Counterinsurgency and Development in FATA: Lessons from US Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan
Counterinsurgency and Development in FATA: Lessons from US Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan by Hijab Shah, Georgetown Security Studies Review
The Pakistani armed forces claim to have entered the decisive phase in their counterinsurgency operations against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the country’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). If Operation Zarb-e-Azb is indeed as close to success as the military says, a window of opportunity has opened for the Pakistani government to plan for post-conflict stabilization in the restive region; as the military phase of counterinsurgency draws down, the government will have the opportunity step in and establish its legitimacy and authority in the tribal areas by means of a development strategy.
A robust plan to develop the infrastructure and augment the economy of the tribal areas could dramatically improve the quality of life of the local population, thus increasing satisfaction with the government, and augmenting its legitimacy and authority. How Islamabad decides to execute the plan, however, is critical to the success of the venture in FATA. Lessons from the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan could be instructive for the Pakistani government in this regard; understanding the mistakes replicating the successes of the United States over the past decade will help the Pakistani government prepare more intelligently and resourcefully for post-military operation development in FATA…