Quadcopters Have Become the Taliban’s New Weapon – and Pakistan Is Not Ready

Abstract

Pakistani terrorist groups have started using small drones to terrorize local populations and target the already-stretched security forces, which are, so far, extremely vulnerable to this style of warfare and need a comprehensive recalibration of policy choices.

Introduction

Pakistan’s northwestern flank, which includes parts of the southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province (including former FATA) and Balochistan, has experienced a serious uptick in militant activities targeting Pakistani state infrastructure and personnel. Terror groups, especially the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), are using advanced and sophisticated drone technology. Unlike a few early episodes, they are not using drones only for psychological operations by recording terror attacks. In recent days, they have employed drones to attack Pakistani military assets deployed to secure the area from cross-border terrorism emanating from Afghanistan.

A New Age of Terror

Last week, The Khorasan Diary reported that three Pakistan Army personnel lost their lives, including a captain-ranking officer, when terrorists attacked a military post in South Waziristan – a region subject to counter-terror operations for nearly two decades. They used quadcopters to drop explosive ordnance that killed the army personnel. Around the same time, militants reportedly carried out seven drone attacks in a single day. Reuters reported eight attacks targeting police and security forces in Bannu (KP) and adjacent areas.

Terror attacks in KP are not new, but the evolving tactics symbolize a more lethal underpinning: the permeation of commercially available small drones and their retrofitting for militant activities. The four-prop drones can fly hundreds of meters into the air, cross land obstructions with ease, and carry out attacks from a distance – allowing the activator to remain in safety. At a time when state militaries are still in the initial phase of operationalizing dual-use drones and manufacturing advanced unmanned systems that employ artificial intelligence, non-state actors have also wielded them. Off-the-shelf availability, cost-effectiveness, and feasible retrofitting are making small drones the go-to weapon for these actors – even worse, for jihadi outfits.

Past as Prologue

Terrorists in Pakistan are using a familiar playbook. A decade ago, the Islamic State – when raging across Iraq with deadly attacks against military and civilian targets alike – employed drones in the Battle of Mosul for two complementary objectives. It used them to record attacks in progress for ground intelligence and propaganda, and targeted a column of Iraqi and allied forces with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). The psychological impact of this footage was highly demoralizing, showing Iraqi personnel dislodged from their positions and running to save their lives. The footage of the actual blast was even more harrowing. The second and more advanced use of quadcopters was to attack the enemy by dropping explosive ordnance (mortar shells) with pinpoint accuracy. This enabled the Islamic State to target troops hiding behind cover, provided it with situational awareness, and helped outflank the troop concentrations. It was like an Air Force aircraft delivering JDAMs – but on a smaller scale. Over the last decade, militaries and militants have extensively used drones in Myanmar, Lebanon, Ukraine, Russia, Libya, and Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s militancy threat – from 2007 to 2015 and 2021 to the end of 2024 – has remained rudimentary in tactics since 2007. Terrorist groups relied on classical guerrilla warfare tactics like suicide bombing, squad ambushes, sabotage operations, or IED ambushes. Since none of these groups could match the capability or numbers of the military, counter-terror operations often saw militants being killed in large numbers when the state responded. The Pakistani military, in its counter-violent extremism (CVE) efforts, mostly relied on conventional military methods, which might have sufficed for the time being but came with a severe cost of personnel lost during intelligence and counter-terror operations. Many lost lives in the ambush attacks because the military did not have an adequate number of mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles (MRAPs). Additionally, its usual transport carriers (Toyota pickups and utility trucks) could not stand against improvised heavy explosives. Gradually, the military obviated this threat by employing jammer vehicles that would lead the convoys and disable planted IEDs.

However, drones bring a newer and more complex form of threat, which requires a serious strategic recalibration in the CVE campaign. Terrorist outfits – both Jihadis and ethno-nationalist separatists in Balochistan – may still be in the initial phase of using drones, but the ease of availability and an open arms market in Afghanistan is ramping up arms access for them. Their attacks still lack the finesse seen in other theaters such as Ukraine and Iran, because their quadcopter employment is in an early (and experimental) operational phase. Ultimately, they will be able to improve targeting systems and train their members to carry out such attacks with more efficacy.

Is Pakistan Ready?

