The Expansion of the PCC in Portugal: Challenges, Impacts, and Responses

The presence of Brazilian criminal organizations abroad has notably increased, particularly the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), which has caught the attention of European authorities due to its expanding operations in Portugal. Evidence indicates involvement in drug trafficking, money laundering, and firearms smuggling, posing significant risks to internal security in Portugal and across Europe. This article examines the implications of the PCC’s activities, the strategic use of Portuguese ports, the growth of cocaine consumption in Europe, money laundering schemes, and potential countermeasures.
The PCC’s International Expansion
Established in São Paulo prisons during the 1990s, the PCC evolved from controlling local prisons to becoming Brazil’s dominant criminal organization, deeply involved in international cocaine trafficking. In Portugal, authorities consider the country a critical European gateway for narcotics shipped mainly from Brazil. Key ports such as Lisbon, Leixões, and Sines have become primary entry points for cocaine shipments. Despite debates about the exact number of active PCC affiliates in Portugal, violent incidents and drug disputes have consistently implicated the group as a major actor.[1]
European authorities fear the PCC could replicate patterns of corruption and intimidation observed in Brazil. Investigations highlight PCC attempts to infiltrate legitimate economic sectors, including construction, restaurants, aviation, and real estate, to launder illicit proceeds. In cities like Lisbon and Porto, Brazilian and Portuguese nationals are recruited to manage shell companies discreetly channeling drug profits into legitimate businesses.[2] Additionally, notable PCC leaders such as André de Oliveira Macedo (“André do Rap”) reportedly spent extended periods in Portugal undetected, emphasizing the strategic use of European nations for money laundering and operational cover.
Portuguese Ports as Cocaine Gateways
Portugal’s strategic Atlantic position makes it ideal for drug traffickers seeking efficient cocaine logistics. Cocaine primarily enters through shipping containers camouflaged among legitimate goods like fruit or coal. The Polícia Judiciária’s “Operação Porthos” uncovered extensive bribery involving port workers and tax agents, facilitating cocaine distribution throughout Europe via truck transportation.[3] The European market’s high cocaine prices significantly amplify profits, encouraging increasingly sophisticated and covert logistics managed by criminal groups like the PCC.
Reports from the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) indicate steadily rising cocaine use across Portugal, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Consumption now extends beyond large cities to smaller towns, highlighting broader societal impacts. [4] Despite record seizures, Portugal alone captured 23 metric tons of cocaine in 2024, trafficking networks remain resilient. Notably, crack cocaine use has intensified in vulnerable communities, exacerbating social and health issues related to drug abuse.
Critical to PCC operations is the laundering of substantial drug profits. PCC-linked investments in Europe notably include construction projects, exotic fruit importation, restaurants, barbershops, and virtual fraud schemes. These sectors are attractive due to low regulatory barriers and ease of financial transactions in euros. Shell companies often register under individuals with clean criminal records, maintaining minimal but believable commercial activities to disguise their true purpose. [5] Concerns persist regarding potential corruption among local authorities facilitating these schemes.
Case Study: Arrest of a PCC Diver
A recent arrest in Lisbon highlighted the scale and sophistication of the PCC’s operations. Authorities captured a Brazilian national responsible for coordinating cocaine retrieval from ship hulls at a local port. Investigators seized advanced diving equipment, submachine guns, assault rifles, and modified pistols, underscoring the operational sophistication and violent potential of PCC activities in Europe.[6] Such weaponry suggests a worrying escalation risk in violent crime in Portugal, traditionally a low-violence environment.
The PCC’s cocaine trafficking operations often parallel illegal firearms movements. The presence of sophisticated firearms among PCC operatives in Portugal raises alarm about potential violence escalation, like violent dynamics observed in Brazilian drug disputes. Countries like Spain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands already face violence from cocaine trafficking groups vying for control over lucrative routes.[7] Portugal’s law enforcement must prepare for potential increases in armed conflict resulting from these criminal expansions.
Given the transnational scope of the PCC, robust international cooperation is crucial. Portugal and Brazil recently reinforced cooperation through agreements signed at the 14th Luso-Brazilian Summit, aiming to enhance intelligence-sharing, joint investigations, and financial tracking of criminal enterprises.[8] Cooperation with European agencies like Europol and Interpol is essential to effectively dismantle transnational trafficking and money laundering networks.
