Stay in Your Lane: The US Military and the Interagency Community
Stay in Your Lane: The US Military and the Interagency Community by Brian Hayes – Georgetown Security Studies Review
… Of course, military capabilities are sometimes quite useful in addressing humanitarian crises and disrupting criminal networks. For example, US naval vessels quickly move relief supplies, search and rescue aircraft, and fully equipped operating rooms in response to disasters in or near coastal areas. This vital capability exists nowhere else in government. Other military capabilities, such as surveillance aircraft and intelligence collection platforms, augment law enforcement agencies’ efforts to interdict drugs en route to the United States. Such common-sense uses of military power to support non-military objectives should continue.
However, policymakers should ask hard questions about the degree to which the armed forces have taken leading roles in traditionally civilian-led missions, such as development and public diplomacy. Military personnel typically have little expertise in these areas. In Afghanistan, the US armed forces tried their hand at economic development, frequently failing to coordinate with the US Agency for International Development. “Unsurprisingly”—as the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction observed—DOD didn’t have much expertise in economic development and many of its projects failed.” In Liberia, a US military task force ignored the advice of public health experts and spent hundreds of millions of dollars on Ebola treatment centers that proved essentially useless. Proposed DOD “strategic communication” to counter violent extremism presents another questionable use of military power: why should Army psychological operations personnel conduct what is essentially public diplomacy? Although in some cases the US military has voluntarily stepped into these roles, it is also important to recognize policymakers’ partial responsibility for the military’s encroachment into traditionally civilian activities. When civilian agencies lose funding while defense budgets remain steady, the military may take on new roles in order to fill the gaps.
In similarly misguided efforts to those above, SOUTHCOM has proposed to work with foreign law enforcement. Most US military personnel know little about policing—a point illustrated by an officer’s recent admission that he watched television cop shows to prepare for an assignment training Afghan police. Civilian US federal law enforcement agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have long operated in key South American countries, and their agents have substantial training and experience in criminal investigation and prosecution. The Departments of Justice and State also operate training and assistance programs for foreign prosecutors and law enforcement officers. If the United States wants to support South American law enforcement more aggressively, it should assign the task to these civilian agencies, not the US military…
Let us look at these things — possibly in a differently way that we have in the past.
New starting point:
a. The U.S./the West wins the Old Cold War and — thus and thereby —
b. Becomes responsible for “civil order and governance” throughout the entire Rest of the World.
In this regard, to consider the insight provided by LTC David A. Mueller here — but on a much larger/worldwide scale:
“We have seen from the above examples that civil order and governance historically are the responsibility of the military that conquers a territory.”
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-84/Article/1038803/civil-order-and-governance-as-military-responsibilities/
Thus, while we might argue whether it was the “militaries” of the U.S./the West that won the Old Cold War, and/or whether the U.S./the West “conquered the territories” of the Rest of the World in order to achieve this objective, might we agree that, indeed, (a) the Old Cold War was won by the U.S./the West and, thus, (b) “civil order and governance” — of the entire Rest of the World thereby — became the responsibility of the U.S./the West?
This suggesting that:
a. Indeed post-the Old Cold War,
b. Such things as “foreign law enforcement” fell more directly into our militaries — and thus more into Admiral Tidd and SOUTHCOM’S — “lane?” (By way of default, “the only one with any capability,” and/or limited historical precedence — see LTC Mueller above, if nothing else?)
Same-same for all our combatant commanders post-the Old Cold War?
(Properly add to this an acknowledgement of the U.S./the West’s determination, post-the Old Cold War, to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines, then one comes to understand how these such, often contentious and contested, post-Old Cold War activities came to fall significantly into our militaries’ — rather than into some other agencies’ — “lane?”)
I rate this article as crapola. Agenda based, and factually incorrect.
The author is both confused and biased, and misses the larger points of ADM Tidd’s strategic approach.
