“Why We Lost,” A General’s Account of Two Wars, by Daniel Bolger
“Why We Lost,” A General’s Account of Two Wars, by Daniel Bolger. Washington Post book review by Carter Malkasian.
No U.S. general has criticized the Iraq and Afghanistan wars more sharply than retired Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger. “Why We Lost” is neither a memoir nor a window into private meetings and secret discussions. It is a 500-page history (including prologue and endnotes) filled with heartfelt stories of soldiers and Marines in firefights and close combat. It weighs in mightily to the ongoing debate over how the United States should wage war.
Bolger served in Iraq from 2005 to 2006 as the officer in charge of training the Iraqi army, and then from 2009 to 2010 as commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division. After that, from 2011 to 2013, he led the U.S.-NATO mission training the Afghan army and police. He holds a doctorate in history and has written several military histories. His prose flows. He speaks his mind, comparing himself to Gen. Joseph “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell of World War II fame, who was known for his coarse personality…
Good to read a review, Carter Malkasian is very critical at thend of LG Bolger.
There is a SW Forum thread on the book, wondering if anyone aboard had read the book. More than 1600 views and no-one had!
Link: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=21537
We should avoid undue criticism of any service leader because we never know the whole story of went on behind the scenes. The pressures these leaders faced over their long careers with many years including combat leadership cannot be understood by most to include my peon self. Every senior leader did something that stood out during their career to reach such a senior rank. However, back on November 11, SWJ published another review of LTG Bolger’s book which had this alarming quote:
As Colin Powell put it “If you break it, you own it.” For someone with a doctorate in history, I wonder how many instances LTG Bolger can point to where it worked to have finished major combat operations and subsequently “backed out and left it to the local people to sort it out.” It has worked so well in Libya, Iraq, and Syria after all.
Considering that LTG Bolger was responsible for training forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan, he surely understands the challenges involved in training security forces from scratch. In Afghanistan you had ANSF with multiple languages and ethnicities, major illiteracy, desertion problems, and drug use. Even this article admits that the light Afghan footprint initially resulted in just 35,000 trained ANSF by 2006.
If we had left immediately after the first year of OEF, who truly believes the Taliban would never have returned, Pakistan would not have resumed exerting influence, and Afghan ethnicities and warlords would have found a way to coexist in peace. Just as critically, what would have stopped al Qaeda training and sanctuary from returning.
Likewise, if we had not disbanded the Iraq Army primarily consisting of Sunnis, and a government filled with Baathists, wouldn’t a still living Saddam Hussein have found a way to return to power? Does anyone truly believe the Shiites and Sunnis would have sung kumbaya together if we had not been there? No death squads or genocide would have occurred?
No, LTG Bolger, his fellow generals, and other senior uniformed leaders did not screw up these wars. No, “King David” and COIN were not at fault because Joint Security Stations were not even attempted early in the conflict when the worst of the instability was occurring. If the surges were not exclusively the solution, they certainly were not contributing to problems. And even this article mentions that General Shinseki was marginalized after claiming that more forces would be required…and he was right, just as he became the fall guy for the VA whose problems were longstanding.
The truth is advisors to President Bush screwed up by allowing OIF to occur in the first place. Mr Rumsfeld failed to acknowledge an insurgency was starting that needed addressing with a major stability operations force. Advisors to President Obama added to the tragedy of errors by setting dates certain to depart and failing to retain a residual force in Iraq. Moreover, who ever in the State Department determined that prior colonial borders could continued to exist and any government could have ruled legitimately in either contrived territory must have been smoking something grown in Afghanistan.
The true strategic solutions to these wars and others involve issues that our current President diametrically opposes. Private sector U.S. fracking and Canadian oil brought to market using the Keystone Pipeline are major solutions to suppressing Russia’s defense budget and subsequent aggression. Likewise, energy self-sufficiency ensures that the Middle East cannot exert undue influence on our decision-making. Becoming more energy self-sufficient includes clean coal, nuclear power, and other alternative energies that maintain low energy costs to compete with China and restore U.S. manufacturing. The last thing the U.S. needs is to pay premium dollars to eek out the last bit of carbon dioxide elimination while the Chinese and Indians pollute to their heart’s content. Meanwhile, China becomes a major military superpower while we bankrupt ourselves chasing global warming solutions that others are causing.
I said this on the original SWJ post/review about LTG Bolger’s book, but I’ll summarize here: I heard LTG Bolger’s NPR interview when the book was released, and I wasn’t impressed. I did a little bit of research, and learned that the “Strategy Research Project” he wrote for the Army War College wasn’t actually about strategy. LTG Bolger apparently sees himself as a new “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, but at the risk of legitimizing Tom Ricks, LTG Bolger strikes me as precisely the sort of kept-his-nose-clean officer who was promoted beyond his competence. Now, he sees an opportunity to make a name for himself (maybe in preparation for an attempt at a political career?) by throwing his peers under the bus and selling a campaigning-relabeled-as-strategy diatribe to a reader base that doesn’t know any better. As such, I won’t be investing any time or money in LTG Bolger’s book.
Given that our enduring political objective (the transformation of outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines):
a. Was not achieved in Iraq and Afghanistan via regime change — plus short-term (less than 50 years) nation-building/COIN. And
b. Was not achieved in Libya, etc., via regime change — minus nation-building/COIN (of any stripe).
Then should we not look at the problem from a more logical point of view?
This being that we should not — in the pursuit of our enduring political objective outlined above — generally consider “regime change” (plus or minus nation-building/COIN) as a normal, reasonable and intelligent course of action?
A proper course of action being, instead, to continue to hammer away at the existing regimes.
Herein to consider that, in this alternative manner (the non-regime change approach) such great nations — and such great civilizations — as those of China and the former USSR were recently transformed more along modern western lines.
Thus, re: LTG Bolger’s thought — that we should simply hit them hard and leave — to add that we should not (except in the most important and extreme cases) attempt regime change via this “hit them hard” process.
