Gangs and the Military Note 5: The Historical Evolution of Cross-Border Crime
This note examines the historical evolution of cross-border crime through the case of Samuel Ross (Sam) Mason, an 18th-century river pirate who capitalized on economic instability, weak governance, and jurisdictional chaos to build a criminal enterprise along the Mississippi River. By analyzing Mason’s operations, the paper explores the systemic factors that allowed organized crime to flourish without strong state control and coordinated law enforcement. His case is compared with modern transnational organized crime, including drug cartels, human trafficking networks, and money laundering, which exploit similar legal loopholes and economic vulnerabilities in contemporary global systems. The paper draws historical parallels between early piracy, smuggling, and criminal economies with today’s illicit activities, emphasizing how economic disparities, legal fragmentation, and weak state capacity continue to facilitate criminal networks. Finally, the study provides policy recommendations, advocating for international collaboration, economic stabilization, and legal harmonization as essential strategies to disrupt transnational crime and strengthen global security frameworks.
Introduction
Crime does not exist in a vacuum—it is shaped by economic instability, weak governance, and legal loopholes that allow criminal enterprises to thrive. This was as true in post-Revolutionary America as it is today in the world of transnational crime. The case of Sam Mason, a former militia captain turned river pirate, provides a historical lens through which we can examine how criminals exploit systemic weaknesses to build sophisticated, cross-border operations. Like modern organized crime groups—ranging from drug cartels to human trafficking syndicates—Mason and his gang thrived in an era where fractured legal systems and weak law enforcement provided ample opportunities for illicit activities.
One of the most significant aspects of Mason’s criminal career is that he was the first identified Military-Trained Gang Member (MTGM), a classification used to describe individuals who repurpose military knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) for criminal enterprise.[1] Mason’s tactical experience, leadership, and combat training from the French and Indian and Revolutionary Wars were not abandoned but adapted—redirected from military service to river piracy, organized smuggling, and territorial control along the Mississippi River.[2] This same pattern can be observed today, as military-trained individuals are increasingly sought after by transnational criminal organizations for their expertise in logistics, combat strategy, and operational planning.
Drawing parallels between Mason’s operations and modern crime syndicates, this paper examines the underlying economic, jurisdictional, and governance factors that allow criminal networks to flourish across borders. The study further explores policy solutions, arguing that international cooperation, legal harmonization, and economic development are essential to dismantling today’s transnational crime networks. Just as Mason’s criminal empire was made possible by systemic weaknesses in law enforcement, modern crime prevention must address the structural vulnerabilities that continue to sustain global organized crime.
Brief History of Sam Mason
Sam Mason was a military officer, colonial judge, and notorious outlaw who transitioned from militia soldier to leader of a feared band of American river pirates along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. His life reflects a complex intersection of loyalty, lawlessness, and opportunism during the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Born in 1739, Mason’s family lived in Frederick Town, now Winchester, Virginia.[3] As a young man, he served in the French and Indian War (1754–1763), fighting for the British colonial forces against the French.[4] The war saw extensive frontier skirmishes, and Mason gained firsthand experience in wilderness combat, which would later serve him well in his criminal enterprises.
During the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783), Mason fought on the American side, serving as a militia captain in present-day Wheeling, West Virginia. His service in the Virginia militia placed him amid violent conflicts, particularly against British loyalists and their Indian allies.[5] After the war, Mason settled in the Ohio River Valley, a region that was still largely unsettled and prone to lawlessness. He initially worked as a farmer and judge in Washington County, Pennsylvania. His appointment as a judge indicates that he was, at least for a time, a respected community member.[6]
By the late 1790s, Mason had abandoned any pretense of respectability and turned to river piracy. He established a base of operations on the lower Ohio River, setting up operations in Cave-In-Rock, Illinois, a well-known outlaw haven.[7] His gang frequently preyed on flatboats between Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and New Orleans, Louisiana. The piracy was largely opportunistic—Mason’s gang would ambush boats carrying cargo or settlers, robbing and sometimes killing their occupants.[8]
As river piracy became more dangerous due to increasing patrols, Mason and his men began engaging in land-based robbery operations along the trail that became the Natchez Trace. By 1802, the US government had intensified efforts to eliminate piracy, leading to Mason’s capture near present-day Caruthersville, Missouri in early 1803. His trial occurred in New Madrid, followed by a jurisdiction hearing by the Spanish Governor of Louisiana in New Orleans.[9] When it was determined most of Mason’s crimes occurred in America, Mason and his gang were transported under guard to Natchez. A broken mast on the transport required the crew to divide their focus between guarding the prisoners and rebuilding the mast, and the gang escaped along the way.[10]
In response to the Mississippi Governor’s offering of a reward, two of Mason’s gang members offered what they said was his head, hoping to collect the proceeds. When it was determined the head was not Mason’s, they were tried for murder and executed.[11]
Economic Disparities
Economic instability has long been a driving force behind criminal behavior, particularly in regions with weak or fragmented legal frameworks. The trajectory of Sam Mason, from Revolutionary War hero to notorious river pirate, underscores the impact of economic hardship on individuals’ choices to engage in crime. His case also reflects broader historical patterns, where post-war economic distress led many veterans to turn to unconventional or illicit activities due to a lack of institutional support and viable employment opportunities.[12]
In the post-Revolutionary War period, thousands of former soldiers struggled to reintegrate into civilian life. Without pensions or economic stability, many found themselves destitute, with limited avenues for legal survival. Mason and his gang exploited these conditions, operating along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers and preying on merchants and settlers for financial survival.[13] This pattern of economic desperation leading to criminal organization is not unique to Mason’s era, as modern criminal networks continue to thrive in regions experiencing similar economic vulnerabilities.
