Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting A Resistance
Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting A Resistance
International Journal of Korean Unification Studies vol. 24, no. 2
David S. Maxwell
Unification of Korea is the only acceptable outcome on the Korean Peninsula. It is the only condition that will solve three of the most intractable problems in Northeast Asia: (1) the Kim family regime’s nuclear threat; (2) the human rights atrocities and crimes against humanity that have been perpetrated on the Korean people living in the north each and every day for the past six decades; and (3) the achievement peace and prosperity in the region. It is only through unification described as “a stable, secure, peaceful, economically vibrant, non-nuclear peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people,” that can bring security and stability to Northeast Asia.
There are four paths to unification: peaceful, internal regime change, regime collapse, and war. Because no one can foresee the path it will take, planning for unification has been stymied. Peaceful unification is the best but also counterintuitively the hardest to achieve. Regime collapse (that could lead to conflict) and war will result in the significant loss of blood and treasure and have global economic impact as a minimum. Further, it is possible that due to North Korean indoctrination that the Korean people living in the north may resist unification and form a resistance to conduct an insurgency against the ROK as it implements unification plans.
There is the possibility of growing internal resistance against the Kim family regime. Considering the possibility of resistance after the removal of the regime, one way to prevent it may be to co-opt the internal resistance now, give it support and whether it is successful or not, this could help prevent organized resistance to unification. It is time to take a professional approach to supporting a resistance in the north.
Keywords: Unification, Kim family regime, Dresden Initiative, resistance, unconventional warfare
Dave,
How is it in US vital interests (adequate to rationalize the risk of provoking retaliatory war acts from this nuclear power) for the US to conduct unconventional warfare against North Korea by providing support to an internal North Korean revolutionary movement?
What creates the urgency to warrant the risk of attempting to accelerate an outcome that may not be any better for us, or our allies and partners in the region, than the current situation? What would warrant us creating yet one more in a long line of US facilitated foreign governments, and therefore fundamentally lacking in popular legitimacy with large portions of the affected population?
Is this not a mission that South Korea is fully capable of conducting on their own if they believe it to be of vital interest to them? We have helped to create the time and conditions necessary for South Korea to emerge as modern success story. It seems to me that greater distancing by the US and greater autonomy for South Korea is more logical strategically than this UW intervention into North Korea that seems to move our relationship in the opposite direction. If South Korea wants our support in such a high risk operation, but is unwilling to undertake the operation alone, that seems a bit suspicious.
Better we focus on how to better counter the UW efforts of Russia, AQ and ISIS, than spread ourselves even thinner by beginning another operation that could easily prove to be far more deadly, expensive and distracting from items far more vital to our interests than any conflict since the last time we went into North Korea.
I just don’t see how the cost benefit equation works out in our favor.
“Considering the possibility of resistance after the removal of the regime, one way to prevent it may be to co-opt the internal resistance now, give it support and whether it is successful or not, this could help prevent organized resistance to unification.”
I strongly agree with this part, in order to assist the resistance, I believe it is crucial for the ROK and US HUMINT community to build multiple channels of communication and information inside North Korea. However, an important question is “How can we prevent a North Korean version of Free Syrian Army?”