Did the West Provoke Putin’s War on Ukraine?
Abstract: A number of prominent scholars, journalists, and politicians have advanced the thesis that the West provoked Putin into attacking Ukraine by enlarging NATO into Central and Eastern Europe and by declaring in 2008 that Ukraine would become a member as well. The dubious assumptions on which this thesis is based are contradicted by my personal experiences at NATO and with Vladimir Putin, which show, first, that the Russian Government has always known that NATO’s 2008 declaration was essentially hollow; and second, that well before he became Russian President, Putin saw the West as an adversary and believed Ukraine naturally belonged to Russia’s sphere of influence. Putin’s war against Ukraine is best seen, therefore, as Putin’s last-ditch effort to stifle Ukrainian efforts to escape from Russia’s orbit rather than the result of Great Power competition.
Did the West Provoke Putin’s War on Ukraine?
I would argue that attributing responsibility to the West for provoking Putin ignores that he has long been on a quest to return Russia to a position of dominance over Ukraine and other countries in Eastern Europe. During his politically formative years in the 1980s and 90s, Putin served as a KGB operative in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and then as a city official in St. Petersburg. His words and deeds over these years demonstrate that his original and enduring goal has been to return Russia to great power status with all the trappings that accompany such a position, including the domination of neighboring states.
From this perspective, the war in Ukraine would primarily be the result of Putin’s desire to end Ukraine’s persistent efforts to escape the Russian orbit. Rather than try to explain the war in Ukraine as a consequence of great power competition, it seems to me more likely that the war is the outcome of great power/lesser power dynamics.
Critiquing the Thesis of Western Responsibility
The current debate over responsibility for the war in Ukraine effectively began with an article written by John Mearsheimer in 2014, which argued that the West was at fault for the events leading up to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Mearsheimer sees the ongoing conflict in Ukraine as a consequence of NATO’s 2008 declaration that Ukraine would (someday) become a member of the Alliance. On several occasions since the war began in February 2022, Mearsheimer has reiterated his view that NATO’s engagement with Ukraine sparked Putin’s decision to take military action.
Recently, Mearsheimer has – if anything – dug in on his thesis of Western responsibility, advancing seven reasons to reject the conventional wisdom and an additional three reasons why NATO enlargement was the cause of the war that are readily contradicted by facts accessible to almost any reader. Despite the dubious nature of some of Mearsheimer’s assertions, his view has attracted a number of influential adherents, including a prominent expert on Russia’s economy, a former fellow at the CATO Institute, and President Trump’s personal envoy to Putin.
This thesis of Western responsibility makes a number of assumptions that are open to question. Among these are: first, that great power competition is the driving force behind all international conflicts; second, that the real purpose of NATO enlargement, regardless of NATO’s explanations for how enlargement has come about, was to expand Western influence; third, that NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Declaration that Ukraine (and Georgia) would join NATO was an operational declaration; and fourth, that Putin has not been proactive, but reactive in his policy decisions, which, presumably, would be relatively benign in the absence of Western “provocations.”
The last two assumptions are especially pivotal. My own experience at NATO from 2000 to 2002, engaging with diplomats assigned to the Russian Mission to NATO, convinces me that the Russian Government has a very clear understanding of how NATO operates. From personal involvement in similar communiques, I know that documents such as the Bucharest Declaration are the product of compromises between NATO members desiring to find common language on key issues. I also know – as the Russian Government must know – that a declaration supporting membership without establishment of a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine means there will be no concrete steps towards membership, despite the wording of the declaration.
The MAP was established in 1999 to assist countries aspiring to join NATO meet certain political, economic and military criteria, including a democratic political system; a market economy; fair treatment of minority populations; an ability to make a military contribution to NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations, among other requirements. While the MAP has not been a prerequisite for membership (e.g., Finland and Sweden, as long-standing democracies did not need one before being admitted to NATO), for the states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and Yugoslavia, it became a virtual necessity. NATO has insisted that participation in the MAP does not imply a timeframe nor a guarantee of admittance to the Alliance (which requires a unanimous vote of current members), but in practice, successful completion of the MAP indicates a country has become a functioning democracy and is ready for membership.