Economic hardship continues to be a powerful predictor of criminal activity today, particularly in developing nations where high unemployment rates, income inequality, and weak governance leave populations vulnerable to illicit networks. Studies in criminology and economics consistently demonstrate a correlation between economic downturns and rising crime rates, particularly in regions where state institutions fail to provide adequate social protections.[14] Economic crime has been seen as more than a consequence of individual choices but a structural issue that emerges when economic opportunities are scarce and governance is weak.[15]
Many individuals in economically vulnerable regions are drawn to criminal enterprises for financial survival. In Latin America, particularly in Mexico and Colombia, young people often join drug cartels due to the lack of viable employment opportunities.[16] The promise of financial stability and the absence of alternative economic pathways make organized crime an attractive option. Similarly, in Eastern Europe, human trafficking networks have expanded significantly in post-Soviet states, where economic distress has left many individuals susceptible to exploitation.[17]
Criminal organizations target those seeking financial security, luring them into trafficking schemes under the guise of employment opportunities [18] Economic instability in countries like Nigeria and Libya contributes to increased smuggling operations in Africa.[19] Desperate individuals with few legal avenues for migration become entangled in illicit schemes that frequently place them at risk of exploitation by organized crime groups.[20]
Addressing the economic drivers of crime requires policies beyond traditional law enforcement strategies. Strengthening border security alone does little to mitigate the root causes of transnational crime. Instead, effective crime prevention must focus on economic stabilization, employment opportunities, and institutional reforms. One crucial approach is investment in workforce development. Countries with high emigration rates should prioritize job creation programs to reduce the economic pressures that push individuals toward illicit activities.[21] Microfinance initiatives can also empower at-risk populations by providing access to small loans and entrepreneurial opportunities, allowing individuals to pursue lawful means of financial stability.
International economic partnerships are vital in reducing crime by fostering economic growth in vulnerable regions. Cross-border trade agreements and investment in sustainable industries can help mitigate economic distress, particularly in areas with high organized crime rates.[22] Collaborative economic aid programs that support job growth in crime-prone nations can reduce the incentives for individuals to participate in illicit enterprises. Strengthening social services is another essential component of crime prevention. Education and vocational training in high-risk regions can significantly lower crime rates over time by equipping individuals with the skills needed for legal employment. Additionally, expanding access to rehabilitation programs for individuals involved in low-level criminal activities can prevent deeper entrenchment in organized crime.[23] By addressing the economic conditions that fuel criminal networks, policymakers can create more effective and sustainable strategies to combat transnational crime.[24]
Jurisdictional Chaos
One of the most significant factors that enabled Sam Mason’s criminal enterprise was the fragmented legal landscape of the Mississippi River region. During the late 18th century, the river was a contested border between Spanish Louisiana, French-controlled territories, and the newly formed United States. The lack of clear jurisdictional authority allowed criminals like Mason to exploit legal ambiguities, evading prosecution by shifting between territories. This legal fragmentation created an environment where government leaders struggled to maintain order, mirroring contemporary challenges in addressing transnational crime.[25]
The Mississippi River functioned as a geopolitical fault line, where differing legal systems and enforcement policies often conflicted. During the 18th century, Spanish colonial authorities struggled to enforce strict anti-smuggling regulations across their vast territories. This leniency was partly due to the widespread nature of smuggling and the challenges in curbing such activities. In contrast, American-controlled frontier regions faced significant difficulties in law enforcement. The vast and often isolated territories lacked formal policing institutions, relying instead on community-based justice systems and volunteer militias. This decentralized approach made it difficult to effectively patrol expansive waterways and wilderness areas, allowing criminal elements to exploit these gaps in enforcement. Mason’s ability to navigate these competing jurisdictions illustrates how criminals thrive in environments where legal authority is fragmented and enforcement coordination is weak.[26]
Mason robbed travelers and ran a sophisticated 18th-century laundering network to disguise stolen goods and money. Testimony from his gang members revealed Mason’s ties to a merchant who exchanged stolen goods for gold and silver.[27] Mason and his gang altered stolen goods, saddles, dyeing fabrics, guns, and porte-manteaus before reselling them to avoid detection. He also apparently had agreements with horse traders in Bayou Pierre, selling stolen horses at a fraction of their value to be resold farther downriver or across the Spanish border, making them difficult to trace.
