Authoritarian Consolidation through Crisis: The Instrumentalization of the July 15, 2016 Coup Attempt and Terrorism in Turkiye
On July 15, 2016, Türkiye experienced one of the most anomalous coup attempts in its modern history, an event still shrouded in ambiguity. The ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) has consistently failed to pursue a transparent and impartial investigation into the unresolved dimensions of the coup attempt. Instead of enabling an independent inquiry, the AKP has promoted a politically expedient narrative, suppressing dissent, and imprisoning those who challenge the official account.
Once considered a model for reconciling Islam and democracy, Türkiye’s democratic institutions have steadily eroded under the AKP’s increasingly authoritarian rule. The 2016 coup attempt marked a turning point, providing the regime with a pretext to further consolidate power. Since then, the AKP has systematically instrumentalized counterterrorism rhetoric to justify sweeping constitutional changes and to restructure the state apparatus in alignment with its political objectives.
This article critically interrogates the events of July 15, examines the hypothesis that the coup was staged or exploited by the AKP, and analyzes how the regime has leveraged the threat of terrorism to consolidate its authority. The July 15 coup attempt displayed several irregularities that diverged from conventional military coup strategies. Launched during prime-time hours, the operation appeared more symbolic than strategically coherent—only one lane of the Bosporus Bridge in Istanbul was blocked, and control over Istanbul Airport was limited and temporary. Notably, no high-ranking political leaders were directly targeted, and there was no comprehensive effort to seize control of major media outlets. Instead, the plotters focused solely on the state broadcaster TRT1, a channel with relatively limited national viewership. These inconsistencies have led scholars and political commentators to question both the motives and the authenticity of the attempt, prompting ongoing debates over whether the event was a genuine coup or a manipulated scenario aimed at political consolidation.
Although President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his administration officially characterized the events of July 15, 2016, as a military coup attempt, alternative interpretations have been offered by opposition figures and international observers. Former Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu referred to the incident as a “controlled coup,” suggesting it may have been anticipated or manipulated to serve political ends. Similarly, then–U.S. Vice President Joe Biden remarked on the surreal nature of the event, likening it to “watching a video game.” When asked to identify a questionable government initiative, then–Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım tersely responded, “July 15,” hinting at the ambiguity surrounding the incident. Selahattin Demirtaş, the imprisoned former co-chair of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi – HDP), contended that President Erdogan had been strategically prepared for the situation and adeptly used it to consolidate power.
Despite the divergent narratives regarding the coup’s nature and origins, what remains indisputable is its transformative effect on Turkish politics. The July 15 incident marked a critical inflection point, accelerating Türkiye’s drift toward authoritarianism and distancing the country from Western democratic norms.
The author’s interview with a former CIA officer who was stationed in Ankara during the July 15, 2016 coup attempt provides critical insights into the event’s inconsistencies. The officer noted that while he had no direct evidence, it was plausible that certain military units had been misled while others were ordered to respond, contributing to the coup’s chaotic nature and reinforcing the perception of internal division within the military. American Embassy personnel reported that a helicopter appeared to fire on the TRT state television building in Ankara, but the rounds were likely blanks, suggesting a symbolic, rather than tactical, action. The officer further emphasized that the Turkish military, known for its professionalism and past coup experience, would not have conducted such a poorly executed operation, such as only closing one direction of the Bosphorus Bridge. He described Turkish officials’ behavior during the coup as disorganized and amateurish, stating that their public appearances resembled “bad acting.” Finally, the officer dismissed allegations of U.S. involvement as unfounded, arguing that the United States had no strategic interest in supporting a coup in Türkiye in 2016, especially in the absence of a credible, pro-Western alternative capable of ensuring national stability and preserving NATO and bilateral defense commitments.
Unanswered Questions and Critical Inconsistencies Surrounding the July 15 Coup Attempt
The government’s exclusive promotion of its own narrative, along with the imprisonment of individuals who questioned or challenged it, and the lack of transparency in post-coup investigations have led many analysts to view the July 15 coup attempt as a potentially orchestrated event intended to serve the political interests of the AKP regime. The persistence of unanswered questions, including why the government and its bureaucrats failed to prevent the coup despite early warnings, how the investigations have exhibited bias, and how contradictory elements of the official account emerged, underscores the need for critical inquiry. This article addresses several of these questions as part of a broader examination of the coup attempt and its aftermath.
