Can the Counterinsurgency Doctrine Be Saved?
Can the Counterinsurgency Doctrine Be Saved? By Karsten Friis, The Diplomat
With the apparent lack of progress and success in Afghanistan and Iraq, counterinsurgency (COIN) has fallen out of favor within the political and military establishments in the U.S. and elsewhere. Regardless of whether these failures were due to erroneous implementation or theoretical shortcomings, COIN is no longer considered “hot” in strategic circles. However, one should be careful not to throw the baby out with the bath water. There are elements of COIN worth preserving and retaining for future operations. By modifying our understanding of COIN using insight from security and peace-building literature, a revised concept can be developed which could inform future irregular wars more efficiently than current doctrine. We call it the stakeholder-centric COIN.
An insurgency is first and foremost a struggle for political power over the allegiance of the population in a given territory. It is a method employed by a non-state actor to challenge the existing political authority. Counterinsurgency, on the other hand, is defined as “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency,” as stated by the U.S. Field Manual 3-24. The concept of legitimacy is clearly the centerpiece of FM 3-24 and defined as the primary objective of any operation. A legitimate government is understood as one that rules with the consent of the governed, providing security and basic services. This has inspired the term population-centric COIN.
COIN has been widely criticized both for its theoretical shortcomings and for its failure to provide victory in Afghanistan and Iraq…
COIN is a necessity. It will never go away it is part of the phenomena of the gray area (revolution, resistance, insurgency, terrorism, and civil war). But what we have to learn is that in the fundamental COIN equation of Insurgents + Population + Counterinsurgent (+external support to the Counterinsurgent) that we are the external support and not the Counterinsurgent (unless of course there is an insurgency in the US to be countered).
Concur completely with Dave on this point. As I have long advocated, COIN is a domestic operation. In fact, the US is pretty good at COIN, with James Madison and Lyndon Johnson being two of our most reconciliation to re-construct a new Union once that war was over in order to avoid a prolonged resistance insurgency that was certain to occur if we simply occupied or punished them as a conquered nation.
But our “COIN” doctrine does not recognize COIN as COIN, and instead it is primarily about describing our support to some foreign COIN effort as COIN. The strategic effect is that, since we are doing the same operation, we invariably end up adopting approaches that undermine the very perceptions of popular legitimacy necessary to cure the revolutionary, internal insurgency of the partner we are trying to help; and at the same time our we quickly spark a powerful resistance insurgency against our very presence and interference in this internal political dispute.
Both Resistance and Revolution are very different types of insurgency. The first being a form of war, and the second being more accurately thought of as “illegal democracy” IMO. I realize doctrine and I differ on this distinction. Both conditions create lines of motivation, and few insurgents are purely one or the other when both exist. Some Taliban, for example, may be 90% motivated by the presence of ISAF forces and their actions, and only 10% motivated by a desire to overthrow an Afghan government that has small affect on their life. Some are the other way, and many somewhere in between. Good “COIN” and support to COIN understands this dynamic and works equally to reduce both lines of motivation.successful practitioners. Lincoln and Grant both also understood with keen clarity how important it was to both completely win the Clausewitzian war with the Confederate nation, and to immediately adopt full and complete
But our COIN doctrine does not understand insurgency, and sees US support to COIN as COIN. It is a deadly mix. a “zombie doctrine” that seems logical on its face, but that has no soul.
(Oh, and forget any definition of legitimacy created by conference, compromise, and the senior man on the project slapping the table and declaring a definition “correct.” Insurgency, legitimacy, and all natural things are what they are, and will not conform themselves to current bias, culture or perception. For purposes of internal revolutionary insurgency, the form of legitimacy that is essential for resolving the conditions behind the insurgency, is best thought of as “popular legitimacy” – or simply the recognition of the right of some system of governance (formal or informal, foreign or domestic) to affect ones life, and the lives of a population group one identifies closely with. This is not a legitimacy that can be created, granted or bought. It is a legitimacy that must be earned…)
(With due apologies to Lewis Carroll…)
In the midst of the word he was trying to say,
In the midst of his laughter and glee,
He had softly and suddenly vanished away—
For the COIN was a FID, you see.
