Ukraine’s Long-Range Special Operations: Lessons from Desert Pioneers
The tools have evolved, but the warrior’s calculus—audacity multiplied by precision equals strategic effect—remains timeless.
The thunderous crack of explosions across Russian airfields on the night of June 1, 2025, marked not merely another escalation in Ukraine’s defensive war, but a masterclass in the enduring principles of deep special operations. Ukraine’s Security Service (SSU) executed “Operation Spiderweb” (Pavutyna), simultaneously striking four Russian airfields across thousands of kilometers, reportedly destroying over 40 strategic bombers. Combined with the audacious attack on a Russian marine base near Vladivostok earlier this week—some 6,800 kilometers from Ukrainian territory—these operations demonstrate how small, determined forces can achieve strategic effects through audacity, innovation, and meticulous planning.
Yet these modern exploits are not revolutionary in concept. Rather, they represent the sophisticated evolution of operational principles first codified in the burning aircraft wreckage scattered across German airfields in North Africa during World War II, when a young Scots Guards officer named David Stirling led the newly-established Special Air Service (SAS) in proving that small units striking with surprise could have larger strategic effects than entire armies.
The Desert Laboratory
The parallels between Ukraine’s current operations and the Special Air Service’s North African campaigns are neither coincidental nor superficial. They reflect fundamental truths about asymmetric warfare that transcend technology and geography. When Major Stirling’s raiders (comprised of British SAS and Long Range Desert Group troopers) destroyed 37 Luftwaffe aircraft at Sidi Haneish airfield on July 26, 1942, they established a template that Ukrainian operators are executing with drone technology rather than Lewes bombs, but with identical strategic logic.
The SAS pioneered what we now recognize as the core tenets of deep special operations: the element of surprise achieved through operational security and misdirection; the targeting of high-value, lightly defended assets in the enemy’s rear areas; and the psychological impact that far exceeds the tactical damage inflicted. The SAS raiding force demonstrated this principle perfectly when just five men penetrated Agedabia airfield and placed Lewes bombs on dozens of aircraft and an ammunition depot, turning the entire facility into a raging inferno.
The operational methodology bears striking similarities. Both the SAS and Ukrainian operators relied on extensive reconnaissance, detailed planning, and the exploitation of gaps in enemy defensive coverage. The desert raiders used the Long Range Desert Group for intelligence and infiltration; Ukraine’s intelligence services employ sophisticated surveillance and open-source intelligence to identify targets and plan approach routes. Both understood that success depended not merely on reaching the target, but on achieving maximum destructive effect before the enemy could respond.
The Vladivostok Gambit
The May 30 attack on Russia’s 155th Marine Brigade near Vladivostok represents perhaps the most audacious long-range special operation since the SAS raids. Ukrainian Military Intelligence sources confirmed that two explosions struck the deployment area of the 47th Separate Airborne Assault Battalion, affecting both personnel and equipment. The psychological impact of demonstrating reach into Russia’s Far East—traditionally considered a secure rear area—parallels the shock value of early SAS raids that struck German and Italian facilities hundreds of miles behind the supposed front lines.
This operation demonstrates sophisticated intelligence preparation of the battlefield reminiscent of the methodology employed by both the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and American Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The 155th Marine Brigade was specifically targeted because of its active involvement in operations against Ukraine, including battles in Mariupol, Vuhledar, and Kursk region. This targeting philosophy—striking units directly engaged in operations against friendly forces—mirrors the SOE’s practice of targeting specific Wehrmacht units and their supporting infrastructure based on detailed intelligence assessments.
Innovation Through Adversity
The technological evolution from Lewes bombs to precision drones masks deeper continuities in special operations thinking. The SAS developed the Lewes bomb out of necessity—a lightweight, effective incendiary device that could be easily transported and placed by small teams. Ukrainian operators have similarly innovated within constraints by developing, smuggling, and then deploying swarms of drone in close proximity to targets over several thousands of kilometers away, effectively extending their operational reach far beyond what conventional forces could achieve.
The organizational innovation parallels are equally instructive. The SOE was established with Churchill’s mandate to “set Europe ablaze” through sabotage and subversion behind enemy lines, operating outside conventional military structures to achieve strategic effects. Ukrainian intelligence services and special operations forces (SOF) have similarly been given broad operational latitude to conduct deep strikes that conventional forces cannot execute, operating with minimal oversight but maximum strategic impact.