In this non-regime change manner to cause:
a. Otherwise oppressive, odious and dangerous regimes to
b. Ultimately embrace the state and societal transformations that we require and to (and this is very important)
c. Have them adopt and implement these changes themselves and
d. Themselves, deal with those that would resist such changes.
(This being what the otherwise oppressive, odious and dangerous regimes of China and the former USSR did via the “other than regime-change” approach to state and societal transformation that we used against these entities.)
Bottom Line:
“Why we lost” to be understood — not so much in terms of nation-building/COIN or no — but, rather, in terms of our error in adopting “regime change” as the principal method that we would use to pursue our enduring political objective (outlined in my first paragraph above).
There are two other reviews of this book elsewhere on SWJ.
A long SWJ review by Jospeh Collins: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-long-war-four-views minus any comments
A SWJ Blog link to a review by NPR, with five comments: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/a-3-star-general-explains-why-we-lost-in-iraq-afghanistan
We cannot even define what “winning” is in the current family of conflicts we engage in. How are we then supposed to define “losing”?
But clearly we are not achieving our strategic objectives through the series of military campaigns that we initiated (conflicts of choice, our choice) with the belief that the problem facing our nation was some “threat” we could simply wage “war” against, “defeat” that threat and thereby “win.”
That was a simplistic, superficial assessment of the symptoms of the deeper problems of the growing disconnect between how America engaged the world, and growing friction due to how that world was changing from what we wanted the world to be and what the world actually was.
But to some of LTG Bolger’s points: Why have we dropped the punitive expedition from our policy tool bag? I cannot rationalize reasons for going to war against Afghanistan or Iraq either one – but both could have used a serious tune-up in the form of a carefully tailored punitive expedition designed to punish them for their sins against us, and to serve as clear warning to others who might also seek to poke the bear in the future.
But one must leave governments in place to live by the lessons one has taught them if they hope for those lessons to have maximum effect. What good to then remove the government one has just “educated”??
But punitive expeditions against Afghanistan and Iraq would not have solved the problem of the growing friction between US foreign policy and a rapidly evolving world. Punitive expeditions against those countries and a focused CT pursuit of AQ would not have resolved the growing friction between the many governments of the Middle East and those segments of their populations reasonably perceiving the status quo of governance to be intolerable and finally, being empowered to do something about it.
AQ was, and is, an opportunist. They had a clearer view of the true nature of strategic environment that we did. They understood the full power, latent within the disaffected Sunni populations across the greater Middle East, and they leveraged and exploited that energy to advance their goals. AQ did not create the Arab Spring, but they recognized the energy behind it. We ignored the clear signs, deluded by our belief that no reasonable population would find fault in a global system designed by the US, for the US. But they do find fault. State actors find fault with that system as well. Rising powers such as Russia, China, Iran and many others chafe at constraints on their own sovereignty in the name of a global system designed to put them at a strategic competitive disadvantage.
No, LTG Bolger did not give us a strategic “ah hah”! with this book. He in his critique of the decisions made and actions taken is no less tactical and superficial than those he targets. He does not offer us a vision that would have taken us to a better place, rather he offers a variation of tactics that would have taken us to a different place.
We do need to be much more intellectually honest about the strategic failure of the past 12 years. This in not a failure of the Bush policy vs the Obama policy – this is a failure equally earned and equally shared. But that equal earning and sharing must also be between our civilian policy makers and the military who crafted seriously flawed concepts for enacting those policies. Plenty of blame to go around, but people only seem to line up to take credit.
The good news is that we are not, and have not, been a nation at war. We are the most powerful nation in a rapidly evolving world and our policy is out of touch. Lets tune up our understanding, let’s tune up our policies, and let’s tune up our approaches. One can neither win nor lose a war when one is not at war.
If one has to wonder if they have won or lost a war – then that is the clearest metric at all that they were never at war to begin with.
Professor John Schindler’s review: http://20committee.com/2015/01/06/america-and-the-drive-by-strategy/
He cites LG Bolger: ‘The war required a way to use a tactically superb force to contain and attrit terrorist adversaries. In this, America’s generals failed. We found ourselves impaled and bogged down in not one, but two Middle Eastern countries, and this on the best advice of educated, experienced senior military men and women who had all studied Vietnam in their service schools. Over time, piece by piece, the generals recommended slogging onward … Absent a realistic campaign concept in both countries, wars of attrition developed. Some saw it as a failure of imagination’.
RCJ wrote,
‘ … a carefully tailored punitive expedition designed to punish them for their sins against us,….’
I didn’t get the memo on the ‘sins’ the Iraqis and Afghans had committed against us.
We were not willing to execute a ‘tailored punitive expedition’ on those responsible for 9/11 in 2001 anymore than we are today.
Our political and military leadership had to beat up on someone so they chose the world’s poorest country and the only Arab country that had zero Wahhabi fruitcake within its borders.
We have profound problems within our political and military leadership that are much more serious than a lack of strategic vision. In fact one could argue strategic failure is inevitable if we continue to ignore simple honesty in our decision-making.
RC
We lost because we the failed to “see and understand” and yet we claimed to have a strategy–still looking for one in this current Iraq round.
BUT we did claim at one time to have a redline in the sand on the use of chemical weapons by Assad but then again all it was was words.
Eliot Higgins @EliotHiggins
Playlist of videos from the first reported chlorine barrel bomb attack in Kafr Zita, Hama on April 11th 2014
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-eDHqQIZsDM&list=PLPC0Udeof3T7yySO0dNQ2aNDO4Wuzb5JB …
Assad is still dropping chemical barrel bombs and yet our response is again what?
New OPCW report reiterates usage of chlorine gas to target civilians in #Syria:
http://www.ibtimes.com/syria-chemical-weapons-new-opcw-report-reiterates-chlorine-gas-was-used-civilians-1775642 …
What seems to be missing from COL Jones and RantCorps’ discussion/analysis below is our (the United States’) overriding and enduring political objective.
Thus, the questions: Would/will lesser measures (example: “punitive expeditions”) help to transform the Middle East more along modern western political, economic and social lines? This, in sufficient time, for example, to prevent another 9/11, or to prevent the use of WMD against ourselves, our allies and/or our other interests?
