Book Review | Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century (Second Edition)
Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century (Second Edition). By Anthony King. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2025. ISBN: 978-1-5095-6336-4. Maps. Photographs. Glossary. Notes. Sources Cited. Index. Pp. x, 292. $26.95.
Introduction
As odd as it might seem, a good deal of change has visited international affairs since Anthony King published the first edition of Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century in 2021. King, Director of the University of Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute, has revisited the subject of urban warfare at the most appropriate time. In the period between 2021 and the publication of King’s second edition of Urban Warfare, the United States ended its 20-year war in Afghanistan, Russia invaded Ukraine, Israel and Hamas went to war in Gaza again, Iran escalated its wars in the Middle East via its proxy networks, Bashar Al-Assad fell from power in Syria, India and Pakistan went to blows, and the list goes on.
Considering these conflicts, King’s original thesis – i.e., that urban warfare is a defining feature of 21st century armed conflict – has been all but confirmed by the conflicts that have unfolded in the interval between 2021 and today. As a result, the publication of King’s second edition of Urban Warfare is both timely and needed. However, and perhaps more importantly, Urban Warfare is foundational reading for anyone interested in – or required to be knowledgeable about – the study of armed conflict, the relationship between force structure and military operations, and the relationship that exists between geography, strategy, and military operations.
Summary
In a reorientation toward the conflicts that have occurred since the publication of Urban Warfare’s first edition, King examines his original thesis against the Russia-Ukraine War’s post-2022 phase and the Israel-Hamas Conflict, among others. In doing so, King provides three primary arguments. First, warfare in urban environments is becoming more frequent and increasingly prevalent in war. During much of the 20th century, land armies were large and when they fought, they fought across vast fronts in which urban areas were often minor considerations to much grander military operations. King takes the time to highlight several exceptions to this general rule, to include battles like World War II’s Stalingrad or the post-Soviet era battles of Grozny.
Nonetheless, 21st century land armies are significantly smaller than their predecessors. As a result, modern militaries don’t operate along fronts, but tend to operate at pinpointed locations on the battlefield, while economy of force operations are scattered across the theater’s remaining battlespace. King notes that many of these pinpoints happen to be towns and cities like Debal’tseve, Aleppo, Marawi, and Mosul. Accordingly, instead of hiding in the wash of large-scale combat, urban battles are the defining feature of 21st century war.
Second, King posits that sieges are not relics of a bygone era, nor isolated battlefield anomalies. As he clearly states, the blistering battles of Mariupol, Bakhmut, and Gaza (among many others) demonstrate sieges are prevalent, relevant, and persistent features of war in the 21st century. However, King notes that because armies today are quite small, sieges tend to occur within urban areas, and do not necessarily encompass an entire town or city. Rather, micro-sieges – or sieges within a city – are also a defining feature 21st century war. In his first edition, King made this case by discussing Operation Iraqi Freedom’s siege of Sadr City in 2008 – a US-led siege of an unruly district of Baghdad. In the second edition, King carries this idea forward by noting several micro-sieges that occurred in the Israel-Hamas conflict and the Russo-Ukrainian War.
Third, King points to maneuver warfare’s waning importance (and relevance) in 21st century war. At the same time, he highlights that positional and attritional warfare have ascended the throne and are currently the dominant forms of warfare in 21st century wars. King notes that this isn’t because of institutional preference, or for lack of effort to the contrary, per se, but because of a handful of complimentary and competing variables shaping the tone and tenor of warfare. Those variables include: (1) larger towns and cities than in the past, (2) increasing urbanization across the globe, (2) the decreasing size of modern militaries, (3) each combatants interest in survival, and (4) the increasing threat of sensor-based precision strike networks. To be sure, King writes:
Yet, as the urban battle has reached a higher level of intensity and enemy forces have been determined to hold a city, maneuver has become an illusion…Once an opponent has secured an area, urban warfare has become position. Siege conditions have set it (p. 175).