Both organizations understood that success required thinking beyond traditional military boundaries. The OSS’s Special Operations branch, modeled on the British SOE, carried out missions “dropping small teams of officers to train and assist resistance fighters, as well as commit acts of sabotage, destruction, and general mayhem”. This integration of direct action, intelligence collection, and psychological operations presaged Ukraine’s current multi-faceted approach to deep operations.
Strategic Implications for Western SOF
The Ukrainian model offers several critical lessons for Western SOF facing potential peer conflict scenarios. First, the integration of unmanned systems with traditional special operations methodology represents a force multiplier that dramatically extends operational reach while reducing personnel risk. The ability to conduct simultaneous operations across multiple theaters—as demonstrated in Operation Spiderweb—provides a template for distributed operations that could overwhelm enemy defensive planning.
Second, the Ukrainian approach demonstrates the continued relevance of targeting enemy logistics and force generation capabilities in the deep rear. Russian forces have advanced by attacking Ukrainian logistics vehicles and depots up to 30 kilometers behind the front lines, yet Ukraine has responded by striking the infrastructure that generates these forces thousands of kilometers away. This operational logic—attacking the source rather than the symptoms—reflects the strategic thinking that made the SAS so effective against Axis logistics in North Africa.
Third, the psychological dimension remains paramount. The SAS understood that creating uncertainty and forcing the enemy to divert resources to rear area security was often more valuable than the immediate tactical damage inflicted. Rommel nicknamed Stirling the “Phantom Major” and committed considerable resources to stopping the raiders, demonstrating how effectively the SAS had gotten inside the German command’s decision cycle. Ukrainian operations have similarly forced Russia to declare “counter-terrorism operation regimes” and divert security resources to protect previously secure facilities.
Operational Lessons for the Future
Western SOF should extract several specific operational lessons from both the historical precedent and contemporary Ukrainian practice. The primacy of intelligence preparation cannot be overstated—both the SAS and Ukrainian operators achieved success through meticulous target analysis and environmental preparation. SOE and OSS training emphasized clandestine infiltration, organization and employment of guerrilla forces, and acts of sabotage against key enemy infrastructure, but modern operations require equivalent sophistication in electromagnetic warfare, cyber capabilities, and unmanned systems integration.
The question of command and control represents another critical lesson. Both the SAS and Ukrainian operations succeeded because they were granted operational independence within strategic guidance. Micromanagement from higher headquarters would have been fatal to these time-sensitive, opportunity-driven operations. Western SOF planning must account for the communication latencies and decision-making speeds required for effective deep operations in contested electromagnetic environments.
Finally, the sustainability question looms large. The SAS operated with minimal logistics footprint by necessity, but Ukrainian operations demonstrate how largely commercial, off-the-shelf unmanned systems can extend operational endurance while reducing the traditional logistics burden of special operations. With the growing prevalence of 3D printing (or “additive manufacturing”), this shift toward technology-enabled persistence could fundamentally alter how Western SOF approach deep operations planning.
Conclusion
Ukraine’s recent deep strikes against Russian strategic assets represent more than tactical innovation—they embody the evolution of special operations principles pioneered in the crucible of World War II. The SAS proved in the North African desert that small, audacious units could achieve strategic effects through careful planning, technological innovation, and operational audacity. General Eisenhower later credited SOE and OSS special operations with playing “a very considerable part in our complete and final victory“.
The technological leap from Lewis guns and Lewes bombs to precision drones and cyber capabilities is profound, but the underlying operational logic remains constant: well-trained, properly equipped small units can achieve effects far beyond their size when they operate with intelligence, surprise, and clear strategic purpose. For Western SOF preparing for potential peer conflicts, the Ukrainian model offers both inspiration and instruction. The desert pioneers of 1942 proved the concept; Ukrainian operators are perfecting the practice for the conflicts of tomorrow.
The ghosts of Stirling’s raiders might well recognize the burning aircraft at Belaya airfield. The tools have evolved, but the warrior’s calculus—audacity multiplied by precision equals strategic effect—remains timeless. In an age of great power competition, these lessons from the desert and the steppe may prove the difference between conventional stalemate and decisive victory.
Remember always the motto of the SAS – “Who Dares Wins.”
(Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.)