Within the context of our such concerns — and our overriding/enduring political objective said to be related thereto — to understand, for example, why our recent actions/activities were directed against:
a. The political, economic and social make-up of the states and societies of the Middle East? And not, as it were, against
b. The “Wahhabi fruitcake” or “Florida, California, England, France and Germany?”
Herein, the “sins of Afghanistan and Iraq” (et al) to be understood:
a. More in terms of their contrary (non-western) political, economic and social make-up.
b. And less in terms of the common, overall and general problems (genocide, terrorism, insurgency, etc., etc., etc.) which are thought to emanate therefrom.
Thus, our actions at state and societal transformation were said to be directed — not at the “results” or the “symptoms” of the problem — but, rather, at its perceived “root cause.”
(The Marines in Tripoli having no such similar mission?)
Back now to “why we lost:”
Herein — and again in consideration of both (1) our concerns and (2) our overriding/enduring political objective which is said to be related thereto — to ask did we:
a. Go about it (state and societal transformation — on a grand scale) the wrong way (ex: regime change; invasion; nation-building COIN, etc.)? And/or did we:
b. Simply fail to appropriate and devote the necessary resources (time, blood, political capital, money, etc.) needed to get the job (fundamental, complete and comprehensive state and societal transformation) done?
I am bringing some of COL Jones’ thoughts — in his comments well below — to the top of the page here so that we might, hopefully, discuss them further. Here is the excerpt:
“Were most of the 9/11 attackers Saudi citizens? Absolutely. But equally absolutely they were also nationalist insurgents whose primary motivation in life was to take down the house of Saud. They simply bought into bin Laden’s message: You can’t succeed in your nationalist goals of taking down corrupt regimes at home, unless you first help us to break the will of the US government to protect same.”
To these thoughts by COL Jones, let me ask this question: Take down the house of Saud to what end?
As to this question, consider the following answer:
So as to throw out Western influence, power and control in the region and to, thereby, contain, roll back and reverse Western efforts to transform Islamic states and their societies more along modern western lines.
Herein, to correctly understand “the primary motivation in life” of bin Laden, those of his ilk and the populations that support same. And to correctly understand what the term “corruption,” that COL Jones uses in his last sentence above, actually means to these people.
In this same light (them: to throw out and reverse Western “corrupting” influence, power and control; the US: via “transformation,” to continue to have — and expand upon — such influence, power and control) to understand:
a. The appeal of bin Laden (et al’s) message to the hearts and minds of the Islamic populations — in KSA — and elsewhere within the Islamic world?
b. The (comparative) lack of appeal of our opposite/opposed message? And
c.. Why we would, post-9/11, go after bin Laden, his like-minded landlord and followers (and Saddam Hussein?) and not go after the house of Saud and those similar rulers that we had more “in our pocket?”
Bottom line:
a. The goal (and therefore the conflict) to be considered not in “nationalistic” terms (only a means to the end) but, rather, in cultural/civilizational terms (and, thus, in terms of power, influence and control); both for “us” and for “them?”
b. These such matters (which are in such sharp contrast to our “universal values” vision) to be taken into proper consideration re: “why we lost?”
Thed,
I’ve enjoyed the exchange between you and Rant with both of you making good points. Methinks Rant probably has it right in citing that many Saudis are the source of many wars and terror incidents over the past several decades. However, agree with you that a punitive raid on KSA would have been inappropriate after 9/11, both because it would have prevented us from using KSA facilities during OIF and it likely would have been catastrophic from an oil export perspective. We see the Saudis today attempting to bankrupt U.S. frackers through their own over-production at a cost to them of about $2 a barrel. What would they have done to curtail oil exports driving the price the other direction if we had attacked them for seemingly an inappropriate reason.
But you continue that our COIN TTP in Iraq or Afghanistan were flawed. You repeatedly mention Dhofar and other historical insurgencies. Rather than disrupt your comments regarding COL Collin’s article, let me make my case here that the Dhofar Rebellion was nothing like Iraq or Afghanistan.
* Believe you mentioned elsewhere that Dhofar was about the size of Anbar and Helmand provinces. Anbar has nearly two million Iraqis while Helmand has 1.4 million Afghans. A Marine Major’s 1984 study cited a Dhofar population back then of 50,000 and an Oman-wide population of only one million. Was the rest of Oman involved in the insurgency or just Dhofar? We certainly know the insurgencies were widespread in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This alone coupled with the respective sizes of the military forces involved renders the comparison invalid.
* Dhofar and Oman in general have over 2000 kms of sea access which means that any resupply of COIN forces was vastly simplified compared to getting items and forces to Anbar or Helmand provinces. Air attacks from the sea and ports were available close to the fighting. This does not apply to most of Iraq or any of Afghanistan.
* Oman has oil and its GDP today is 65th compared to Iraq’s 47 and Afghanistan’s inflated 107 due to our presence. It could afford a large military yet at the time of the Marine Major’s study it had only about 15,000 land forces which is many times smaller than Iraq’s or Afghanistan’s security forces. They also were facing an insurgent force many times smaller with a casualty rate a fraction of our conflicts. Yes the Saudis were helping the insurgents, but so were the Chinese and Russians and communist influence was the larger threat given the strategic location of Oman.
* Oman has no large Sunni/Shiite divide and nearly all are of the moderate Ibadi school of Muslim. The Dhofar rebellion was not about religious differences but instead had communist influences and direct Soviet and Chinese support. The Iranians actually were assisting the Sultan as this was pre-1979. I doubt they would assist them today under their current theocracy.
* 73.4% of today’s 4 million Omanis live in urban areas and given the desert terrain of 80% of the land, it probably was not much different back then. Oman cities are quite modern compared to Afghanistan and many if not most our coastal cities. Not the same in Helmand and Anbar. Afghanistan and Helmand and Anbar provinces are far less urban (although admittedly Iraq as a whole is). It was not an Oman-wide insurgency unlike both Iraq and Afghanistan where Texas-sized territories had large insurgency issues.
