Review Essay: On Contested Shores Volume 2
Timothy Heck, B.A. Friedman, and Walker D. Mills, Editors, On Contested Shores: the Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare, Volume 2. [Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, Paperback/Ebook, 382 Pages, ISBN: 979-8-9862595-8-1, DOI: 10.56686/9798986259581]
Amphibious warfare is one of the absolute most complicated operations an armed force can undertake. Just as roaring waves crash upon a shore and shape the land, where naval power meets ground forces consistently produce the most consequential battles in human history. Yet there have not been many authoritative academic texts on amphibious operations that span across multiple conflicts, observing different points in time and space. Most focus on one war or conflict, like World War Two. Volume 2 of On Contested Shores is a rare example of the former, continuing on the path of Volume 1, drawing lessons on amphibious operations derived from case studies on various conflicts across history.[1]
Each chapter is an analysis and timeline of a different amphibious operation in history that lends itself in some way to examining some of the common themes in the DOTMLPF-PI construct from professional military education. (Doctrine and Logistics, Technology and Innovation, Organization and Training, Policy and Interoperability, Military materiel and Personnel) Indeed this is how this book is organized, with several chapters each belonging to one of those five categories. It contrasts with Volume 1 which proceeded and organized itself chronologically. The editors are Timothy Heck, Brett A. Friedman, and newly introduced for Volume 2, Walker D. Mills. Timothy Heck is the deputy editorial director of the Modern War Institute at West Point and joint historian with the Marine Corps History Division. Brett A. Friedman is a fellow Marine Corps officer, Historian, and author of On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle. Walker D. Mills is an active duty Marine Corps officer who has been published in the Military Review, USNI Proceedings, War on the Rocks, and the Marine Corps Gazette. He is one of the senior editors at the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC).
Doctrine and Logistics
Chapter one begins with the logistical successes that enabled the United States military to invade deep into Mexico during the Mexican-American war amidst real challenges of doing so in the mid 1800’s. The authors write how the industrial and recruiting hubs were centered in New England and the ports of departure for the enterprise were in Louisiana. Threats of widespread disease in Mexico helped curtail the possibility of a straight land march from America’s southern border and similarly put limits on the amphibious invasion. And this would be the first major joint amphibious operation at scale for the U.S. Army and Navy. Despite the odds, the amphibious landing was a success and General Scott would go on to take the city of Veracruz (p. 19). This chapter is the most comprehensive work on the Mexican-American war that I’ve ever read, offering details ranging from General Scott and General Jesup’s relationship during the Second Seminole war to the actual specific General Orders issued by the officers. The breadth of the chapter is devoted to a thorough chronological account of the entire enterprise.
Chapter two entertainingly chronicles the “battle” between boatbuilder Andrew Jackson Higgins and the Navy’s then incompetent Bureau of Ships. The chapter describes the background first, how Higgins came to develop rugged boats capable of navigating the Louisiana swamps filled with sandbars and other hazards to navigation in service of oil exploration and timber companies. He evidently had recognized the utility of such boats to the military, and repeatedly petitioned the Navy and then the USMC to see his boat design, named the “Eureka” (pp. 21–22). Meanwhile the authors write how the Navy’s Bureau of Construction and Repair (BuC&R) was simultaneously crafting and soliciting bids to New England companies for landing craft designs, while ignoring Higgins more successful design. Repeatedly mentioned throughout the chapter are various trials in which Higgins landing craft significantly outperform the Navy’s designs even in basic seaworthiness while the Navy continues to award contracts for its subpar landing craft while stonewalling Higgins. The chapter comes to its summation during a final battle organized by then Senator Harry S. Truman in a trial at sea between Higgins Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) and the Navy’s own tank lighter on 25 May 1942 (p. 38).
Chapter three examines Soviet/Russian amphibious warfare/theory and does so through a Russian language lens. The context of the chapter starts with a focus on WW2. Amphibious warfare for the Soviets in WW2 was primarily used to bolster nearby land forces given their primary fight with Germany. “Indeed, the Soviets reported 114 amphibious landings during the Nazi-Soviet war, of which only 4 were large-scale operations. In contrast, the Western Allies conducted 22 major and hundreds of minor landings during the war” (p. 48). The chapter goes on to study the post WW2 years of the Soviet navy, and compare Soviet amphibious necessity and doctrine to America. The authors note how this has led to a lack of Soviet logistical readiness for amphibious operations and moreover a self-declared inability for chapter 3 to judge the strength of Soviet amphibious concepts.
