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This Week at War: Strategic Error

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08.24.2012 at 09:45pm

In my Foreign Policy column, I explain why better strategic warning won't by itself make the U.S. and its allies safer.

 

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Pentagon's central provider of military intelligence to field commanders and policymakers, recently rededicated itself to the mission of strategic warning. Its new five-year plan commits the agency "to prevent strategic surprise." This week the two-thousandth U.S. soldier died in the now eleven-year Afghan war. Many will see this milestone as just one of the many painful consequences of the intelligence community's failure to warn policymakers about the 9/11 attack. From that perspective, it is understandable that DIA's leaders seem to be putting strategic warning at the top of their priorities.

But will the renewed commitment to strategic warning actually make the United States safer? Improved strategic warning won't improve safety if policymakers don't act on the warnings they receive. And despite the intelligence community's best efforts, surprise is nonetheless inevitable, if only because adversaries are constantly probing for openings. DIA and its fellow intelligence agencies are not wrong to step up efforts at preventing strategic surprise, but it is actually just as important to focus on tactical warning. And, ultimately, the real burden falls on policymakers to follow through on the warnings they receive and to prepare for the surprises that will inevitably occur.

A declassified CIA essay from 2003 attempted to explain the difference between tactical and strategic warning. Tactical warning focuses on specific incidents, targets, or perpetrators, with a goal of deterring or limiting damage from an adversary's attack by alerting friendly forces and resources already in place. Strategic warning, by contrast, focuses on long-term developments that, when brought to the attention of policymakers, will allow officials to redirect resources, formulate contingency plans, establish new programs, form new relationships, and otherwise meaningfully prepare for new conditions and trends.

Some may consider the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the September 2001 attacks to be strategic surprises, due to the magnitude and consequences of those events. But by the CIA definition, these were tactical, not strategic surprises. The U.S. government was long aware of Japan's designs on the Pacific and had been developing a war plan for decades prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. Similarly, the U.S. government was well aware of al Qaeda before 9/11 and was slowly — if inadequately — responding to the threat. The intelligence failures in both cases were tactical, not strategic.

By contrast, the Iranian revolution in 1979 and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 were strategic surprises in the sense that both occurred so quickly that policymakers did not have a chance to either deter or mitigate their effects in advance through new programs, shifts in resources, or the establishment of new useful relationships and alliances. Policymakers were left scrambling with these tasks largely after the fact. Strategic warning could have allowed the Carter administration to better prepare for the consequences of Iran's upheaval. And with more warning, the U.S. and its allies might have been able to reposition military forces to deter Saddam Hussein's takeover of Kuwait.

Haunted by these and other shortcomings, the U.S. intelligence community is now engaged in long-term comprehensive research projects such as Global Trends 2030, a large strategic forecasting report the National Intelligence Council will release later this year. Global Trends 2025, released in November 2008, described long-term demographic, economic, environmental, and institutional trends and discussed their implications. With money increasingly short, policymakers will be under pressure to prioritize defense spending, and they will look to the intelligence community to help them identify the threats that matter and those they can safely ignore. However, the Global Trends reports show the cultural gap between policymakers and intelligence analysts; while the report was undoubtedly insightful to its authors, it is hard to find any connection between reports such as Global Trends and changes policymakers have made to actual policies and programs.

Intelligence analysis deals in probability estimates of future events and solving puzzles to avert surprise. Policymakers by contrast are often focused on today's crisis and want a "straight answer" to their questions, not a probability distribution. This cultural gap and the differing institutional pressures separating policymakers and intelligence analysts can create dangers. Surprise is failure for the intelligence community. It is thus no wonder that as an institution it is focused on what might be lurking in its blind spots. But that search should not come at the expense of well-known problems, such as the U.S.-China rivalry, that are clearly in the windshield. Policymakers need to ensure that while the intelligence community is working hard to avoid another embarrassing surprise, it is not losing its focus on problems that are well-known and that may be developing into crises.

That means that strategic intelligence and warning, while vital, should not come at the expense of tactical warning. Tactical warning capabilities, when known by an adversary, can be just as effective at deterring conflict as strategic warning. Had U.S. commanders in the Pacific in 1941 displayed better tactical warning processes, Japanese decision-makers, realizing they could not achieve tactical surprise, may have been dissuaded from attacking. According to the Pentagon's 2011 report on China's military power, China's military doctrine emphasizes surprise, deception, and offensive operations. This increases the importance of U.S. tactical warning capabilities in the Pacific, which commanders and policymakers would be wise to both reinforce and display as a means of bolstering stability. As a Washington-based agency, DIA may see strategic warning as its proper role, with tactical warning a responsibility for field operators such as U.S. Pacific Command. But if tactical warning is short-changed by increased attention to strategic warning, risk may increase. It is the responsibility of policymakers to ensure that all levels of the intelligence bureaucracy are properly covering essential intelligence missions and requirements.

It is also up to policymakers to take responsibility for their relationship with the intelligence community. Policymakers should give useful guidance to analysts on intelligence priorities, receive intelligence products with an open mind, and accept their role for either changing policy and programs accordingly or acknowledging why they opt not to. Strategic warning will result in increased safety only if policymakers act on the warning.

How to act is not always simple or obvious. The Clinton and Bush administrations received strategic warning about al Qaeda but until 9/11 underestimated the threat's potential. Before 9/11, the U.S. government also failed to fully appreciate how al Qaeda had switched from being a strategic to a tactical warning issue. Similarly, while the authors of Global Trends 2030 and other strategic analysts are off in search of the next ephemeral "unknown unknown," policymakers have a responsibility for clear and present challenges, such as formulating strategies for the U.S.-China competition. Policymakers need to accept their part of this responsibility while also demanding continued support from the intelligence community.