* Of the four million Omanis today only slightly more than half are Omani while the remaining 1.7 million are expatriot laborers. There was oil production even at the time of the Dhofar rebellion as guerilla actions attacked those facilities. That implies a GDP based on actual oil production and trade vs. a largely-poppy based GDP in Afghanistan and a lack of opportunity in Anbar. That is unlike Iraq and Afghanistan as whole which have 20-30 million people in each.
* The original Sultan in power in 1962 was not replaced by his son until the coup of July 1970. So in effect half the rebellion differed from the other half. There was no “surge” until the son took power. The son was Sandhurst trained which would indicate an instant affinity to military matters and a British connection that no doubt helped him secure British SAS support immediately after the coup.
* There was no coup in Iraq or Afghanistan. A repressive leader was not the original source of either current U.S.-involved insurgency although admittedly the poor policies of al-Maliki and Karzai probably helped keep insurgencies going. The Shiites and Kurds no doubt were fighting Saddam Hussein and the Northern Alliance fought the Taliban but obviously neither were making any progress until we attacked by air, land, and sea. The Sultan father was very repressive and villages were burned and wells concreted over or blown up under his rule to attempt to stop the rebellion. No wonder they rebelled. By 1970 much of the Jebel were communists due to his policies…not radical Muslim extremists.
What are your arguments that the Dhofar rebellion could have in any way been a model for how to fight using a COIN strategy/tactic in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Thed,
Forgive me but you missed my simple question as to the COG of the problem.
IMO in a ‘war of words’ it’s best to take CvC’s advice and first ‘understand the kind of war on which they are embarking’ otherwise we’re just making what another man called ‘noise’.
In 30 years of dealing with JJs from a dozen different nationalities I found the energy produced by the desire for revolution against the ruling elite of the KSA the 800 pound gorilla in their emotive mind-set – especially the Arabs.
Many folks hold different opinions to my own and I respect that but I am at a loss if this grievance does not drive any debate concerned with the political violence across the region.
Regards,
RC
The KSA aside we still are forgetting the 1000 pound bear in the room—Iran and their drive to control the entire Green Crescent from AFG to Lebanon.
Still looking for that elusive US Syrian/Iraqi strategy—and we are supporting “who” again in the fight against IS?
Was nice to see the US supplied Abram tank driving in Iraq with a Hezbollah flag draped on it.
#Iraq Iraqi Parliament member tells Lindsey Snell #Shia Militias are no better than #ISIS
pic.twitter.com/Gagm7cIbTc
The following quotes come from the RAND Oct. 2014 study “Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War.” This study was one of the four recent sources retired COL Collins cited in his recent article. I believe these quotes counter many of LTG Bolger’s beliefs:
RCJ wrote:
‘For the US to bring revenge against the Saud’s simply because the nationality of the attackers would have been the stupidest move we could have possibility made. We have some dumb moves, but thank God we did not make that one.’
Hang on a minute I am not an advocate of raiding – forgive but I thought it was your good self who reminisced for:
‘More ‘the shores of Tripoli’ this sort of thing used to be the bread and butter for the Marines.’
Secondly the nationality per se of the majority of the attackers was as relevant as their hair color or what size shoes they wore. It is the political aberration the Saudi elite impose upon their fellow citizens that creates the energy that fuels the insurgency as you helpfully state further down the thread:
‘But equally absolutely they were also nationalist insurgents whose primary motivation in life was to take down the House of Saud.‘
Where we appear to enjoy some agreement is the COG of the region’s problems is the House of Saud’s monopoly on the KSA’s wealth, power, religion, pursuit of happiness and more besides.
I am not a believer in the merit of Raiding but many folks are. I was assuming somewhat the mantra of the Devil’s Advocate and the contention was that if one believes a tactic is effective then it should be applied to the root cause of the problem. IMO bringing down COIN,FID,Drones,HTP, PsyOps and the whole RMA-enabled circus upon the heads of Afghans, Libyans, Somalis, Yemenis, Iraqis, Syrians etc. just adds noise at best and more than likely fans the flames of political inspired violence elsewhere.
It is my contention that our political, military and corporate leadership fail to provide effective strategic guidance for the simple reason they refuse to acknowledge the Saud’s political elite are the cause of the region’s political problem. Alarmingly some of our closest allies are even more wedded to them than we are.
I wholeheartedly agree raiding Riyadh would have been stupid but who said we were smart? Perhaps a Devil’s Advocate’s approach soon after 9/11 might have sharpened a few minds and consequently avoided so much wasted blood and treasure.
Needless to say hindsight is a wonderful thing but just say around Xmas 2001 we were all sitting down in our living rooms and choking on our Xmas turkey whilst watching a few hundred dead Marines being dragged naked thru the streets of Riyadh on CNN. As you point out the outcry as to how such a stupid disaster could have got beyond the planning stage – leave alone given the go ahead – would have been immense. But I ask you; what did your 2014 Xmas turkey taste like – with 14 years, 7,000 KIA, 52,000 WIA and $5 trillion to wash it down with?
But here’s the rub. Despite the appalling cost since 2001 our politicians, generals and CEOs are still appeasing the political dysfunction that fuels the region political unrest. If back in 2001 the Devil had had his way and a disastrous Raid had ensued, how many of our leaders would still be in bed with the House of Saud? I would venture not a single one.
Furthermore I would argue such a coming together of minds in 2001 would have subsequently spared many of our dead and wounded.
As Outlaw often points out, popular perception plays an important role in the region’s political stability. If we had attacked the political elite in the KSA soon after 9/11 many folks within the region would have recognized the act as an honorable attempt to settle a blood feud.
More importantly, in light of the political grievances plaguing the region, the force brought down on the ruling KSA elite (as opposed to wretched Afghans, Paks, Iraqi’s etc.) would have been seen as a long overdue comeuppance for the hoarders of the region’s political, economic and religious power.
Raiding would have been stupid but there is a whole raft of RMA-enabled tactical tools that IMO are equally stupid. Even if I am hopelessly misguided, it still stands that if we insist on doing something, should it not be the COG that first and foremost gets the treatment?