Chapter four is entirely about the modern necessity to focus on contested logistics in amphibious warfare. The chapter takes time to examine the Pacific theatre of WW2 to learn from the Empire of Japan’s logistical supply failure which lead to “…60 percent of all Japanese military deaths between 1941 and 1945, or more than 1 million troops died of starvation and related illness in what was one of the greatest logistical disasters in military history” (p. 68). With a major war in the Pacific in the 21st century, the United States will have to grapple with that grim fact from history. Potential solutions written about in Chapter 4 include self sufficient forward operating bases, with enhanced technologies designed to enable food production or even 3D printing weapons and parts, shifting from petroleum fuels to electric and hydrogen vehicles, hidden caches of supplies located onsite, and ultimately a closed system that significantly lowers the need for massive resupply for Stand In forces. While the chapter does introduce a myriad of potential solutions and logistical risk mitigators, it also addresses foreseeable cons with each. Ultimately the chapter concludes with the recognition that the Marine Corps and the U.S. Military must implement major changes in force sustainment now or risk facing disaster in a future Pacific war.
Technology and Innovation
Chapter five details an exhaustive history spanning a decade of how the Landing Ship, Tank (LST) was combined with the Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT) to become a juggernaut in amphibious warfare, allowing allied troops in WW2 to now rapidly overwhelm Japanese shoreline defenses in the Pacific. Nash Sr. writes how Donald Roebling originally invented the LVT (then called the “Alligator”) in 1935 to operate both on water and in swampy terrain for rescue missions (p. 90). The use case specifically for the LVT’s over the Higgins boat is the need to overcome coral reefs encircling many of the remaining Pacific islands and Atolls that the Higgins boat may not be able to cross over due to the depth of its hull. The theory culminates in the Battle of Tarawa, wherein while both waves of Higgins boats (or LCVP’s) and LVT’s were launched, only the LVT’s managed to cross the coral reefs with the LCVP’s getting caught on the reef during the low neap tide. Overall this chapter is another expansive look into how one simple innovation by an American for civilian purposes ends up changing the face of amphibious warfare.
Organization and Training
Chapter six is an interesting departure from the WW2 focus, and explores the amphibious invasion by Union of South Africa forces into German South West Africa (GSWA) territory during WW1. As an analysis on amphibious warfare, the chapter makes it clear that logistical limitations in the ports, bad weather, and administrative/political hurdles with respect to both the British and the Union of South Africa all contributed to significant delays and challenges in the operation. The beginnings of an Afrikaner Rebellion also diminish Union forces considerably and prevent the operation from taking the entirety of GSWA territory as South Africa was planning, although they do succeed in taking Walvis bay unopposed.
Chapter seven continues into first World War with an examination of the German Amphibious Landing on the Baltic Islands in 12–17 October of 1917. The focus in this chapter is on adaptability and initiative, with an amphibiously inexperienced German military planning and successfully executing the amphibious landings in a matter of weeks, which leads to the closure of the Eastern Front of the Great War (p. 144). An interesting highlight of this chapter is the creation of one of the first Joint Commands with Air, Army and Naval leadership, established by the German military during planning for their amphibious operation. Operation Albion is described as proceeding with German aircraft providing a large surveillance sweep, German battleships silencing the coastal guns at the Taga Bay entrance, and bicycle troops being used in amphibious landings for the first time ever, which allowed the Germans to rapidly disembark and advance. Operation Albion’s legacy helped develop the German tactical concept of Blitzkrieg and continues to be studied by United States armed forces as a “relevant example of how armed forces can adapt to new and unfamiliar situations quickly” (p. 162).
Chapter eight examines 3 different case studies of inland maneuver within amphibious operations in polar or near polar environments. Examined by Lance R. Blyth are the Falklands in 1982, The Aleutian island chain in 1943, and Narvik, Norway in 1940. The chapter begins with Norway. The author states that the German force became cut off and held off repeated allied attacks for two months, owing much of their success to the fact that the German and Austrian troops were not only the 139th Mountain Infantry but the individual troops were in fact recruited from mountainous regions in Styria and Carinthia. Part 2 of the chapter shifts to the maneuvers in the Aleutian island chain, describing how at first the U.S. 7th infantry landed at Attu and was woefully unprepared for the cold climate, suffering 1 cold casualty per 13 men (p.175). The chapter concludes with an examination into the Falklands campaign, where the British forces were adequately trained, supplied, and prepared for the cold climate. Overall the chapter makes it clear what makes the difference between the Americans experience in Attu vs the British and German experience in Norway and the Falklands: Logistics and training.
