​Dealing with Drones: Why Words Matter

While the June 1, 2025 Ukrainian drone attack, “Operation Spiderweb,” against Russian air bases has been described as a “wake-up moment,” the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) either needs to stop feigning surprise ​(​or needs to prepare for constant surprise​)​ in the development and employment of “drones” in warfare. The unmanned aircraft phenomenon is not new. Only a decade after the Wright brothers’ first flight, the United States developed the ‘Kettering Bug,’ a track-launched, unmanned “aerial torpedo” capable of striking ground targets up to 75 miles away. During World War II, Germany employed the first cruise missile, the V-1, which is not unlike the so-called “kamikaze drones” that various actors employ today. Simply put, the threat from unmanned aircraft has been around for over a century. The major difference today, however, lies in the exponential proliferation and expansion ​of ​their capabilities and ​the ​tactics ​used ​to employ them. The increasing volume of attacks and the continued advancement of unmanned aircraft technologies and tactics are exposing gaps in existing air defense capabilities and approaches to protection. Because the problem is layered ​– ​involving cost, size, proliferation, doctrine, and technology​ – ​the solution will likewise require a layered, interconnected, and comprehensive approach. However, the fundamental first step must be to innovate the way we talk—and therefore think—about unmanned aircraft. By distinguishing between various systems—such as smaller drones and larger unmanned aircraft systems—and framing the challenge within the broader context of protection, the defense community can develop more appropriate, efficient, and intelligence-driven responses. 

In order to apply disciplined reasoning to the implications of this evolving threat, the defense community (which includes the DoD, but also the defense industry and the media which reports such stories) must employ disciplined language. Media (and even military) reporting typically use the singular term “drone” to mean any variety of unmanned aircraft, from larger sophisticated aircraft like the MQ-9 and one-way attack aircraft like the Iranian produced Shahed 136 to small hobbyist quadcopters. Conflating these various systems can oversimplify and obfuscate the discussion on countering the threats when in reality they reflect vast differences in size, cost, purpose, and capabilities. The word “drone” is vague and inconsistent with the variety of systems it attempts to describe, which leads to flawed assumptions, faulty logic, and misunderstanding. This is akin to saying “fighter jet” when you are referring to any aircraft, whether it is a Boeing 747 or two-seat Cessna. It can also lead to an oversimplification of counter-unmanned aircraft solutions. The solution for countering a quadcopter looks very different than thwarting a preprogrammed, one-way aircraft, not to mention neutralizing a large, satellite-controlled unmanned aircraft.  

While the lines can get blurry, UAS typically serve as an extension of airpower while drones expand ground combat. The distinction is not merely about semantics; it carries doctrinal implications and cues for solutions.  

Conversely, the DoD and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) categorize unmanned aircraft primarily by size in five groups and three classes, respectively. However, these distinctions are rarely referred to outside of technical and acquisition purposes and understandably so. ​​Therefore, for both clarity and simplicity, “unmanned aircraft” will be used in this piece as a generic and encompassing term. “Unmanned aircraft system” (UAS) will be used to describe larger, more complicated fixed-wing aircraft, while “drone” refers to smaller and widely proliferated systems such as quadcopters or other hand-held or hand-launched aircraft. While the lines can get blurry, UAS typically serve as an extension of airpower while drones expand ground combat. The distinction is not merely about semantics; it carries doctrinal implications and cues for solutions.  

Understandably, the fact that drones maneuver through the air muddies ​​the waters, so to speak. From spears and arrows to bullets, rocket-propelled grenades, artillery rounds, mortars, and rockets—to name a few—the modern military drone still represents an evolution of man’s quest to extend the reach of his fist while his feet are planted on the ground. The revolution of the drone and unmanned aircraft in general lies in the creativity of how they are employed and the capabilities they provide untethered to a human. Yet the temptation to treat all unmanned aircraft as an air and missile defense (AMD) problem results in inefficient and unintended consequences, such as exacerbating the cost-exchange dilemma whereby the defender is expending much more than the attacker. Consider the case of the $3 million Patriot missile used to shoot down a $200 quadcopter drone. Or when the United States used a $400,000 AIM-9X Sidewinder missile from an F-22 to shoot down a low-tech Chinese spy balloon. These instances represent the equivalent of using a shotgun to kill a fly instead of a fly swatter. The first example highlights employing an anti-air solution to a doctrinally ground-based threat. ​​The latter shows how intelligence, more than technology, factors more deeply into the unmanned aircraft dilemma. The unmanned aircraft race is not just about technology, but about staying ahead of your adversary’s plans and deceptions. 