Parliamentary Commission and Omission of Key Figures
The AKP formed a parliamentary commission with the stated goal of investigating the July 15 coup attempt and compiling a comprehensive report. However, the commission’s findings were eventually removed from the official parliamentary website, raising serious concerns about transparency. Moreover, the commission deliberately avoided summoning two key figures whose actions on the night of the coup remain central to understanding what transpired: then-Chief of ll Staff Hulusi Akar and then-head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), Hakan Fidan. Both individuals reportedly held meetings with high-ranking military personnel in the hours leading up to the coup, yet provided inconsistent or incomplete accounts of their roles. Despite the AKP’s insistence on the culpability of Fethullah Gulen, the opposition, and even foreign actors such as the United States, these two critical officials were never required to testify before the commission. Why did the AKP government, while asserting it possessed strong evidence against external and internal actors, avoid the appearance of Akar and Fidan before the commission?
Promotion Despite Alleged Failures
Hulusi Akar and Hakan Fidan, despite their apparent failure to anticipate and prevent the July 15 coup attempt, were not only spared from punitive measures but were instead promoted in the days following the event. This raises critical questions about accountability and governance within the AKP administration. In democratic systems, officials who fail to fulfill their duties in matters of national security are typically subject to investigation, removal, or sanction. Why, then, were Akar and Fidan elevated rather than held responsible? What political, strategic, or institutional factors influenced these decisions, and what implications do these promotions have for civil-military relations and the rule of law in Türkiye?
Conflicting Accusations and Lack of Evidence Regarding Coup Plotters
The AKP government has advanced multiple competing theories regarding the alleged perpetrators of the July 15 coup attempt, implicating actors such as the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and the followers of Fethullah Gulen. Despite these accusations, no conclusive evidence has been publicly presented to substantiate any of these claims. In an interview conducted by the author, Henri Barkey, a prominent American scholar and expert on Turkish affairs, categorically denied any involvement in coup-related activities and stated that he had never met any of the individuals accused by the regime. This raises critical questions about the rationale behind the AKP’s broad attribution of blame to disparate actors with no apparent coordination or common interest. Why has the AKP insisted on promoting such a wide array of unsubstantiated claims, and what political purposes might these shifting narratives serve?
Scale and Resources of the Coup Attempt
According to a statement released by the Turkish General Staff, approximately 8,651 soldiers participated in the July 15 coup attempt. The operation involved 35 aircraft, 37 helicopters, 246 tanks and armored vehicles, 3 naval vessels, and 3,992 light weapons. The statement also characterized the overall scale of military participation as representing only about 1.5 percent of the armed forces. In an interview with the author, a former CIA officer emphasized that the Turkish military possesses extensive experience in executing coups and could have succeeded had there been genuine intent. Despite the limited number of active participants, the AKP regime purged or dismissed 24,256 high-ranking military personnel in the aftermath. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan later stated that out of 32,189 officers serving in the Turkish Armed Forces at the time, 10,468—roughly 33 percent—were expelled. Even more notably, among the 1,886 staff officers, 1,524—approximately 81 percent—were dismissed. Many of these individuals had reportedly acted to prevent or limit the impact of the coup. Nevertheless, the vast majority were accused of links to terrorism and subjected to harsh treatment, including torture and threats against their families. This raises fundamental questions: How were the purge lists compiled so rapidly and on what basis? To what extent were these actions part of a politically motivated effort to reshape the military rather than an evidence-based investigation into individual responsibility?
Questioning the Evidence and Investigation of Fethullah Gulen and Adil Oksuz
The AKP regime accused Fethullah Gulen and Adil Öksuz of orchestrating the July 15 coup attempt, with Oksuz allegedly overseeing Gulenist military personnel aligned with the Gulen movement. From the onset of the coup attempt, the AKP publicly designated Fethullah Gulen as the mastermind and sought his extradition from the United States. However, these accusations lacked substantial evidentiary support. A former CIA officer noted, “From a legal standpoint, the Turkish government did not present the United States with any shred of legal evidence proving Gulen’s involvement in the alleged coup attempt. Most documents submitted would not withstand scrutiny in any court of law, being replete with emotional rhetoric and speculative assertions insufficient for indictment or extradition. Moreover, the Turkish government declined to provide assurances regarding Gulen’s human rights protections if extradited. The mass arrests and purges of thousands of citizens further illustrated the regime’s likely approach to any trial. Some observers characterized the government’s collective response as unprofessional and reactionary.”