Chapter nine is incredibly noteworthy because it changes the context of how the 1967 Arab-Israeli war is commonly understood today. Ginor and Remez write that the Soviets instigated the war directly to set the stage for an Egyptian victory over Israel, which would further the USSR’s global interests (p. 182). The authors write how the Soviets built up their navy throughout the 1960’s and quote Soviet professor Aleksandr Kislov of the Russian Academy of Sciences Center for Research of Peace Problems as saying the USSR planned to intercede, “in dire necessity, to stop Israeli aggression” (p. 185). They write how the Syrian forces had orders to cross across Israel from the Golan Heights and rendezvous with an “Egyptian” landing force in Haifa, that is in reality a Russian force. This is a fascinating chapter.
Policy and Interoperability
Chapter ten describes how Great Britain and the United States in World War Two built up their joint interoperability first through Operation Torch in the invasion of North Africa, and then used that experience to succeed in Operation Husky in Sicily. The chapter makes it clear that for the success of Operation Husky in invading Sicily, much is owed to the naval and Airforce bombardment that caused droves of Axis troops to become demoralized and surrender in addition to being cut off from resupply and reserve forces. The Chapter concludes by identifying coordination, communication and trust as chief lessons solidified in Operation Husky.
Shaun Mawdsley in chapter eleven writes about the commando raid on the Green Islands in 1944 by U.S. and New Zealand personnel. The chapter gives a timeline of the planning and execution of the raid, from the preplanning discussions with Admiral Halsy and General Douglas MacArthur to the final withdrawal of the commandos. The raid succeeded in its objectives and as Mawdsley writes, “The mission vindicated the benchmark cost effectiveness of Second World War amphibious raids…” (p. 244). Lastly Mawdsley heaps praise on the New Zealanders performance in the mission.
Chapter twelve serves to examine the Peoples Republic of China’s (PRC) amphibious landings in Taiwan’s offshore islands in the 1950’s in order to provide context for how the PLA acts today regarding the island of Taiwan itself. It opens with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) complete disaster when it initially tried to take Quemoy Island. The chapter continues as a timeline of events detailing the PRC’s evolving plans to take Taiwan, the abrupt outbreak of the Korean war which diverted PRC plans to take the island, and the realigning of American naval forces to the Taiwan strait by President Truman (p. 239). The chapter describes the shift in Chinese strategy to avoid open war with American forces, and instead take the remaining smaller Taiwanese held islands one by one. For anyone looking to understand the historical context of the mindset of the PRC regarding Taiwan and how they aim to take it, this chapter is a must read.
Military Material and Personnel
Chapter thirteen presents itself as a look into how the Union’s series of coastal forts and fleet of brown water ironclads stopped foreign (Particularly British) intervention in the American Civil War. Author Howard J. Fuller begins by contradicting Winston Churchill‘s claim that British seapower, “…remained the stoutest guarantee of freedom in the Americas…” (p. 248). Instead he writes that America’s greatest enemy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the British Empire. The author continues with an in depth examination of the Monroe doctrine and Europeans powers reaction to it throughout the chapter. The series of coastal fortifications begins to expand in the wake of the Monroe doctrine, and by the end of the Crimean war British politicians are openly contemplating how effective their newly massed forces might be against American forces in the Western hemisphere (p. 263). The chapter goes on to chronicle events in the 1840’s up through the Civil War that describe a cold war existing between Great Britain and the United States, with repeated British accounts observing the evolving state of American coastal and Naval armaments and vessels. Taken as a whole, chapter thirteen is a fascinating look at repeated points in history that Great Britain and the United States very nearly came to war.