No doubt CvC experienced similar disaster at the hands of Napoleon and I imagine the folly of some RMAs of the day played a role in his determination to promote the critical importance of first understanding what type of war you are embarking on and where lies the enemy’s center.
No doubt if we execute the correct tactics against the correct COG – victory will follow. Unfortunately we have not managed to solve that simple riddle since WW2.
If we execute the wrong tactics against the wrong COG – military disaster is unavoidable (Vietnam).
If we execute the correct tactics against the wrong center we will suffer a thousand cuts on a long march to failure (GWOT).
If we execute the wrong tactics but apply them to the correct COG we are on what Sun Tzu considered ‘the slowest route to victory’. However given our appalling record over the last 70 years this path gives us some hope for strategic success.
Because our Operational aim is directed at the COG, whatever tactic we select – Raid, COIN, FID, UW, Drone, HTP, PsyOps, AirSeaBattle etc. it will impact upon the causation of the political problem.
Initially this impact may be good, bad or indifferent but its effect on the core (as opposed to effects on some meaningless ‘other’) will offer up valid lessons learned that we can promptly adapt and develop to help shape a winning strategy.
RC
To bring back the discussion to the center as to why we failed—this is cut from a blog article today by a well know former US CT type in DC with years in the field that actually goes to the heart of the lack of a US strategy in both Iraq and Syria and for that matter even the Ukraine.
An interesting read.
To get my bias out there, I’ve been immersed with this issue since before 9/11. As someone who worked operational counterterrorism in the intelligence world, as well as later served as a consultant on the same to several agencies of the U.S. and Allied governments, I’ve been part of this debate virtually since its creation. The hours I have spent hashing out “strategic communication” strategies against Al-Qa’ida and its friends is nearly countless. My position is clear: Call terrorists what they call themselves. The U.S. Government has no reason to get involved in disputes about anybody’s religion — the very last thing we ever want to do is tell Muslims what their faith is or is not — but when bad guys say they’re Salafi jihadists, that means they probably are, and we must not be afraid to say so.
Lots of things motivate terrorists. Anarchists are motivated by anarchism, Irish nationalists are motivated by Irish nationalism, white supremacists are motivated by white supremacy, and Salafi jihadists are motivated by Salafi jihadism. This is only complicated if we choose to make it so. The loser-criminals who killed seventeen innocent people in Paris last weekend may be very bad Muslims, but they were Muslims all the same.
Moreover, the “they’re not really Muslims” dodge is not only dishonest, it’s an insult to the huge numbers of Muslim cops, soldiers, and spooks who have given their lives in the struggle against the Salafi jihad, many of whom made the ultimate sacrifice in U.S.-led campaigns all over the globe. The bottom line is the Islamic world is having a robust debate, sometimes settled with guns and bombs, about what it should be in the twenty-first century, and that’s a debate for Muslims — not us, we’re spectators — to have. We have plenty to do with tracking and hunting down terrorists, preferably before they kill.
I also staked out a hazardous position, years ago, by having a centrist take on political Islam: we need to talk about it, we will never understand the Salafi jihadist enemy if we don’t, but we must not obsess about it. A lot of our recent homegrown terrorists resemble spree killers who seek out Salafi jihadism — not the other way around — as an excuse to act out their sick violent fantasies. Understanding the nuances of Islamic theology is not what they are about.
That said, on the other side, we have those who seek to embroil the West in an endless war against Islam, not just radical Islam. Their worldview is nearly as absolutist as the Salafis’ and about as helpful. The motivations of such people are a mix of their own religious faith and bias, and their understanding of Islam is generally as shaky as that possessed by teenaged drug addicts seeking to redeem themselves in a martyrdom operation. When this dangerous nonsense creeps into U.S. Government anything, I have protested, sometimes publicly. Fortunately these types are usually stopped in their tracks with one simple question: “If Islam is the problem — What’s the solution?”
Yet Islamism, as distinct from Islam, is a genuine problem in many places. The terrorist element is the obvious challenge, but there’s also the problem of subversion, to bring back a Cold War term that needs rebirth, and anybody who’s looked at this issue honestly knows that Islamism pushes a worldview that is deeply incompatible with Western democracy, much less post-modern ideas on faith, society, gender, and sexuality. It’s clear now that most Egyptians don’t want to live under the Muslim Brotherhood, even though it was born there, so I can’t imagine many Westerners are eager to either.
The touchy issue of subversion must be handled discreetly by governments, but counterterrorism is a much more public matter. Here the Obama administration’s inability to call the enemy what it is has been troubling for years. I have no problem with ditching the Bush-era rhetoric of the “Global War on Terrorism” but denying that we are embroiled in a long-term campaign against Salafi jihadism that looks a lot like a war of sorts, cannot be done without dishonesty.
We are in serious trouble if the US JCoS does not know when Iran is in violation of the UN sanctions. Seems he also forgot when Iranian supported Iraqi Shia groups were killing US troops with EFPs.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Martin Dempsey has described Iran’s military action against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq as a “positive” development, according to recent comments.
Dempsey, during a join press conference with his Israeli counterpart earlier this month, said Iran’s involvement in Iraq is not surprising to the United States and currently does not threaten American efforts in that country to battle IS (also known as ISIL or ISIS).
“Iran has been both interested and sought to influence the future of Iraq since Iraq’s sovereignty was restored in 2004, so Iranian influence is not [a] surprise and Iranian advisers have been in Iraq for a very long time,” Dempsey said during the press conference, according to Jane’s. “As long as the Iraqi government remains committed to inclusivity of all the various groups inside the country, then I think Iranian influence will be positive.”
Iran does not pose a threat to the United States in Iraq, according to Dempsey.
“It’s not threatening to U.S. forces or to our mission at this point. If it were to become that way, then we would have to adapt our campaign plan,” he added.
However, Iran’s transfer of weapons to Iraq would constitute a violation of United Nations resolutions governing Tehran’s military activity, Jane’s noted in comments on Dempsey’s remarks.
