Stove-Piped and Surveilled: The Erosion of Sahelian Intelligence Networks in an Era of Great Power Competition
A wave of military takeovers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has triggered a broad regional realignment away from Western-backed security frameworks like the G-5 Sahel and Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Disillusionment with ECOWAS over its perceived emphasis on political conformity rather than tailored security responses escalated in July 2023 when ECOWAS issued a formal ultimatum to Niger, demanding the reinstatement of President Mohamed Bazoum and threatening military intervention. In response, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023 and formally withdrew from ECOWAS in January 2024.
In contrast to multilateral efforts, security partnerships with Russia and China offer these regimes rapid material support, elite protection, and non-interference, an appealing alternative for leaders facing internal unrest and legitimacy crises. This article argues that the collapse of multilateral intelligence-sharing platforms and the rise of bilateral partnerships with Russia and China are fragmenting Sahelian intelligence networks, degrading counterterrorism capacity, and accelerating instability across the region. The erosion of coordinated ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), SIGINT (signals intelligence), and HUMINT (human intelligence) platforms has left security forces blind to fast-moving extremist threats, while Russia and China construct surveillance models designed to entrench authoritarian control rather than foster regional cooperation.
The G5 Sahel and MNJTF: Pillars of a Collapsing Architecture
The G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) and the MNJTF served as the region’s primary institutional platforms for intelligence sharing and counterterrorism cooperation. Established in 2017 from an earlier intergovernmental framework, the FC-G5S included Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. It was structured around five operational sectors with joint command and was tasked with cross-border counterterrorism missions, combating organized crime, and restoring state control in insecure zones. Despite limited funding and operational constraints, the force facilitated basic intelligence fusion through sector-level hubs and coordination with Western actors. INTERPOL supported the FC-G5S Police Component, integrating biometric and explosives data into battlefield assessments and enabling limited connectivity to the I-24/7 global database. These capabilities, while far from comprehensive, represented the backbone of early warning systems and actionable threat alerts. AES member states’ withdrawal collapsed this architecture, and with it, the limited but functional systems for cross-border intelligence cooperation.
The MNJTF, created in 2014 under African Union authorization, brought together Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin with headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad, and sector commands across the Lake Chad region. As with the G5 Sahel, these efforts were made possible through donor support and technical assistance from Western partners. However, the task force struggled with uneven capabilities, inconsistent rules of engagement, and limited interoperability among national forces. Intelligence integration remained shallow, and long-term strategic gains proved elusive. However, the MNJTF achieved tactical successes, including retaking territory, dismantling insurgent camps, and rescuing hostages during operations like Operation Yancin Tafki in 2019 and Operation Lake Sanity in 2022. These victories demonstrated the force’s potential when coordination and resources were available. With the withdrawal of Niger and Burkina Faso, the MNJTF’s operational reach and political cohesion have been severely undermined, further reducing the region’s already limited ability to conduct integrated threat tracking.
Operational Gaps: The Degradation of ISR, SIGINT, and HUMINT
The withdrawal of key international partners from the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin has significantly degraded intelligence capabilities across multiple domains. The Sahel has few formal intelligence fusion centers, but de facto platforms once played key roles in integrating intelligence disciplines such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); signals intelligence (SIGINT); human intelligence (HUMINT); and open-source intelligence (OSINT). These included EUCAP support cells, French military intelligence nodes, and ad hoc operations centers linked to the G5 Sahel and MNJTF. Their dismantling has resulted in the stove piping of information, limited dissemination, and slower analytical processing. France’s drawdown of Operation Barkhane and the closure of US and French drone bases in Niamey have removed essential aerial surveillance platforms, including fixed-wing aircraft and Reaper drones. These platforms once enabled persistent coverage of jihadist transit corridors and supported joint targeting operations. With the dissolution of joint operations centers, real-time technical feeds are no longer integrated across sectors, and situational awareness has deteriorated in areas where violent extremist groups remain highly mobile and technologically adaptive.
Human intelligence collection in the Sahel region has also suffered significant setbacks due to the physical withdrawal of international advisors and the gradual attrition of local informant networks. Many of these human sources were developed over years of embedded cooperation within French military operations in the Sahel and the European Union Capacity Building Mission in the Sahel (EUCAP Sahel), which played critical roles in training, mentoring, and facilitating The departure of foreign personnel has disrupted these established channels, leading to the loss, compromise, or silencing of informants who were vital for providing timely early warning of ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and insurgent troop movements. Without them, national forces lack real-time situational awareness, reducing the effectiveness of kinetic operations and increasing the likelihood of delayed or failed interdictions. Coordination mechanisms for deconfliction and strike prioritization have also been lost, impairing both precision and force protection.