In defending against unmanned aircraft, the language of the DoD also confuses the issue when it refers to countering small drones as “counter unmanned aerial systems” or CUAS. Because UAS also refers to the very large and sophisticated unmanned aircraft, the term CUAS, like “drone,” broad-brushes the issue. Rather than treating all unmanned aircraft as an AMD, CUAS, or drone problem—it would be more helpful to start speaking in terms of the joint function of protection, which Joint Publication 1 Joint Warfighting describes simply as “preserving the joint force’s fighting potential.” Because the threats are complex, this back-to-the-basics approach helps to simplify the solution by fighting effects-based weapons with an effects-based approach. 

U.S. Soldiers conduct Mobile Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Integrated Defense System (M-LIDS) training, Camp Buehring, Kuwait. The M-LIDS weapon system can be mounted on vehicles and is designed to target and disable, or destroy hostile drones or other unmanned aerial vehicles (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Damian Mioduszewski).

An actor no longer requires precision guided munitions dropped by stealth fighters to take out its adversary’s air force or air defense assets on the ground; drones have democratized the same effects. Similarly, a protection mindset does not group all unmanned aircraft as one singular threat, nor does it strictly separate each variety of UAS or drone into rigid stovepipes, but seeks a holistic, effects-based method of protecting the fighting potential of its forces. AMD certainly falls under protection when appropriate but so does physical security, which incorporates a blend of active and passive, simple and sophisticated, and above all else an intelligence-based approach to identifying critical vulnerabilities and meeting the threat. With this philosophy, threats from unmanned aircraft would be matched with appropriate and more efficient solutions. Key infrastructure and assets should be protected from larger UAS by AMD capabilities, but also from smaller drones by more ground-based-threat protection measures. Within AMD—traditionally geared toward shooting down fast airplanes and missiles—cost-parity solutions should be developed to see and shoot down slower and lower UAS. If AMD relies on a defensive “stiff arm” approach, then operational leaders should demand other proactive, offensive, and intelligence-forward forms of protection.  

Developing technology for counter-unmanned aircraft applications to jam, degrade, suppress, or kill is a necessary, but also fleeting aspect of the ​​solution as shown with the war of adaptation between Ukraine and Russia. Rather, in the race for innovation, an effects-based mindset focused on protection frames the problem partly in terms of intelligence, seeking to stay ahead of the adversary’s intent instead of chasing constantly changing tactics and technology. This is increasingly more apparent given Operation Spiderweb’s 18-month setup, and more recently, Israel’s June 12, 2025 attack on Iran’s nuclear sites, leadership, and air defenses which relied on the aid of smuggled drones and UAS. It is not enough to focus on defending just against drones, but rather against drones in combination with deception and surprise. These factors make staying ahead of the adversary through intelligence a crucial element of protection against drones and UAS. 

Dealing with drones, or UAS, or unmanned aircraft, requires more than just new technologies. It demands clearer thinking and the deliberate use of terminology. We should call a spade a spade and a drone a drone. ​UAS requires an air defense approach, albeit with needed improvements in cost and efficiency. Drones require an intelligence-forward urgency to not only stay ahead of innovations in technology, but in tactics, especially involving deception. Most importantly, once we can distinguish the threats of which we speak, counter-UAS or counter-drone efforts need to be understood in terms of the protection function. As unmanned aircraft continue to reshape the character of conflict, a steady, effects-based view of protection will shape how the DoD understands and counters them. By aligning our language with the layered reality of the threat, we lay the groundwork for more effective and efficient solutions. If we are to prevent surprise in a battlespace increasingly defined by innovation and adaptation, how we talk about unmanned aircraft may be just as important as how we stop them.