From the Vietcong to the Islamic State, the Perils of Underestimating the Enemy’s ‘Will’
From the Vietcong to the Islamic State, the Perils of Underestimating the Enemy’s ‘Will’ by David Ignatius, Washington Post
Underestimating an adversary’s will to win can be a costly mistake in war, as Director of National Intelligence James Clapper noted in an interview last week. He said the U.S. had made that error recently in assessing the Islamic State, just as it did nearly 50 years ago in evaluating the staying power of the Vietcong.
Clapper’s comment was part of a broader trend over the past week in which senior military and intelligence officials have been unusually forthright about issues involving President Obama’s strategy for combating the Islamic State. In addition to Clapper’s remarks, this “push back” has been evident in comments by Gen. Martin Dempsey and Gen. Ray Odierno, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and chief of staff of the army, respectively, about the possibility that ground combat troops might be needed in Iraq and Syria.
It’s as if senior officials, having been through the vortex of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, don’t want to make the same mistake this time of suppressing concerns or misgivings…
This article reminds me of a few quotes. We should probably pay attention to what they themselves say and what has been said about them in order to understand them:
“You will kill ten of our men, and we will kill one of yours, and in the end it will be you who tires of it” Ho Chi Minh (1969)
The United States has a strategy based on arithmetic. They question the computers, add and subtract, extract square roots, and then go into action. But arithmetical strategy doesn’t work here. If it did, they would already have exterminated us with their airplanes.
— Gen Vo Nguyen Giap
“Guerrilla warfare is not dependent for success on the efficient operation of complex mechanical devices, highly organized logistical systems, or the accuracy of electronic computers. It can be conducted in any terrain, in any climate, in any weather; in swamps, in mountains, in farmed fields; its basic element is man and man is more complex than any of his machines.” Brig Gen S.B. Griffith in the Introduction to Mao’s On Guerrilla Warfare, 1961.
This is the theory that ‘weapons decide everything’, which is a mechanistic theory of war…In opposition to this view, we see not only weapons but human beings. Although important, weapons are not the decisive factor in war; it is man and not material things that decide the issue.
— Mao Zedong
In order to win victory we must try our best to seal the eyes and the ears of the enemy, making him blind and deaf, and to create confusion in the minds of the enemy commanders, driving them insane.
Mao Tse-Tung, On The Protracted War (1938)
Kill one, frighten ten thousand.
Mao Zedong
This is the theory that ‘weapons decide everything’, which is a mechanistic theory of war…In opposition to this view, we see not only weapons but human beings. Although important, weapons are not the decisive factor in war; it is man and not material things that decide the issue.
— Mao Zedong
“Guerrilla warfare is not dependent for success on the efficient operation of complex mechanical devices, highly organized logistical systems, or the accuracy of electronic computers. It can be conducted in any terrain, in any climate, in any weather; in swamps, in mountains, in farmed fields; its basic element is man and man is more complex than any of his machines.” Brig Gen S.B. Griffith in the Introduction to Mao’s On Guerrilla Warfare, 1961.
“A trained and disciplined guerrilla is much more than a patriotic peasant, workman, or student armed with an antiquated fowling-piece and home-made bomb. His endoctrination begins even before he is taught to shoot accurately, and it is unceasing. The end product is an intensely loyal and politically alert fighting man.” Brig Gen S.B. Griffith in the Introduction to Mao’s On Guerrilla Warfare, 1961.
Behind “will” lies something that might be called “motivation.” Yes?
Thus, for the Vietcong:
“They consider themselves primarily as Vietnamese patriots, and the war as a continuation of the struggle to free Vietnam from foreign domination … ” http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM4703z2.html
(Herein communism — and their struggle via this mode/method — being seen as a viable means to achieve such an end.)
So, let us consider this for the Islamist fighters’ motivation:
They see themselves as primarily Islamic patriots, and the war as a continuation of the struggle to free the Islamic world from foreign domination.
(Herein the Caliphate — and this struggle to establish same — being seen as a viable means to achieve this desired end.)
Thus as:
a. “We” seek to dominate these regions even further — by causing these states and their societies to become more organized along (and, thereby, more dependent upon) our way of life and our values, attitudes and beliefs.
b. “They” seek to (1) eliminate our current domination and (2) avoid further domination/dependency; this, by using the Caliphate (much as the Vietnamese used communism) as an alternative organizing concept/model/idea.
So in this new war of attrition — which replaces the war of attrition which just ended (the Cold War) — who is most likely to prevail?
a. The local people — seeking freedom from foreign domination — via alternative political, economic and social concepts, models and/or ideas?
b. Or the western states and their societies — seeking to achieve even greater domination of these local peoples and places — via the installation of their foreign institutional models and their foreign values, attitudes and beliefs?
In the 20th Century “Long War” (the Cold War), the communists seem to have won many/most of the battles. But they lost the overall war. Having been somewhat “transformed” more along modern western lines, they are now much more dependent upon our way of life. Thus, “sanctions,” based on same (which under communism would have had virtually no effect), now can be made to “hurt.”
Thus, in our present “Long War” — and given our “will,” our staying power and our resources — should we not expect that this exact same result (transformation more along modern western lines) will also be fate of the Islamists? Regardless of how many “battles” they may win in the interim.
Too many comments have gone off target by making (or challenging) comparisons between ISIL and the Viet Cong. The teaching point of this article is that members of the intelligence/military/diplomatic community who see policy going astray in their area of expertize ought to forcefully and cogently make their views known. I fully agree.
Unfortunately, all too frequently views which do not conform with policy, or the short-term interests of the policy maker, are ignored. Beyond that, speaking out is all to frequently detrimental to the career of the contrarian. Even informed analysis by very senior officers is very easily ignored. How do we solve that?