Defining African Insurgency
Defining African Insurgency
Stephen Hindes
With American forces entrenching themselves in Africa, African leaders must ensure they prioritise the root causes of their conflicts and not view them from within the narrative of the American led War on Terror.
The increased American military presence in Africa has added another destabilizing effect to Africa’s already tenuous security landscape. Yet Africa’s gravest security concerns do not stem from its Islamist networks but rather from succumbing to the narrative underpinning Obama’s new strategy for prosecuting the Long War. What is at stake is a fundamental question of perception; of whether Africa’s Islamist networks and associated insurgencies will be viewed as the locally driven conflicts they are or perceived as terrorist networks linked to Al Qaeda’s global ideology and the related War on Terror narrative. The outcome of this struggle is more than just an exercise in academic categorization but will influence whether or not African nations address the fundamental reasons leading to conflict or whether they rely on American led military solutions to what are inherently not military problems.
This contest of perception has been more broadly underpinned by debates regarding how best to define Islamist non-state armed groups post 9/11. Paradoxically, 9/11 seemed to on the one hand emphasize the need for a strict counter-terrorism response while on the other hand demonstrating the need to address local social, political and economic grievances drawing young Muslim men to violence. As Afghanistan drew to a grind and Iraq spiralled out of control, this tension came to a head however was seemingly resolved with the rise of counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine that placed local drivers of conflict onto centre stage. Yet despite the American military acknowledging that the insurgencies it was fighting were driven on the back of local grievances, addressing these issues were still undertaken, and secondary to, as part of a broader strategy aimed at defeating a globalist Al Qaeda enemy. Yet with unsustainable costs, loss of lives and less than clear results, the pendulum has swung back towards strict counter-terrorism responses aimed more at containing threats than dealing with the root causes that drive conflict. With Obama putting a full stop on massive troop deployments, and budgetary restraints all but cementing this position for the foreseeable future, Special Forces and drones have emerged as the front line troops prosecuting the Long War.
Obama’s evolved counter-terrorism strategy has therefore shaped its relationship with Africa. General Ham, who was previously in charge of AFRICOM, America’s new central command for Africa, stressed America’s overriding concern in regards to AFRICOM’s mission. He claimed, “As Al Qaeda has syndicated its ideology and violence, its affiliates and adherents in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have become increasingly networked and adaptable in their recruiting, training, financing and operations…The need to put pressure on Al Qaeda affiliates and adherents in East, North and West Africa has never been greater”.
Already American forces have currently conducted training missions with countries such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, the DR Congo, Malawi, Niger and Ghana while in the east Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and South Sudan have all hosted American forces. Alongside this the Obama administration has been busy building a network of drone bases throughout Africa to conduct raids on Islamist networks. Bases have reportedly been constructed in areas such as Niger, Ethiopia, Djibitou and the Seychelles while unconfirmed reports have drone bases being planned for Kenya and South Sudan.
Yet the continuation of this misguided strategy only risks further destabilizing the regions of Africa with which it is being implemented. As the conflict in Yemen has shown, the US focus on sustained drone strikes and military training have only benefited Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. According to Gregory Johnson, an expert on Yemen from Princeton University, AQAP has been able to grow in terms of recruits by exploiting feelings of frustration and abandonment caused by sustained military action. While Africa’s insurgencies have not gone the way of Yemen, attempting to deal with them on the basis that they are a global terrorist network will increase the chances that they do.
In Nigeria, where Boko Haram has emerged as a credible threat to the Nigerian state, sustained military intervention by state forces, backed by US military assistance, has not achieved a viable solution. In fact according to the Council of Foreign Relations Nigeria Security Tracker, deaths attributed to Boko Haram actions have steadily increased since July 2011. What has sustained Boko Haram has been the Nigerian’s government inability to address its poor governance, historical tensions between its Muslim north and Christian south, government corruption and security force brutality. Similarly, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) stemmed from an Islamist insurgency in Algeria. According to experts, Algeria still remains of central importance to AQIM despite in recent years its expansion of operations. While AQIM is quick to stress its allegiance to Al Qaeda global, it is still principally an insurgency given purpose by virtue of local grievances.
The objective therefore for African leaders is not to turn away American military assistance but rather to ensure American military engagement is guided by a mature understanding of African grievances. To ensure this happens African leaders need to focus on two key points. Firstly, underpinning Africa’s engagement with America must be an understanding that Africa’s security concerns, particularly those with which America has concerned itself with, are principally an insurgency, and not a terrorist threat. The rhetoric must therefore change. Instead of focusing on Islamist terrorist networks, African leaders should be focusing on an Islamist insurgency intimately linked firstly to African experiences and not the experiences of Western powers.
In turning words into action, African leaders then need to ensure that American involvement is guided by an in depth, well thought out, jointly designed country plan that prioritizes the role of departments such as USAID, the State Department and their African counterparts. Such a plan needs to ensure that local issues become the central principle guiding US engagement and that the social, political and economic drivers driving insurgency are dealt with first and foremost. Military action therefore needs to be conducted on the basis that it advances the objectives of the country plan.
Knowing your enemy is one of the fundamental tenants of military practice. If African leaders are to benefit from American military engagement in their regions they must ensure they understand their enemy, for failure to do so will only ensure they embark down the road of the Long War.