“Any transfer of Iranian military equipment to Iraq, as well as the presence of Iranian military advisers, would be a violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747, which banned any state from importing military items or services from the Islamic Republic,” they wrote.
Iran has been spotted using its F-4 Phantom II aircraft to carry out strikes in Iraq and has “also been seen carrying out ground attack sorties in support of joint Iraqi Army-militia operations in the east of the country,” according to Jane’s.
“The Iraqi Army is also using military hardware that has come from Iran, most notably Su-25 ground attack aircraft,” Jane’s wrote. “The Iraqi Ministry of Defense released a video on 30 December showing an HM-20 multiple rocket launcher (MRL) operating with the 5th Infantry Division in Salah-al-Din province. The HM-20 is the Iranian designation for a copy of the 122 mm BM-11 MRL mounted on a MAN LX tactical truck.”
http://uk.businessinsider.com/dempsey-says-irans-military-in-iraq-is-positive-2015-1?r=US#ixzz3P5VKsQSI
Appears the IDF takes care of the ME and Iran better than the current US foreign policy in the ME. Why is that again?
Sky News Arabia and others reporting that commanders from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard also killed in Quneitra strike.
https://twitter.com/SkyNewsArabia_B/status/556861004328747010 …
Basically: IDF jst killed 6 of Hizbollah’s-best inside #Syria. Incl Nasrallah’s “godson” Jihad Mughneye pic.twitter.com/x7sPcfhgXp
#LEBANON (Jan18 #Beirut 19:43) Source: #Hezbollah ordered “general mobilisation” after today’s #Israel.i strike.(Libancall) #Libanon #Syria
Bad day 4 IRGC / MT @sheeraf IDF strike bigger than originally thought. Now confirmed several Iranian commanders killed alongside Mughniyeh.
Defense Min. Yaalon won’t comment on strike but adds cryptically in radio interview “#Hezbollah should explain what it’s doing in #Syria”
Senior Israeli military official says if Hezbollah responds to todays strikes with rockets, there will be a “very heavy response.”
This interested in “why we lost” or why we have so-far lost the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan might be interested in the new release by McFarland Publishers, Counterinsurgency: What the United States Learned in Vietnam, Chose to Forget, and Needs to Know Now, by David Donovan.
Considering America’s experience with counterinsurgency one would expect that the expertise gained over that time should have shown itself in its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. For a long while, it did not. Too many lessons had to be learned over again. In Counterinsurgency, Donovan addresses the key issues relevant to counterinsurgency and provides discussions based on personal experiences with decades of thought given to them afterward. Personal vignettes from his own experiences and from the experiences of others are placed throughout the book to illustrate points being discussed with real-life examples. The book will be useful to both the counterinsurgency planner and the advisor in the field, but it is also a book for the general reader who wants to understand the complexities of counterinsurgency and the implications that come with it.
In particular,Donovan focuses a lot of attention on counterinsurgency advisors because they are the key players in any counterinsurgency effort. They transmit knowledge and values to their counterparts, which means advising is a job requiring appropriate personnel selection and advanced training.
The reader will quickly learn that Donovan is no Pollyanna. He is quite clear about the too-common failure of counterinsurgency programs and the key factors that cause it. Relatedly, he uses the metaphor of the Potemkin village, i.e. facades put up to make things look better than they are, when discussing critically the tendency for over-optimism when considering and implementing counterinsurgency campaigns.
An earlier, online version of the book was entitled, War of a Kind, and was extremely well reviewed prior to that version’s being taken down in deference to the hard-copy version.
Interesting development and it is Russia this time not the IS or AQAP.
A few commenters especially Paul Schindler have indicated that actually the initial Paris attacks while claimed by AQAP have actually a Russian background and many laughed–and now?
Agence France-Presse ✔ @AFP
#BREAKING Five Russians held in France on suspicion of planning attack: prosecutor
AFP is reporting that 5 Russian citizens have been held in France on suspicion of planning an attack. Exact details to come.
UPDATE: 5 men 4 chechen, 1 austrian arrested in Beziers France, Suspected of preparing an attack in Austria.
John Schindler @20committee
5 Russians “from N Caucasus” arrested for plotting terrorism in France…now why on earth would they do that?
Outlaw and I (well below) have been discussing “why we lost” from the perspective of a clash between:
a. The values, attitudes and beliefs of the ultra-liberal “West.” And
b. The very different values, attitudes and beliefs of the more conservative “Rest.”
(Thus to consider the present conflict/contest as being world-wide in nature and scope, much like the Cold War.)
In this regard to consider, for example, the recent comments of (1) the Pope yesterday in the Philippines and (2) the Prime Minister of Turkey in Germany last week:
a. The Pope:
“Every people deserves to conserve its identity without being ideologically colonized … When imposed conditions come from imperial colonizers, they search to make people lose their own identity and make a sameness … this is ideological colonization.”
http://www.aol.com/article/2015/01/20/pope-catholics-dont-have-to-breed-like-rabbits/21132002/ (Courtesy of yours truly.)
b. The Turkish Prime Minister:
“Yes, integrate yourselves into German society but don’t assimilate yourselves. No one has the right to deprive us of our culture and our identity … “Islamophobia should be seen in the same way as anti-Semitism.”
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/erdogan-urges-turks-not-to-assimilate-you-are-part-of-germany-but-also-part-of-our-great-turkey-a-748070.html (Courtesy of Outlaw.)
Thus, to see “why we lost” from the perspective of our miscalculation re:
a. How we believed states and societies, individuals and groups, and national and religious leaders —
b. On a world-wide scale and to include even our own Pope —
c. When confronted with a challenge from the West and re: “conservative values”
d. Would not, as we expected, roll over and play dead. But, instead —
e. Would rise to the occasion and fight to preserve their more-traditional values, attitudes and beliefs; this,
f. In the face of an assault on same by the ultra-liberal West.
(In this West v. the Rest light, to also understand why Putin might wish to jump on the “conservative values” bandwagon.)