“Any use of force must be applied to attain political goals rather than tactical military aims.”
(Thus, in our case, as the foreign intervening power, the use of military force must be applied so as to facilitate the transformation of the subject states, and their societies, more along our alien, and often profane, political, economic and social lines.)
” … military force is instrumental in influencing the decision-making calculus of the different stakeholders … the relevant military, political, social, religious, etc. stakeholders … to compel them to enter into negotiation and eventually to compromise.” (Note: this is a cobbled-together quote — with items, for clarity, being taken from two different paragraphs of the text.)
(Thus, in our case, as the foreign intervening power, our military force must be used to compel the relevant military, political, social, religious, etc. officials into joining with/cooperating in our efforts to transform their states and societies more along our modern western political, economic and social lines.)
So: To consider the viability of this suggested concept, let’s put the shoe on the other foot and ask:
a. Whether such a “stakeholder-centric” approach —
b. Used by a foreign intervening power against the states and societies of the U.S./the West
c. Whether this such approach would lead to our “stakeholders” essentially turning traitor and joining with/cooperating in the transformation of our states and their societies more along the alien and profane political, economic and social lines of the enemy? (For the sake of this question/example/argument, let’s say along communist or Islamist political, economic and social lines.)
Finally, I think, the idea that “the people get the final and decisive vote” — as this relates to our or to some other state and society thus under attack — this compelling “population-centric” argument also calls this “stakeholder-centric” concept/approach into serious question.
Thus, for “counter-insurgency” — to be real — it must deal with, and not avoid, ALL these critical, and dominant, “Red Dawn” aspects of these matters?
Herein, to understand the fundamental problem; which is:
a. That NO long-standing way of life, way of governance and associated values, attitudes and beliefs should be expected to go gently into the night; this,
b. Via a “stakeholder,” and/or a “population,” -centric approach — used to deal with the natural/normal resistance that occurs in such forced transformations.
“The Counterinsurgency Doctrine”, eh? It’s difficult to read any of this and not respond in an immature, despondent fashion. “Stakeholder-centric COIN”, “leader-centric COIN“… It’s very simple: get about five adults who understand both strategy generally and COIN specifically to write a coherent COIN field manual, and then execute it. (I’m sorry, but those people probably won’t be in uniform, and they almost certainly won’t work for TRADOC.) As I’ve argued previously, there has been virtually no attempt to do that in the last fifteen years, and America actively opposed it both during and after the Vietnam War. No matter which flashy label you slap on it, COIN is challenging, but possible. It will continue to appear impossible if America continues to pursue an ill-defined “win” by throwing combined arms maneuver and RMA at tactical and operational objectives while ignoring strategic ones.
“Acknowledging the crucial significance of the stakeholders, we propose the end-state for a COIN operation as: a political agreement between the main stakeholders in the conflict that is regarded as legitimate and ensures a stability acceptable to all. The goal is to enable a political process that leads to an agreement between the main stakeholders that will allow the external forces to withdraw.”
First to understand that neither “stability” nor “withdrawal” were, or are, the primary goals of the U.S./the West intervention.
Rather, “transformation” (of outlying states and societies along modern western lines) and “incorporation” (of such “transformed” states and societies more into the western-led international community and global economy); these are our primary goals.
And to understand that, to achieve these goals, we have shown that we are willing to sacrifice both “stability” and “withdrawal.”
“Professor Mads Berdal … argues that if there is one overarching lesson from the post-conflict interventions from the 1990s on, it is that stability cannot be imposed on war-torn societies from the outside.”
Note that Iraq and Afghanistan were not “war-torn societies” at the time of our interventions and that, accordingly, “stability” could not have been what we sought to impose.
Rather, our intentions were — in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere — to (a) transform these outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines and to (b) incorporate these transformed states and societies more into the western-led international community and global economy.
“Professor Alex de Waal at Tufts University similarly criticizes the very idea that “Western” state institutions are a necessity for peace, a premise shared by both COIN and UN peacekeeping doctrines. He questions if state-building is the right remedy for war-torn societies with limited historical experience with centralized states.”
