Rethinking the Response to Russian Aggression: Command, Management, and Leadership

Introduction

A persistent argument has resurfaced in Western foreign policy circles—one that suggests Russia’s pattern of aggression in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Ukraine (2022) resulted from Western weakness and appeasement. Advocates of this view assert that stronger, more immediate responses to Russia’s earlier incursions could have deterred future aggression. However, history suggests a more nuanced interpretation, one that aligns well with a framework of command, management, and leadership in addressing different types of problems. Rather than viewing Russian expansionism through a narrow lens of strength and weakness, a more adaptive approach—one informed by the realities of wicked problems—may be necessary.

The conceptual distinction between command, management, and leadership has roots in both military and business traditions. But, its conceptual separation evolved over time through various disciplines, including military strategy, organizational theory, and leadership studies. Command is the oldest of the three, originating in military history. It refers to authority to give orders and enforce obedience. Ancient military theorists like Sun Tzu (The Art of War) and Carl von Clausewitz (On War) emphasized command as the ability to make decisive orders in combat. Leadership in a military context emerged as distinct from command, as effective generals not only commanded but also inspired and led their troops (e.g., Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar). Management in the military developed later with the rise of large bureaucratic armies, particularly in the Napoleonic era and beyond, focusing on logistics, planning, and organization (e.g., Prussian military reforms under Helmuth von Moltke the Elder). The U.S. military and organizations like NATO formalized the distinction between command (authority in structured environments), management (resource allocation and planning), and leadership (inspiring and guiding people).

The Command Approach: Crisis and Military Intervention

Command is the domain of crisis, where decisive action and authority are required. Hardline critics argue that the West should have taken a more command-driven approach in 2008 and 2014—perhaps through military intervention, direct deterrence, or rapid NATO expansion. This view suggests that a firm show of strength at earlier stages would have prevented Russian President Vladimir Putin from continuing his expansionist policies.

However, the historical record complicates this assumption. Military confrontations do not always deter aggressors; they can escalate conflicts, especially when the adversary has a high stake in the outcome. Russia’s interventions in Georgia and Ukraine were driven by long-term strategic and security interests, not merely opportunism. The assumption that an earlier show of force would have averted later conflicts neglects the risk of premature escalation, particularly when dealing with a risk-accepting nuclear power. Moreover, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars demonstrated that prolonged military entanglements can weaken Western resolve, reducing future appetite for direct interventions. The belief that military deterrence alone prevents war is overly simplistic—history has shown that both weakness and belligerence can provoke conflict.

The Management Approach: Sanctions and Bureaucratic Solutions

Management deals with tame problems—those that are complicated but solvable through standardized, bureaucratic solutions. Western responses to Russia’s aggression have often taken a management-oriented approach, relying on economic sanctions, arms provisions, and diplomatic isolation.

While these measures imposed costs on Russia, they have not fundamentally altered its behavior. The assumption that economic sanctions alone could deter a nation willing to endure hardship for strategic gains underestimates the resilience of authoritarian regimes. Russia is a country, not merely a risk-averse economy. Additionally, while Ukraine was not in NATO, NATO was in Ukraine. Arming and training Ukraine strengthened its defense, but it may have also hastened Russia’s 2022 invasion by reinforcing Kremlin narratives that the West was encroaching on Russia’s sphere of influence.

Consider then the argument made by ex-NATO Chief Jens Stoltenberg that if only NATO had managed to provide more arms even earlier, Ukraine’s forces would have been stronger and Russia could have been deterred—that it “could even have prevented the invasion.” This argument overlooks this crucial issue: the growing flow of weapons and NATO-Ukraine security cooperation were key factors triggering the 2022 invasion. Arming Ukraine sooner would not have deterred conflict but likely would have accelerated it, leading to an even earlier war. That, in turn, would have been an even worse alternative—with the U.S. and its allies still entangled in Afghanistan, and years of vital international training disrupted, such as Operation Interflex, which later proved essential in helping Ukrainian forces resist Putin’s re-invasion. This alternative history paints a darker, bloodier, and grimmer picture, with Russia striking earlier and advancing further in its brutal assault.

The Leadership Approach: Wicked Problems and Adaptive Strategy

Leadership is required for wicked problems—those that lack clear solutions and involve evolving, interconnected factors. Russian aggression is not simply a problem of deterrence; it is part of a larger geopolitical dynamic that involves historical grievances, either real or perceived, NATO expansion, energy politics, and regional security calculations.

A leadership approach would recognize that no single response—whether military intervention or sanctions—would have definitively prevented Russian expansion. Instead, it would emphasize:

• Strategic deterrence combined with measured concessions—as seen in John F. Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, where confrontation was tempered by diplomatic negotiation.
• Recognizing trade-offs—such as the costs of prematurely accelerating NATO expansion, which may have provoked Russian insecurity rather than deterring aggression.
• Framing Western responses beyond binary choices of strength vs. weakness—acknowledging that diplomacy, economic pressure, and selective military aid must be used in concert, rather than assuming that any single approach guarantees deterrence.

Rethinking the Past, Informing the Future

Of course, tired, perpetual Munich analogies still continue, but rather than judging past decisions through the simplistic lens of strength versus appeasement, Western policymakers should assess crises as matters of judgment, where trade-offs and unintended consequences must be carefully considered. The assumption that earlier escalation would have deterred Russia ignores historical complexities and the risks associated with military confrontation.

Instead, leadership in this context demands a sophisticated, adaptive strategy—one that blends deterrence, engagement, and a long-term vision for regional stability. The goal should not be merely to project strength but to exercise strategic foresight, shaping responses that are both forceful and effective in fostering a more stable international order.

As the West continues to navigate its response to Russia, it should avoid the trap of framing policy in purely reactive terms. Instead, it should cultivate a proactive strategy that anticipates potential flashpoints, builds resilient alliances, and strategically engages adversaries. Success lies not in rigidly adhering to a singular approach but in dynamically adapting to the evolving realities of global power politics.