The ability of criminal networks to exploit jurisdictional loopholes has persisted into the modern era. MTGMs like Mason have been observed engaging in cross-border criminal activities, utilizing gaps in law enforcement jurisdiction to evade prosecution. In contemporary settings, MTGMs have been linked to transnational crime syndicates that exploit unstable or corrupt governance structures to sustain their operations.[28]
While he was not required to contend with corrupt government officials, Mason perfected the art of witness intimidation. He masterfully used the benefits of the porous and unsupervised border to grow his operation. This historical precedent finds striking parallels in the modern world, particularly in regions with porous international borders and inconsistent governance. The operations of contemporary drug cartels, human trafficking syndicates, and organized crime networks often depend on similar jurisdictional weaknesses.
Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán’s cartel, for example, exploited the differences in law enforcement capabilities between Mexico and the United States to smuggle drugs with minimal risk.[29] Similarly, Pablo Escobar’s operations in Colombia capitalized on local corruption and a lack of extradition laws, allowing his cartel to flourish despite international pressure.[30] By bribing officials on both sides of the US-Mexico border, cartels can maintain supply chains, launder money, and avoid prosecution. Sullivan’s analysis reinforces the need for international cooperation, stricter anti-corruption measures, and enhanced oversight of law enforcement agencies to combat the cartel influence in cross-border crime.[31]
Modern criminal organizations frequently exploit jurisdictional loopholes, taking advantage of weak or corrupt local governance to establish operational hubs in regions where law enforcement is ineffective. In some cases, entire industries of illicit activity emerge in these legal gray zones. Human trafficking rings, for example, operate with relative impunity in border regions where inconsistent immigration laws allow traffickers to move victims across jurisdictions undetected. Likewise, money laundering operations rely on financial secrecy laws in certain countries to obscure the origins of illicit funds, making prosecution difficult for law enforcement agencies in stricter jurisdictions.[32]
Addressing the challenges posed by jurisdictional fragmentation requires a coordinated international response. One of the most effective strategies involves strengthening legal cooperation through mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) and facilitating cross-border investigations and prosecutions. Countries that share high-crime border regions must prioritize intelligence-sharing agreements to ensure criminal actors cannot escape capture simply by crossing a national boundary.[33] For example, the European Union’s Schengen Information System has harmonized law enforcement efforts across multiple jurisdictions, allowing authorities to track and apprehend criminals more efficiently.[34]
Technological advancements also offer new tools for combating cross-border crime. Artificial Intelligence (AI)-driven surveillance systems, satellite tracking, and biometric databases enable law enforcement agencies to monitor high-risk areas more effectively, reducing the ability of criminals to exploit jurisdictional gaps. Additionally, stronger regulations on financial transactions can help prevent money laundering, ensuring that illicit funds cannot easily be moved through international banking systems.[35]
While the United States plays a significant role in securing its borders and enforcing immigration laws, the ultimate responsibility for dismantling transnational criminal networks lies with the source countries. Strengthening governance structures, reducing corruption, and improving legal frameworks are essential steps in closing the jurisdictional loopholes that allow organized crime to flourish. Without addressing these systemic vulnerabilities, criminal networks will continue to adapt, finding new ways to exploit the weaknesses of fragmented legal systems.