Conversely, the Gulen movement asserts that Adil Oksuz played a central role aimed at falsely implicating Gulenists with the coup attempt. Oksuz was detained near Akıncılar Air Base on July 16, 2016, yet released after only two days—despite widespread detentions of thousands of individuals during the same period. The justification for his release was that he had a fixed address and was not considered a flight risk. This leniency stands in stark contrast to the treatment of other detainees, many of whom were held without substantial evidence. Although the prosecutor appealed the release, requesting a formal arrest, the Higher Court rejected the appeal. In official documents, he was misleadingly listed not as a civilian, but as military personnel. Out of 99 suspects referred to court that day, only Adil Oksuz was released.
Further deepening the mystery, a senior adviser from the Prime Ministry visited Oksuz twice while he was in custody—visits later confirmed by the adviser—and communicated with him in Arabic. According to internal intelligence files, Oksuz was allegedly listed by the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) under the codename “Timsah” (The Crocodile), implying that he may have served as a converted informant.
These irregularities raise critical questions: Why was the AKP unable—or unwilling—to produce credible legal evidence linking Fethullah Gulen to the coup? What explains the lack of serious effort to apprehend and investigate Adil Öksüz? And why was a figure so central to the official narrative allowed to disappear without consequence?
The Post-Coup Purges: Preparedness or Opportunism?
President Erdogan described the failure of the July 15 coup attempt as a “gift from God,” a statement that signaled the AKP’s readiness to swiftly purge opposition elements within the government. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath—within just ten hours—the regime began detaining more than 3,000 judges and prosecutors, alongside thousands of police officers and military personnel. A former CIA officer critically questioned the credibility of the government’s actions, stating: “The simple question that we can pose to Erdogan and his government is: (a) If you did not know about the coup, how were you able, within 12 hours, to produce a list of over 10,000 government employees at various levels accused of being Gulenists and infiltrators? (b) If you did know about the coup and had such a list beforehand, why did you not arrest these suspects earlier to prevent loss of life? Regardless of their answer, they are culpable either for failing to act in time or for the questionable origins of these suspect lists.” This raises critical questions about the provenance of these lists: Who compiled them, and by what criteria did the AKP regime link these officials to the coup attempt?
Misidentification of the Coup as a Terrorist Attack
In the early hours of the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, there was a widely shared perception among military personnel that Türkiye was under a terrorist attack, specifically targeting the General Staff Headquarters and nearby military units. This misinterpretation was influenced by a series of terrorist incidents in the months preceding the coup, which had already heightened the sense of national insecurity.
According to the author’s interview with a Turkish retired military personnel, several senior commanders who were aware of the planned coup deliberately framed the unfolding events as a potential terror threat. This framing facilitated the mobilization of military personnel under the pretext of counterterrorism, effectively drawing them into the coup operation without full knowledge of its true intent. The military personnel referred to a classified directive issued to the Head of Intelligence at the Turkish General Staff, dated July 11, 2016. The directive warned of alleged intelligence indicating potential terrorist attacks targeting military barracks and the General Staff Headquarters.
The same retired military personnel emphasized that the attempted coup could have been averted had then-Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar issued an explicit directive clarifying the nature of the threat when intelligence reportedly emerged in the afternoon of July 15. However, no such directive was issued. On the contrary, the retired military personnel claimed that Akar’s inaction and ambiguous messaging contributed to the unwitting involvement of some personnel in the coup. Further corroborating this account, the CIA officer confirmed that U.S. intelligence initially assessed the incident as either a terrorist attack or a response to one—potentially involving members of the Turkish military—given the context of multiple terrorist attacks across Türkiye at the time, including those carried out by ISIS and the PKK. This mischaracterization raises critical questions: Who authorized the directives warning of an imminent terror threat? Why was the threat framed in this way? And how did this perception influence the decisions of military personnel who found themselves on duty during the coup attempt?