BOTTOM LINE:
In our Cold War days, the Pope would seem to have looked at the West as the champion of conservative values — and looked at the communists (who, in those days, were the one’s that demanded radical, alien and profane state and societal transformations) — as the clear enemy.
Now, because the West today is the one who is seen as demanding radical, alien and profane changes — and the Rest seen as championing conservative values — the Pope seems to have more in common with our enemies.
How can we hope to win such a battle (the West v. the Rest) given this roll reversal — which the conservatives might say puts the West on the wrong side of history — the wrong side of virtue — and the wrong side of the Pope?
As an aside:
Consider this from SecDef Hagel (in the article entitled “As He Exists, Hagel Candid on Intervention” of my 26 Jan-2 Feb edition of the “Army Times”):
“You can’t force the United States’ value system and our values and our standards and our structures and our institutions down anybody’s throat … And we make a huge mistakes when we think we can go around and make many USAs all over the world. It just won’t work, never has worked. Help them; human rights, freedom, people having rights to decide their own lives for their own families and opportunities. That’s universal. How they do that, how they structure that, that should be up to them, not to us or anybody else.”
(Sorry: Do not have the link.)
Goes to “why we lost?”
And/or goes to the reason why Hagel is being shown the door?
This indirectly goes to the question concerning the failure of our own strategy if there ever was one in Iraq, AFG, the Ukraine, and now again Syria and Iraq.
Strategies in the 21st century demand imagination, thinking outside the box, ie critical thinking and adaptation and must be able to question our old habits and come up with new ideas and ways to address the quote that Hagel provided us to think about.
Well worth the read:
A Dutch bloggers view of the Ukrainian fighting and why the US/EU/NATO does not respond—am afraid I actually agree with him.
Really read it from end to end and you will notice I have mentioned much of it here on the Ukraine thread—and regardless of my respect for Bill M Russia is inherently the greatest threat against the US in 25 years –OR has no one in the US noticed Putin has effectively disowned the nuclear concept of MAD and that is far more dangerous than a bunch of black flag waving fascist islamists trying to create a Sunni nation.
Putin has effectively with this current US president shown to the world the “fakeness of US foreign policy” or basically put we have no policies.
THERE is though an economic “nuclear weapon” that the US/EU have that will end Putin’s aggression immediately and it is a two step process–step one cut off all Russian companies from any capital anywhere outside of China, and step two disconnect Russia from SWIFT—the core question is do western leaders have the courage to pull the trigger–this is where the blogger is correct–they do not.
Before reading this Dutch bloggers comment–remember the Russians just released their new nuclear war doctrine that “foresees the use of tactical nuclear weapons first in order to deescalate”.
Remember nuclear use to deescalate actually the first time any nuclear power has formally stated that option and what did Obama respond with–silence.
Oh and by the way if you feel I am wrong did anyone catch the simple fact that the DNR as a proxy for Russia basically “declared war on the Ukraine” yesterday in the name of Russia and Putin and his FM backed them up within minutes with supporting statements and the IS is what a truly “serious direct threat to the US”?
Poroshenko’s dilemma
“I am a president of peace. Not of war.” said president Poroshenko.
The problem is: his country is at war whether he likes it or not.
But Poroshenko knows it is a war he can not win.
Why?
Because Putler has nukes (and many other nasty tricks of course).
E.V.E.R.Y single time Ukraine upscaled it’s response to the Russian aggression to counter it, the Russians upscaled THEIRS even more.
And where does that end?
If the road of upscaling-aggression would be walked, in the end Putin would use nukes. And Ukraine does NOT have an answer to that.
So an all out war with Russia… Ukraine will loose that. Period.
And THUS Ukraine seeks help from the West and started with an unilateral ceasefire and later Minsk bilateral, EVEN THOUGH everybody knew the Russians would use it to restructure and reinforce their forces in Ukraine.
But Ukraine can not win the war against Putler without the West. That’s why Poroshenko listens to them. To get their help. And THEY say: don’t fight.
Because the West does not want war. Not in Europe but neither in Ukraine. It’s bad for business!
So the West hesitates. Lingers. Tries to find a ‘diplomatic solution’.
And they tell Poroshenko: do not fight, because we will sanction Putin. Show the world HE is the aggressor and not you and we will hit him in his pocket.
Why they do it this way? Why not send weapons?
Because Putin has nukes!
We don’t want a nuclear war. We don’t want upscaling-aggression all the time with the use of nukes in the end.
Sanctions are working pretty good when you look at the Ruble. But it’s not good enough. Because it takes a loooot of TIME before it really has a good effect.
But ALSO because the West does not understand Putins game. Putin does not play by the rules. That is: OUR rules. Putin has his own set of rules and PRETENDS to play OUR game. That’s why he is able to endlessly fool Western diplomats.
If sanctions hurt Putin… he will STEAL what he needs to survive. He STEALS Crimea. He STEALS coal from Donbas and sells it to Ukraine who has no option but to buy it. He steals a complete factory for helicopter engines from Donbas, transports it in his humanitarian white trucks and builds it up again somewhere in Russia.
Putin will STEAL from the West too. Mark my words. He will if he needs to do that for his survival.
Because NOBODY can get Putin and his gang. Why? He has nukes.
Imagine… one bomb on Berlin and Europe is out.
Because what we gonna do? Nuke back? And get an all out Nuke war? We don’t want THAT.
And THUS the West has to allow Putin grabbing what he wants and HOPING things will get better anyways.
But what the West does not fully understand is that they have REALLY GONE MAD in Russia. Beyond imagination. To this point that almost all of them believe the crazy propaganda they produce themselves. It is a vicious circle they are in. A VERY aggressive one.
AND they have nukes… a lot of them!
That is a very dangerous combination. Madness and Nukes…
Putin is going to grab what he wants with force. If anybody wants to stop him, he will upscale. Our collective (Ukrainian AND European) dilemma is this: How much will we allow him to grab before we say it is enough? Until he is in Berlin?
You think he will not go to Berlin? Of course he will. U.N.L.E.S.S somebody or something stops him.
(That is… he and his gang, because they are all in it together.)
