITN), Unified Network Plan, and other programs are designed to enable this—but they also introduce complexity that can overwhelm the tactical edge.

Consider the contrast: CPT King once operated with a SINCGARS radio, a GPS, a CD-ROM, and a map. Today’s company-level commander, operating from a Tactical Command Post (TAC), must manage:

• Four or more communications systems
• Multiple software applications for planning, C2, and situational awareness
• GPS and geospatial tools
• Multiple sensors, UAS, and CUAS elements
• Mobile power systems
• All while navigating contested spectrum environments and constant surveillance
• When that commander PCSs, and the new one comes in, everyone must re-learn new systems, as the Army employs numerous models, brands, and C2 frameworks

When the unit comes under fire and systems begin to fail—jammed, degraded, or simply too complex to troubleshoot in real time—the commander is left managing 15+ systems, each with its own update cycle, interface, and failure point. This is not just a technical challenge; it’s a tactical liability. Not only are direct operations in combat a problem, but the Army is saturated with far more radios, computers, software models/brands, sensors, and competing companies – when a commander moves on to another, they need to be re-trained on all new systems (plus the new updates).

And yet, innovation is inevitable. Warfare will continue to evolve, and the need to maintain technological superiority will remain. But current conflicts and training environments have revealed a troubling trend: the battlefield is becoming oversaturated with technology, especially for light infantry and maneuver forces. The very systems designed to create a decision advantage are instead creating a quagmire of complexity.

 Operational Solution – Tactical MCP Restructuring:

Recommended are two “fixes” that can be implemented in congruence. One is operational: the modern TAC must shrink to the size of a single light tactical vehicle and primarily act as a lightly manned (squad to platoon-sized), mobile information node within an established lodgment, or constantly on-the-move. Call it a “Mobile Command Post” (MCP). These “command nodes” should also increase in quantity within brigade combat teams (BCTs) – preferably one per company. This structure ensures that MCP signatures remain light, while nodes can extend throughout/beyond a Forward Line of Troops (FLOT), while simultaneously sending communications and information to the higher-level echelon in the rear – all while managing the battle. Operational tempo is the key here; the MCP technology works, while the unit commander decides. The system should not be an impedance.

To maintain operational tempo and survivability, the TAC must evolve into mobile, distributed command nodes—MCPs—that act as autonomous C2 platforms.

Tactical Command Post Restructure

Size and Structure

• Vehicle-mounted, squad- to platoon-sized
• One per company in BCTs
• Enables distributed C2 and redundancy

Role and Employment

• Mobile information nodes – eventually unmanned or autonomous
• Relay data, support ISR, coordinate fires
• Rapid displacement capability

Survivability and Signature Management

• Software-defined radios and sensors
• Spectrum agility and terrain masking
• Remote operation to reduce personnel exposure

Trainability and Continuity

• MCP kits must be standardized and modular, allowing commanders and staff to train on a common set of tools
• Personnel rotating between units should encounter familiar systems, reducing downtime and increasing operational effectiveness
• This approach ensures that commanders can lead with confidence, regardless of where they are assigned

Technological Solution – A Light, Sustainable, Mobile Command Post (MCP) Concept: 

Coinciding with these operational principles, the MCP’s technology must evolve with the modern understanding of joint force entry. Tempo is arguably the most important trait of maneuver operations. Decision-making at speed, even on the move, is necessary in today’s climate. To maintain overmatch in multi-domain operations (MDO), motorized infantry battalions must possess a mobile command post (MCP) capability that supports rapid decision-making, mobility, and survivability. The MCP must enable commanders to operate at the speed of relevance, particularly in contested environments saturated with unmanned systems, electronic warfare, and long-range fires.

MCP Capability Requirements

Mobility and Platform Integration

• Mounted on high-mobility, low-signature platforms (General Motors ISV variants)
• Modular for C5ISR integration
• Low cost and logistical footprint
• Mobile comms architecture with Hoverfly VHAs, and SATCOM
• Dismountable mesh radio systems

Power Autonomy

• Onboard or portable power kits
• Silent watch and hybrid configurations (GM ISV and Utility Vehicle with upgraded power configuration)

Modular, Trainable C5ISR Architecture

• MCPs must use pre-approved, Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA)-compliant commercial technologies that are modular by mission set and standardized across the force
• All C2 systems must be software-defined, enabling AI/ML integration and automated resilience features
• Kits must be trainable and sustainable, allowing personnel to operate familiar systems even when reassigned to new units
• Modular kits reduce training time, increase interoperability, and ensure continuity of operations across the Army

Integration of Anduril’s Lattice AI/ML Platform

• All hardware should be capable of incorporating the Lattice AI and OS backbone
• As part of the Army’s award to Anduril Industries under the Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) initiative, the Lattice C2 platform is already being integrated into compute nodes
• Lattice provides a modular, open-architecture software backbone that fuses sensor data and automates decision support

Interoperability and Sustainability

• Certified by PEO-C3T for ITN and COE
• Plug-and-play with joint networks
• Scalable, sustainable, and remotely updatable
• 3 – 4 standardized “kits” that include commercial radios, compute, software, and sensors (infused with Lattice) that commanders can train on and be accustomed to. They also allow for modularity across mission sets.

• • All “kits” are comprised of available COTS systems that meet the above criteria – this keeps costs and logistics trains at a minimum

In Summary

The introduction of mission-specific, standardized “kits” significantly enhances the concept by addressing several key challenges:

• It ensures interoperability across units.
• It reduces the training burden and improves operational continuity.
• It simplifies logistics and cost management by relying on widely available COTS components.
• It allows the system to remain adaptable, reducing complexity and increasing operational effectiveness.

By tailoring technology to mission needs while maintaining a standardized base of equipment and software, the MCP concept becomes far more practical and scalable. This should indeed fix a major part of the problem of technological overload, making the systems more practical for frontline commanders.

Conclusion – Empowering Commanders at the Tactical Edge:

American doctrine encourages decentralized decision-making, but today’s commanders are being buried under complexity. We must give them tools that move with them, adapt to terrain, and amplify their ability to lead under fire.

MCPs must be mobile, modular, and interoperable, capable of pushing and pulling information across the battlefield, coordinating fires, and enabling decisions at speed. They must be fast, affordable, and scalable. One day, they may even operate unmanned, autonomously relaying data while commanders focus on maneuver, not maintenance.

If we simplify command technology, we conduct modern platforms, software-defined systems, and streamlined techniques—empowering commanders to lead decisively. We reduce cognitive overload, increase survivability, and restore the tempo that wins battles.

Twenty years ago, in Nasiriyah, our Army unit commander would have welcomed today’s technology. But we must ensure it creates space for the next young officer to operate freely—not trap him in a web of systems that slow his unit and confuse the mission.

The future of maneuver warfare is not about more technology—it’s about better technology, used smarter and built to serve the commander. The solutions are here. The need is urgent. The time to act is now.