Economic Instability and Organized Crime
The rise of organized crime is often deeply rooted in economic instability and systemic governance weaknesses. Throughout history, regions facing financial distress, high unemployment, and weak state control have provided fertile ground for criminal enterprises to thrive. Sam Mason’s gang was an early example of organized crime exploiting economic instability to create a structured illicit network. His operation was not merely a collection of opportunistic robberies but a sophisticated river piracy, smuggling, and land piracy operation targeting vulnerable merchants along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.[36]
Economic instability has long served as a recruitment tool for criminal organizations. As seen in Mason’s era, returning soldiers without economic security often turned to crime for survival. In modern contexts, military-trained individuals have been actively recruited by gangs, outlaw motorcycle groups, and extremist organizations, drawn in by financial incentives and the promise of a structured brotherhood.[37] Many of Mason’s followers, marginalized by post-war economic hardships, turned to crime out of necessity. The lack of viable employment, combined with a weak law enforcement presence, allowed Mason’s gang to operate with impunity for years.
A similar dynamic is observed today in regions plagued by economic instability, where organized crime syndicates recruit members from economically disadvantaged populations. In Central America, for instance, criminal organizations such as MS-13 and the Sinaloa Cartel thrive by capitalizing on poverty and weak state institutions.[38] These organizations provide financial incentives, protection, and even social services in areas where governments fail to do so. Similarly, in Southeast Asia, human trafficking rings and drug syndicates exploit economic vulnerability, drawing individuals into illicit economies through coercion or financial necessity.[39]
Economic instability fosters the recruitment of individuals into criminal organizations and increases public tolerance for organized crime. Criminal groups function as parallel governments in many impoverished regions, offering local communities financial assistance, employment, and security. This phenomenon has been documented extensively in Southern Italy with the Sicilian Mafia, where economic hardship enabled the mafia to position itself as an alternative to the state.[40] Similar patterns are observed in Brazil’s favelas, where drug cartels establish local governance structures in the absence of effective state control.[41] They operate across borders, establishing drug pipelines, laundering money through international financial systems, and forging alliances with foreign criminal groups.
Organized crime syndicates operate through a structured financial system that enables them to generate, move, and integrate illicit money into the legal economy. This process involves several key stages:
- Illegal Activities → Criminal organizations generate large-scale revenue from illicit activities such as drug trafficking, human smuggling, and arms dealing. These activities provide cash-heavy income streams, making it difficult for law enforcement to track transactions.[42]
- Cash Revenue → The earnings from these illicit operations are typically in untraceable cash, creating the need for laundering. Black-market profits from narcotics, illegal labor, and counterfeit goods are among the most lucrative sources of revenue for criminal syndicates.[43]
- Money Laundering → To prevent detection, criminals use various laundering techniques, including:
- Shell companies disguise illicit money as legal profits.
- Fake invoices to create a paper trail for illegitimate earnings.
- Gambling operations where cash is converted into digital assets before withdrawal. [44]
- Financial Networks → Once laundered, illicit funds enter complex global financial systems, including:
- Offshore bank accounts in countries with weak transparency laws.
- Cryptocurrency transactions that allow for anonymous and borderless financial movement.
- Banking loopholes in jurisdictions where anti-money laundering regulations are weak.[45]
- Integration into the Legal Economy → At this stage, criminals legitimize their wealth by investing in:
- Luxury real estate and high-value assets (e.g., art, yachts, and high-end vehicles).
- Business investments, including restaurants, hotels, and construction companies, mix illicit money with legal profits.
- Stock markets and hedge funds use shell investors and money laundering schemes to obscure illicit origins.[46]
This multi-step financial cycle ensures that criminal organizations remain profitable, sustainable, and difficult to dismantle. Figure 1 represents this process, emphasizing the systematic nature of transnational organized crime and its reliance on financial loopholes.
Figure 1 – The Multi-Step Financial Cycle
Disrupting the Economic Foundations of Crime
Addressing organized crime requires more than aggressive law enforcement; it necessitates tackling the economic and structural conditions that allow these networks to thrive. Effective policies should focus on economic stabilization, institutional reform, and social investment to reduce the socioeconomic vulnerabilities that criminal organizations exploit. One of the most effective long-term strategies is economic revitalization in crime-prone areas. Governments and international organizations must invest in job creation, education, and vocational training to provide alternatives to organized crime. Programs aimed at reintegrating at-risk individuals—such as former gang members or individuals involved in illicit economies—can significantly reduce the criminal labor pool. Countries with high crime rates must also strengthen governance and reduce corruption, as weak institutions enable criminal networks to flourish unchallenged.[47]
A comprehensive approach should also reduce the demand for illegal goods and services. In the case of drug trafficking, for example, demand-side interventions—such as expanded drug rehabilitation programs and public health initiatives—can be as crucial as supply-side enforcement. Similarly, efforts to combat human trafficking must address both the economic pressures that drive people into exploitation and the demand for trafficked labor in wealthier nations.[48]
While the United States and other developed nations can support these efforts through international aid, diplomatic engagement, and intelligence sharing, the responsibility for economic and governance reforms ultimately lies with the affected countries. Without addressing these internal vulnerabilities, organized crime will continue to thrive, fueling illegal immigration, corruption, and instability.[49]
Cross-Border Crime
The Mississippi River during Mason’s time functioned as a natural yet porous border, where legal authority was fragmented and enforcement was inconsistent. Criminals like Mason took full advantage of these conditions, moving freely between jurisdictions to evade prosecution and expand their criminal enterprises.[50] Mason’s criminal network was partially sustained by his strategic use of geographic boundaries, much like modern MTGMs who exploit border weaknesses for illicit operations.