Contested Chronologies: The Prosecutor’s Report and the Problem of Predictive Documentation
According to a retired military personnel interviewed by the author, a critical document challenges the integrity of the official narrative surrounding the July 15 coup attempt. This document, included in the Akıncı Air Base trial file, is a formal report signed by Serdar Coşkun, who was serving at the time as a prosecutor in the Bureau for Crimes Against the Constitutional Order within the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office. Dated July 16, 2016, at 01:00 a.m.—approximately three hours after the attempted coup began—the report was intended to serve as an evidentiary foundation for the initial stages of the investigation and was subsequently distributed to relevant authorities. What renders this document particularly contentious is its inclusion of events that had not yet occurred at the time it was written. For instance, it describes the bombing of the Grand National Assembly and the intersection near the Presidential Complex as if these incidents had already taken place, despite the fact that they occurred later. Even more problematic is the inclusion of events that did not occur at all, such as the alleged siege of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) compound and the bombing of the Special Forces Command and Police Intelligence Directorate. The level of foresight implied by the report’s content suggests the possibility that it may have been prepared in accordance with a predetermined scenario. This leads to critical questions: What sources or “evidence” did the prosecutor rely on when drafting a report that referenced events not yet occurred or that never took place? How can such foreknowledge be explained in a supposedly spontaneous and chaotic moment of crisis?
Questioning the Official Narrative: Anomalies in the Alleged Bombing of the Turkish Grand National Assembly
The July 15, 2016 coup attempt involved numerous suspicious incidents, as well as actions by the ruling AKP government that suggest efforts to suppress scrutiny. These include the killing of military cadets—allegedly by jihadist groups—on the Bosphorus Bridge; the deaths of over 250 people, for whom ballistic analyses were reportedly not permitted by the government; and the deployment of snipers against civilians—an unprecedented occurrence not seen in previous military coups worldwide. One particularly questionable claim involves President Erdogan’s supposed narrow escape from a hotel in Marmaris on the night of the coup. However, according to the author’s interview with a British tourist who was staying at the same hotel, this account appears to be inaccurate. Among the most controversial aspects of the coup is the alleged bombing of the Grand National Assembly. The AKP government claimed that coup plotters targeted the parliament building using F-16 fighter jets. Yet journalist Ahmet Nesin raises serious doubts about this narrative. According to his observations, the crater in the garden lacks any burn marks or shrapnel, and appears almost suspiciously clean, with clearly defined borders. Additionally, a nearby building, located close to the supposed blast site, sustained no damage—an unlikely outcome given the destructive power of an aerial bomb. Photographs taken from the side show that structural columns lean inward, implying that the explosion may have occurred inside the building rather than being caused by an external airstrike. This is further supported by the fact that the adjoining building wall would have obstructed any side-on aerial attack. Another photo of the ground shows no visible signs of impact—no crater, no burns, and no damage even to wooden floorboards—suggesting that the area was left virtually untouched. Given the known impact capacity of an F-16 bomb, which would typically pierce both the ceiling and the floor, the absence of significant structural damage raises serious concerns about the credibility of the official account.
Narrative Inconsistencies and the Possibility of Foreknowledge in the July 15 Coup Attempt
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has offered multiple, and at times conflicting, accounts regarding when he first became aware of the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, raising concerns about the credibility and consistency of the official narrative. In various national and international media appearances, Erdogan provided differing timelines. Initially, he stated that he learned of the coup in the afternoon hours of July 15. However, in a CNN International interview on July 18, he claimed to have been informed around 8:00 p.m. On July 20, during an interview with Al Jazeera, Erdogan asserted that it was his brother-in-law who informed him of the attempted coup. Later, in a July 30 interview with ATV, he revised this timeline again, stating that he was notified by his brother-in-law at approximately 9:30 p.m. and subsequently attempted—unsuccessfully—to contact the head of the MİT at 10:00 p.m.
Additionally, Doğu Perinçek, leader of the nationalist-leftist Patriotic Party (Vatan Partisi) and an influential figure among the post-coup military leadership, publicly claimed that President Erdogan had been informed about the coup attempt one day in advance. Perinçek also made an official visit to Iran shortly after the coup and remarked on the mass purges within the Turkish Armed Forces by stating, “Türkiye is cleaning the connections of America from the Turkish military. They are all Americanist.”
Adding to the complexity, Erdogan later disclosed in 2017 that, on the night of the coup, in addition to the aircraft that transported him and his family, planes were also stationed at three separate locations as part of a diversion strategy. “We had planes at three different locations that night because we were going to create a diversion,” he said. This statement implies a level of premeditated coordination, suggesting that not only was Erdogan’s safety prioritized, but that the broader operational response may have been informed by prior knowledge.
These inconsistencies give rise to several critical questions: Were the decoy aircraft mobilized reactively or preemptively? How was such a logistically complex operation involving four planes and four airports executed within the tight timeframe of just 2.5 hours, as claimed by the official narrative? Given expert assessments that such an operation would typically require 5 to 7 hours of preparation, is it plausible that this deployment occurred without forewarning? What chain of command authorized these actions, and why were they only disclosed a year later? The discrepancies in Erdogan’s statements and the highly coordinated nature of his response invite deeper scrutiny into the timeline and internal dynamics of the events of July 15.