And therefor the ULTIMATE question we have to ask ourselves is this: how are we going to deal with Putlers nukes if he would start to use them?
Do we have an answer to that?
If we DON’T have this answer, he will eventually (between now and so many years) run all over Europe with his crappy tanks, with uncountable victims.
While we debate whether we failed or succeeded maybe we need to ask ourselves do we even have a current coherent foreign policy on anything that makes sense to anyone?
Yesterday Russia declared open war on the Ukraine via their own funded and lead proxy mercenary state the DNR and did anyone notice anything other than business as usual in DC?
We now are in a full blown slid into 1914 style war in Central Europe 25 years after the Wall came down and our foreign policy towards Russia is what?–talking and or silence it seems.
Our foot dragging on the economic sanctions, the constant drive to talk and the failed belief that “diplomacy” will work if we only can get Russia to converse should be finally called out for what it was and is a failure to the fourth degree.
This is just a quick sample of “a Russian declared war actions on the Ukraine” this morning alone and even with the Congress passed and US President signed aid law on the books –just what is the US response?–by the way check the mass of the western media not much being mentioned there as well as of this morning.
And for the 50th time–just what is the US strategy towards Russia and for that matter the IS?
Kremlin Leader’s Distorted View of the World.
http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/01/talking-to-putin-about-ukraine.html?spref=tw …
Mariupol today. Severe escalation!
pic.twitter.com/tf7ZNLGldJ
30 Russian vehicles near Pavlopil incl 8 tanks; 15 near Mariupol incl 6 tanks https://www.facebook.com/dmitry.tymchuk/posts/626144204180905 …
East Mariupol, Kiev street, after Russian Uragan attack
pic.twitter.com/Sz0wr4huu6
This helps to determine direction of Mariupol rockets. (Soon we will hear Russian reports that “Ukraine did it”).
pic.twitter.com/LakUaP7UjL
It was the heavier “Uragans” that Russians shelled on Mariupol today
pic.twitter.com/pvjyt1VX8W
Ukrainian MFA: At least 10 civilians including children have been killed at Mariupol shelling
pic.twitter.com/qv2vBe0FOO
Azov in Mariupol reporting several dead and many wounded after MLRS hit a market http://u.afp.com/zNp
pic.twitter.com/5b4rXYNKEt
#Mariupol, Vostochny. Shelling from Novoazovsk direction.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NKAq9nmm93A …
pic.twitter.com/uSL9ELEt39
The following this week were Russia’s actions and statements:
1. the Russian FM in an open press conference states—we have influenced the DNR to pull back to the Minsk demarcation line
2. then the DNR declaration of war followed by two statements by Putin and his FM 1) the Ukraine did not respond to our proposals about the artillery pull back and 2) we are not involved in the internal affairs of the Ukraine
3. claimed they wanted the Normandy talks to proceed
4. recalled their signatures on the 13 November ceasefire agreement and claimed they still supported the Minsk demarcation line
5. then Russian troops go on a full attack
6. Putin claims in the face of lies–that the Ukrainian AF bombed Russian citizens
7. AND now importantly Putin sends “suggested changes to the Minsk demarcation lines” which if followed would create the “New Russia” and the Ukraine does not respond–the actual reason for this declaration of war and Russian offensive
8. Russia places Crimea troops on full alert after they shell Mariupol
Now the following below and we still think the IS is the direct threat–read the NYTs “Holy War” article?
Russia “is on a holy mission. It’s at war with the US…” – Moscow professor’s take on escalating Ukraine war
http://nyti.ms/1uG3Vom
Kremlin Leader’s Distorted View of the World.
http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/01/talking-to-putin-about-ukraine.html?spref=tw …
Here Putin claims that the Ukrainians used aviation to bomb Donbass in recent days.
http://www.kremlin.ru/news/47505
Whether today, Feb or March, Russian Forces will move to seize control over Ukraine’s Sea of Azov coast, building #landbridge for #Crimea.
Russia is getting nervous about the possibility of being cut off from SWIFT – calls such move tantamount to war
http://on.ft.com/1Cm0oMC
URGENT! In connection with the events in #Mariupol, the #Russia|n Armed Forces in #Crimea alerted!
Zerkalo Nedeli publishes #Putin letter to #Poroshenko and shows his suggested new border with separatists
http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/pismo-putina-poroshenko-polnyy-tekst-i-putinskaya-karta-linii-razgranicheniya-164964_.html …
Regarding “why we lost,” should we see this — not in isolation and as re: Iraq and Afghanistan only — but more holistically (the West v. the Rest?) and, thus, as relates to our efforts world-wide?
Thus and for example:
a. Not only in terms of our failed designs on transforming (more along modern western lines) the Greater Middle East.
b. But also in terms of our similar failed efforts (as Outlaw so clearly outlines below) to transform Russia (and, indeed, many others).
In all cases, I suggest, this failure stems from a simple mistake, to wit:
a. Of asking such fundamentally “different” states and societies to
b. Make (1) such full, complete and total transformations as we desire (2) immediately rather than much more gradually.
Thus, due specifically to this mistake, on many fronts we get:
a. Not accommodation, progress, rule-of-law, success, modernization and secularization (our transformational desires). But, rather,
b. Resistance, failure, crime/corruption, backsliding, archaic orders and ideas and religiosity.
In this regard to understand how we got into our current “holy wars;” which extend not only to the Greater Middle East but also to the Russian homelands and beyond.
“Konstantin Sonin, a professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, echoed that point. “The influence of economists as a whole has completely vanished,” Mr. Sonin said of the Kremlin. “The country is on a holy mission. It’s at war with the United States, so why would you bother about the small battleground, the economy?”
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/24/world/europe/ukraine-violence.html (Courtesy of Outlaw below.)
“Why we lost” needing to, thus, be viewed more through the large, more-holistic West v. the Rest view/lense provided above — which Outlaw seems to be pointing us toward?
(Outlaw’s main point however being, if I read him right, that the greater danger is to be found in the Russian theater/front of this West v. the Rest conflict.)