Vietnam and Afghanistan – Shared Failure
Abstract: As conflict looms throughout the world, the United States must again learn lessons from its failed conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Both conflicts featured blurry battle lines, nebulous objectives, undefinable victories, and inhospitable terrain that nullified the U.S. airpower and physically punished its ground forces. For a Presidential administration deciding if or when to intervene in a foreign country, the failures of Vietnam and Afghanistan should be a crucial influence in whatever foreign policy decision the administration makes.
Introduction
As a possible conflict in the Middle East looms, it is a prescient time to look back at America’s two longest wars and the lessons learned in blood. In the almost fifty years since the fall of South Vietnam and five years since the Taliban regained power in Afghanistan, it has become clear that the outcomes of both conflicts had one comparable result: failure. But what lessons can be learned from the parallels and differences in the two conflicts, and can those lessons give policymakers a greater understanding of future challenges? To compare America’s two longest wars and create lessons learned, this article will look at four variables: policy objectives, popular support, tactics and terrain, and government partners. The comparisons between the conflicts are not limited to these variables, but this article will restrict the scope of the analysis to these four critical topics.
Policy Objectives
In both Afghanistan and Vietnam there appeared to be a slow descent rather than a deliberate commitment to full-scale intervention. This failure to initially develop clear, accurate strategic goals and tangible steps to achieve those goals hamstrung efforts in both countries.
After the shocking events of 9/11, the United States and its coalition partners invaded Afghanistan to defeat Al-Qaeda and deny terrorists a safe haven to plan further attacks against the United States and its allies. This remained a key aim of the conflict, but over nineteen years other objectives took precedence. As the conflict stretched, nation-building became the primary objective, namely providing security to the population, assisting the government, and funding development projects. In 2011, then Commander, United States Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A), General Stanley McChrystal claimed the new strategy was analogous to nation-building with 95% of the coalition effort focused on supporting the population and 5% on targeting insurgents. This mission creep, combined with an undefined end-state frustrated multiple presidential administrations and stretched the conflict out while never accomplishing the original, primary mission: denying terrorists a safe haven.
In Vietnam, the main policy objective was to avert communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Policymakers thought a communist Vietnam would be the first domino in a wave of communist takeovers in Thailand, Laos, and throughout the region. The strategy on the ground was to support the South Vietnamese government from both an internal threat, the Viet Cong guerrillas, and an external threat, the North Vietnam government. Unlike Afghanistan, American strategy did not initially focus on nation-building. The South Vietnamese had a functioning government that was in place before America’s intervention, but its ineffectiveness hampered U.S. efforts. This strategy turned a local insurgency into an existential threat and confused U.S. policymakers and warfighters. The U.S. Strategy in Vietnam seemed to change and morph with new administrations, without committing to one effective path. As Lyndon Johnson claimed in his 1971 memoir, Vietnam “was a political war, an economic war, and a fighting war—all at the same time.” U.S. support to South Vietnam began with an advisory presence, escalated to conventional warfare, then eventually to a strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam and its neighbors to try and force a peace settlement.
An inability to accurately define and adhere to strategic goals and then combine those goals with obtainable tactical objectives resulted in mission creep and a quagmire in both countries. The initial strategic goals of both conflicts were dramatically different, but both saw the tactical objectives change significantly over time. Eventually presidential administrations in both conflicts realized they could neither accomplish the goals, nor “declare victory and get out.” As the conflicts wound down, the overall strategy shifted to finding a diplomatic solution and attempting to preserve credibility, secure even small gains, and not abandon allies.
Popular Support
Both Vietnam and Afghanistan dragged on too long at too high a cost to sustain public support. Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden were each unable to reverse a slowly declining rate of public approval as more and more Americans became disillusioned with the war and their support changed to opposition.
The initial invasion of Afghanistan had almost unanimous U.S. approval. On September 14, 2001, Congress passed Senate Joint Resolution 23 authorizing the use of military force in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks 98-0 with two non-votes. And in November 2001, a poll by CNN/Gallup/USA Today indicated that 92% of Americans backed military action in Afghanistan. Eighteen years later, U.S popular support for troops fighting abroad was not so overwhelming. In a 2019 survey, only 38% of respondents believed it was the correct decision to send troops to Afghanistan and just 19% believed the invasion was a success. The existential call to arms Americans felt immediately after 9/11 faded during 19 years of unending combat. Afghanistan was the longest war in American history and U.S. soldiers who were not even born on 9/11 were deployed to Afghanistan by the end of the war.