Exploitation of Terrorism
The weaponization of terrorism has become one of the most enduring legacies of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. In the post-9/11 era, the U.S. government increasingly employed the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” to justify a wide range of domestic and international actions—including the targeted killing of American citizens without due process. The label of terrorism has since evolved into a powerful political tool, often used to legitimize state actions that would otherwise be considered unlawful or unethical. This strategic framing has not remained confined to the U.S.; it has been exploited by authoritarian regimes across the globe. Leaders from Russia to the Middle East and Africa have exploited terrorism narratives to eliminate political opposition and consolidate power. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin used terrorism-related charges to silence political dissident Alexei Navalny, while authoritarian leaders across the Middle East and Africa have routinely branded opposition figures as terrorists to justify repression. Similarly, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has demonstrated a high level of proficiency in employing anti-terror rhetoric to suppress dissent and criminalize opposition movements.
Following the failed coup attempt in 2016, the AKP regime strategically utilized the concept of terrorism to label and suppress its political opposition. The most heavily targeted group was the Gulen movement. A central question that arises is why President Erdogan developed such strong animosity toward Gulen, ultimately seeking to eradicate his influence. According to the author’s interview with a retired high-ranking police chief, Erdogan believed that Gulen-affiliated police officers were responsible for the December 17 and 25, 2013 corruption investigations. However, this claim has not been substantiated by credible evidence.
The December 17 investigation used solid evidence and centered on allegations that Turkish officials helped Iran evade U.S. sanctions by opening escrow accounts in Turkish banks, in exchange for large bribes. The December 25 investigation focused on how a businessman known for financing al-Qaeda operated in Türkiye and was involved in corrupt government contracts.
Further insight is provided by a former CIA officer, who explained: “It is well known that Erdogan and Gulen used to be very close allies. However, Gulen noticed Erdogan’s increasing usage of Islamic religion as a political tool within Türkiye, and the immediate surrounding neighborhood, leaving Türkiye with practically no friends in the region. Erdogan’s behavior also triggered sensitivities with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who are usually looked at as the leaders of the Sunni Muslim world, especially that he started to present himself as an alternative to many Arab/Muslim leaders. Finally, Erdogan became more of a dictator/Sultan. For all these reasons, Gulen distanced himself from Erdogan and began to make public statements opposing Erdogan. That led to a rapid change in the nature of their relationship, from allies to enemies. Therefore, using Gulen as the enemy who plotted the alleged coup serves multiple purposes for Erdogan, including discrediting Gulen in the eyes of the Turkish public.”
The AKP regime officially designated the Gulen movement as a terrorist organization, labeling it the “Fethullah Terrorist Organization” (FETO). However, as noted in annexes of the U.S. State Department’s Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, “FETO” is not recognized as a designated terrorist organization by the United States.
Between 2016 and 2023, the AKP government initiated an estimated 2.2 million terrorism-related investigations against the Gulenists, in accordance with amended criminal procedural laws. Yet, data from the U.S. Department of State’s global terrorism database recorded only 434 terrorist incidents in Türkiye during the same period—most of which were low-scale attacks attributed primarily to the PKK. This stark disparity raises critical questions about the legitimacy and proportionality of the government’s counterterrorism narrative.
In the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, tens of thousands of individuals alleged to be affiliated with the Gulen movement were imprisoned, forcibly disappeared, or subjected to torture and other ill-treatment during interrogations. As of February 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had issued 44 judgments against Türkiye for violations of the European Convention on Human Rights, impacting 1,605 individuals and ordering the payment of approximately €7.3 million in compensation. The most common violations pertained to infringements on freedom of expression, the right to a fair trial, and the right to liberty and security. Similarly, United Nations bodies have reported widespread and systematic human rights violations, including arbitrary detention, a lack of judicial independence, and discriminatory practices.
There have been confirmed instances of sexual harassment and rape, particularly targeting women associated with the movement. The government’s repressive policies extended even to minors, with high school students being arrested over alleged affiliations. Members of the Gulen movement have been systematically excluded from employment in both public institutions and private sector companies, and they have been denied access to social security and health insurance. Individuals found to be offering financial or material support to movement members have been prosecuted under charges of aiding terrorism. Despite such widespread and severe state-sponsored repression, the Gulen movement has notably abstained from any acts of violence.