The use of drones for psychological operations and targeting armed forces indicates Intentions are evident, and so are the efforts. Armed with American weapons like rifles, night vision scopes, electronic equipment, battle-hardened, and backed by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the terror groups can leave their targets in shock anytime in the coming months. TTP-associated media is already replete with drone footage of IEDs targeting Pakistani military and police assets. And now, like the Islamic State, they are moving to the second phase – using drones in active combat. Prospects are bleak for the already stretched Pakistani security apparatus in the northwest and a looming Indian threat to the east.

The rapid evolution in drone technology and terrorists’ persistence in employing them make it complicated for the Pakistani security forces to catch up with the terror-based drone threat. Unlike non-state actors, which are more flexible in accessing and mainstreaming evolving technologies, militaries are bound by long and bureaucratic acquisition processes. Tackling the drone threat successfully will, expectedly, require more time, resources, and institutional learning. By then, however, quadcopters may already be obsolete.

Another challenge facing Pakistan is the rugged, porous terrain on the western border, which is difficult to police entirely. Islamabad already has serious concerns about cross-border terrorism, as terrorist groups cross the Pak-Afghan border, carry out attacks, and return to the Taliban-held territory in Afghanistan. Protecting the border and restricting incursion through negotiations with the Taliban regime is even more complicated. The Taliban, like many Afghan rulers, do not officially recognize the Pak-Afghan and subscribe to the mantra of the “Durand Line” as a disputed line created by the representatives of the British Empire. Amid this, the usage of small drones adds another threat to these cross-border attacks. Small drones with ranges of 10 to 20 km can easily permeate the border terrain and strike Pakistani locations. For terror groups, this obviates the need to dedicate a workforce to other operations and helps them avoid collateral damage – all the while providing material for psychological operations.

Pakistan’s Choices

Can Pakistan do anything? Pakistan is past the initial phase, and it must adopt a multi-pronged strategy to deal with this challenge. First, the state needs to realize that the TTP and other Jihadi groups are rapidly mainstreaming advanced technologies. Pakistani law enforcement agencies are not simply facing a ragtag militia. They face a committed, battle-hardened force that aims to dislodge Pakistani forces and has the support of their brethren in Kabul.

Second, Pakistani security pundits should engage in serious strategic recalibration to develop a new counter-terror doctrine that prioritizes counter-drone systems and other emerging technologies as central themes of Pakistan’s counterterrorism purview. Despite acquiring modern drones from Turkey and China, their use has been limited so far. Instead, the Pakistan military, too, has been using quadcopters dropping mortar munitions, which have smaller payloads and face range limitations. They also lack advanced targeting systems such as thermal or infrared tracking and, hence, increase the ratio of collateral damage. Third, military units located on the Pak-Afghan border need to be armed with two-pronged counter-drone systems. The first of them can be an anti-air fire system.

In this context, self-propelled armored vehicles offer multi-pronged solutions. China, Pakistan’s largest source of weapon imports, has rapidly advanced its systems in this category. Pakistan can acquire systems like the Type-625 and the PGZ-09, which Chinese military units have also procured. These systems offer flexibility, as they can protect moving convoys, provide perimeter defense to stationary units, and can be relocated to the areas of operation. As armored systems, they can withstand explosive attacks. Fourth, Pakistani security forces can also deploy man-portable anti-drone systems using electronic warfare and jamming. The second leg of this system would operate in the electromagnetic spectrum and use directed energy weapons. These systems can be used to protect larger installations.

Amid all the above actions, however, a crucial step would be to restrict the terror groups’ access to such quadcopters. Intelligence-based operations in areas where these systems are provided, retrofitted, and operationalized must be carried out. The security forces will need a dedicated effort to neutralize terror units that specialize in using quadcopters and can have the capability to use fast-speed first-person view (FPV) drones.

Conclusion

For the Pakistani state, it is a race against time. Terrorist groups using drones is a newer form of asymmetric sub-conventional war that will be difficult to contain if not stopped in its current nascent phase. The next year, therefore, is crucial. The “networked” terrorism employing psychological operations and kinetic drone actions requires a serious effort. Otherwise, the salami tactics used to counter terror attacks in Pakistan’s northwest will not augur well for the country in the coming years.