From Ending Two Wars to Engagement in Five – with the Risk of a Sixth
12.03.2014 at 06:53pm
From Ending Two Wars to Engagement in Five – with the Risk of a Sixth by Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Presidents propose action, and then reality intervenes. This cycle holds special irony in the case of President Obama. A year ago, it looked like he might end two of the longest wars in U.S. history by the time he left office. As of today, President Obama has involved the United States in five evolving conflicts, and there is little prospect any of them will be over by the time the next president is inaugurated, unless the United States chooses to disengage and lose.
It may not be possible for President Obama — or indeed any future U.S. President — to undo what President Bush has done, to wit: (1) To stir up the fires of freedom and independence with (2) no reasonable, intelligent and/or viable plan for dealing with the numerous revolutionary wildfires that would, thereby, result. (The “They Will All Want to Be Like Us Plan” not qualifying as reasonable, intelligent and/or viable.)
Thus, the genie is out of the bottle, the lid to Pandora’s Box is off and chaos and suffering — as one might expect — reigns. Herein, the world never to be the same (or better) again?
Thus, a strategy needed that addresses how to — not reverse things (this would seem equally imprudent/irrational/impossible) — but, rather, to deal with and make the most of this horrible situation (a situation that is, in fact, of our own creation).
In the old days, such a strategy might be:
a. To let these folks work things out among themselves.
b. To deal with the resulting problems only on the margins and only as they effect us directly.
c. Otherwise, the West simply “holding its water” — until such time as viable leaders rise to the top and come forward for us to deal with.
Today, however, a more proactive approach would seem necessary; this, due to our dependence on — and responsibilities to — the international community, the global economy and the nations and populations thereof.
The problem with this idea is that there may be, in fact, no national or international will or consensus — and, indeed, no national or international money — available to use for such proactive activities. This, due to the financial crisis and the loss in confidence achieved on President Bush’s watch.
These providing that the old method/mode — identified at “a” – “c” above — may, by default, become our new strategy?
There is no “win” to be found in Afghanistan or Iraq through military action – but that was determined by how we began those conflicts, not by how we ultimately conclude our overt military role in either one.
By design, our entry into each place blew out any semblance of government possessing popular legitimacy; and we then installed systems of governance we believed would be best for us that were de facto illegitimate because of it – rather than allowing new systems possessed of some degree of popular legitimacy to emerge of their own accord.
We followed the great power colonial playbook, unadjusted for the realities of the modern globalized world. We then defined the naturally occurring friction to those deeply flawed political situations as “irregular, complex warfare” – and set out to wage a confused mix of “COIN” war to fix them. I am sure that our primary competitors around the globe are quite amused by our self-induced frustration.
There is no military win to be found, but if we reframe the problem in more accurate terms and adjust our approaches and goals accordingly, there is still an opportunity to achieve a political win that serves our truly vital interests (not the expansive, ideological bundle of interests laid out in the NSS) quite well.
But between the good cold warriors and the equally out of touch social engineers who dominate our policy and military decisions, I see little hope that we will make that transition in time – if at all.
This is perhaps the primary way great powers fade, or stumble and fall. So full of our own narrative of a world we arrogantly profess to lead, that we cannot accurately see the world for what it actually is.
I agree with COL Jones and CSM(?) Bill M. below,
That the U.S. military cannot solve our current problems in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Problems which I define as states and societies — and indeed state and non-state actors — becoming:
a. Organized, ordered and oriented in such a way as to
b. Protect and defend themselves and their individual and unique ways of life (and their associated individual and unique values, attitudes and beliefs) against
c. The post-Cold War assault being made on same by the United States/the western world.
d. Herein, these individual and/or combined efforts being made to (1) stop, contain and roll back the West re: (2) its effort to gain greater power, influence and control throughout the world via (3) its aggressive efforts to transform other states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines.
(Based on my description of the problem above, one can see that I do not associate our problems today with “globalization.” Rather, I say these problems can be traced directly to the United States/the West’s post-Cold War expansionist initiatives — which I now suggest begin, not with Bush Jr. and/or 9/11 but, rather, with the Clinton Administration and “Engagement and Enlargement”.)
So: To understand “From Two Wars to Engagement in Five With a Risk of a Sixth” — and, indeed, to understand the current actions being undertaken by such nations as Russia, China, Iran, etc. and the problems related thereto — from the standpoint of (1) our pursuit of our post-Cold War political objective (expansion) and (2) the defensive response of state and non-state actors thereto (to stop, contain and/or roll back the advance of western power, influence and control).
(Thus, very “normal/natural” responses by our opponents?)
In the old days (to wit: during the Cold War), it would have been the United States/the West that stood with the local populations, to stop the threat to their way of life that was posed by the great (communist) powers, who were bent on eliminating same and replacing these with (in the eyes of many locals) the alien/profane way of life favored by the communist great powers.
Today, however, it would seem that the shoe is on the other foot with:
a. “We” (the West) being seen as the aggressors; bent on advancing our own (in the eyes of many local people) alien and profane way of life.
b. While “they” (such nations as Russia, China, Iran and certain non-state actors) are being seen as the defenders of conservative/religious/traditional values, ways of life, etc.
Thus, the problems of the communist great powers during the Cold War — associated with their efforts at expansion then — now, due to our similar expansionist efforts post-the Cold War, these self-same problems now become ours. (Many of the communist great power’s conservative/religious opponents, likewise, now becoming ours?)
Questions: How did the communist great powers overcome the natural/normal resistance to their expansionist activities, and achieve expansion, in spite of such resistance, anyway? Anything we can learn there (militarily or otherwise)?