Contemporary examples along the US-Mexico border demonstrate how MTGMs facilitate drug and human trafficking by maneuvering through areas with limited security, much as Mason did along the Mississippi River.[51] Today, this historical example finds clear parallels in the operations of transnational criminal networks, where weak border enforcement, legal inconsistencies, and jurisdictional conflicts continue to facilitate illicit activities such as human trafficking and drug smuggling.
Modern human trafficking networks function in ways strikingly like Mason’s, capitalizing on the disparities between national immigration laws and enforcement capacities, and traffickers move individuals across borders undetected. For example, human trafficking in Eastern Europe often thrives due to inconsistencies in anti-trafficking laws among EU member states and neighboring non-EU countries. Victims are often transported from poorer countries with lax enforcement (such as Moldova and Ukraine) into wealthier European nations, where bureaucratic obstacles hamper prosecution efforts.[52]
Similar trends are seen in North America, where traffickers exploit inconsistent border security measures between the United States, Mexico, and Central America. Many victims, particularly women and children, are smuggled through multiple countries before arriving at their final destinations.[53] The same jurisdictional evasion tactics employed by Mason’s gang to escape prosecution are mirrored in modern trafficking operations, where smugglers use fake documentation, bribes, and shifting routes to avoid detection.
Addressing human trafficking requires greater legal harmonization across national borders. Interpol, the UNODC, and regional coalitions must work to strengthen international agreements that facilitate the prosecution of traffickers across multiple jurisdictions. Law enforcement agencies also need to prioritize intelligence-sharing mechanisms, allowing for real-time tracking of trafficking operations. Additionally, economic stabilization programs in source countries can reduce the vulnerability of populations most at risk of exploitation.
Mason’s use of the Mississippi River as a smuggling corridor finds a direct modern equivalent in the operations of drug cartels that exploit international borders for trafficking purposes. From the US-Mexico border to the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia, criminal networks thrive in regions where enforcement is inconsistent or corruptible. Much like Mason’s ability to evade capture by moving between different territorial authorities, modern drug cartels manipulate variations in law enforcement intensity and judicial loopholes to operate with minimal risk.
The Mexican cartels, particularly the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), have perfected tunnel-based smuggling operations, drone-based narcotics drops, and even semi-submersible vessels to bypass traditional border enforcement mechanisms. Similarly, in South America, cocaine trafficking routes through Colombia, Brazil, and Venezuela remain difficult to police due to the sheer volume of geographic terrain and political instability.[54]
One of the most effective strategies for addressing drug smuggling involves disrupting supply chains at their source rather than merely reinforcing border security. Efforts must be twofold, targeting both producers and consumers. In producer nations, economic development initiatives that provide alternatives to illicit drug cultivation have shown promise.[55] In consumer nations, public health initiatives aimed at reducing drug dependency can play a significant role in lowering demand. Additionally, AI-based tracking systems and cross-border intelligence-sharing can enhance real-time detection of trafficking operations.[56]
Strengthening Border Control and International Cooperation
Just as Mason’s era demonstrated the difficulties of managing cross-border crime due to legal fragmentation, modern crime-fighting efforts must address international crime’s physical and digital dimensions. Strengthening border security through technology-driven solutions, harmonizing international legal frameworks, and enhancing cross-border cooperation are critical steps in tackling transnational criminal enterprises. A key focus should be placed on integrated law enforcement strategies, where agencies from different countries operate joint task forces to combat human trafficking and drug smuggling. Multilateral agreements, such as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), must be reinforced to ensure seamless coordination among international policing efforts.[57]
While the United States and other developed nations manage border security, the primary responsibility for dismantling criminal networks lies with the source countries. Strengthening domestic governance structures, increasing transparency, and reducing corruption are essential to ensuring that transnational criminal organizations do not continue exploiting jurisdictional loopholes.
