In Charting Trump’s National Security Policy, Look to Nixon for Inspiration
Introduction
As President Donald Trump develops his foreign policy during his first year back in office, he and his national security team should reflect on Richard Nixon’s presidency. Trump, like Nixon before him, confronts a world in disorder following a difficult political comeback. Trump must end a long-running and bloody war—in Ukraine, like Nixon did in Vietnam—and avoid a great-power armed conflict by strengthening deterrence and the balance of power. Like his forerunner, Trump must reconcile isolationist tendencies at home with the need to confront threats abroad. He must cope with existential dangers, like nuclear weapons but soon also AI and biohazards, outline a crisis management approach and a framework on the use of force, and rehabilitate planning in the National Security Council to confront and adapt to a diverse range of threats. With wars raging in Ukraine and Gaza, and tensions mounting in Taiwan and elsewhere, the Trump Administration needs to get its policy approach right.
The Nixon presidency offers a model for the conduct of disciplined statecraft. The former president’s policies reflected the political realities of his time, which have strong parallels with today. Nixon sought to balance the inward-looking sentiment of the U.S. electorate at the time with the need to carry through with America’s foreign commitments. His diplomacy could exert pressure on recalcitrant adversaries, when necessary, while working towards reciprocal and principled accords. Dr. Henry Kissinger, initially Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs and later concurrently Secretary of State, explained that Nixon confronted each international crisis by outlining the national interest and developing an inspired vision of the desired environment. He created incentives for restraint through bilateral agreement rather than unilateral concessions, always getting something in return. Nixon focused on three principles: the centrality of the national interest, the maintenance of the global equilibrium, and the conduct of sustained discussions among major countries to construct a framework of legitimacy within which the balance of power can be defined and observed. Nixon’s deliberate and structured approach to policy provided a rigor that has been lacking in U.S. international affairs in recent years. President Trump needs a similar methodology to examine contemporary security challenges effectively, build support for his vision, and achieve U.S. national security objectives.
Nixon was a consummate realist and assumed the presidency in 1969 after an improbable return to office. He had served as Dwight Eisenhower’s vice president for two terms and lost a run for the White House to John Kennedy following the controversial 1960 elections. The setback was compounded when Nixon later fell short in an election to be governor of California in 1962. But like Trump, in an extraordinary display of resilience, Nixon again campaigned for the presidency in 1968 and won a decisive victory.
Nixon came into the presidency as the American ground war in Vietnam was entering its fourth year and about ten months after the Tet Offensive played out on American televisions. Public sentiment, already opposed to the war by 1967, weighed on U.S. policy deliberations. In response, Nixon outlined his famous Nixon Doctrine: reaffirming U.S. treaty commitments; pledging a “shield” if a nuclear power threatened the freedom of a U.S. ally that was vital to American security; and in the cases of other forms of aggression, committing the United States to furnishing military and economic assistance, but looking to “the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.”
Negotiating with Adversaries
Nixon’s diplomacy could pressure intransigent adversaries, while striving for fair and legitimate agreements. He initiated tough diplomatic negotiations with the North Vietnamese to end the Second Indochina War with honor, while under mounting pressure from anti-war protesters and the congressional opposition at home. Nixon intensified the air campaign against the North, while General Creighton Abrams completed the successful Vietnamization of the war effort. These actions, combined with the U.S. opening to China, enabled Kissinger to hammer out the precarious 1973 Paris Peace Accords. While South Vietnam did fall in 1975, the U.S. congress does not escape a measure of responsibility, after it slashed the military and economic assistance to Saigon envisioned under the Nixon Doctrine.
Trump, like Nixon, faces difficult negotiations to end a tragic and costly war without surrendering U.S. interests. The intensified fighting in Ukraine is now in its fourth year. Many Americans are weary of foreign interventions in the aftermath of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and some question the large commitment of funds and material resources to support Kyiv. Trump has expressed his regret for the great loss of human life in Ukraine and must respond to public sentiment, while not selling-out U.S. allies and partners. He is determined not to repeat anything like the disastrous 2021 Afghanistan collapse, which emboldened America’s adversaries. Trump may have to intensify military, economic, and diplomatic pressure—like Nixon—and work with partners to incentivize the Kremlin during negotiations. Trump could prove more aggressive than Biden in shutting-down the delivery of Iranian weapons to Moscow and more persuasive in getting India onboard with international oil sanctions against Russia.