Reevaluating the “War on Drugs”
Globally, the traditional “war on drugs” approach has been increasingly criticized for its ineffectiveness and high societal costs, including mass incarceration and persistent drug supplies. Despite aggressive enforcement, cocaine continues to enter Europe in ever-increasing amounts, suggesting limitations of current policies.[9]
Portugal’s progressive approach of drug use decriminalization (adopted in 2001) has improved public health outcomes but has not addressed the supply side of drug trafficking. The notion of legalizing and regulating substances like cocaine to undercut criminal revenues remains contentious, with significant ethical and political barriers. However, given persistent trafficking and rising drug consumption, some European countries are exploring regulation and legalization models to potentially mitigate organized crime’s economic base.[10]
Conclusion
The PCC’s activities in Portugal reflect broader trends of organized crime’s globalization. Portugal, strategically positioned for cocaine entry into Europe, faces escalating challenges, including sophisticated drug logistics, violence risks from firearms smuggling, and pervasive money laundering. While enhanced transnational cooperation is imperative, discussions around innovative policy approaches—potentially including regulated narcotic markets—also merit consideration. Europe’s response to this complex problem must combine rigorous enforcement, international collaboration, social policy innovation, and critical reflection on prohibition policies’ limitations. Ultimately, decisive and coordinated action will determine Europe’s resilience against transnational organized crime.
Endnotes
An earlier version of this article was first published by Roberto Uchôa on his LinkedIn account on 13 March 2025.
[1] Henrique Machado, “Relatório aponta cerca de 1.000 membros do PCC atuam em Portugal.” CNN Brasil. 08 November 2023, https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/internacional/relatorio-aponta-que-cerca-de-1-000-membros-do-pcc-atuam-em-portugal/
[2] Carlos Vasconcelos, “Atrás dos euros, PCC quer lavar dinheiro do crime na Europa, a começar por Portugal.” Público. 28 October 2024, https://www.publico.pt/2024/10/28/publico-brasil/noticia/atras-euros-pcc-quer-lavar-dinheiro-crime-europa-comecar-portugal-2109767.
[3] Euronews, “Portos portugueses usados como porta de entrada na Europa de droga da América Latina.” Euronews. 25 February 2025, https://pt.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/25/portos-portugueses-usados-como-porta-de-entrada-na-europa-de-droga-da-america-latina.
[4] European Union Drugs Agency, “European Drug Report 2024.” EUDA European Union Drugs Agency. 2024, https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/european-drug-report/2024_pt.
[5] Gian Amato, “PCC tem rede de empresas de fachada para lavar dinheiro do tráfico em Portugal.” O Globo. 22 November 2024, https://oglobo.globo.com/blogs/portugal-giro/post/2024/11/pcc-tem-rede-de-empresas-de-fachada-para-lavar-dinheiro-do-trafico-em-portugal.ghtml.
[6] Henrique Machado, “Importante membro do PCC vivia no Montijo.” CNN Portugal. 11 March 2025, https://cnnportugal.iol.pt/pcc/trafico-de-droga/importante-membro-do-pcc-vivia-no-montijo-e-ajudava-mergulhadores-a-tirar-toneladas-de-droga-de-cascos-de-navios-em-lisboa/20250311/67d08b8cd34e3f0bae9b8168.
[7] “Global Report on Cocaine 2023: Local Dynamics, Global Challenges.” UNDOC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. April 2023, https://www.un-ilibrary.org/content/books/9789213626788#chapters.
[8] Jair Rattner, “Portugal e Brasil unem-se para combater crime organizado.” Público. 15 February 2025, https://www.publico.pt/2025/02/15/publico-brasil/noticia/portugal-brasil-unemse-combater-crime-organizado-pcc-mira-2122618,
[9] Rui Silva, “Análises a águas residuais revelam aumento no consumo de cocaína.” Expresso. 20 March 2024, https://expresso.pt/sociedade/2024-03-20-Analises-a-aguas-residuais-na-Europa-revelam-que-o-consumo-de-cocaina-continua-a-aumentar-cd80c2aa.
[10] European Union Drugs Agency, Op. cit., at Note 4.
For Additional Reading
John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, Editors, Competition in Order and Progress: Criminal Insurgencies and Governance in Brazil. Bloomington: Xlibris, 2022.
John P. Sullivan and Diego Ramírez Sánchez, “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 55: Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) Expanding its Reach to Chile.” Small Wars Journal. 25 March 2024, https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-55-primeiro-comando-da-capital-pcc-expanding-its.
Roberto Uchôa, “Why The Expansion of Brazilian Gangs Is Largely Going Unnoticed.” Small Wars Journal. 10 February 2025, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/02/10/why-the-expansion-of-brazilian-gangs-is-largely-going-unnoticed/.