Sam Mason’s story is a historical case study illustrating how criminals exploit jurisdictional fragmentation, economic instability, and legal loopholes to build and sustain criminal enterprises. While the context has changed, the core challenges remain strikingly similar in the modern era. Whether it is human traffickers navigating weak immigration policies or drug cartels exploiting border vulnerabilities, the lessons of Mason’s time remain relevant.
Mason’s career as a Revolutionary War officer and a river pirate presents a compelling case study of how military training, wartime experience, and the socioeconomic instability of early America could shape criminal enterprises. Table 1 provides a tool to examine Mason’s military-acquired skills and how they manifested in his criminal enterprises, along with notable behavioral indicators, with a structured comparison of Mason’s criminal behavior and the military knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs).
Table 1: Comparison of Mason’s Military and Criminal Attributes[58]
Conclusion: Mason as a Prototype MTGM
The rise of Sam Mason as a river pirate was not merely an individual choice—it was a consequence of a post-war economy in disarray, a legal system unable to enforce territorial authority, and a governance structure that left vast regions unprotected. His transition from soldier to criminal was not an anomaly but a recurring pattern, from post-Napoleonic bandits in Europe to modern-day cartel enforcers. The systemic vulnerabilities that enabled Mason’s criminal enterprise fuel transnational crime today.
The most striking parallel between Mason and contemporary organized crime is the role of military-trained individuals in illicit networks. Mason was not an ordinary outlaw—he was a strategic actor, leveraging combat experience and logistical expertise to create an efficient criminal operation that outmaneuvered law enforcement. Today, the same phenomenon occurs with drug cartels and human traffickers who actively recruit former military personnel to enhance their operational effectiveness. The cartel sicarios trained in paramilitary tactics and the guerrilla fighters transitioning into organized smuggling rings reflect an ongoing pattern of military expertise fueling criminal enterprises.
The lesson from Mason’s story is clear: disrupting modern transnational crime requires more than reactive law enforcement—it demands structural reform. Governments must address the conditions that allow criminal enterprises to flourish. Economic stability programs are essential to preventing post-conflict regions from becoming recruitment grounds for illicit networks. International legal cooperation must be strengthened to close jurisdictional loopholes that enable criminals to evade prosecution. Law enforcement agencies must engage in cross-border intelligence-sharing to prevent organized crime from exploiting fragmented security responses, just as Mason did centuries ago.
The case of Sam Mason is more than a historical curiosity—it is a warning. It demonstrates that organized crime does not emerge in isolation but thrives where economic hardship, legal fragmentation, and weak governance intersect. The vulnerabilities of Mason’s era remain unresolved in many regions today, and as long as those vulnerabilities persist, so too will the cycle of transnational crime. Learning from history is not merely an academic exercise—it is an essential strategy to prevent the mistakes of the past from continuing to empower the criminals of the future.
Additional Reading
Leland D. Baldwin, River Pirates and the Natchez Trace. In The Keelboat Age on Western Waters. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980.
William C. Davis, A way through the wilderness: The Natchez Trace and the civilization of the Southern frontier. New York: Harper Collins, 1995.
Alexander DeConde, This Affair of Louisiana. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976
Peter J. Kastor, The Nation’s Crucible: The Louisiana Purchase and the Creation of America. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
Otto A. Rothert, The Outlaws of Cave-In-Rock. Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1924.
Carter F. Smith, Gangs and the Military: Gangsters, Bikers, and Terrorists with Military Training. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.
End Notes
N.B. Excerpts from the author’s forthcoming book Pursuing River Pirates, the Hunt for Sam Mason, with Rowman & Littlefield (now Bloomsbury Publishing) are included in this note.
[1] Carter F. Smith, “Gangs and the Military Note 1: The Increased Threat of Third Generation Gangs with Military-Trained Gang Members.” Small Wars Journal. 18 April 2018, https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/gangs-and-military-note-1-increased-threat-third-generation-gangs-military-trained-gang.
[2] Carter F. Smith, Gangs and the military: Gangsters, bikers, and terrorists with military training. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019.
[3] Cecil O’Dell, “Pioneers of Old Fredrick Co., Virginia,” citing Hite/Fairfax Lawsuit, British Copy, Hunter McKay Extracted Copy, 1995, p. 1613; William M. Lamar, “Capt. John Stevenson’s Roll,” 1961, p. 143 and “Frederick County roster,” 1961, p. 211. Virginia’s Colonial Soldiers. Richmond: Virginia State Library. 1995, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Virginia_s_Colonial_Soldiers/0RpcjJQBm6AC.
