How to Win: Village Stability Operations
How to Win: Village Stability Operations by Douglas A. Samuelson, Best Defense Book Review
A retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer offers a new perspective on the political debate raging over how to defeat terrorism: “They’re all wrong.” What we need, he contends, is a change in focus from conventional force, applied in support of national governments, to village stability operations (VSO), emphasizing developing local leadership and building from there.
Lt. Col. (ret.) Scott Mann should know. In his 22 years of service, he led VSOs in Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador. Leading U.S. experts labeled his accomplishments, and those by his Special Forces colleagues, as the “game changer” in Afghanistan in 2010-2012. In his new book, Game Changers: Going Local to Defeat Violent Extremists, he outlines the VSO approach in four steps…
I. Let’s start where we need to start here:
a. The goal of the Soviets/the communists — when they were doing “expansion” back-in-the-day — was to transform outlying states and societies more along communist political, economic and social lines.
b. The goal of the U.S./the West — when we are doing “expansion” today — is to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines.
Re: these such “expansionist” endeavors (those of the Soviets/the communists back then and those of the U.S./the West today), these great powers encountered both state and non-state actors that did not wish to be so “transformed;” neither by the Soviets/the communists back-in-the-day nor by U.S./the West today.
It is within this context (folks who do not want to be “transformed” more along the alien and profane lines of either communism or westernism and, specifically, the non-state actor such folks) that we find, shall we say, the “violent extremists.”
II. Having gotten this important background before us, now to consider — within this specific context — LTC Scott Mann’s new book “Game Changers: Going Local to Defeat Violent Extremists;” wherein, LTC Mann suggests methods that we might use to
a. Overcome these “resisting transformation” violent extremists and to
b. Achieve — in spite of such resistance — our goal of transforming these outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines.
III. In this regard, note that LTC Mann immediately acknowledges the “asymmetric” nature of these wars. Thus:
a. The much more powerful U.S./the West fighting only a “limited war” for “limited ends” (to wit: a war to transform “the other” more along our own political, economic and social lines). And, thus, a war that the U.S./the West must find an economical way to pursue. (As per LTC Mann, this such economical method is via Village Stability Operations/FID?) Whereas, and as LTC Mann also points out,
b. For our much weaker opponents — to wit: the “resisting transformation” violent extremists (for whom a better “narrative,” “terrorism” and adaptability may be his only effective weapons?) — this is, indeed, a “total war;” a war for all the marbles. (To wit: a war to defend and retain his ancestral and preferred way life, his ancestral and preferred way of governance and his ancestral and preferred values, attitudes and beliefs.)
IV. That (see “a” and “b” immediately above) is, in fact, (a) what these fights are all about and, thus, (b) the criteria by which we should evaluate LTC Mann’s recommendations?
More to follow.
Here is the core problem and it has been seen in AFG with VSO but not loudly talked about even inside Special Forces and to a degree explains why the SF CIDG program in Vietnam was far more successful than that similar program in AFG.
To make the CIDG program work…we were under the CIA and COORDs and that gave the program a certain amount of flexibility and adaptability that has been missing since then with the exception of one ODA in AFG that went native and got some of them tossed out of SF BUT at the same time they were highly successful in their operational area and that is all that counts in a guerrilla war.
Here is another key success point…every ODA member was empowered to make it work down to the young unexperienced SP/4….if you worn the Green Beret you were empowered….and nothing else mattered and the higher SF Commands did not get into your business at the camp levels…they actually did everything possible to make you successful down to providing supplies and equipment that “where not quite legal in their acquisition”….
Example…as a young SGT leading a Cambodian recon company I could if I was tracking a NVA or mainline VC unit….I could decide to engage and or simply fade away, report their movements and survive to fight another day….does the current SF have that ability..not so sure.
The current US Army Special Forces is far to politically correct to run VSO and or any program similar to the CIDG program as it takes a Special Forces that is totally grounded in guerrilla warfare and willing to be politically incorrect as the success of the program is what counts not how you dress in a combat zone and or many of the other small/large things that make the difference when you are driving a VSO style program.
AND here is the kicker…..the current SF structure is officer top heavy and tends to micromanagement which will kill any VSO concept trying to be implemented by ODAs in the field that are a long way from the “flag pole”…..and living among the “natives” trying to build trust.