Participation in the MAP also means a country obtains guidance from NATO in defining the goals it must achieve to fulfill NATO’s criteria and receives assistance from NATO in fulfilling those goals. Without such guidance and assistance, it would be hard for a country like Ukraine to meet the requirements for admission to NATO, as evidenced by the fact that for almost 17 years since the Bucharest Declaration, Ukraine appears almost no closer to membership now than it was then.
The Problem of Pinpointing Putin’s Views
The fourth key assumption of Putin being reactive, rather than proactive, is even more critical to the debate. If, from the start of his Presidency or even earlier, Putin saw a need to obtain control over Ukraine, then the argument that the West bears responsibility for the war in Ukraine is considerably weakened.
It is not a simple matter, however, to decipher what Putin thought and when. There is very little public record of his attitudes and beliefs before he became a Russian national political figure in 1999. Putin did not stand for elective office and made no campaign speeches. To the extent that Putin made public statements while he served in the St. Petersburg city government in the 1990s, these were in the form of official announcements rather than speeches on policy. Until he ran for President in 2000, there was simply no reason for Putin to make his views public.
There are several sources, however, that help delineate Putin’s attitudes and beliefs during their formative period. First, there are Putin’s own written works, published at the time he became a national political figure. His article, Russia at the Turn of the Millennium, was published on 29 December 1999 (and reprinted as an appendix to his later so-called “autobiography“). The article serves as a political campaign document that contains Putin’s ideas for rectifying Russia’s “groping in the dark without having a clear understanding of national objectives and advances which would ensure Russia’s standing as a developed, prosperous and great country of the world.” It contains an analysis of Russia’s economic situation at the time, lessons to be learned from Russia’s Communist past and the immediate post-Communist decade, and Putin’s proposals for Russia’s future as a strong, centralized state with a robust economy.
A second written work that appeared in early 2000 was Putin’s book, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President, which is generally referred to as his “autobiography” even though it is not an autobiography in the traditional sense, but a compilation of Putin’s (propagandistic) responses to questions posed to him in a series of sessions with selected journalists. The autobiography recounts Putin’s views on his life, career, politics, and world events, including his KGB service in the GDR and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the war in Chechnya, the NATO intervention in the war between Serbia and Kosovo, and relations between Russia and NATO. That both works appeared at the start of Putin’s national political career suggests that they reflect thoughts he already held before he ascended to national office.
The accounts of Putin’s rise to power produced by notable journalists and scholars are also helpful in discerning the attitudes motivating Putin’s behavior. While these authors have not uncovered pronouncements by Putin on his worldview during his politically formative period – a problem highlighted by Hill and Gaddy, in particular – their detailed accounts of Putin’s childhood, his service in the KGB, and his deeds and misdeeds as a city official in St. Petersburg, all serve to define the framework within which Putin’s ideas developed.
Putin has Always Viewed the West as an Adversary
A final source for understanding Putin’s thinking consists of statements Putin made in private about his views on politics and the world. Most of these statements were to colleagues and subordinates in the St Petersburg city government, who have generally been reluctant to reveal what Putin said to them. Because Putin was my designated interlocutor in the city government when I served at the U.S. Consulate in St. Petersburg in the early 1990s, as I have reported elsewhere, I was able to hold extensive personal conversations with him over a period of almost18 months, outside of our official interactions, that allowed me to plumb Putin’s views on Russia’s place in the world.
Putin’s personal history makes clear that from the beginning of his adult life, he viewed the West as an adversary. In his autobiography, Putin characterizes his work as a KGB operative in the GDR as “political intelligence.” He states that, “we were interested in any information about the ‘main opponent,’ as we called them, and the main opponent was considered NATO.” It would seem unlikely that a person with this particular background might evolve into a pro-Western politician, and evidence indicates that Putin did not. In our frank discussions in St Petersburg, Putin expressed to me his deep mistrust of the West. He believed Western leaders would help Russia only so long as it was to their own benefit. Friction with the West was inevitable because Russia’s interests were bound to diverge from those of other countries. Russia would have to stand up for its own interests.