Unlike the war in Afghanistan, the war in Vietnam had no clear beginning. But for the American populace, 1965 and its massive influx of troops and sustained bombing campaign served as the overt starting point for American intervention in the country. In 1965, support for the Vietnam war was at its highest point with 63% of respondents supporting the conflict. Support remained high in 1966 but then started a slow and gradual decline till its lowest point of only 32% of respondents supporting the war in March 1970. The decline in support for the Vietnam conflict was quicker than the decline in Afghanistan, but Vietnam did not have the same strong unifying event that 9/11 initially provided.
Like Afghanistan, American support for military intervention in Vietnam and the defense of democracy was initially high but slowly faded as casualties increased and the stalemate dragged on. Both conflicts point toward a certain lesson: the longer a conflict goes on without an identified end state or clear policy objective, the public will become less likely to support continued commitment of U.S. blood and resources.
Tactics and Terrain
Both conflicts were composed of conventional tactics and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in daunting, unforgiving terrain. Modern technology like precision bombing and night vision aided in Afghanistan, but ultimately the COIN tactics remained markedly similar. Taliban guerillas are similar in many aspects to Viet Cong guerillas, with both consisting of decentralized fighting groups and shadow political leadership who used their familiarity with the terrain to mitigate the U.S.’s technological superiority. And in both conflicts’ safe havens in Pakistan or Cambodia and Laos played key roles in supporting the insurgent force.
Post-invasion, Afghanistan became the modern implementation of COIN strategy through attempts to build up governance and win the hearts and minds of the populace to delegitimize and ultimately defeat the insurgency. In Afghanistan, COIN strategy emphasized improving Afghan security forces, enhancing intelligence, and developing infrastructure. But soldiers faced an enemy that used the rugged mountains and karez systems to avoid conventional engagements and choose their own time and place for attacks, usually against the very government systems the U.S. was attempting to legitimize. The Taliban had great success attacking Afghan security forces who were separated from coalition forces. The enemy was adept at employing cover and concealment, surprise, and hasty retreat to live to fight another day. Safe havens in Pakistan created a “fighting season” during the summer and fall months before fighters and leadership would retreat across the mountain for rest and recovery as winter snow closed the passes.
From 1965 to mid-1968, America’s tactic in Vietnam was to cause sufficient casualties among the North Vietnamese soldiers and Viet Cong guerrillas that they would quit or sue for peace. From 1968 to 1972, COIN operations came to the forefront. The U.S. tried to enable the local South Vietnamese forces and build the legitimacy of the government but the conventional search and destroy mission continued. The Combined Action Program, which peaked in 1970, was an example of a successful COIN strategy but it was limited and never received sufficient support to make a difference in the conflict. Like Afghanistan, battles in Vietnam were distinguished by punishing terrain. Vietnam was fought in thick underbrush and dense jungles. Most firefights occurred between dismounted infantry units and lasted for several hours before the insurgents would disappear back into the jungle. And like the Taliban, Vietnamese fighters were also able to use safe havens in neighboring countries to rest, refit, and resupply.
Despite a concerted COIN campaign in Afghanistan, and because of a half-hearted campaign in Vietnam, the United States failed to win the hearts and minds of the population sufficiently to rally the populace and deny the enemy support. The belligerents were then able to implement a strategy of wearing down and outlasting the United States and did not need to win conventional battles. This strategy was boosted by the Taliban and Viet Cong’s access to external safe havens. Although tactics evolved and changed, the brutal nature of the terrain favored insurgency in Afghanistan and Vietnam and the presence of sanctuaries greatly aided the enemy. The thick jungle and rugged mountains limited the success of American airpower. When the U.S. was able to deploy air support, the enemy could melt away and avoid decisive engagements. COIN strategy had some limited tactical success in both countries, but the inadequate commitment of resources, shortcomings of the partners in both countries, and insurgents’ safe havens hamstrung COIN efforts.