While we have a few VSO successes to analyze it does not match the total overall complete success of the CIDG program in Vietnam which in the end transitioned over 80,000 well trained and reasonably well led Vietnamese/Cambodian CIDG units into both the SVN RF/PF and the SVN Rangers and who fought exceptionally well in the eastern NVA invasion and fought extremely well in the 1975 invasion until rolled over by a far superior in manpower/arms NVA..
I remember the intense VSO debate that broke out here in SWJ back when the program was first written about if my memory is correct in about the 2009 timeframe by a ODA team leader headed to AFG who firmly believed it was the way forward…heck he took so many bullets for the idea and it was not pretty with a majority critiquing it and saying it would not work.
Now we see this article which claims it is the next best thing to sliced bread.
The proven/successful CIDG program has always been the way forward and it was out there to be analyzed and modified but the world of COIN simply ignored it until it way to late to even attempt in a way to field test it in Iraq and or AFG.
Given the author (LTC Mann’s) suggestion that we are engaged in war to defeat “violent extremists,” it is important, I believe, to put these (violent extremists) — yesterday and today — into a proper strategic context. I will attempt to do this by comparing, in very general terms, these “violent extremist” folks (a) in the Old Cold War of yesterday and (b) in the New/Reverse Cold War of today.
I. Violent extremists, in the Old Cold War of yesterday, might have been viewed in the following strategic context:
a. An expansionist great power (the Soviets/the communists back then) bent on spreading its political, social and economic systems/models throughout the world; this, giving (logical) rise to both state and non-state actor resistance and, indeed, “extremist” groups — all seeking to defend their preferred way of life, their preferred way of governance, etc.
b. Versus: A status quo great power (the U.S./the West back then) who, in sharp contrast, was committed to containing the spread of communism. Herein, often coming to the aid of/enlisting the support of the “resisting” state and non-state actor groups (noted above), and herein often working with the so-called “violent extremists;” all this, to achieve the strategic goal of “containment.”
(One might suggest that the Soviets/the communists back then, by attempting the unenviable task of “world revolutionary change,” had the proverbial crappy end of the strategic stick; while the Rest of the World, back then, had the much nicer [obstruction; containment] strategic handle to work with.)
II. In the New/Reverse Cold War of today, however, this strategic context has essentially been reversed; with such great nations as China, Russia and Iran, now, playing the “containment” role and coming to the aid of/enlisting the support of certain other “resisting” entities today. Thus, it is:
a. The U.S./the West today that is the entity seeking “world revolutionary change;” in this case, via the spread of our way of life, our way of governance, etc., throughout the world; this, giving (logical) rise to both state and non-state actor resistance and, indeed, “extremist” groups — all seeking to defend their preferred way of life, their preferred way of governance, etc.
b. Re: our worldwide “expansionist” ambitions today, consider the following from our present State Department:
“Over the past quarter-century, a large number of nations have made a successful transition to democracy. Many more are at various stages of the transition. When historians write about U.S. foreign policy at the end of the 20th century, they will identify the growth of democracy–from 30 countries in 1974 to 117 today–as one of the United States’ greatest legacies. The United States remains committed to expanding upon this legacy UNTIL ALL THE CITIZENS OF THE WORLD have the fundamental right to choose those who govern them through an ongoing civil process that includes free, fair, and transparent elections.” (Emphasis added.)
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/democ/
c. Thus, to suggest that the U.S./the West sees “violent extremists” — in the New/Reverse Cold War of today and re: our contemporary expansionist ambitions — in much the same way that the Soviets/the communists saw “violent extremists” in the Old Cold War of yesterday and re: their expansionist designs back then. (In both cases, as standing directly in the “expansionist” nations way.)
(Note here that, in the New/Reverse Cold War of today, and with the U.S./the West now having embraced the unenviable “expansionist” mission, it appears that the U.S./the West now has the proverbial “crappy end” of the strategic stick. This, while the Rest of the World today appears to have the much nicer [obstruction; containment] end of the strategic stick to work with.)
Again, and as per my comment below, all this is background.
But you should be able to tell where this heading, re: VSO, etc., which I will attempt to handle in my next installment.