Despite serving as deputy to the first democratically elected mayor of St. Petersburg, Putin was not enamored of Western democracy. Masha Gessen states that Putin was always trying to get the mayor “to see the disadvantages of the democratic system.” In our private discussions, Putin denigrated legislators as representatives of special interests, a criticism he repeated later in his autobiography, where he explains his poor relations with the city council as the result of its elected members lobbying someone’s interests. In several conversations with me, Putin disparaged political parties for the same reason. He also disparaged the idea of a free press and other democratic institutions.
Putin’s Break with the West as Russian President
At the time he assumed national office, Putin’s view of Western democracy had not changed. In his Millennium article, Putin writes that Russia will not become a second edition of the U.S. or Britain, “in which liberal values have deep historic traditions.” Instead, he argues for a state with a strong executive authority that will take the primary role in promoting, but also controlling, economic development, and will be the driving force behind change in Russia.
From virtually the start of his presidency, scholars such as Lilia Shevtsova detected Putin’s determination to be less deferential towards the West than he felt that Boris Yeltsin had been. Still, Putin’s anti-Western perspective was tempered by his pragmatic recognition that Western investment would be needed to help Russia’s economy catch up to the West. In both his autobiography and in his private conversations with me, Putin said his experience in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had convinced him that economic reform would be the only way for Russia to recover from mistakes made under communism.
After assuming national office, Putin initially continued to cooperate with the West, despite his criticism of Western actions, such as NATO’s intervention in the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia (designated by NATO as “Operation Allied Force”), that was justified by NATO on humanitarian grounds, but which Putin characterized in his autobiography as a “direct violation of UN decisions.” Within a short period, however, Putin began to feel that his cooperative gestures, such as offering support for U.S. use of former Soviet military bases in Central Asia in the War on Terror, and his acceptance of U.S. terms on how to reduce strategic nuclear weapons in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), were not reciprocated.
Once Putin found that the United States continued its criticism of his domestic policies and was unwilling to treat Russia as an equal internationally, he saw little reason to maintain cooperation with the U.S. In particular, Putin was angered by the unwillingness of the U.S. to modify its international behavior to accommodate Russian interests and by U.S. support for the so-called “color” revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) that brought about changes in the governments of those states that threatened to undermine Russian hegemony in the so-called Near Abroad (the former parts of the Soviet Union that became independent countries after the collapse of the USSR). In his speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin abandoned his pragmatic approach, denouncing the U.S. in Soviet-style language that reflected a renewed adversarial perspective and effectively put an end to cooperation with the West.
Putin’s Quest to Return Russia to Great Power Status
In his conversations with me in the early 1990s, Putin repeatedly made clear his view that Russia would have to rely on itself to regain its “rightful” status as a great power. This rightful status included acceptance by the U.S. and its allies that Russia’s sphere of influence included the Near Abroad and Eastern Europe. In this connection, Putin particularly emphasized that it was “in the natural order of things” for the states making up the Near Abroad to act in harmony with Russia.
At the time that Putin became a national political figure, his goal for Russia had not changed. In his Millennium article, Putin states flatly that, “Russia was and will remain a great power.” He goes on to delineate a long-term strategy for rebuilding Russia’s economy as a means of achieving a position of strength. Putin was more circumspect in discussing Russia’s relations with its neighbors, but at several points in his autobiography, he revealingly bemoans the “loss of the Soviet position in Europe” as his only regret pertaining to the collapse of communism.
As Russian President, Putin has attempted to dominate neighboring countries, including Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, through military integration (through the Collective Security Treaty Organization) and economic integration (through the Eurasian Economic Union). He has also sought leverage over Eastern and Western Europe by creating dependencies on Russian energy or exploiting existing dependencies.
