U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014
U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014 by Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, RAND Corporation
This report examines the 14-year experience of U.S. special operations forces in the Philippines from 2001 through 2014. The objective of this case history is to document and evaluate the activities and effects of special operations capabilities employed to address terrorist threats in Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines through (1) training and equipping Philippine security forces, (2) providing operational advice and assistance, and (3) conducting civil–military and information operations. The report evaluates the development, execution, and adaptation of the U.S. effort to enable the Philippine government to counter transnational terrorist groups.
An average of 500 to 600 U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps special operations units were employed continuously under the command of a joint special operations task force. They provided training, advice, and assistance during combat operations to both Philippine special operations units and selected air, ground, and naval conventional units; conducted civil–military and information operations on Basilan, in the Sulu archipelago, and elsewhere in Mindanao; provided intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and emergency care; aided planning and intelligence fusion at joint operational commands and force development at institutional headquarters; and coordinated their programs closely with the U.S. embassy country team. The authors conclude that Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines contributed to the successful degradation of transnational terrorist threats in the Philippines and the improvement of its security forces, particularly special operations units. It identifies contributing and limiting factors, which could be relevant to the planning and implementation of future such efforts.
Key Findings
U.S. Special Operations Forces' Activities in the Philippines Between 2001 and 2014 Contributed to a Reduced Transnational Terrorist Threat and Support for Threat Groups
- The number of enemy-initiated attacks has dropped, the number of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) militants has decreased, and polls show reduced support for the ASG and a substantial majority reporting satisfaction with Philippine security forces.
U.S. Special Operations Forces' Activities in the Philippines During That Period Also Increased Philippine Security Forces' Capabilities at the Tactical, Operational, and Institutional Levels
- At the tactical level, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) provided training, advice, and assistance to conventional Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) units at all echelons throughout Mindanao, including Philippine Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force units. In the later years of Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines, U.S. SOF also provided training, advice, and assistance to the PNP Special Action Forces. U.S. SOF interviewees judged that Philippine SOF are among the most proficient of those Asian SOF units with which they had worked.
- At the operational level, U.S. SOF advised and assisted the AFP headquarters to improve its joint processes and integrate command and control, planning, and intelligence functions.
- At the institutional level, U.S. SOF contributed somewhat to strategy, planning, and coordination at the AFP national headquarters, and they helped Western Mindanao Command develop its plans and intelligence analysis and fusion capabilities.
Activities During That Period Had Other Effects as Well
- The activities enhanced the bilateral defense ties between the United States and the Philippines.
Recommendations
- U.S. counterterrorism policy in recent years has sought to rely increasingly on indigenous forces. Some efforts have enjoyed greater success than others, including this Philippine example. The study found that key factors that contributed to success in this case were: 1) maintaining the sovereign government lead, which avoided U.S. dependency; 2) adjusting plans through regular assessments; 3) employing SOF and other capabilities in a synergistic way; and 4) creating and maintaining interagency coordination. These findings may be useful in developing policy options and plans for other long-term SOF and partner building missions.
This excerpt can be summarized as Special Operations Forces simply doing their job by relying on their training, long term relationships with the host nation military, understanding of the operational environment because of continuous training in country for decades, and most important employing the fundamental SOF doctrine as it existed at 9-11.
QUOTE U.S. counterterrorism policy in recent years has sought to rely increasingly on indigenous forces. Some efforts have enjoyed greater success than others, including this Philippine example. The study found that key factors that contributed to success in this case were: 1) maintaining the sovereign government lead, which avoided U.S. dependency; 2) adjusting plans through regular assessments; 3) employing SOF and other capabilities in a synergistic way; and 4) creating and maintaining interagency coordination. These findings may be useful in developing policy options and plans for other long-term SOF and partner building missions. END QUOTE
I’ll have to read the entire report, but the classification of the Abu Sayyaf as a “transnational terrorist threat” seems initially suspect. Any attempt at applying the lessons of this exercise to other conflicts needs to recognize that by the time the US got involved the Abu Sayyaf was primarily a criminal enterprise and that its appeal to both communities and recruits was almost entirely dependent on the group’s ability to generate money, primarily through ransom payments. The rapid rise of the ASG was a consequence of a number of high-profile kidnappings that generated large ransom payment, not of ideological appeal.
Well, I read the thing, a rather grim exercise that ended with me channeling Conrad’s Kurtz, grasping head in hands and mumbling “the horror, the horror”. I can only hope that somewhere in the internal bowels of State and Defense an unexpurgated version is circulating, and that this sugar-coated rose-colored tripe has been rolled out simply for palliative public consumption. It’s a bit shocking to imagine what the US Government must have paid RAND for this, a bit scary to think that it will be cited as an authoritative source for decades to come, and downright horrifying to think that it might actually shape decisions in the future.
Without excessive detail… the discussion of the history and development of the Abu Sayyaf is just pathetic; a half-bright high school student with an internet connection could have done better. The critical issue of both civil and military government collusion with the ASG is simply written out of the story, as if it did not exist. Local governance, the key to any actual resolution of the conflict, is treated as peripheral and mentioned only in passing. The focus on ASG and JI as the embodiments of threat severely limits the relevance of the discussion, as does the failure to look at the internal dynamics of the ASG as a contributing factor to many of the developments that are assumed to be caused by US or Philippine Government action. The Mamasapano disaster, which calls into question many of the supposed gains and which effectively torpedoed the Central Mindanao peace process and left the region drifting determinedly back into war, is a footnote.
I got the impression overall that it was simply ordained from the start that the whole thing had to be treated as a great success.
I wish some discussion of this operation would note that while there were some accomplishments on the military side, they are likely to have no long term impact on the region, because the core problem – civilian governance – is completely outside the remit of any plausible US operation. The US didn’t solve the problems because it can’t. They are Filipino problems and need to be addressed by Filipinos.
I don’t see how we can learn from these things if we can’t even talk about them honestly.
Day,
I was struck by the similarity of your description of a morphing of an embryonic ‘Jihad’ into a criminal enterprise in the PH and what happened to the Muj in AF. For some reason folks just don’t want to believe how readily this happens no matter how well-intended the original framework or initial successes .
Despite 3000 tons of refined heroin spreading out across the globe and the blatant evidence of hundreds of thousands of hectares of blooming poppies, we are constantly bombarded with PC RAND-speak about the primacy of drivers grounded in spirituality and Jeffersonian legitimacy.
I mean to say the criminal evidence in AF can be seen from the Space Station whereas in the PH it is characterized with typical criminal underworld deceit/deception. As such I don’t rate the chance of outside help being of much utility in the PH any time soon.
RC
18 Filipino Soldiers Killed In Clashes With Abu Sayyaf Militants – https://beyondthelevant.com/2016/04/10/18-soldiers-killed-in-clashes-with-abu-sayyaf-militants/ …
26 years later (with SF being there from 2001-2014) and they are still on the battlefiled….so was in fact the US SF engagement starting in 2001 a success or a failure????
That should be the core question answered by RAND……but it was not.