The article starts with this lament, “Admiral Kurt Tidd wants to be South America’s top cop. Tidd, the commander of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), is not content to focus on military activities. Instead, Tidd wants SOUTHCOM to target criminal networks throughout the theater in order to “detect, illuminate, [and] disrupt” criminal activities. Tidd—a US Navy officer—also wants to support South America’s police officers, lawyers, and judges.[i] He recently stressed the need for “engagement” in areas such as city neighborhoods and prisons.[ii]”
The author then points out that ADM Tidd doesn’t have law enforcement experience; therefore, he is unqualified. First off, I doubt ADM Tidd said he wanted to be top cop, but he did point out during a Congressional Posture brief that the U.S. law enforcement model where success is measured on the amount of drugs seized is failing badly in the region, and that a new approach is required. Even if the police are seizing more drugs, more drugs are moving into the U.S., the character of human trafficking is changing for the worse (more aliens of concern versus laborers), and the level of violence has gone through the roof resulting in large parts of SOUTHCOM becoming unstable and a base for a range of bad actors to threaten the U.S. directly.
In this case I’ll take an Admiral with a strategic vision over another DEA agent attempting to build a case on a specific individual and seize another shipment of drugs. The policing the author refers to will be conducted by local security forces, most likely a combination of military and police. Since these challenges are transnational, ADM Tidd can assist partners develop information sharing mechanisms and improve their relevant tactical skills with military assistance. The key isn’t chasing the product (drugs, weapons, or illegals), but neutralizing the network(s). The military is uniquely suited to provide assistance in this endeavor, despite the ADM not having a law degree or police experience.
The author represents those who are eager to protect their lane out of self-interest. The ADM is focused on changing the approach to make meaningful progress. We can all stay in our lanes and wait for catastrophic failure, or leaders can step forward and offer some alternative approaches, even approaches outside of their supposed lanes.
The following documents may prove useful in this discussion:
First, a 2013 Congressional Research Report entitled: “The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress:
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf
Herein, note that:
a. “Dr. Cynthia Watson, a professor at the National War College and author of “Combatant Commands: Origins, Structure, and Engagements” describes combatant commands as being: Commands in charge of utilizing and integrating air, land, sea, and amphibious forces under their commands to achieve U.S. national security objectives while protecting national interests. …” (See Page 2.)
b. What is considered to be the “primary threat” to SOUTHCOM regional security (see “Counter-Trafficking” at the bottom of Page 56):
“The USSOUTHCOM Commander noted that illicit trafficking of drugs, weapons, and people and their associated TCOs constitute the primary threat to regional security. … ” And
c. What is considered to be the primary cause of these such difficulties (See “Natural Disasters, Poverty, and Violence” at the top of Page 57):
“The USSOUTHCOM Commander testified that natural disasters, poverty, and violence in the region have a negative impact on regional security and stability. … ”
Next, and now re: then-Vice Admiral Tidd’s confirmation hearing, to consider what then-Vice Admiral Tidd saw as “progress” in this region:
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tidd_APQs_12-09-15.pdf (See “Major Challenges” at Pages 5 and 6 of this document):
“Today, no nation in the region poses a direct, credible conventional military threat to the United States. Although there are many longstanding border disputes, there is minimal risk of inter-state armed conflict between neighboring countries. As I understand it, Latin America and the Caribbean has witnessed significant progress — especially in terms of democratic consolidation; the growth of market-based economies; and the protection of human rights — however the region still faces numerous persistent unresolved challenges. … ”
Conclusion:
Given the apparent World War II and Old Cold War origins of the Unified Command Plan and the Combatant Commands (see Pages 3 through 5 of my first linked document above), I believe we can now draw a direct line — yesterday as today — between:
a. The — enduring — policy of the United States as outlined in NSC-68:
“Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. … a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat … the policy of striving to develop a healthy international community is the long-term constructive effort which we are engaged in.”
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-2.htm And:
b. The use of our Unified Command Plan and the Combatant Commands/Commanders to achieve this exact such purpose (again: foster a world environment, a healthy international community, in which the American system can survive and flourish.) Herein,
c. “Progress,” along these lines; this to be understood in terms of achieving — in USSOUTHCOM and/or elsewhere — ever-greater advancement toward “democratic consolidation, the growth of market-based economies and the protection of human rights?” (This, so as to overcome the significant difficulties remaining in this and other regions?)
Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
Q: Helping to “foster a world environment, a “healthy international community,” one in which “the American system can survive and flourish” (the overall U.S. national security objective, still today, thus best described/defined?) — this being in Admiral Tidd’s, and indeed in all our combatant commanders’ yesterday and today, “lane?”
A: You betcha. Indeed, that was, and still is, his/their raison d’etre.
(The above-provided thoughts and documentation seeming to confirm this such suggestion?)