Nixon observed that the criticism of half-measures was often no less severe than for concerted actions, while the prospects of success were better for the latter. He favored a full throttled effort from the outset once a decision is made, such as when he extended support to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. This approach contrasts with the incremental U.S. military assistance to Kyiv and sanctions on Russia following the 2022 escalation of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.
At the time of this writing, Trump has spoken with presidents Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy about negotiating an end to the Ukraine War. Key administration officials have also had high level meetings. The trajectory until recently offered Putin a lose-lose proposition; either Russia gives up the territories it occupies in eastern Ukraine and ends its aggression or Moscow’s economic and diplomatic isolation become enduring. The emergence of a powerfully armed Ukraine fully integrated with the West—if not within NATO, as part of the European Union—seemed like a foregone conclusion. Michael Waltz, until recently the U.S. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, stated the goal of securing a permanent end to the Ukraine War. But after Russia’s extraordinary losses and recent advances, is Putin willing to make any concessions? With the territorial lines being the most visible measure of success, Putin may believe that any return of Ukrainian lands, after such enormous cost, could prompt challenges to his power.
An enduring agreement must be seen as legitimate by both sides and would likely require some return of Ukrainian territories. The compromise to Moscow might include home rule and local security arrangements, for example, in those areas vacated by Russian forces. The return of Ukrainian land can open the door to sanctions relief for Russia and possibly to future talks between Washington and Moscow on other important issues—such as limiting strategic arms and the militarization of space. Despite the desire for a definitive solution and given Putin’s reluctance to cede control of territory, the parties could find themselves in a two-stage negotiation, beginning first with a pause in hostilities (like in Gaza). In this case, the West cannot give away all the inducements only to obtain a cease fire; something must be left for the final settlement.
Nixon would advise on getting something in return for each concession, in exchange for Ukraine forgoing NATO membership, for example, and he would urge U.S. leaders today to understand what areas are nonnegotiable. During the discussions with Hanoi’s representatives to end the Vietnam War, the communist called for the removal of President Nguyen Van Thieu and other government officials in Saigon. Nixon and Kissinger rejected this demand and did not allow Hanoi to win in the negotiation what it could not accomplish on the battlefield. An interim cease fire agreement today may have to accept Russian forces in eastern Ukraine but should not legitimize their presence long-term. Doing otherwise would establish a dangerous precedent. A path must be left open for Russia’s future return into the community of nations following some measure of restitution—possibly in a post-Putin era. Nor should Moscow have any say on who governs in Kyiv or on the disposition of Ukrainian and NATO forces, which leaders will need to optimize continually to deter Russian aggression for the foreseeable future.
Strengthening Deterrence and the Balance of Power
Nixon’s three principles—outlined above and focused on interests, equilibrium, and legitimacy—guided his actions during his presidency and provide a useful framework for today’s national security challenges. Nixon’s 1972 visit to China was one of his signature achievements. Planned carefully during secret negotiations, the summit culminated in the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué. The document initiated the process that would later normalize relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China in 1979—at the cost of ending Washington’s recognition of the Republic of China in Taiwan. Nixon’s reproachment with China exploited the preexisting split between Beijing and Moscow and reset the superpower equilibrium. The present international landscape is different, as China has become the leading authoritarian power and an aspiring global hegemon.
After an extraordinary rise to possess the world’s second economy, China today is experiencing a shrinking population and workforce, hyper-inflated property values, and an overleveraged lending sector. Beijing is increasingly bellicose on the world stage, particularly towards Taiwan and the Philippines, the latter a key U.S. regional ally. Combined naval maneuvers between China and Russia near the Japanese home islands have caused distress in Tokyo, and a recent live fire drill in the waters between Australia and New Zealand forced the rerouting of civilian airliners. Beijing engages in ever more dangerous behavior, seeking advantage across a range of security, economic, and technology areas, while increasingly exercising covert influence within the United States and other countries. China seeks to shape global opinion and public policy in ways that distract, divide, and weaken its adversaries and benefit Beijing. However, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Xi Jinping’s threatening pronouncements and aggressive wargames have focused the mind of policymakers across Eurasia, with many countries becoming increasingly aware of their security challenges and looking to the United States for leadership and support.