Emergence of Alternative Security Providers: Russia’s Wagner, to the Africa Corps Group Model
Russia’s growing role in the Sahel reflects a pivot from multilateral security cooperation toward regime-centric partnerships that fragment regional counterterrorism efforts. As Western counterterrorism partnerships erode, Russia has moved to fill the strategic vacuum in the Sahel by expanding the footprint of the Wagner Group, a Kremlin-linked private military company. Wagner initially entered Mali in late 2021 under a bilateral agreement with the transitional government led by Assimi Goïta, reportedly in exchange for mining concessions and political support. While Russian officials claim Wagner operatives—now operating as Africa Corps under the Russian Ministry of Defense—provide counterterrorism assistance, the group’s activities focus overwhelmingly on regime protection, elite security, and suppression of dissent. Units have been linked to extrajudicial killings, particularly in central Mali, where Wagner fighters alongside the Malian army perpetrated the March 2022 Moura massacre, resulting in over 500 civilian deaths.
By embedding closed security structures within host regimes, Russia has sidelined regional cooperation mechanisms and diminished multilateral oversight. Despite claims of Russian withdrawal in early 2024 following internal leadership turmoil and the death of Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group has not fully vacated the Sahel. Elements rebranded under the Russian Ministry of Defense or affiliated contractors remain active. In Burkina Faso, Wagner personnel have reportedly trained presidential guard units and deployed to protect key mining and infrastructure sites. Similar reports suggest a limited advisory presence in Niger, where Russia has sought diplomatic overtures to the junta.
Wagner’s intelligence model is designed to prioritize secrecy and unilateral control, undermining early warning systems and joint threat analysis, reflecting a broader Russian tendency to prioritize operational secrecy and unilateral control over multilateral coordination. There is no established mechanism for sharing intelligence with regional partners or multilateral bodies such as the African Union or INTERPOL. Instead, tactical information collected via drone surveillance, reconnaissance patrols, or local informant networks is typically retained within closed circuits, accessible to host governments and Russian handlers. Wagner has flown Orlan-10 surveillance drones in Mali since 2020, allowing them to draw on imagery to guide both regime protection and resource extraction efforts. Wagner also purchased two commercial satellites from the Chinese firm Beijing Yunze Technology Co. Ltd. to aid intelligence operations. Russia’s broader approach to security partnerships in Africa operates without a coherent public strategy and instead with plausible deniability, regime survival, and the consolidation of influence rather than collective threat mitigation.
Russia’s intelligence doctrine is built on strategic manipulation rather than cooperative security, weakening its reliability as a counterterrorism partner. For Russia, intelligence serves to project and retain power. Intelligence sharing, particularly for counter-terrorism purposes, has historically been used to gain a strategic advantage and undermine the West. Rather than gathering robust intelligence, the Russian FSB frequently relies on limited information, leading to broad, indiscriminate targeting rather than the precise identification of extremists. During its intervention in the Syrian civil war from 2015 to 2025, Russia leveraged intelligence sharing with the United States under the guise of joint counterterrorism and collective security operations to gain greater monitoring capabilities of the US and territorial advantage in Syria. Russia’s intelligence approach prioritizes political relevance over collaboration. It forms bilateral partnerships focused on regime stability, viewing those misaligned with internal interests as unproductive, highlighting the risks of relying on Russian intelligence in the Sahel.
Russia’s intelligence posture in the Sahel reflects a broader shift away from collective security and toward transactional, regime-centric partnerships that fragment regional coordination. By treating intelligence as a tool of political leverage rather than shared security, Russia degrades early warning systems, obstructs multilateral threat tracking, and erodes trust between states. Its presence entrenches a model in which authoritarian stability is prioritized over long-term counterterrorism effectiveness, accelerating the region’s descent into disjointed and opaque security governance.
China’s Security Offer: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Strategic Access
China’s expanding security role in Africa reflects a model of influence that emphasizes surveillance and regime preservation over shared regional threat mitigation. China has steadily increased its security footprint in Africa through its Global Security Initiative (GSI), a diplomatic and defense strategy unveiled by President Xi Jinping in 2022 to reshape international security norms around the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and regime preservation. Through collective stability initiatives, China’s GSI seeks to bridge gaps between security frameworks, particularly following the recent fragmentation with the formation of AES. While China has avoided deploying military personnel in the Sahel, it has pursued bilateral security agreements that emphasize technological capacity-building and surveillance-driven governance.
