Disasters, Conflict, and Myanmar’s Uncertain Future
Abstract
A powerful earthquake struck central Myanmar on March 28, 2025, leaving thousands dead and tens of thousands more displaced—but the most profound impact from this disaster may be on the country’s already fragile political future. In a nation already torn by civil war, the disaster has become a new front in the junta’s attempt to maintain control.
Despite a temporary ceasefire declared by opposition forces, the military delayed its own response and resumed airstrikes within hours of the quake. Aid convoys have been attacked, medicine blocked, and supplies confiscated—mirroring the junta’s obstruction during Cyclone Nargis (2008) and Cyclone Mocha (2023). But unlike in 2008, the regime is more isolated and militarily weakened.
A highly coordinated resistance now controls more than 40% of Myanmar’s territory, as morale within the Tatmadaw weakens amid a growing number of defections and forced conscriptions. Internationally, China is engaging with both the junta leadership and the opposition. Meanwhile, several ASEAN neighbors are growing increasingly frustrated with the military’s failure to honor basic peace commitments. General Min Aung Hlaing’s recent rare appearance at the BIMSTEC summit reflects a bid to revive the regime’s legitimacy through disaster diplomacy. However, with shifting power dynamics and mounting global scrutiny, the junta’s old playbook may no longer be effective. In fact, we argue that it is more likely that this earthquake may lead to a further unraveling of the military’s decades-long rule over Myanmar.
This piece draws on exclusive sources and historical comparisons to examine whether the earthquake will entrench authoritarian rule — or hasten its collapse. As Myanmar approaches pivotal elections in December 2025, the regime’s response to this crisis could prove decisive. At stake is not just recovery from a natural disaster, but the possibility of a political turning point in one of the world’s most protracted conflicts.
The tragic March 28, 2025, earthquake near Mandalay, Myanmar, has already claimed the lives of more than 3,000 people and displaced tens of thousands. The disaster’s impact has been magnified by the country’s ongoing civil war, which has destroyed the country’s fragile infrastructure, making aid delivery and the retrieval of survivors difficult. Relief efforts have been hampered by attacks on aid convoys, military checkpoints, and a lack of access to rebel-held and remote regions. Although opposition forces, and later, the military junta, declared a temporary ceasefire to allow for a disaster response, clashes continue in some areas, and the ceasefire’s scope remains limited. While this lull in fighting offers the junta an opportunity to engage in disaster diplomacy, our contact on the ground confirms that the military regime is confiscating aid and blocking the delivery of medicine to areas controlled by opposition forces in an effort to strengthen its weakened position in the ongoing conflict.
The junta’s obstructive behavior mirrors its deadly inaction after Cyclone Nargis in 2008 and Cyclone Mocha in 2023, when it denied visas to aid workers and delayed relief at customs while still publicly requesting assistance. However, compared to previous disasters, the junta is now in a much worse military and economic position. The military government has lost effective control over significant portions of the country in the face of a highly coordinated and militarily effective opposition, including the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), the armed wing of the government in exile, the National Unity Government (NUG), and allied ethnic armed organizations. Together, these groups have captured military bases and built cross-ethnic alliances in regions previously under military control. Additionally, the junta was already facing serious morale issues, marked by widespread defections and a new reliance on forced conscription. Amid these multiple crises, Myanmar’s junta chief, General Min Aung Hliang, made a rare international visit to the BIMSTEC summit in Bangkok to speak to regional leaders. Hlaing’s attendance at the regional conference confirms the Tatmadaw’s desire to capitalize on the current wave of international goodwill, after having been previously barred from participating in meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), since the army seized power in the February 2021 coup and began to brutally suppress opposition.
Drawing on sources knowledgeable of the junta’s actions in the aftermath of the earthquake, we compare Myanmar’s 2025 earthquake response to previous disasters and examine what these patterns reveal about the future of the regime. Will the junta alter its strategy of using disaster diplomacy to legitimize its rule, strengthen its military position, and garner economic concessions – or will it double down on its authoritarian survival strategies? The answers to these questions will shape not only Myanmar’s recovery but also the broader question of whether disasters can create space for peace in even the most fractured states.
Cyclone Nargis and the Limits of Disaster Diplomacy
Cyclone Nargis, which struck Myanmar in 2008, had a profound impact on the country’s civil war and internal political dynamics. The storm killed at least 138,000 people and devastated the Irrawaddy Delta. The military junta’s slow and inadequate response, coupled with its refusal to accept international aid, eroded public trust and exposed its prioritization of control over humanitarian needs.