[4] William M. Lamar, “Capt. John Stevenson’s Roll,” p. 143 and “Frederick County roster,” p. 211. Virginia’s Colonial Soldiers. Richmond: Virginia State Library. 1961, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Virginia_s_Colonial_Soldiers/0RpcjJQBm6AC.
[5] “Minute [or Order] book of the Virginia Court held for Ohio County, Virginia, (n.d.), p. 10. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, https://historicpittsburgh.org/islandora/object/pitt%3A31735038275974/viewer#page/12/mode/2up.
[6] Boyd Crumrine, History of Washington County, Pennsylvania, with Biographical Sketches of Many of Its Pioneers and Prominent Men. Washington, PA: Chartiers Historical Society. L. H. Leverts & Co. 1882, http://chartiers.com/crumrine/twp-donegal.html.
[7] Raymond M. Bell, “Samuel Mason 1739-1803: Captain in Virginia, judge in Pennsylvania, river pirate in Kentucky, desperado in Mississippi. Washington, Pennsylvania.” West Virginia Ancestry: 1985, https://wvancestry.com/Files/Samuel_Mason_1739-1803.pdf .
[8] “Mason (Samuel) Trial Records.” Call number Z/0273.000, Archival Reading Room, Manuscript Collection. Jackson, Mississippi. Mississippi Department of Archives and History (MDAH): 1803, http://opac2.mdah.state.ms.us/phpmanuscripts/z0273.php
[9] Ibid.
[10] “Natchez,” Kentucky Gazette (Lexington, KY), 3 May 1803.
[11] Josephus C. Guild, Old times in Tennessee, with historical, personal, and political scraps and sketches. Nashville: Tavel, Eastman & Howell: 1878, https://archive.org/details/oldtimesintennes00guil_0
[12] Revolutionary War veterans. American Battlefield Trust. (n.d.),https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/revolutionary-war-veterans.
[13] Otto Rothert, The Outlaws of Cave-in-Rock: Historical Accounts Of The Famous Highwaymen And River Pirates who operated In Pioneer Days upon the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers and over the old Natchez Trace. Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark. 1924, https://archive.org/details/outlawsofcaveinr00roth/page/n9/mode/2up.
[14] Global Initiative to End Violence Against Children and Adolescents in Schools (GIVAS) final report. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2023, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/GIVAS_Final_Report.pdf.
[15] Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, and Justin McCrary, Controlling Crime: Strategies and Tradeoffs. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. (NBER Books), 2011.
[16] “Controversial alternative for a trapped labor force: Mexico’s formal employment and illicit drug production. Washington, DC: Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA): 2018, https://coha.org/controversial-alternative-for-a-trapped-labor-force-mexicos-formal-employment-and-illicit-drug-production/.
[17] Trafficking in persons in Europe: A regional analysis. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2023, https://www.unodc.org/documents/publications/TiP_Europe_EN_LORES.pdf .
[18] 2024 trafficking in persons report. Washington, DC: US Department of State. 2024,https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/ .
[19] Transnational organized crime in West Africa: A threat assessment. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (n.d.), https://www.unodc.org/toc/en/reports/TOCTAWestAfrica.html.
[20] Peter Andreas, Border games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico divide. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009.
[21] Katherine Beckett and Theodore Sasson, The Politics of Injustice: Crime and Punishment in America (2d Ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2004
[22] “Hubs of illicit trade: White paper.” Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TRACCC). Fairfax: George Mason University. May 2023, https://traccc.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Hubs-of-Illicit-Trade-White-Paper-Final-19052023.pdf.
[23] “What Works in Reentry [Video].” Office of Justice Programs.Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice (NIJ). (n.d.), https://nij.ojp.gov/media/video/17596.
[24] The globalisation of crime: A transnational organized crime threat assessment. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2010, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf
[25] Op cit., Andreas, at Note 20.
[26] Robert M. Coates (1930). The outlaw years; the history of the land pirates of the Natchez Trace. New York: Macaulay Company. 1930, https://archive.org/details/outlawyearshisto0000unse
[27] Op. cit., “Mason (Samuel) Trial Records” at Note 8.
[28] Carter F. Smith, “Gangs and the Military Note 2: Military Trained Gang Members as Criminal Insurgents.”Small Wars Journal. 31 May 2018, .https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/gangs-and-military-note-2-military-trained-gang-members-criminal-insurgents
[29] “Money laundering methods of drug cartels and the capture of El Chapo.” Thomson Reuters Legal Insights. (n.d.), https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/white-papers/money-laundering-methods-of-drug-cartels-and-the-capture-of-el-chapo.