Chapter fourteen is one of my favorites in Volume 2. Evan Ota writes in detail about the roots of the United States Marine Corps Small Wars ethos and background, and how that background came to pay exponential dividends in the Pacific theatre of WW2. He starts by chronicling the birth of the Fita-Fita Guard in American Samoa, comprised of Samoans who joined the burgeoning local militia led by 1st Sgt Nelson Nuron in 1900-1902 (p. 288). The focus then shifts to Haita, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic, detailing how Marine Corps NCO’s and officers joined the local police forces while on active duty, enabling them to further equip the constabularies and train more locals according to their standards. Ota notes that Lieutenant Vandegrift was present in Haiti, training, “…two companies of constabulary with the aid of a U.S. Marine fluent in French” (p. 280). This would be replicated on the eastern half of the island and in Nicaragua, with Marines training and equipping locals to serve as force multipliers, with incredibly successful results. The cadre of Marine Corps officers who led these combined forces would go on to fight in the Pacific, bringing their experiences with them. The author of this chapter does an incredible job of detailing how each experience in the Small Wars of the 1900’s would go on to shape the Marine Corps identity for over a century. The chapter concludes by emphasizing that in light of modern threats in the Pacific today, we must again embrace and seek security cooperation with local leaders.
Timothy Heck’s chapter fourteen examines the lesser known Kerch-Eltigen amphibious landings that led to Soviet Russia liberating Crimea from Nazi Germany in 1943. Heck gives an account of the German and Romanian forces military strength compared to the Soviets, (in which the Soviets far outnumber them in soldiers, artillery, and armor) as well as the command and control difficulties facing the Axis forces. As the Soviet vessels begin to depart for the landings, they are disrupted by a storm and some Soviet units are delayed by several days for the landings, while others proceed with the original plan (p. 311). Once they finally make the landings initially unopposed, “Fifteen minutes after the Soviet landing…The Germans called for fire from a battery of four heavy cannons…the Soviet flotilla, improperly armored, suffered heavy losses” (p. 312). As the chapter continues to describe the grinding battle which is essentially becomes a stalemate, Heck makes note of the pro-Soviet partisans who played an effective role harassing and degrading German military power. Ultimately the landings at Kerch-Eltigen are redeemed when the 4th Ukrainian Front pushes into Crimea across the Perekop Isthmus and routs the Axis forces (p. 319).
The final chapter of Volume 2 examines the development of the PRC’s Marine Corps, The People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC) with a focus towards what their operations and makeup look like today and in the future. The timeline of the development of the PLANMC begins in 1950 as the Chinese communist forces suffered setbacks in taking the islands held by the Nationalist forces. They create the PLANMC to invade Taiwan (p. 323). Salo describes how they are disbanded after the Korean war and the failure to take Taiwan, and then recreated with a larger scope due to the, “poor performance by the PLA Army against a numerically inferior South Vietnamese force during the Paracel Islands campaign…” (p. 323). The rest of the chapter is largely focused on what the PLANMC looks like today, describing it’s place in the Chinese Navy (PLAN), its organizational makeup, personnel strength, armaments, amphibious vehicles, and it’s mission structure.
Conclusion
On Contested Shores, Volume 2’s conclusion zooms out and explains that it was written considering the conflicts erupting throughout the world, in light of the Marine Corps transformation that started in 2019, and in service of reembracing rigorous scholarship in the Marine Corps. The editors make it clear why they chose to organize Volume 2 differently than the first volume, and why they followed in the steps of Lieutenant colonel Merrill L. Barlett’s Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Operations written 30 years ago. Following the conclusion is a selected bibliography along with suggested further readings.
The larger enduring theme that both Volume 1 and Volume 2 of On Contested Shores cover is that successful amphibious operations rely on a myriad of factors to name only a few: logistics, sound command and control, area familiarization, adequately trained personnel, and in modern times application of the “Joint Force,” an integration of Air, Land and Sea power. Both volumes taken together give one a much deeper appreciation for the sheer scope that is required for a successful amphibious operation. Each chapter in both volumes takes a specific amphibious operation in history and examines it as a case study, detailing the operation’s timeline and deriving key lessons from it. The books make it clear that amphibious operations on “Contested Shores” are some of the most, if not the most, complicated maneuvers that militaries have undergone since the dawn of warfare. As America shifts to face down the Chinese threat in the Pacific, every single relevant policy maker and stakeholder should read these volumes to get a grasp on what will be required of the United States Military and the defense industrial base.
Endnotes
[1] The first volume of A Contested Shores was a broad introduction to the theme. See Timothy Heck and B.A. Freidman, Editors, On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, Paperback/Ebook, 2024, 452 pages, ISBN: 978-1-7320031-4-9, DOI: 10.56686/9781732003149. A comprehensive review essay on volume 1 is found at John P. Sullivan and Hal Kempfer, “On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare. Edited by Timothy Heck and B.A. Friedman. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2020, Journal of Strategic Security 14, no. 4 (2021): pp. 116–127, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.14.4.1994
