Can General Linder’s Special Operations Forces Stop the Next Terrorist Threat?
Can General Linder’s Special Operations Forces Stop the Next Terrorist Threat? By Eliza Griswold, New York Times Magazine
… The shift in American military strategy from huge, expensive weaponry to a lighter, more flexible approach reflects a sharp decline in the American appetite for foreign engagement. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have left nearly 7,000 Americans dead and carried an estimated price tag of $4 trillion to $6 trillion. Conventional warfare is viewed by many Americans as too costly. As a whole, the military has moved away from deploying large numbers of troops and now favors targeted action like drones and raids. Increasingly, it is looking for ways to deploy groups like Linder’s: small teams of men, in fleece jackets and sneakers, quietly fanning out across the African continent. On any given day, there are 700 Special Forces in Africa, part of a larger U.S. military presence that ranges from 5,000 to 8,000 people on the ground. These Special Operations teams, which can be as small as one commando, deliver aid to places where it has generally been too risky to dig wells or hand out eyeglasses, don ties to work at U.S. Embassies and train with African commandos. They also coordinate with the diplomatic corps of the U.S. government and Africom. They are adaptable enough to shift as the nature of the threat shifts, fighting the kind of asymmetrical warfare that special operators have been fighting since World War II. “This is what S.O.F. is trained to do,” Linder said. “This is why they built us.”…
The “invisibility” of Kony’s forces seems impossible to me considering that when training in OIF, it seemed an impossible task just teaching basic rifle marksmanship.
It would appear that (one of) the job(s) of our special forces is to (1) threaten/undermine local governments/governors who will not do our bidding and to (2) shore-up local governments/governors who we need or who will do our bidding.
Thus, one job of SF would seem to be — using BG Linder’s and/or his teams terms — to:
a. Re: threatening/undermining local governments/governors, to put disaffected/disgruntled individuals and groups “on to the battlefield.” And
b. Re: shoring-up local governments/governors, to take disaffected/disgruntled individuals and groups “off of the battlefield.”
In both of these cases, this job being significantly done, it would appear, by “building relationships” with local populations. (“You can ‘win’ naked and with a butter knife.”)
With regard to threatening/undermining local governments/governors, by putting disaffected/disgruntled individuals and groups on to the battlefield, this would seem to be made more easy in those cases where the local governments/governors were attempting to rapidly transform the subject state and society more along alien and/or profane political, economic and social lines.
Why? Because, in these instances, the conservative elements of the population provide a “natural enemy asset pool” from which our forces might easily draw from. These elements, one might suggest, needing little motivation to be put “on to the battlefield.”
Here, likewise, any “ungoverned spaces” are in our favor.
On the other hand, and with regard to shoring up local governments/governors attempting to transform their states and societies more along alien and/or profane political, economic and social lines; in these cases, each of the assets noted above (the conservative elements/natural enemy asset pool and the ungoverned spaces) become significant liabilities.
This, in turn, causing it to become much more difficult to “keep” off of the battlefield — much less “take” off of the battlefield — the populations which have been enflamed, mobilized and activated by their governments/governors unwanted, botched, stillborn and/or half-hearted “transformation” policies and actions.
Tough job indeed for our special forces in these circumstances.
In this important and seemingly comprehensive article, I found the understanding represented by these passages to be of particular interest:
“One of Linder’s most unconventional warriors is a Special Forces lieutenant colonel named Patrick … Their job, Patrick said as the men sat around a conference table, was to determine “who’s at risk, who’s becoming more susceptible to the siren call of violent extremism.” … It wasn’t simple poverty that made people susceptible to extremism, Patrick said … “This is a war taking place in ungoverned spaces, where the people are facing a crisis of adapting to modern life.”
“So far, Patrick’s teams had mapped several tribes that were particularly vulnerable to the militants’ recent marketing campaign. Using sermons and songs embedded on SIM cards, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa was peddling its message in the name of Usman dan Fodio, a 19th-century Fulani hero and reformer who waged jihad across West Africa to purify Islam. More than 100 years later, his message resonates among people who find themselves marginalized by the modern world. The most vulnerable communities aren’t those of isolated mountain people, but those “squeezed in the middle” — caught between a traditional way of life and a failing contemporary landscape.”
For me, this depiction of the “conflict environment,” as understood by LTC “Patrick” and his teams, to wit:
a. “People facing a crisis of adapting to modern life,”
b. “People who find themselves marginalized by the modern world,” and
c. “People caught between a traditional way of life and a failing contemporary landscape”
These depictions, in my view, are glaringly similar to and reminiscent of our own “conflict environment” of the 19th Century, to wit: that of the American West and the American South;
Where, then as now, the populations in these “outlying,” “different” and/or “frontier” regions faced similar difficulties (see “a” – “c” above) in the “ungoverned” (or shall we acknowledge as simply “differently governed”?) spaces and places of these similarly trying and transitional times.
Thus, again in my opinion, much to be learned here.
Some interesting comments throughout this article.
LTC Patrick says he (SF) can do something given a year but would mess things up given a few weeks. This seems to reinforce the notion that ODAs ought to spend more than a few weeks or even a typical 6-month deployment in a particular location in order to build, nurture, and exploit that all-important relationship with the host-nation elements. 12-18 months minimum may be a good start.
“What makes a Special Operator special, according to Linder, has nothing to do with high-tech gear….you can win buck naked with a butter knife.”…interesting observation given the high-tech gear ODAs go out with, rely on, and seem less-than-enthused to operate without. Furthermore, what seems to make SOF special may have less to do with gear or butter knives and more to do with the immediately accessible amounts of money (& equipment) thrown at problems causing host-nation forces to become dependent on continual US support. This coupled with the comment from the Ugandan Colonel Kabango…”high-tech has failed because the LRA is so rudimentary…” might
be an indicator that SOF, and USSF in particular, ought to become more accustomed to operate using local equipment and techniques (or operate using 1940s equipment) in order to lessen the requirement for constant (& locally unsustainable) support from “The Big PX” across the pond.
Finally, a couple of NGOs were mentioned in the article….the Open Societies Foundation and The Rift Valley Institute. In an effort to afford US military personnel, conventional & SOF, greater insight & familiarity into the various African regions in which we will likely operate in the coming years, we should consider allowing US military members to take a “leave of absence”, perhaps through temporary assignments in the Inactive Reserves, in order to work in these, and other similar, organizations, much like the “Train With Industry (TWI) program the Army currently has for certain branches/ functional areas. If Africa is “the battleground of the future” as BG Linder put it, this may help us get some expertise across the force that will come in handy in the near-future.