Government Partners
The Central governments in both Afghanistan and Vietnam had rampant corruption, were inept, and considered to be puppets of the United States. This created a lack of public support for America’s allies and drastically increased the difficulty of COIN operations. The illegitimate government in Vietnam helped the Viet Cong recruit and in Afghanistan prompted most Afghans to support neither the Taliban nor the government, a win for the insurgent group.
The lack of government legitimacy in Afghanistan complicated the U.S.’s COIN strategy. Hamid Karzai became the first President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan during national elections held in October 2004 after heading the Afghan Interim and Transitional Authority since 2002. Karzai’s administration was dogged by allegations of corruption and ineffectiveness throughout his tenure. Ashraf Ghani succeeded Karzai as President of Afghanistan in 2014 and reelected in 2019. But Ghani’s legitimacy was questioned throughout his time in leadership. Allegations of electoral fraud resulted in protracted stalemates, and finally a power-sharing agreement with his primary opponent, Abdullah Abdullah. The successive governments in Afghanistan were so ineffective that in some areas the Taliban’s shadow governance was considered more legitimate and delivered needed services and security that the government could not.
Like Afghanistan, the series of South Vietnam Government figures that the U.S. partnered with were corrupt and illegitimate in the eyes of the Vietnamese people. The government of Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem was unable to rally the populace due to corruption and authoritarian rule. He was overthrown by General Duong Ban Ming who was replaced in 1964 by General Nguyen Khanh. Finally, as America began to dramatically increase its participation in the war, another coup resulted in General Nguyen Van Thieu becoming the nominal head of state. In 1967, South Vietnam held its first elections under a new bicameral system. Thieu was elected with a majority of the popular vote, quickly consolidated power, and ran unopposed in 1971 in a sham election. The series of authoritarian, military dictatorships and fraudulent elections created a corrupt and illegitimate government that negatively affected U.S. operations and South Vietnamese support for the conflict.
Counterinsurgency operations are difficult under the best of circumstances, but working by, with, and through a corrupt state makes COIN almost impossible. In COIN, the U.S.’ primary role is to enable a host nation that must be capable of providing civil control and security. If the host government is incapable or unwilling to provide basic security, the best outcome COIN operations could hope to achieve is a stalemate.
Conclusions
Afghanistan was the closest experience to Vietnam that America suffered since Vietnam. America’s decades-long failed involvement in both countries has left a legacy of a divided country and discredited foreign policy. The Vietnam and Afghanistan wars are eerily similar in that the U.S. found itself entangled with unclear goals, soaring costs, and little chance for success. Both conflicts featured blurry battle lines, nebulous objectives, undefinable victories, and inhospitable terrain that nullified the U.S. airpower and physically punished its ground forces. The parallels between the lessons in Vietnam and the lessons relearned during the occupation of Afghanistan are glaring. Successful COIN or nation-building requires an effective, legitimate government. Safe havens, which allow insurgents to rest and recover, prolong the conflict and increase the difficulty in defeating them or compelling them to the negotiating table. Terrain can mitigate U.S. technological superiority. And a lack of an identified end state and tangible steps to achieve that end state will lead to a drawn-out conflict and the eventual loss of popular support. The legacy of the Vietnam war resulted in a new strategy for warfighting– using military only if there was a clear, attainable goal, employing overwhelming force, and having a defined exit strategy. These lessons appeared to have been forgotten post 9/11 to the detriment of U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan.
Like Vietnam, the war in Afghanistan will likely have little lasting strategic achievements as the Taliban reconstitute their oppressive rule, now aided by a sense of victory and abandoned U.S. military equipment. However, the U.S. should endeavor to codify the lessons learned again in Afghanistan. The second Trump administration is facing challenges across the globe, from near peer competitors, failed states, and drug cartels and now a possible regional conflict in the Middle East. When deciding if or when to intervene in a foreign country, the failures of Vietnam and Afghanistan should be a crucial influence in whatever foreign policy decision the administration makes. Clearly defining objectives, installing or supporting a legitimate partner, understanding and adapting tactics to the terrain, and denying the enemy a safe haven should be critical factors in defining an engagement strategy, wherever in the world it may happen.
Disclaimer: The views expressed here are solely those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the views, policies, or positions of the US Government, US Department of Defense or its components, including the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College.