Again to note that (1) “war-torn societies” with (2) western military forces deeply embedded therein; this is not what we encountered as we began our recent escapades.
Rather, what we encountered were states and societies (a) not organized, ordered and oriented more along modern western political, economic and social lines and (b) not adequately incorporated into the international community and/or the global economy. These, I suggest, were the “flaws” that we sought to remedy via our “COIN”/”state-building”/”peace-making”/”peace-keeping” etc. methods and operations.
(This given [1] the opportunity for massive intervention presented by 9/11, [2] our rising belief in such things as “universal values” and “the end of history” and [3] our desire to capitalize on and consolidate potential gains re: our recent winning of the Old Cold War.)
Thus, it was to achieve our goals of — not “stability” and “withdrawal” but, rather, “transformation” and “incorporation” — that, I suggest, we adopted “population-centric COIN,” (etc.) approaches.
Accordingly, the question that must be asked, is whether a “stakeholder-centric” approach is as likely — or more likely — to provide that we achieve our properly stated goals; these being: (a) the “transformation” of outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines and (b) the “incorporation” of these “transformed” states and societies more into the western-led international community and global economy?
“An insurgency is first and foremost a struggle for political power over the allegiance of the population in a given territory. It is a method employed by a non-state actor to challenge the existing political authority.”
That more accurately describes “An insurgent” than “an insurgency.” It is very important to note, I believe, that the insurgent, is not the insurgency. The insurgent is a symptom of insurgency, and exploiter and manifestation of a negative political energy when one or both of two types of conditions exist.
Internally is revolution, illegal democracy if you will. A belief that rises within a population that they have no choice but to act out illegally, and often violently, to coerce their own government. This may be to force some change, as with the US Civil Rights movement; or this may be to break off some territory to form a new state, as the Sunni Arabs of Syira and Iraq feel is necessary for their future and is currently exploited and led by ISIS – or as the American Colonies did; or it may be to overthrow a regime completely, as in the French Revolution. All of these are forms of internal revolutionary insurgency, none of which that were actually “war” or “warfare” or that would have responded in a productive and durable way to a war or warfare response by the government/counterinsurgent. Revolution is like a dispute between a son and a father. The father may be violently attacked by the son, but to simple defeat the son is no real solution and only suppresses the symptoms. To bribe the son (pop-centric COIN} is no cure either. One must actually address the issues at the root of the dispute. Mitigate the violence, talk, reconcile issues, evolve governance. This is illegal democracy and typically occurs when and where trusted, certain and legal means of affecting governance do not exist, and in times when populations are either evolving rapidly in expectations, or are being stressed by some condition of weather, economy, governance, etc. It is natural, and a right and duty of populations everywhere IAW the US Declaration of Independence.
The other form of insurgency is a form of war and warfare. That is resistance insurgency. When two or more distinct states or systems of government wage war, or in other ways impose upon the sovereignty of one by another. Typically this is a physical occupation by one. Often the population fights along with the government and the army, as in the Russian resistance of Germany in WWII. Often it is a population that remains in the fight long after the government and the army have been defeated or surrendered, as in the French resistance during WWII. More modernly we need to also consider that “occupation by policy” can create a resistance effect as well. The example of a US foreign policy for the Middle East designed for the Cold War and extended largely unchanged into the post Cold War era is our current case. This is the energy that allows AQ and ISIS to unite disparate revolutionary insurgencies to a larger common cause of resisting against excessive incursions on their sovereign rights as populations to have governments that are responsive to their evolving needs. This is a form of war, and Clausewitz applies.
I believe not understanding insurgency for what it truly is is the primary reason that US COIN doctrine, strategies and tactics ultimately fail. Couple with our strong sense of “American Exceptionalism” that our actions cannot possible cause these perceptions in others like the actions of any other nation behaving similarly would. Also an American “strategic culture” that believes that if we simply dedicate ourselves completely to some project (Panama Canal, WWII, man on moon) we can make it happen when others would fail. Know yourself.
We can be good at insurgency, and as I said, domestically in what is truly COIN for us, we are. But we get confused when we go and initiate or involve ourselves in the insurgencies of others.