In the aftermath of the cyclone, widespread displacement and weak local authority, especially in neglected or contested regions, demonstrated the junta’s weakness, if not complete absence, in areas outside the main urban centers of the Irrawaddy Delta. In these contested areas, ethnic armed groups—particularly in Karen and Shan states—stepped in to provide aid and expand their influence. Despite the widespread devastation, the military continued its offensive against minority populations, further militarizing conflict zones and deepening instability.
Just a week after the storm, as much of the country remained without any relief, the junta moved forward with a constitutional referendum. The referendum sought to entrench military power by reserving 25% of parliamentary seats for the armed forces and granting the military control over key ministries and emergency powers. Furthermore, it set the groundwork for the 2010 elections, which the military’s Union Solidarity and Development Party won. However, Cyclone Nargis also galvanized the pro-democracy movement. The National League for Democracy (NLD) and other opposition groups leveraged the crisis to highlight the junta’s incompetence, gaining both domestic support and international sympathy.
In exposing the regime’s fundamental weaknesses, the cyclone intensified both civil unrest and calls for reform. While the junta initially tightened its grip, the disaster also created openings for political change, setting in motion a limited but notable shift toward democratization. Between 2010 and 2020, Myanmar underwent a period of limited democratization marked by the transition from direct military rule to a quasi-civilian government. This fragile progress was abruptly reversed by the military coup in February 2021.
State of the Conflict: Assessing the Junta’s Hold on Power
The earthquake comes in the midst of a devastating civil war between the junta’s ruling State Administration Council and rebel groups scattered around the country. Following the 2021 coup, Myanmar descended into civil war after the military seized power from the democratically-elected National League for Democracy (NLD after unsuccessfully trying to have the results of the 2020 election – which the NLD won in a landslide – overturned.
The first two years of the civil war were largely a stalemate between Myanmar’s armed forces, called the Tatmadaw, and a plethora of armed opposition groups scattered across the country. The tide of the conflict changed in 2024, when, after a series of military defeats and territorial losses, the Tatmadaw extended a peace offer to opposition forces. Then, in December 2024, the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed group based in Rakhine state in the north, laid siege to military forces and managed to wrestle control of the country’s western border with Bangladesh.
Adding to the government’s woes are reports of spies within the ranks. These soldier-spies, referred to as “Watermelons” (green on the outside, but rebel red within), provide invaluable information that armed groups use to tip the balance of the conflict in their favor, resulting in their control of 42 percent of the country.
Worried about defectors within its ranks and concerned about Chinese support for all sides to the conflict, the Tatmadaw has come to rely on conscription and weapons from Russia to remain in power. In December 2024, after major wins over the Tatmadaw, two members of the powerful Three Brotherhood Alliance – a coalition of three ethnic armed groups: the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army – accepted China’s request for a ceasefire. However, not all armed groups are ready to lay down arms and negotiate with the junta. Ethnic armed organizations like the Karen National Union (KNU), which has been fighting the central government for decades, have stated that any post-conflict Myanmar should not include the military in politics.
Continuity and Change: Comparing the Junta’s Position in 2008 and Today
Any doubt concerning how the Tatmadaw’s response to the earthquake would differ from its response to previous natural disasters was put to rest when hours after the earthquake, military generals ordered airstrikes on targets in Shan State and Karen State. Further evidence of the government’s aim to capitalize on the tragedy is its delayed response to the unilateral ceasefire announced by the NUG and the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The military junta waited five days after the earthquake and the opposition’s announcement of a ceasefire before issuing a statement calling for a two-week halt – until April 22 – in hostilities.
Nevertheless, a confluence of regional and international factors have drastically changed the political and economic landscape in which the junta currently finds itself. First, China’s decision to support all sides to the conflict and hold its own talks with opposition groups signals that Beijing views the odds of the military junta obtaining a decisive victory and regaining territory are low. Second, the ongoing war in Ukraine means that Russian parts for the junta’s tanks and missiles may not be readily available when needed. Third, concerns about a global economic recession and decreased aid mean that economic recovery from the disaster will be slow, affecting the junta’s ability to buy public support as well as support from the military’s rank and file, given the unpopularity of conscription. Fourth, Myanmar’s increasing isolation from some of its ASEAN allies threatens to deteriorate already fragile regional relations, for example, Indonesia and Malaysia are increasingly wary of the junta’s failure to honor ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus for peace.
Toward an Uncertain Future
Unlike 2008, the current political landscape is marked by a far more organized and well-funded armed resistance, greater international scrutiny, growing fatigue by ASEAN neighbors, and deepening economic isolation. As a result, elections in December 2025 may not offer the junta the same level of legitimization as it did in 2008. Instead, the earthquake response and its continued disregard of the April 2 ceasefire, will serve to undermine whatever goodwill it has accrued in the international community and, rather than using the crisis to consolidate power, as it did following Cyclone Nargis, the military risks accelerating its loss of control—both territorially and diplomatically.
