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Getting the Military and Social Scientists Back Together: The Need for “Expeditionary Social Science”

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10.01.2016 at 01:46pm

Getting the Military and Social Scientists Back Together: The Need for “Expeditionary Social Science” by Jonathan Bate, Modern War Institute

The military and the academy need each other, at least when it comes to enhancing our understanding of war. While programs such as the Minerva Initiative provide critical funding for research in the academy, the 2014 dissolution of the Human Terrain System – a program which embedded anthropologists, sociologists, and other scholars with US military units – reveals the ongoing need to foster more meaningful collaboration between the military and academia.

Critically, the relationship offers mutual benefits for both groups. On one hand, the Department of Defense has the opportunity to tap into a vast pool of intellectual and methodological talent at little cost. Likewise, social scientists – whether they are empiricists or theorists – can receive approved data to fuel studies which may provide invaluable insights into the workings of conflict. Additionally, closer collaboration can increase researchers’ understanding of how the military operates and hence aid the development of useful and relevant research questions. Furthermore, DoD can deepen its understanding of population-centric conflict and improve the effectiveness of its overseas stability operations through a stronger partnership with the social science research community…

Read on.

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Dave Maxwell

It is all about the assessments. Those who can conduct accurate and thorough assessments are worth their weight in gold. Of course those who pay attention to assessments and use them in strategy development and campaign planning are themselves golden. We should not forget the inherent responsibility the military has for conducting area study/area assessment, target audience analysis, and civil information management.

We should consider our own history with the Special Operations Research Office:
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjpzYmdg7rPAhWIax4KHR_xC1IQFggjMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fcgi-bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DAD0607767&usg=AFQjCNFhxu8vsBaEutkZIEC7ap3LTG7Zvg&sig2=KjsdUIZqM4CowIyKhgR09A&bvm=bv.134495766,d.dmo

http://www.worldcat.org/identities/lccn-n88-627995/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Camelot

Outlaw 09

This is just an attempt to do a “rebirth” of the Human Terrain Team concept that was largely a great profit making deal first for defense contractors and then for those that started it and then for those that participated in it. BUT for the US taxpayer who paid for it not much was gained by the program overall.

BUT in reality it never went completely away as mandated by Congress…it was and is still hidden inside DoD just as was/is JIEDDO….

Bill C.

From our author’s paper above:

BEGIN QUOTE

In their book Poor Economics, Banerjee and Duflo propose that the development community has struggled to reduce global poverty because it does not adequately understand the subject and its root causes. The same may be true with population-centric conflict; the military has struggled due to an inadequate understanding of the effects of military interventions on the human dimension.

END QUOTE

The “root cause” of population-centric and, indeed, great nation conflict in the New/Reverse Cold War of today (much as it was the “root cause” of both such types of conflict in the Old Cold War of yesterday) is the determination of an “expansionist” nation (the Soviets/the communists then; the U.S./the West now) to transform the entire Rest of the World more along this “expansionist” nation’s very unusual and unique — and thus often alien and profane — political, economic, social and value lines.

(Re: the U.S./Western such “expansionist” efforts today see:

a. http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/thewestandtherest. And

b. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html)

Thus, by simply eliminating the improper name “stability operations” and, in the place of same, adopting the correct term “transformative operations,” this “root cause” — of both population-centric and great nation conflict today and indeed yesterday — is revealed. (Rather than concealed, as per the term “stability operations.”)

Having accomplished this mission — of correctly identifying the problem, and of properly identifying its “root cause” — we can now move on to a proper understanding — in this exact context — of “tactical economics” and “strategic economics.”

This being that:

a. “Tactical economics” (such as the small projects that our author describes) is used as a “stalking horse” (a false pretext concealing someone’s real/true intentions); this, to provide the initial/interim “stability” needed, so that we might get closer to our “prey;” this, so as to apply:

b. “Strategic economics” thereafter, to wit: the larger projects, which are undertaken on the basis of transforming these — (now “quieted?”) outlying states, societies and civilizations of the Rest of the World — more along, in our case today, modern western political, economic, social and value lines.

Thus, the ultimate role and goal of the “development community” — and of its military arm — and of “tactical economics,” “strategic economics,” etc., — to be understood in terms of transforming the entire Rest of the World, in our case today, more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines.

Bottom Line:

Re: this situation, I do not see the need for “social scientists” so much — to help us understand “war,” “population-centric conflict” and/or, indeed, “great nation conflict.” These, I suggest, are adequately described, and understood, as per my “West versus The Rest”/”expansionist nation” discussion above.

Rather, I see the need for “social scientists,” today, more to access and describe, within these outlying states, societies and civilizations of the Rest of the World (a) who might be “with us” re: our desired “transformation” projects, (b) who might be “against us” re: these such projects and (c) who is uncommitted and, thus, might prove useful/dangerous/malleable by either (or both) sides.

Thus, and in sum, I am suggesting that our “social scientists” might prove more useful to us — overall — more as per our “strategic”/”transformative” endeavors — and not so much as per our interim/”stalking horse”/”tactical”/”stability” maneuvers;

BOTH OF WHICH, HOWEVER, I SUGGEST THE ENEMY WILL ACTUALLY SEE RIGHT THROUGH.

Why?

Because the U.S./the West, much like the Soviets/the communists before us, wears its “expansionist” grand strategy “heart” directly on our heavily exposed foreign policy “sleeve.”

This, ultimately rendering our all our such tactical and strategic efforts — such as those discussed above — less effective/useless, or nearly so.

(P.S. Still think that our efforts are designed, ultimately, to be simply “stabalizing,” rather than massively “transformative,” in nature? Then see the following by Sir Adam Roberts: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4091371?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents (Specifically: Page 601 onward, and re: the section entitled “Post-1945 Occupations With a Transformative Purpose.”)

(And re: Sir Adam Roberts, see his credentials here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Roberts_(scholar) And here: http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/associates/adam-roberts.html )

dotybrianp

If influence is power, power is control and control is formed through dissuasion, destruction, and degrading an adversary then we absolutely should want to obtain max information where cultural considerations are concerned. The HTS program was not a total failure but rather it was not integrated properly. DoD possessed a tool which it did not fully know how to use. Not having information of cultural relevance can have the same consequences as not having IPB. It is a gap that needs to be filled.