Bob
Dave,
I guess I don’t have to tell anyone not new to these SWJ conversations that I’m not a fan of COIN. I think the manual should be graded as a net negative as to our understanding and performance. Sure there are “elements of COIN worth preserving and retaining for future operations,” but I don’t think we’re zooming in on those elements. It seems we’re defending what’s wrong with COIN. ‘Legitimacy’ is a siren, a red herring and an inducement to equivocation and moral compromise. In big English it is best described as BS. And yet, we have, approvingly, “… legitimacy is clearly the centerpiece of FM 3-24 and defined as the primary objective of any operation” as received knowledge. Ouch. Money paragraph: “COIN has been widely criticized both for its theoretical shortcomings and for its failure to provide victory in Afghanistan and Iraq. Critics have called for a more traditional military approach, arguing that the focus should be on the insurgents, not the causes of insurgency.” That part’s not a too-far-off description of how I feel. Then comes, “However, as we see it, the enemy-centric approach is unsustainable: by seeking a purely military solution it ignores the local politics at play and its importance for a future peace.” It would be a sloppy strawman to claim I would seek a PURELY military solution. Little is pure, and I’m always ready for the exception and moderation. Still, why accept that the term COIN is a keeper when it is connotatively tied so tightly to ‘underlying causes’, ‘population-centric’, ‘legitimacy’, and other crimes against clear thinking. COIN, to me, means doing good things, however abstract, inappropriate and ill-conceived they may be, and therewith pave roads to hell. I agree wholeheartedly that the standard slate of actors, especially if we’re one of them, is anti-govt (maybe insurgent), govt (maybe counterinsurgent), foreign intervener (maybe on behalf of the govt). I think it is a rare struggle indeed that is entirely internal, and there is usually more than one anti-actor, the government is often divided and changing, and there are several foreign actors — all that mess. I prefer an intellectual model of approach to that messiness wherein we focus on those organizations able to provide impunity to their people. Such a model gives us the possibility of mapping the physical geography of that impunity and then measuring if we’re closing it or not. All this legitimacy stuff has become vexing, if not totally meaningless. It was used 170 times, in varying ways, in the last manual attempt.
Geoff
One problem with this argument is that stakeholders extend beyond the confines of existing nation-states. MAJ Farhad’s article points out that Pakistan’s ISI was driving Afghanistan insurgency even back in the 1980s, not to mention the Soviets and British before that. This article and the very existence of Central Asian “stans” that are largely ethnically-based on Afghanistan’s northern borders ensure stakeholder interest in the similar peoples that live in Afghanistan. Colonial ill-drawn boundaries and the very credibility of the Neapolitan state itself cause many problems.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/11/04/in-northern-afghanistan-a-mix-of-taliban-foreign-fighters-and-soldiers-spread-thin/
Tajikistan has Tajiks. Uzbekistan has Uzbeks. Turkmenistan has Turkmen. Afghanistan has all those ethnicities in large numbers along its northern borders but no similar “Pashtunistan” or “Baluchistan” exists in areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan thanks to a Durand Line purposely drawn to allow the Brits to “divide and rule.” The Pashtuns think Afghanistan is a Pashtun state. Northern Alliance ethnicities that outnumber the Pashtuns think otherwise. In addition, far more Pashtuns live on the Pakistan side of the Durand line which guarantees both Taliban sanctuary and Pakistan/ISI fear of a Pashtun insurgency within their own borders not to mention fear of Indian influence in non-Pashtun areas of Afghanistan.
Geoff and RCJ are talking about Columbia and other insurgencies in their comments citing legitimacy as a factor in COIN. However Dr. Demarest points out that perhaps one tenth of one percent of Columbians make up FARC. That and many other oft-cited insurgencies have little bearing on the legitimacy of governments and security forces in current insurgencies in the Middle East, Levant, and Central Asia. Columbia is primarily a Christian country with a unified Army, with 99% speaking Spanish, and comprising an 86% Mestizo and white population unlike the multi-ethnic, multi-language, multi-religious Levant and Afghanistan. Unlike Columbia, the ANSF, Iraq, and Syrian Armies and militias do not represent large segments of the populations of those “countries.” If you go to the Wikipedia for Columbia, you also note a figure that shows the changing boundaries of that nation during the time of its independence. Yet we seldom seriously address such a possibility in fixing boundary-driven problems in Islamic nations—while simultaneously insisting on such a boundary change in Israel??
