The End of the Tank?
The End of the Tank? The Army Says it Doesn’t Need it, but Industry Wants to Keep Building it. By Marjorie Censer, Washington Post
… The manufacturing of tanks – powerful but cumbersome – is no longer essential, the military says. In modern warfare, forces must deploy quickly and “project power over great distances.” Submarines and long-range bombers are needed. Weapons such as drones – nimble and tactical – are the future.
Tanks are something of a relic.
The Army has about 5,000 of them sitting idle or awaiting an upgrade. For the BAE Systems employees in York, keeping the armored vehicle in service means keeping a job. And jobs, after all, are what their representatives in Congress are working to protect in their home districts.
The Army is just one party to this decision. While the military sets its strategic priorities, it’s Congress that allocates money for any purchases. And the defense industry, which ultimately produces the weapons, seeks to influence both the military and Congress…
The tank has been obsolete since I was a cadet 11 years ago. In fact, the tank was obsolete in 1990’s. We can say that the tank has been obsolete according to some theory or another since on or about the time of its invention. The tank is a weapons platform. If you can deliver the firepower+survivability+mobility (or some alternative) of an MBT on a non-MBT platform then go for it, provide it. Until that time, the tank is the most mobile and survivable 120mm canon + HMG platform we have.
I understand industry is fighting to keep its capacity alive in light of the fact that the Army/USMC have nearly fully modernized units. I also understand that a focus on future systems have slowed the development of new (and therefore replacement) upgrades for the Abrams. But that is an industry problem, not a “future of tanks” problem.
One does have to ask if rapid replacement of the current number and configuration of MBT’s is feasible (in case of unexpected losses)without maintaining the factories in idle/stand-by (and therefore funded) mode. But again, that is not a question of the platform’s utility.
On a final note, a more deployable Army doesn’t mean nothing heavy. It means enough light BCTs to accomplish the goals you imagine tasking that Army with that require such deployability. Rapid deployment is one criterion. Just because you got there doesn’t mean you are equipped to win.
Great… Here we go again… When the F-4 was built, it was built with no cannon… Because guns were obsolete… Why a super duper missile is better. Except when it isn’t.
What really is worrisome is that the brass have forgotten this lesson. I am not saying tanks will not evolve… But right now we have nothing that fills that gap.
By this line of thinking, manned combat aircraft is obsolete, helo’s especially.
In fact most of what we use is. The laptop I am using has more power than the 1100 lb computer the Apache carried for years and may still.
We must have systems for land, sea and air. They will change. Nothing replaces a tank when you need one.
I remember going to mountain school years ago where I was told “The US Army does not fight in the mountains”… What are those big piles of dirt I see in Afghanistan again?
Our senior leadership does more damage to our preparedness than the Taliban ever has or will.
The bottom line is the US never has the right stuff at the right time. Until no one else fields one I think we better keep them. Because our senior leadership cannot pick a field uniform that works, let alone something as important as this.
I don’t believe in keeping anything “just because.” However . . .
“Nothing replaces a tank when you need one.” Hammer999 hits the nail on the head. Sparapet appropriately addresses the issue too (“the most mobile and survivable . . . platform we have”). The tank is the right tool for some jobs – sans creating and buying a much more expensive tool.
This story is not new news. It made the rounds among my (mostly ex-) tanker buddies a year ago. I suspect it was recently provided the to Post with a spin for political reasons. See this Google search (with results): https://www.google.com/search?q=lima%2C+tanks%2C+ordierno%2C+congress&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a
Again, Sparapet: ” . . . an industry problem, not a ‘future of tanks’ problem.” I think that statement is correct. However, I suggest that it’s also a political and DOD budget problem. It’s part of a larger problem surrounding (clouding?) the defense budget. When the first articles made the rounds, the discussion among my friends addressed: the problems of “pork;” cutting the force while saving jobs in Lima; and more recently (this hasn’t died) compensation and retirement being considered while this kind of activity (“pork”) is rampant.