Mission Command in Operation Just Cause
Mission Command in Operation Just Cause
By Clayton Dos Santos and Jesus Gonzalez
The United States (U.S.) Army has been studying and evolving its approaches to military operations. In this context, learning from past experiences is one of the best methods to enhance the Army’s ability to fight. To illustrate that, in December 1989, a remarkable success in military operations took place in Panama (Department of the Army [DA], n.d.), which demonstrated a high level of coordination and command and control on the battlefield. It is known as Operation Just Cause and it was a complex Joint Operation against the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) in Panamanian territory (Wallace, 2019). It captures the importance of training, planning, and leadership to prevail in combat operations. Another doctrinal concept that emerges from this operation is mission command. According to the U.S. Army doctrine, mission command is “the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation” (DA, 2019, p. 1-3). During Operation Just Cause, there were several opportunities to exercise mission command and they were decisive to mission accomplishment. Therefore, it is relevant to present some of the events that took place in Operation Just Cause as part of the U.S. Army learning process, and the application of mission command and leadership to the success of military operations. In order to better comprehend this operation, it is important to understand the scenario in Panama that led to the execution of Operation Just Cause.
Background
The country of Panama is a transcontinental territory that connects Central America to the South America continent. For several decades, the Panama Canal was crucial to the U.S. strategic and commercial interests. In 1983, after the death of the dictator Omar Torrijos, rising to power in the intelligence arena was Manuel Antonio Noriega. He became the commander of the PDF, which encompassed the Panama Armed Forces, the Panama police, customs, and the investigative service of Panama (Cole, 1995). Since then, Noriega developed relations with the U.S. intelligence community as well as with clients from the Medellín drug cartel of Colombia.
Noriega’s Rise to Power and Developed Tensions
Noriega was an influential leader and had many supporters. As he established connections with the United States, he quickly became well known throughout the world and very quickly caught the attention of countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya. He started to play both sides. He would provide intelligence information to the US and he also accepted incentives from the above-named countries. Noriega quickly established rapport and gained trust from anyone who would listen. Noriega asked for military assistance from these countries and begins to establish civilian defense committees known as Dignity Battalions. The Dignity Battalions were responsible for intelligence collection and population control (Ronald H. Cole, Joint History Office, 1995). The men and women of the Dignity Battalions were all supporters of Noriega. In addition to the Dignity Battalions, the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) was approximately 14,000 strong. The PDF’s mission was to defend Noriega’s headquarters known as La Comandancia and other bases throughout Panama. Most of the responsibilities assigned to the PDF came directly from Noriega. There is no proof that the operations process existed in the PDF, hence why Noriega was dubbed a dictator. It is clear however, that he exuded competence and his men believed in his ideals.
In 1987, Noriega decided to increase the anti-American rhetoric, initiating incidents against U.S. military personnel in Panama. The first public tension between Noriega and the U.S. started when the PDF Chief of Staff, Colonel Roberto Días-Herrera alleged electoral fraud and the assassination of the leader of Noriega’s political opposition, Hugo Spadafora. The U.S. reaction to that was a resolution calling for Noriega’s resignation. As a result of that, Noriega’s supporters attacked the U.S. embassy. The U.S. government promptly cut off economic and military cooperation with Panama and indicted Noriega for involvement in drug trafficking (Cole, 1995). Until the end of 1988, more than 300 incidents involving U.S. military personnel and their families occurred (DA, n.d.). One of the last events prior to the U.S. forces launching Operation Just Cause in Panama territory was in May 1989 during Panama national elections. Noriega’s candidate was defeated, and Noriega declared the elections invalid. Following this decision, several incidents took place. The opposition candidate bodyguard was murdered, and the PDF conducted more actions against U.S. military personnel in Panama. Due to the increase of violence in the country, then U.S. President George H. W. Bush decided to U.S. calibrate force posture in Panama, deploying 1,900 U.S. Soldiers to reinforce security in the region (DA, n.d.). Despite all these events, prior to the escalation of the tension, the U.S. had already begun to develop a plan to face Noriega’s ambition.
U.S. Contingency Plan
In 1985, National Security Advisor to President Ronald W. Reagan, Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter, warned that Noriega aimed for the monopoly of power in Panama and at the same time, expand the drug trade in the region (Cole, 1995). For this reason and because of the events that showed Noriega’s intent, in 1987, the U.S. forces developed a plan called Blue Spoon. This plan envisioned the gradual increase U.S. military personnel within U.S. military bases in Panama and initiate a series of exercises in order to be ready for a possible military incursion in the region. The goal, if necessary, was to place U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in position to develop a large joint operation to deter Noriega aggression against U.S. citizens and preserve the operations in the Panama Canal (Cole, 1995). Noriega, instead of understanding and visualizing the most likely end state of the U.S. approach, in March 1988, decided to escalate tensions by declaring a national emergency in Panama, repressing political opposition, and increasing the persecution of U.S. citizens (Cole, 1995). In December 1989, Noriega declared a state of war in Panama and the following event, probably was the last against the U.S. citizens before the military incursion in Panama took place.