[30] “Pablo Escobar. Organized Crime in the Americas” InSight Crime. (n.d.),https://insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/pablo-escobar/
[31] John P. Sullivan, “Considering Cross-Border Cartel Corruption Potentials in the United States.” Small Wars Journal. 16 January 2020, https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/considering-cross-border-cartel-corruption-potentials-united-states.
[32] Op. cit., Thompson Rueter, at Note 29.
[33] “Good practices in the area of border security and management in the context of counterterrorism.” Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). 2016, https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/2016%20and%20before/GCTF-Good-Practices%20-BSM-ENG.pdf?ver=2016-09-13-124953-540
[34] “Schengen Information System (SIS).” European Commission. (n.d.), https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen/schengen-information-system_en.
[35] “Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2021.” Europol. 12 December 2023, https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/main-reports/internet-organised-crime-threat-assessment-iocta-2021
[36] Op. cit., “Mason (Samuel) Trial Records” at Note 8.
[37] Carter F. Smith and Joshua Harms, “The Threat of Street Gangs, Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, and Domestic Terrorist/Extremist Groups. Small Wars Journal, 23 March 2018, https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/threat-street-gangs-outlaw-motorcycle-gangs-and-domestic-terroristextremist-groups.
[38] “Latin American program: Organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. Wilson Center. 2014, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/LAP_single_page.pdf.
[39] Op. cit., 2024 trafficking in persons report at Note 18.
[40] Stefania D’Ignoti, “Mafia, Poverty, and the Pandemic.” Foreign Policy. 4 May 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/04/coronavirus-pandemic-southern-italy-mafia-poverty/.
[41] Roberto Uchôa, “Why the expansion of Brazilian gangs is largely going unnoticed. Small Wars Journal.” 10 February 2025, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/02/10/why-the-expansion-of-brazilian-gangs-is-largely-going-unnoticed/.
[42] Op. cit., UNDOC, “Globalization” at Note 24.
[43] Op. cit., Sullivan “Cross-Border” at Note 21.
[44] “Money Laundering Typologies: Kosovo.” Swiss Cooperation Office. Available at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). May 2020, https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/ks/GeneralTypologies-Eng.pdf.
[45] “Money laundering and terrorist financing risks of virtual assets.” Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 2022, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/topics/virtual-assets.html
[46] “National money laundering risk assessment.” Washington, DC: US Department of the Treasury. February 2024, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2024-National-Money-Laundering-Risk-Assessment.pdf.
[47] Jonathan D. Rosen, “Corruption, Crime, and Gangs in Central America: Understanding the root causes.” Small Wars Journal, 25 October 2012, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2021/10/25/corruption-crime-and-gangs-central-america-understanding-root-causes/
[48] Op. cit., 2024 trafficking in persons report at Note 18.
[49] “Mexico’s long war: Drugs, crime, and the cartels.” Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). 21 February 2025. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-long-war-drugs-crime-and-cartels
[50] Op. cit., “Mason (Samuel) Trial Records” at Note 8.
[51] Carter F. Smith “Gangs and the Military Note 3: The role of West Coast Development in Military-Trained Gang Members.” Small Wars Journal. 22 January 2020, https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/gangs-and-military-note-3-role-west-coast-development-military-trained-gang-members-0.
[52] Op. cit., 2024 trafficking in persons report at Note 18.
[53] “Human trafficking.” US Customs and Border Protection (n.d.). https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/human-trafficking
[54] “The expansion and diversification of Mexican cartels: Dynamic new actors and markets.” Armed Conflict Survey 2024. International Institute for Strategic Studies. 12 December 2024, https://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-survey/2024/the-expansion-and-diversification-of-mexican-cartels-dynamic-new-actors-and-markets/
[55] “Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2020.” Washington, DC. Congressional Research Service (CRS Report No. R46218). 7 February 2020, .https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46218/2
[56] “United States Customs and Border Protection AI Use Cases. US Department of Homeland Security. (n.d.), https://www.dhs.gov/ai/use-case-inventory/cbp.
[57] “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC),” resolution 55/25, 15 Novemebr 2000; entry into force 29 Septemner 2003, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html.
[58] Carter F. Smith, “Samuel Mason: Revolutionary turncoat or opportunistic pirate? Journal of the American Revolution.” 25 February 2025, https://allthingsliberty.com/2025/02/samuel-mason-revolutionary-turncoat-or-opportunistic-pirate/