If the first Trump term alerted the world to the China threat, his second presidency should intensify action, pushing back on Beijing’s mercantilism and indentured relations with other countries, theft of intellectual property and efforts to dominate critical technologies, patronage and corruption of academics and elites, algorithmic surveillance and control, and military bullying. The perilous strategic environment requires dispassionate judgement and shrewd far-sightedness to outline and achieve U.S. policy objectives.
America’s economic and security interests across the Asia-Pacific zone are extensive. The region accounts for a leading share of the world’s GDP growth and is home to an innovative technology sector with interdependencies with the West. The waterways through the Western Pacific are some of the busiest in the world and are key to U.S. trade. Many regional countries have representative governments and are naturally inclined towards the United States, but this alignment could change if Washington loses its nerve in keeping China’s more aggressive impulses in check—regarding a forceable annexation of Taiwan, for example. Were the United States to vacillate in its role of security guarantor, some vulnerable countries would seek accommodation with Beijing. While many Americans decry the U.S. supply-chain dependency on China, the U.S. position worsens considerably if Beijing develops the regional sphere of influence and control it clearly wants. Control over supply chains provides China with the means to coerce other countries, like when Beijing tried to restrict U.S. access to rare earth minerals as part of the dispute on trade tariffs. The PRC’s investments in its blue water navy, overseas basing, and strategic nuclear weapons program, for example, lay bare global ambitions and suggest Beijing will not remain appeased, even if granted generous concessions in the Pacific.
China’s unprecedented military buildup, combined with the “no limits” partnership between Xi and Putin, are straining the global power equilibrium. Nixon would urge corrective action to reaffirm the balance of power, bolstering America’s ability to deter, and if necessary, defeat aggression. Congressman Mike Gallagher, former chairman of the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, has called for strengthening the U.S. Navy and boosting U.S. munition production capacity and stockpiles, with emphasis on anti-aircraft, anti-ship, and land-attack precision strike systems. Missile defense, space control, and modernization of the U.S. nuclear triad are also essential, including the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, B21 stealth bomber, and Columbia class ballistic missile submarine. With China as the pacing challenge, the Trump Administration should prioritize those systems most helpful in blocking Chinese aggression in the First Island Chain and beyond, including Virginia class attack submarines, Hammerhead sea-mines, and bombers with long-range antiship missiles, which can disrupt and destroy naval formations and are not reliant on overseas basing. Carefully scripted military exercises can enhance deterrence by demonstrating the capability of these stealthy systems. For example, the United States could perhaps assemble decommissioned and condemned ships in a remote part of the ocean and obliterate them in an instance, allowing an adversary’s satellites to observe the destruction of the target fleet, while not detecting the approach of the strike force. The Replicator Program, which envisions large scale deployment of autonomous systems, must demonstrate resilience to electromagnetic attack now and in a future with powerful artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computers. Prudence would suggest DoD continue to hedge its bets by developing complementary manned and unmanned systems.
Consideration of the power equilibrium must now also include homeland defense. Adversaries like Russia and China will use space, cyber, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, AI, and biotech to develop novel attack methods, and each requires detailed policy, developed in consultations with the private sector, academic institutions, and multinational organizations. In many instances, the U.S. government may not have the latest technical insights and should engage outside experts to develop effective threat deterrence, detection, and mitigation capabilities. The Trump Administration should consider 21st century approaches to civil defense, infrastructure security, continuity of government, and social resiliency in the face of these new and potentially catastrophic threats.