Compounding that legitimacy problem are the external and internal stakeholder fears that exists in the Levant, Turkey, and Iran where Kurds live in large numbers without their own state. Turkey does not want Kurds to have a state in the Levant because of their own Kurds in Turkey nor do Iraq, Iran, or Assad. Many recognize the Kurds as aggrieved stakeholders just as the Sunnis are within the Levant oppressed by both Assad and Iraq’s Iranian-influenced government. Yet because we have a large embassy in Iraq and a NATO ally Turkey providing us a base at Incirlik, we continue to be a half-hearted stakeholder at best in supporting Kurds and Sunnis and in attacks of ISIL while Russia and Iran are far more aggressive (although not against ISIL).
Beyond that, the linked article up above shows Chechnyans showing up in Afghanistan along with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan that previously had hung out in Pakistan, now driven out by the Pakistan Army and trying to set up shop in Uzbek areas of Afghanistan. Chechnyans have no stake in Afghanistan, yet because they are radical Islamists, they gain a stake by religious calls for Jihad. The same holds true for ISIL both within the Levant, north Africa, the Sinai, and now in Nangarhar province, Afghanistan. Foreign fighters with an Islamist and youth-driven ideology based on tenets of Jihad and fun-travel-adventure flock to war-torn areas without really understanding what they will face. Russian stake-holders soon make that evident with 800 October airstrikes in Syria that kill Sunnis combatants and civilians alike with both classified as “terrorists” that threaten Assad and their port at Tartus.
Now we see a probable bomb on a Sinai-launched civilian Russian aircraft. So being a stakeholder in foreign wars can have a price. However, this morning on CNN, a Robert Pape who is the Director of the Chicago Project on Terrorism used the Sinai potential bombing as an argument against the U.S. becoming a greater stakeholder in the Levant. His basic argument: get involved, become a target of terror. Russia’s likely counter-response? We crushed Chechnya, we can crush Syrian Sunnis and ISIL as well with little regard for civilian life and property.
We can choose to be a half-hearted stakeholder in foreign wars and insurgencies and it will mean we lose influence in those parts of the world. We alternately can demonstrate a prolonged commitment and forward presence as we did in Korea, Japan, Europe, the Balkans, Diego Garcia, Kuwait, and the Sinai and our stake and influence remain a factor. We are unlikely to stop being a target of terror just because we are half-hearted in our efforts. That merely emboldens ISIL and other Islamic extremists. It also signals to autocrats in Russia and China that they need not fear that the U.S. will adequately stand behind its own stakes in the world, and those of its allies.
If I interpreted Karsten Friis’s argument correctly, then I think he makes a meaningful contribution that should influence doctrine and strategic approaches for countering insurgencies. I agree with the counter arguments below that legitimacy is overrated. As MoveForward points out, in most situations the insurgents represent a small percentage of the population. They won’t establish legitimacy, but they can and do establish control. Since this control is imposed, it will be contested. This is the initial contest in a counterinsurgency, and it parallels Clausewitz’s description of the nature of war, whether or not we actually recognize as a war.
In defense of those who argue it is not war, I agree it differs significantly from what our doctrine refers to as traditional warfare. When the counterinsurgent attempts to use the conventional doctrines associated with traditional warfare the counterinsurgent will often fail, or if he wins he more often than not creates a situation that far short of a better and somewhat enduring peace. Control should only be the initial phase of the contest, ultimately a better peace means seeking a solution that promotes long term stability and development. Just because this form of contest is not traditional warfare it doesn’t mean it is not a form of warfare. Unfortunately traditional views of war and warfare have limited our ability to perceive war as the chameleon Clausewitz told us it was.