By promoting surveillance-driven governance tools over interoperable intelligence platforms, China substitutes internal control for regional coordination. Central to China’s security model in Africa is the export of integrated surveillance systems, primarily through state-owned enterprises such as Huawei and the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC). These platforms are most prominently exemplified by the Safe Cities initiative, which deploys facial recognition cameras, license plate readers, AI-assisted video analytics, and centralized command centers for real-time policing. In Burkina Faso, the “Smart Burkina” project will deploy 900 surveillance cameras across Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, supported by a national fiber-optic network, centralized command centers, and hundreds of mobile and vehicle-mounted terminals. In Nigeria, Kaduna State signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Huawei Technologies in May 2024 to advance a Smart City Project aimed at enhancing security, efficiency, and digital governance. These systems significantly enhance domestic intelligence collection and urban threat monitoring capabilities. Huawei and CETC platforms also provide the Chinese government with potential access to vast surveillance networks, enabling offensive monitoring of population behavior and control over key sectors such as mining, manufacturing, education, and logistics. Rather than facilitating intelligence-sharing, these technologies reflect broader Chinese goals of regime support, strategic access, and long-term economic entrenchment under the banner of digital sovereignty.
China has also provided training programs for cybersecurity officers, biometric data technicians, and digital forensics teams. Partnerships with institutions like the Chinese People’s Public Security University facilitate training exchanges, while joint initiatives with Chinese telecommunications providers have established encrypted data storage hubs under national jurisdiction. These efforts reinforce data sovereignty and ensure that intelligence gathered through Chinese platforms remains outside Western or multilateral access. At the 2024 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit, Beijing pledged $140 million in security assistance to the continent. Over the following three years, China committed to training 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 law enforcement officers, including joint exercises, expanded Chinese defense attaché presence, and the hosting of African officers in Chinese cities.
These initiatives underscore China’s growing role in shaping Africa’s security environment, enhancing regime surveillance while offering little utility for regional counterterrorism coordination due to data sovereignty and unilateral intelligence collection. Chinese systems are not interoperable with NATO-standard ISR platforms or Western geospatial intelligence feeds, and information is unlikely to be shared amidst increasing animosity with the United States and partner nations. Moreover, the terms of engagement often include data exclusivity clauses, preventing even friendly governments from sharing collected intelligence externally. The Global Data Security Initiative emphasizes “cyber sovereignty” and autonomy for individual nations. China’s rhetoric surrounding non-interference discourages cooperation on shared security goals. Sahelian states aligned with China gain tools for internal control but lose capacity for integrated regional threat assessment and response.
Shifting Norms: The Decline of Western-Led Security Governance
The security models offered by Russia and China reflect a clear departure from the multilateral, transparency-based frameworks once promoted by Western actors. The Wagner and GSI models emphasize regime security, bilateral control, and non-interference, in contrast to Western priorities of interoperability, civilian oversight, and regional coordination. As a result, intelligence sharing becomes transactional and asymmetrical. Platforms such as AFRICOM’s ISR sharing networks, INTERPOL’s I-24/7 system, and EU-supported security-sector reform programs are sidelined, and cross-border coordination is replaced by fragmented national silos. This divergence has undermined regional early warning systems and reduced the frequency, precision, and effectiveness of joint counterterrorism responses.
Conclusion: How Fragmentation Fuels Extremist Expansion
The erosion of intelligence capabilities and the rise of alternative security providers have created a permissive environment for jihadist expansion. Groups like ISWAP and JNIM now operate with greater freedom in border regions, while national forces struggle with diminished ISR coverage and degraded HUMINT and SIGINT networks. Arrest operations and kinetic strikes occur less frequently and are more likely to fail. Strategically, fragmented politics and misaligned partnerships erode cohesion and complicate international support. Without a unified counterterrorism architecture, external assistance risks dispersing efforts rather than reinforcing regional capacity.
This emerging security order carries grave risks. If current trajectories continue, the Sahel may become a testing ground for surveillance-driven, regime-centric models that sacrifice long-term stability. Counterterrorism becomes performative, with intelligence systems consolidating elite power instead of addressing shared threats. Jihadist actors exploit these gaps, embedding them in ungoverned spaces and further weakening fragile states.
To reverse this trend, Western and regional actors must rethink intelligence cooperation. Rather than multilateral frameworks, international partners should support adaptable, sovereignty-conscious models that strengthen localized capabilities while incentivizing transparency and interoperability. Sustained investment not only in matériel, but in training, liaison networks, and analytical infrastructure, is essential to restoring early warning and deterring extremist expansion. The longer the region remains fragmented, the harder it will be to reclaim ground lost to authoritarian influence and transnational militancy.