On December 16th, 1989, four off-duty U.S. military officers, while driving through Panama City were stopped at a roadblock. The PDF soldiers demanded they get out of the vehicle, they refused and drove away. PDF guards opened fire, killing one U.S. officer. A Navy Lieutenant and his wife were detained by PDF soldiers and sent to La Comandancia, the PDF headquarters. They were ruthlessly interrogated by PDF personnel. General Maxwell Thurman, the SOUTHCOM commander, after receiving the notification of the incident and talking to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff, General Colin Powel, placed all the U.S. military personnel from SOUTHCOM on alert. Subsequently, President Bush authorized the implementation of the operation to safeguard the American citizens in Panama, defend the democracy in that country, combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal (DA, n.d.).
From Noriega’s side, according to Cole (1995), the PDF was ready to employ defensive operations in La Comandancia, and its bases at Fort Amador, Rio Hato, and the Torrijo-Tocumen International Airport. The PDF forces capabilities included assets to conduct sabotage and attacks against the U.S. military installations such as Quarry Heights, Fort Clayton, Howard Air Force Base, Albrook Air Force Base, and the U.S. Naval station at Rodman. In a feasible scenario, Noriega could move his forces to the mountains and to the jungle and conduct guerrilla warfare, extending the operation in time and space. The total PDF of personnel of all ranks was about 15,000 soldiers (DA, n.d.)
The board was set. Unbeknownst to everyone, Operation Just Cause would provide several remarkable examples of the importance of mission command in military operations.
Operation Just Cause and the Application of Mission Command
Notably, the success of Operation Just Cause is due to the U.S. force projection capability. We can easily see the principles of war such as mass, objective, and surprise, the coordination and synchronization of the actions, concern for collateral damage, and planning for consolidating gains as outcomes due to the detailed planning at every level. The ability to develop these approaches were enabled by some vital doctrinal concepts that the U.S. forces exercised during this operation. The discussion about training, mission command, and leadership is key to understanding and visualizing the U.S. forces accomplishments in the Operation Just Cause.
Training and the Application of Mission Command
Since the beginning of the Blue Spoon planning, the U.S. forces developed a series of training and exercises to prepare to act against Noriega’s forces. According to DA (2022a), “Training events also allow a unique opportunity for observers to see how Soldiers react to friction, frustration, and, in certain circumstances, failure” (p. 2-14). The U.S. forces developed training schedules and activities to prepare Soldiers for the follow-on operations. Emphasizing the control of firepower, fire discipline, Soldiers conducted the most realistic training to face armed and unarmed targets (DA, n.d.). As part of the planning phase for the Operation Just Cause, it is accurate to define training as a facilitator of learning from failure, exercising background skills in the preparation of leaders and Soldiers (DA, 2022a).
It is important to remember the relationship between training and the principles of mission command. The principles of mission command are competence, mutual trust, shared understanding, commander’s intent, mission order, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance (DA, 2019). The training conducted by all units involved, built mutual trust, competent leaders, exercised shared understanding, and risk acceptance, skills that were instrumental during the operation. Another example that perhaps was the most beneficial training for the U.S. forces preparation for the Operation Just Cause took place in 1989, during a series of exercises code-named Sand Flea (DA, n.d.). According to Wallace (2019), “The Sand Flea exercises provided repetition on actual objectives, and got the PDF and Panamanians conditioned to night air assaults and increasingly larger U.S. military operations” (p. 27). U.S. forces were able to exercise discipline, a decisive mission command principle that supports the achievement of objectives, the synchronization of actions, and guide leaders to make timely decisions in accordance with the commander’s intent. Thus, it is possible to realize that the U.S. forces training optimized the quality of the actions and the exercise of mission command in the Operation Just Cause.
Mission Command in Operation Just Cause
Commanders at all levels must be able to understand the complexity of the operational environment and look beyond the situation they are facing at that moment. Commanders have to create the most favorable conditions in preparations for future challenges (DA, 2022b). This was exactly what the JTF South Commander provided during Operation Just Cause. The presence of the mission command as elements of command and elements of control was vital to the employment of U.S. forces in the Operation Just Cause. Command and control is “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of mission” (DA, 2019, p. 1-16).
The operation started at 0100 hours on 20 December 1989. JTF South elements included 7th Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne Division, 5th Mechanized Division, 6th Marine Expeditionary Battalion, Joint Special Operations Forces, and the 193rd Light Infantry Brigade (Wallace, 2019). It is pertinent to consider that the magnitude of the operation could move to a chaotic environment easily. Therefore, the elements of command and control were crucial to this operation. The strategic objectives were clearly defined and shared with subordinate commanders: restore democracy in Panama and remove Noriega from power. This translated to military objectives: protect the U.S. citizens, defend the Panama Canal, restore democracy, and capture Noriega (Wallace, 2019). It is feasible to visualize the level of coordination, preparation, synchronization, and depth the U.S. forces achieved in this operation. This was possible due to the command and control of the action by exercising the mission command elements of control. Direction, feedback, information, and communication are the elements of control; on the other hand, authority, responsibility, decision making, and leadership are the elements of command (DA, 2019). By exercising their authority, and providing direction, JTF South commanders were able to maintain the proper flux of information throughout the chain of command, taking advantage of the feedback received, and clear communication with their subordinate commanders. This way, JTF South demonstrated convergence and the understanding of the mission command concept.
