Reimagining Indian Military Doctrine: Operation Sindoor Through the Lens of Gupta Karya

Introduction
Operation Sindoor, a covert Indian response to cross-border terrorism, marked more than just a military retaliation—it revalidated the ancient Indian strategic doctrine of Gupta Karya, (clandestine action). Unlike imported military philosophies, Operation Sindoor affirmed the enduring relevance of indigenous frameworks of warfare rooted in deception, ambiguity, and strategic autonomy. The Arthashastra’s concept of Gupta Karya offers a valuable lens to comprehend India’s modern defense posture through civilizational continuity (See Note 1).
Chronology
On April 22, 2025, a brutal terror attack in Pahalgam, a town in the Indian state of Jammu, and Kashmir, killed 26 civilians, including a Nepali national. This attack was the deadliest terror attack in India since the 2008 Mumbai carnage. The Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba offshoot, The Resistance Front (TRF), claimed responsibility for the attack. India responded swiftly.
The next day, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) announced the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, diplomatic downgrading, the closure of the Wagah border, and restrictions on bilateral agreements. Pakistan retaliated by closing its airspace and suspending the Shimla Agreement, along with increased ceasefire violations.
On April 25, the Indian Air Force (IAF) initiated Exercise Arakmaan, and by May 5, the Government of India conducted nationwide civil defense drills. The government framed these drills as routine preparedness exercises, but in hindsight, they served as operational masking. By the night of May 6, unconfirmed reports of precision strikes began surfacing on social media.
On May 7, the Press Information Bureau (PIB) released a guarded statement, hinting that “appropriate strategic deterrence measures” had been undertaken—indicating the veiled execution of Operation Sindoor. India maintained plausible deniability while allowing strategic narratives to circulate, shaping public opinion at home and abroad without direct confrontation. In doing so, India practiced Gupta Karya in a modern setting, i.e., the government sought to achieve strategic objectives without open warfare or a formal declaration.
Gupta Karya in Action: Operation Sindoor as Strategic Deception
Kautilya’s Arthashastra outlines statecraft rooted in pragmatism, espionage, and secrecy (See Note 2). The doctrine of Gupta Karya empowers a state to protect its interests via deception, covert strikes, and psychological warfare (See Note 3). It is not about gallantry, but about effect—victory through subtlety, surprise, and precision. India’s ability to mask operational intent using public drills, the delay between provocation and retaliation, and calibrated ambiguity in messaging confused adversaries.
The two week “cooling period” served to blur enemy assessment and denied Pakistan any window to pre-empt India’s offensive action. In this gap, public discourse was flooded with rumors and speculation, which furthered India’s strategic cover.
The Role of Technology: From Strategy to Spectrum Supremacy
Operation Sindoor was also a masterclass in electronic warfare and artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled deception. The IAF’s Rafale jets employed the X-GUARD towed decoy system, enhanced by AI-assisted situational awareness, to mislead Pakistani air defenses. A U.S. F-16 pilot reportedly described India’s use of a 30 kg decoy device as “the best deception ever seen,” following Pakistan’s false claim of having shot down an Indian jet.
This was not just a tactical victory—it was a shift in doctrinal warfare. India moved from brute force to information dominance, controlling perception as much as the physical battlespace. The electromagnetic spectrum was as much the battlefield as the sky. This mirrors Chanakya’s or Kaultiya’s core tenet: control perception, manipulate the narrative, strike without exposure.
Deception as Doctrine: A Philosophical Shift
Chanakya asserted that wars are won not only by armies but by strategy, state, and society. Kautilya differs from Thucydides or Machiavelli in that he offered a fully integrated manual for governance, war, espionage, and economic control—centuries ahead of his time and highly relevant to understanding Indian strategic culture today. That is where Gupta Karya becomes doctrine, not just tactic. India has historically studied military traditions across the world, but Operation Sindoor shows that India does not always need to look West. To be sure, India has its own rich, non-Western strategic traditions, grounded in texts, practices, and philosophies that are deeply relevant even in the AI era.
From the Mahabharata to Arthashastra, Indian warcraft has stressed strategic ambiguity, multi-domain synergy, and purposeful restraint. The study of these traditions is essential not for nostalgia, but for doctrinal renewal so that India’s armed forces operate not only with imported frameworks, but with homegrown intellectual confidence.
Conclusion: From Response to Resurgence
Operation Sindoor is not just a case study in counterterrorism. It is a watershed in Indian strategic thought, reflecting a shift toward cognitive warfare anchored in civilizational principles. It signals that India’s strategic posture is evolving, embracing its own doctrinal past while mastering modern warfighting. Gupta Karya is no longer a relic of ancient thought—it is an active blueprint for deterrence, precision, and controlled escalation.
The soul of a nation’s culture is vitally connected with their glorious past. The study of ancient Indian Strategic culture and its rich military education system, therefore, is the key to India search for unravelling the soul of this treasure trove, especially when military leaders are required to be socialized and exbibit.
Operation Sindoor reflects the evolution of India’s strategic posture and its emergence as a distinctive voice in global strategic affairs. The success of Operation Sindoor stands as a testament to the timeless wisdom enshrined in the Sanskrit maxim “Kāryāṇām guptam sādhanaṁ sādhayet” — one must achieve objectives through secrecy. In a complex operational environment marked by high stakes, inter-agency coordination, and the need for rapid yet calculated action, the emphasis on confidentiality was not just strategic, but essential.
Note 1: Arthashastra is an ancient Indian treatise on governance, economics, military strategy, and espionage, authored by Kautilya (also known as Chanakya), advisor to Emperor Chandragupta Maurya (c. 4th century BCE). Often compared to Machiavelli’s The Prince, it lays out detailed guidance for ruling an empire, including secret intelligence operations (Guptakarya). It reflects early realpolitik thinking from South Asia. Read the full English translation by R. Shamasastry.
Note 2: Kautilya, also known as Chanakya, was an ancient Indian philosopher, economist, and royal advisor, best known for authoring the Arthashastra—a treatise on statecraft, military strategy, and political economy. Often compared to Machiavelli, he played a crucial role in the rise of the Mauryan Empire around the 4th century BCE.
Note 3: Guptakarya is conceptually an ancient prototype of what we today call gray zone operations or hybrid tactics, but it is more methodical and ethically flexible. It differs from irregular warfare, which tends to be more tactical, decentralized, and used by weaker parties in asymmetric conflict. Chanakya’s approach is strategic, preemptive, and state-led, prioritizing secrecy, control, and psychological domination — not just military wins.