China’s malign influence within the United States and across academia, the business sector, the political sphere, and in many other areas, requires a holistic response. For many years, U.S. special operations forces have encouraged America’s allies and international partners to adopt a comprehensive defense, involving all levels of government and the civilian population, to counter foreign malign influence and subversion. The time has come for the United States to practice what it preaches and adopt a similar methodology, mobilizing public and private sector vigilance, and making foreign malign influence less effective, while imposing costs on sponsors and enablers. It is possible that societies with adversarial politics, market economics, and open access to information have vulnerability to adversary malign influence, but they are also more prosperous and adaptive in the long run than those without these characteristics. The challenge for democracies is to preserve their fundamental character, while combating corruption, information manipulation, subversion, and other destabilizing activities.
After bracing America’s resolve and strength, Nixon would advise President Trump to engage China on grounds seen as legitimate by both sides. The United States and China have the capacity to bring ruin and devastation to each other. New and developing hazards, like the recent COVID pandemic demonstrated, can have global implications. Agreed norms and protocols should guide CRISPR-gene-editing research and AI development that, like nuclear weapons, can present an existential danger to human civilization in the future. Washington and Beijing could address these and other issues in a Second Shanghai Communique.\
Developing National Security Policy
Nixon applied a deliberate and structured approach to long-term policy, ensuring rigorous and careful deliberation, which is much needed today. As president, he reinstated the tiered system of interagency review for developing long-term guidance that was part of Eisenhower’s National Security Council (NSC) system, but which President Kennedy had abandoned in favor of an ad hoc approach. While the recent Biden Administration also employed a layered NSC process, convening principals and deputies committee meetings and interagency working groups, the historical record will show the Biden NSC struggled to develop and implement durable strategy—outlining a theory of success to address challenges and applying means to policy ends. There was a lack of problem-solving guidance to departments and agencies, beyond the broad 2022 National Security Strategy and notwithstanding a flood of new policy documents in the waning days of the Biden presidency. A scantness of strategic vision and direction constrained U.S. efforts to address challenges from Russia’s war in Ukraine to Iran’s nuclear program and destabilizing activities. The Trump team must not repeat the same mistake and should instead develop and issue explicit instructions, after careful consideration, in support of clearly defined and achievable national security objectives. A failure to do so could result in poorly conceived and uncoordinated efforts across the executive branch, while adversaries make geostrategic gains at the expense of the United States and its allies and partners.
At the height of the Cold War, the Nixon Doctrine made prominent mention of nuclear deterrence. Today, Team Trump faces many developing and existential challenges: potential AI-enabled cyber-attacks and disruption of undersea cables that could trigger a global financial meltdown; bioengineered pathogens more lethal than COVID; EMP weapons capable of causing protracted blackouts; and nuclear weapons in orbit that could return humanity to a pre-Sputnik state, without operational satellites. These and other threats deserve consideration in a Trump Doctrine and policy documents.
U.S. force modernization has temporarily left the United States with too few planes and ships, while struggling to bring new systems online. The Afghanistan pullout humiliation and the promotion of questionable diversity policies in the ranks tarnished temporarily the warfighting ethos of the U.S. armed forces. Meanwhile China’s military buildup continues unabated. Xi has ordered his generals to be ready to invade Taiwan in 2027. His fear now is that China may have peaked too soon, creating urgency in Beijing to resolve the Taiwan matter. In 2022, Russia drew false comfort from the large number of its tanks and aircraft, and in 2023, Iran was too confident in its many missiles and drones prior to the Gaza war. Trump needs to make sure Xi does not make a similar misjudgment.
Conclusion
Trump, like Nixon before him, confronts a world in disorder and the risks from policy missteps are great. Nixon’s principles—focused interests, equilibrium, and legitimacy—provide a useful analytical framework with which to examine foreign policy challenges. The Nixon Doctrine, which reaffirms treaty obligations but requires threatened partners to provide the primary manpower for their defense, is a credible approach with which to balance isolationist tendencies at home with the continuing need to confront threats abroad. Nixon’s use of a maximum pressure strategy during negotiations, while working towards reciprocal and principled concessions, is still necessary today. Like Nixon, President Trump must rely on a rigorous approach to produce detailed policy guidance, mobilize necessary action and resources, and confront adversaries that possess a range of developing capabilities—including nuclear, biological, cyber, space, electromagnetic, and conventional. President Trump and his officials should think of Nixon as they organize the NSC, plan America’s strategy, and deter and defeat threats.
