Special Operations Forces in Unlit Spaces
AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare recently published a Land Warfare Paper titled “Special Operations Forces in Unlit Spaces: Understanding the World's Dark Spots in the Context of SOF Operational Planning.” This paper should be of great interest to those who would like to better understand what defines the unlit spaces of the world and the implication of that definition for Special Operations Forces (SOF).
“Special Operations Forces in Unlit Spaces: Understanding the World's Dark Spots in the Context of SOF Operational Planning” by Joseph A. Royo (Land Warfare Paper 101, June 2014) begins by examining how certain characteristics of unlit spaces impact SOF operational planning. These five characteristics—pertaining to aspects such as the stability of a nation’s governing body, internal infrastructure and overall development—occurring in varying degrees and combinations, are described in detail in the Framework for Unlit Spaces. Depending on the nature of any given unlit space, SOF operational planning and engagements will be affected in different ways and will have to be conducted with malleable methods. Finally, the author looks at two case examples—Afghanistan and Somalia—to demonstrate how the political environments in conjunction with the physical environments during two different time periods present altogether different planning considerations. Because of the potentially wide variance of circumstances within unlit spaces, SOF planners must fully understand the physical and cultural nuances of their operational environments if they wish to conduct successful operations.
Thanks for the link and ref. I look forward to reading the paper with great interest.
Sincerely,
A. Scott Crawford
Thought provoking article…One of the reasons why I like the blog so much.
I think that we tend to view “unlit space” through our own western bias, which tends to drive us to categorizations that may limit our understanding or that are down right unhelpful.
Specifically as we think of “ungoverned” and “under-governed areas”, just because the central national government does not have day to day control of local affairs and public services does not mean that the area has no functioning governance, at least on the local level.
My experience in two African countries which habitually topped the Fund for Peace Failed State Index (rebranded just yesterday as the “Fragile State Index”) were rife with examples of rather robust and organized local governance exercised either through tribal/traditional conduits or through highly autonomous sub-divisions of the nation or a combination of the two.
To the westerner with limited experience, this initially appeared as a “failed” situation but was in fact highly organized and functional.
I might define the World’s Dark (Unlit) Spaces as follows:
As the places which are not, as yet, adequately oriented, organized, ordered and developed so as to allow for optimal access, optimal penetration and optimal use by the states and societies who operate within, and depend upon, the global economy.
The World’s (En)Light(ened) Spaces, in sharp contrast, being those places which are, in fact, so oriented, organized, ordered and developed.
Places such as Afghanistan and Somalia?
Here they cling to — and defend to the death — (much as did the Plains Indians and the Southerners of mid-19th Century America) to earlier, more primitive ways of life and ways of governance.
In mid-19th Century America — and so as to achieve greater access, penetration and use of these “dark” places — we, in effect, outlawed and destroyed the way of life and the way of governance of the American Indians and the American Southerners.
Likewise today this is, in general terms, our goal re: the “unlit” places of the world.
Today, the urban areas of the American South and the American West are pretty much “lit up” and look much the same as other places in the United States.
This is our long-term goal, also, for “the World’s Dark Places.”
And “the enemy” (those who desire a very different way of life and a very different way of governance) (1) know this and (2) have (as best they can) organized and deployed their forces accordingly.
Questions:
a. Given the weapons, technology, etc., available today, might the American Indians — and the American Southerners — have been able to (1) prevail against those who sought to “change” them and, thereby, (2) been able to retain their preferred way of life and their preferred way of governance; at least for a somewhat longer period of time?
b. Is this, again in general/generic terms, the problem-set that our special operations forces, et al, must deal with?