The AKP regime has also systematically employed terrorism-related charges to suppress political dissent and marginalize opposition groups, with a particular focus on the Kurdish population. One of the most emblematic cases is that of Selahattin Demirtaş, the former co-chair of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), a pro-Kurdish and leftist political movement that gained significant electoral support in the 2015 and 2018 general elections. Demirtaş was arrested in November 2016 on charges including “membership in a PKK” and “spreading terrorist propaganda,” primarily due to his political speeches and advocacy for minority rights. His detention has been widely condemned by international observers, including the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which ruled in 2018 and again in 2020 that his continued imprisonment was politically motivated and in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. Despite these rulings, Turkish authorities have refused to release him, citing new indictments.
In addition to targeting religious and ethnic groups, the AKP regime has systematically expanded its repression to encompass secular media outlets, opposition political parties, and even university students. Utilizing broadly defined and politically manipulated anti-terrorism laws, the government has launched investigations and prosecutions against journalists and media organizations critical of the ruling party, effectively stifling press freedom and suppressing dissenting voices. Prominent members of the CHP have also been accused of having affiliations with the PKK, with little to no substantiated evidence—raising concerns that such charges are being weaponized to delegitimize opposition forces. Similarly, the regime has intensified legal pressure on rising political figures such as Ekrem Imamoglu, the popular mayor of Istanbul, who is widely viewed as a credible challenger to President Erdogan. Imamoglu has faced multiple investigations and politically charged legal cases clearly aimed at undermining his public standing and disqualifying him from future electoral contests.
Moreover, the government’s authoritarian tactics have extended into the academic sphere. Students at Boğaziçi University who protested the government’s undemocratic appointment of a rector in 2021—an act that bypassed traditional university election procedures—were labeled as terrorists by government officials. Many were detained, surveilled, and subjected to legal proceedings under Turkiye’s expansive anti-terror laws.
Impacts and Conclusion
The instrumentalization of the July 15, 2016 coup attempt has provided significant political opportunities for the ruling AKP government. President Erdogan famously described the event as a “gift from God,” using it to justify an extensive political purge and a far-reaching transformation of Türkiye’s political system. In the aftermath, the AKP removed all perceived Gulenist elements from state institutions and initiated sweeping constitutional changes. During this period, opposition parties remained largely silent, framing the crisis as an internal confrontation between AKP-led political Islamists and the Gulenist movement, rather than a broader threat to democratic governance.
However, these constitutional changes and legislative overhauls came at a high cost. Türkiye’s already fragile democracy suffered severe setbacks, particularly in the erosion of checks and balances. Today, the executive branch exercises near-total control over both the legislative and judicial arms of government. This concentration of power has enabled the AKP to aggressively target opposition municipalities, most notably those governed by the Republican People’s Party (CHP), leading to the detention of numerous CHP politicians, including Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu.
The manipulation of the coup narrative has also facilitated a broader regime transformation, increasingly marked by kleptocratic governance. Türkiye’s international standing reflects this downward trajectory: the country fell from 52nd place in 2013 to 107th in 2024 in the Corruption Perceptions Index. One of the most significant consequences of this political shift was the mass dismissal of police officers and their replacement with individuals loyal to the AKP. This restructuring of law enforcement priorities led to a sharp decline in traditional policing efforts, particularly in areas such as organized crime, trafficking, and smuggling. Instead, law enforcement resources were largely redirected toward the persecution of alleged Gulenists, creating enforcement vacuums that were swiftly exploited by criminal organizations. Consequently, Türkiye has emerged as a key transit hub for transnational criminal networks, especially in the trafficking of cocaine between Latin America and Europe. The Organized Crime Index now ranks Turkey among the 14 countries with the highest levels of organized criminal activity and influence.
In conclusion, the AKP regime’s instrumentalization of the July 15 coup attempt and its broad application of terrorism discourse have profoundly eroded Türkiye’s democratic institutions, the rule of law, and its international credibility. By labeling wide segments of society—including journalists, academics, opposition figures, and civil society actors—as threats to national security, the government has cultivated a climate of fear and repression. Electoral integrity has been compromised, media freedoms have been curtailed, and judicial independence severely weakened. Throughout this democratic backsliding, much of the Western world remained conspicuously silent. As one former CIA officer observed, the institutional and societal damage inflicted during this period may take decades to repair. The decline of Türkiye as a democratic model in the region poses not only domestic risks but also significant geopolitical consequences for the West.