Another great example of the application of mission command during Operation Just Cause took place in the operational level of warfare. In order to accomplish their mission, the task forces received clear mission orders. According to DA (2019), mission orders are “directives that emphasize to subordinate the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them” (p. 1-11). Narrowing to the operational level, the JTF South had five objectives: the 193th Infantry Brigade, called Task Force Bayonet, was responsible for isolating Noriega’s headquarters, La Comandancia. The 6th Marine Expeditionary Battalion, as Task Force Semper Fi, tasked to secure the Bridge of Americas, and block the western approaches to Panama City. The 7th Infantry Division, Task Force Atlantic, had the task of isolating the Colón region and neutralizing the PDF’s 8th Company and Naval Infantry Company, protecting Madden Dam and freeing political prisoners. The Joint Special Operations Task Force tasked to parachute assault into Rio Hato, neutralizing the PDF’s 6th and 7th companies, disabled PDF patrol, and denied PDF use of Paitilla Airport. The 82th Airborne Division, Task Force Pacific, was responsible for conducting parachute assault to seize Torrijos- Tocumen Airport, and air assault raids to seize Fort Cimarron, and Panama Viejo (Wallace, 2019). All these missions could not be understood and accomplished without the application of mission command through effective mission orders and the commander’s intent, which contain the purpose, key tasks and the desired end state of their actions. Notably, the exercise of mission command was essential for commanders to provide guidance, direction, and to describe their intent in the Operation Just Cause. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to mention that the exercise of mission command during that operation would not be possible without a strong leadership on the battlefield.
Art and Science of Mission Command
The complex operational environment in which Operation Just Cause occurred required leaders who understood the art of command and the science of control, the exercise the operational art, and the proper application the commander’s activities to prevail on the battlefield (DA, 2022b). Therefore, it is unquestionable that leadership, as part of the mission command philosophy, or as an element of combat, is fundamental in any military operation (DA, 2022a). These doctrinal passages reflect the importance of leadership during operation and also corrolate with some actions and decisions that took place during that operation. In about 20 days, Task Force commanders were able to understand, visualize and describe, direct, lead, and assess operations, accomplishing all the objectives defined. Commanders’ abilities to employ the operations process to integrate and synchronize their capabilities across multiple domains is a good example of leadership in operations (DA, 2019).
A scenario that illustrates the importance of synchronizing military capabilities across multiple domains came from the Operation Just Cause perspective. The JTF South operational objective was to conduct military operations with relentless operational tempo and agility in order to overwhelm the enemy forces. To achieve this, the task forces of Task Force Bayonet, Task Force Semper Fi, Task Force Atlantic, the Joint Special Operations Task Force, and Task Force Pacific synchronized and integrated approximately 26,000 U.S. service members from all domains, striking almost two dozen objectives in the first twenty-four hours. This caused a tremendous surprise in the PDF forces and revealed the importance of planning and preparation for military operations (Wallace, 2019). Moreover, this example shows the importance of leadership throughout operations. These actions would not be possible without commanders and subordinate leaders who understand the purpose of operations and provided guidance and motivation to their subordinates. The results of Operation Just Cause demonstrated how training, mission command, and leadership provided a vast advantage for the U.S. forces.
Conclusion
In essence, Operation Just Cause provided multiple events and decisions that demonstrated the importance of mission command principles and command and control during operations. Furthermore, the planning phase and the development of realistic training supported leaders and Soldiers in exercising essential attributes and competencies that would be applied in combat operations. Moreover, leadership was also highlighted as a key component for the success of the operations. Thus, Operation Just Cause presented itself as an excellent case study to support the enhancement of the U.S. Army’s ability to fight.
References
Cole, Ronald H. (1995). Operation Just Cause – The planning and execution of joint operations in Panama. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/Just_Cause.pdf
Department of the Army. (n.d). Operation Just Cause – The incursion into Panama. https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-85-1/cmhPub_70-85-1.pdf
Department of the Army. (2019). Mission command: Command and control of Army forces (ADP 6-0). https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN18314-ADP_6-0-000-WEB-3.pdf
Department of the Army. (2022a). Developing Leaders (FM 6-22).
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36735-FM_6-22-000-WEB-1.pdf
Department of the Army. (2022b). Operations (FM 3-0).
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36290-FM_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf
Wallace, Michael P. (2019). Operational Art during Operation Just Cause.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1083691.pdf