In this contest, the opponents (often there are several)apply force as part of their strategy. Albeit, they often do so in a much more discreet manner to achieve their political ends. The insurgent is often constrained by means, and the counterinsurgent by perception. Still, to the extent possible each tries to impose their will upon the other. Instead of total defeat, they often strive just to get their opponent to acquiesce or compromise to achieve limited objectives. If I read the article correctly, the author suggests the counterinsurgents should use their means to seek a political agreement with the various stakeholders.
“Acknowledging the crucial significance of the stakeholders, we propose the end-state for a COIN operation as: a political agreement between the main stakeholders in the conflict that is regarded as legitimate and ensures a stability acceptable to all. The goal is to enable a political process that leads to an agreement between the main stakeholders that will allow the external forces to withdraw.”
To me that doesn’t differ much Clausewitz’s argument that war is a means to an end, and that end is always subordinate to the object. He also points out that the object over time will often change due to multiple factors. Once it is accepted that total victory is not possible, then lesser objects may become the end.
How that plays out in this type of conflict is more complex due to the potential number of actors that have a voice in the negotiation process. It becomes more challenging when they don’t have a political body (many of the communist insurgencies had a political party in exile that could be negotiated with) that one can negotiate with. If the aim of the counterinsurgent is to “defeat” the insurgency, then they’ll have to go down a bloody road to get there. Just killing off the leaders won’t get them there. If the goal is to end the insurgency, then the counterinsurgent must take a more complex approach to set conditions to reach that settlement. That doesn’t mean security forces won’t be employed to apply force, and often a good deal of force, because first the insurgents must be convinced they can’t achieve their ends militarily. However, that fighting would be in support of achieving political agreements (compromises) to bring the conflict to an end, instead of the fighting becoming the defacto strategy.
As the author points out, we need something between population and enemy centric COIN. These approaches are not working.
He recommends, “instead of seeking to build the legitimacy of the political system in the eyes of every single individual (‘the population’), he focuses on the relevant stakeholders in the marketplace. And instead of building legitimacy through government structures and provision of services, de Waal emphasizes the power-relationships between the stakeholders in the political marketplace.”
I tend to agree with the argument, but it is always situation specific. I do not think the U.S. military or the UN is structured to do this. Furthermore, the U.S. is philosophically constrained to try to impose a democratic state solution on every problem. So in the end we still have a disconnect between ends, ways, and means.
Our enemies have no military academies, no command and staff colleges, no pme at all compared to our system and they keep on beating us! When are we finally going to ask why that is…and do something about it?
With regard to the author’s “stakeholder-centric” thesis, and in matters relating to the U.S./the West’s overarching political objective, to wit:
1, The elimination of alternative ways of life, alternative ways of governance and alternative values, attitudes and beliefs. And, in the place of these,
2. The installation of our way of life, our way of governance and our values, attitudes and beliefs.
With regard to this overriding political objective of the U.S./the West, and as these matters relate to differently ordered, organized and oriented states and societies, who is best described as the ultimate “stakeholder? Is it:
a. The rulers/regimes of these differently ordered states and societies?
b. As per our author here, is it the other “relevant military, political, social, religious” leaders of these alternatively oriented countries/civilizations?
Or, with regard to who is the ultimate “stakeholder” — of a state, society, culture and/or civilization’s unique and time-honored way of life, way of governance and underlying values, attitudes and beliefs — is it, in fact,
c. The populations/the people of these differently organized countries/civilizations?
To help answer this fundamental question, let’s do the “shoe on the other foot” thing and ask who is the ultimate “stakeholder” of the American/Western way of life, of the American/Western ways of governance, and of American/Western foundational values, attitudes and beliefs etc.?
Is the answer to this question:
a. The American/the Western rulers/regimes?
b. Other American/Western military, political, social, religious leaders?
Or, in the final analysis, is the ultimate — and properly understood — “stakeholder” of American/Western ways, mores, values, institutions, etc., actually:
c. The American/the Western populations and people?
Our understanding of what actually constitutes a “stakeholder-centric” approach to counterinsurgency to be determined, in large part, by our answers to BOTH of the “a” – “c” question-sets provided above?