As a result, battles in and around urban areas – like the battles throughout the Gaza Strip and those in eastern Ukraine – will continue to be fought in close quarters, with combatants using position, movement, and firepower to incrementally make forward progress to their prospective military objectives. To put a finer point on that topic, King asserts that, “Urban warfare in the twenty-first century rarely involves maneuver, but rather a grinding war of position.” (p. 164)
Fourth, artillery remains the king of battle. Or as he writes, “Raw firepower remains an intrinsic element of the urban battle.” (p. 147) He finds that artillery remains king because combatants often choose to defend from, and thus attack into urban areas. As a result, attacking forces tend to rely on heavy firepower to overcome the defender-to-attack force ratio and protective structures that incumbers offensive operations in cities. This causes urban warfare to escalate into deadly, destructive, and drawn-out battles of attrition.
Fifth, King adds narrative warfare to the urban warfare equation. In doing so, he demonstrates how information communications technology (ICT), ranging from smart phones in the hands of non-combatants in areas of urban combat to the international news media, help aggregate narratives and contribute to influencing both domestic and international audiences. For instance, King adroitly captures how organic narratives emerged from Ukrainian battlefields as Russian forces pushed into cities like Kyiv, Kharkiv, and many cities dotting eastern and southern Ukraine. King traces that thread to illuminate the link between those organic, urban narratives and the larger Ukrainian information operations which strove to garner international support for Ukraine’s cause. He also highlights how competing narratives of the urban battles in Gaza have influenced domestic audiences across the globe and caused external actors, such as Iran, to openly intervene in the conflict. The addition of narrative is important because it helps pull urban warfare from what some might consider a nuanced facet of war and makes urban warfare more tangible across the spectrum of conflict and the strategic discourse.
In sum, King’s update to Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century has done two things. It uses thoroughly researched empirical data to all but validate his earlier thesis, while accounting for how ICT in urban combat impacts the larger strategic context. In doing so, King’s Urban Warfare is the definitive book for any policymaker, strategist, scholar, or military practitioner needing to understand both urban warfare today and in the future.
Analysis and Evaluation
Anthony King does a terrific job of illustrating urban warfare and its impact on military thought and strategy. He provides a tremendous amount of well-researched data, case studies, and sound methodological techniques to support his argument. In a relatively hot field of study today, Urban Warfare rightly sits atop contemporary contributions to the urban warfare studies community.
Whereas much of the research emerging from the urban warfare studies community focuses on the tactical and technical details of urban warfare, or topical ‘banner’ conversation topics, King’s incisive work compliments the community’s existing literature and general themes and concepts by smartly blending tactical considerations with operational and strategic factors. As a result, Urban Warfare provides a unique contribution that is applicable across all the levels of war, but is equally relevant to policymakers, scholars, and military analysts.
Conclusion
Anthony King’s second edition of Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century continues to demonstrate King’s place as a scholar and leader with few equals in the study of urban warfare. His ability to smartly blend tactical, operational, and strategic insights into a powerful package of ideas through relevant case studies and into a thoughtful narrative is without parallel in the war and urban warfare studies communities. King’s update to Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century should certainly sit atop anyone’s list of must-read books. Likewise, this book will quickly become the authoritative text on urban warfare.
What’s more, Urban Warfare is not just a niche study, nor the study of a discrete phenomenon in war. King expertly places battles, campaigns, and major operations in urban operating environments in the context of the larger wars in which they are a part. In doing so, King illustrates the strategic link between urban combat and how it contributes to the positive war outcomes of each belligerent. King’s research, grounded in evaluating the major conflicts since the publication of Urban Warfare’s first edition, reinforces the many long-standing continuities in war – wars are long, destructive, and expensive.
Moreover, King’s Urban Warfare clearly highlights that despite the increased investment in ICT, drones, precision strike, and autonomous systems on the battlefield, 21st century war is no less deadly or dangerous than at any time in the past. In fact, King’s research suggests otherwise. As wars become more urbanized, civilian harm and collateral damage will become more pronounced, the sting of battle will become starker for military forces (state and non-state), and the financial and political costs of war will increase in kind.
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