Putin’s Campaign Against Ukraine
Ukraine occupied a special place in Putin’s plans because of its history and geography. After assuming the Russian presidency, Putin repeatedly intervened in Ukraine’s domestic affairs to try to steer Ukraine to a pro-Russia course. Initially, Putin’s efforts involved manipulation of Ukrainian politics and elections, but those were thwarted when the so-called Orange Revolution led to the invalidation of the rigged election of pro-Russia presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych in 2004.
Almost ten years later, another Putin effort to pressure Ukraine backfired. In November 2013, Yanukovych – who had been legitimately elected Ukraine’s president in 2010 – reneged on signing a trade and association agreement with the European Union (EU) at Putin’s urging, sparking popular protests. A heavy-handed police reaction, combined with the government’s adoption of repressive laws and Yanukovych’s announced intention to sign an economic agreement with Russia instead of the EU, led to an escalation of the protests that in early 2014 turned into the so-called Maidan Revolution. Unable to maintain control, Yanukovych fled the country and was voted out of office by the Ukrainian parliament, an act both he and Putin later characterized as a coup.
Putin responded to the crisis by annexing Crimea and providing support for pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas region. Evidence suggests this also marked the origin of Putin’s planning for an eventual invasion. Following the election of Volodymyr Zelensky as Ukrainian President in 2019, negotiations directly between the two men failed to resolve the situation in the Donbas. Subsequent actions and public comments on both sides exacerbated their political disagreements and their personal animosity to the extent that Putin presumably felt he had no other option but to resort to Russian military might to achieve his goals in Ukraine, just as he has done in Moldova, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.
In this context, it is important to note the continuity in Putin’s perspective as demonstrated by his statement that he is emulating Peter the Great in taking back territory that once belonged to Russia, and by his speeches and screeds disputing Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent country. More evidence may be found in Russia’s December 2021 proposal, immediately rejected by NATO because of its potential limits on the rights of sovereign states, for a security deal with the West that would require NATO to cease all military activities in Eastern Europe and the states making up the Near Abroad.
NATO May Be the Excuse, but It Is Not the Cause of Putin’s War
Russian-Ukrainian discord did not begin with Putin’s rise to power. Relations between the two countries have been fractious since the emergence of an independent Ukrainian state following the collapse of the USSR. Given this strained history and given Putin’s long-held desire to make Russia a great power again – an important component of which is bringing Ukraine to heel – it seems simplistic to argue that Putin’s invasion is a reaction to NATO’s years-old declaration regarding eventual Ukrainian membership. Such an assertion fits neither with the vision for Russia that Putin has held since his politically formative years in St. Petersburg, nor with the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations since the collapse of the USSR. Nor does the idea that Putin is reacting to NATO’s actions align with his agenda and behavior. Since becoming Russian president, Putin has been proactively attempting to achieve his goals for Russia, not reacting to the actions of others.
Putin’s current view of NATO as an adversary did not develop in recent years. Its origins can be traced to his KGB days in the GDR. In this sense, it is probably NATO’s continued attractiveness to smaller countries in Europe seeking freedom from Russian domination, rather than any NATO actions per se, that has aroused Putin’s ire and served as his self-justification for making war on Ukraine.
Throughout history, there have been numerous examples of smaller powers trying to escape the shadow of larger powers, while larger powers aim to maintain their positions of dominance. The war in Ukraine fits this mold. Ukraine’s desire to join NATO – and also the EU – is another example of a small country seeking to escape domination by a large one. Putin launched his war in what is perhaps a final effort, after a string of failures, to prevent Ukraine’s escape. The conflict was not caused, as the realist critique would have it, by Western initiatives to contest Russian control over Ukraine. Rather – as Ukraine’s success and determination on the battlefield continue to show – it is the Ukrainians themselves who are contesting Putin’s self-proclaimed right to dominate them.