Policymakers should likewise take responsibility for the fact that despite their best efforts, intelligence analysts will inevitably be surprised. Policymakers would be in a better position to deal with surprise if they retained reserves of diplomatic and military resources to draw on when required. Without adequate reserves, investments in warning, such as military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, become even more critical. Neglecting both adequate reserves and warning tools compounds risk. Austerity may be a fact of life in today's Washington, but taking such compound risks is a gamble no one has to make. Policymakers, you've been warned.

 

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davidbfpo

Robert,

A good column, although understandably very US-centric.

I participate in academic intelligence studies and have repeatedly asked why so little is focussed on the relationship between the intelligence producer and the non-intelligence policy decision-maker – who is not always a politician. This side of the Atlantic Ocean it is rare for the non-intelligence policy decision-maker to make any comments in public. Roderic Braithwaite, an ex-UK diplomat and Ambassador in Moscow is one that comes to mind; I’ll not quibble whether he is a policy decision-maker.

There is also the bizarre account by an ex-CIA analyst who prepared profiles for the annual US-Saudi conference, he had no personal dialogue with the readership,more particularly no-one ever asked the readers for their input.

I always found ‘UK Government Intelligence: Its nature, Collection, Assessment and Use’ in Annex A in this UK document the best guide for policy makers: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/nim-november2010.pdf

Although I don’t know if they ever read it!

CBCalif

Whether the December 7, 1941 Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor resulted due to strategic error or an intelligence failure poses an interesting question. A strong case can be made for that attack having occurred due to strategic error on the part of President Roosevelt. In 1940 Roosevelt, and the State Department, decided it was in America’s interest to take actions they believed could restrain the Japanese from making additional aggressive moves in China.

One of those actions President Roosevelt took ordered the Navy, in October 1940, to transfer the ships of the Pacific Fleet from their West Coast bases to Pearl Harbor. At that time Pearl Harbor was not the major Naval Installation it would later become. The Pacific Fleet had historically been based until that time at it bases in Southern California. Also, rarely, if ever, remembered at that time James O. Richardson was (since January 1940) the Admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet. He was considered a leading authority on Pacific naval warfare and Japanese strategy.

Admiral Richardson openly protested against “Roosevelt’s” ordered redeployment of the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor and made his feelings known to both the President and other politicians in Washington D.C. At a White House meeting on October 8, 1940, Richardson reportedly argued that the Pacific Fleet should remain based on the West Coast and not at Pearl Harbor and expressed his disagreement with Roosevelt’s conclusion that the presence of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was a deterrent to Japanese aggression. He argued that the presence of the fleet at Hawaii might deter a civilian political government, but “that Japan had a military government which knew that the fleet was undermanned and unprepared for war, and had no auxiliary ships without which it could not undertake active operations. Therefore the presence of the fleet in Hawaii would not (and did not) exercise a restraining influence on Japanese action.”

Admiral Richardson is then noted as having stated to Roosevelt that senior naval officers lacked the confidence in the civilian leadership of the United States necessary to achieve victory in the Pacific. (See Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings Before the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Congress, Part One, pp. 255-256; James O. Richardson with Admiral George C. Dyer, On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Division, 1973), pp. 435-436; Master Thesis, For The Good Of The Service: Husband E. Kimmel And The Aftermath Of Pearl Harbor at jgkeegan.com/pdf/Thesis021710.pdf

Admiral Richardson was summarily relieved by Roosevelt on January 5, 1941 – so much for accurate disruptive thinking.

My last comment aside, the Japanese military in 1941 was interested in obtaining rubber from (then) French Indo China and oil from the Dutch East Indies. The move by the Japanese military into the Pacific beginning in December 1941 was aimed at securing the above noted resources needed to fuel their war machine and for no other purpose. Every related action taken by the Japanese Navy (and Army) against US and British military installations was made to wither secure their (Japanese) lines of communication with Indo China and the East Indies or to protect their Eastern (Pacific Ocean) flank against US attack. In addition, they apparently believed that by securing many of the Islands one thousand plus miles West and South of Hawaii would provide them with in depth defensive positions which the US would have (they believed) to systematically assault – a classic defense in depth strategy relying on Western Pacific Island bases.

Given their strategic resource objectives of obtaining oil from the East Indies and rubber from Indo China; their force commitments to their Chinese Theater of war; and an added (post-December 1941) need to protect their lines of communication with their resource bases and its Western Pacific flank — what strategic interest would the Japanese Navy have had in mind that would have provoked their interest in attacking on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, had the US Navy’s Pacific Fleet not been based there? Basing the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor constituted, in the Japanese mindset, a threat against their Eastern Flank which had to be removed.

True, the Japanese Navy could have attacked Hawaii and destroyed the USAAF’s fighter planes on the ground at Hickam Field, but for what military purpose. Those fighter planes lacked the range to attack the Japanese bases distant from Hawaii and, therefore, posed no threat to their movement against the Dutch East Indies. In addition, the Japanese Navy lacked the logistic train needed to sustain their Carrier Task Force in that region for any significant time and they would have had to soon withdraw. Most do not realize the critical role that logistical support from an incredibly large number of so-called Auxiliary Ships plays in sustaining a fleet at sea, without which a fleet cannot maintain its presence far from its bases. The Japanese Navy simply lacked the number of Auxiliary Ships such as Oilers to remain in the Hawaii area and therefore to keep strategic control over that area of operations. In addition, the Japanese Army was unwilling to provide the troops needed for any invasion efforts that far from home for territory they deemed no to be strategically worthy.

Given those facts, I would propose that the December 7, 1941 attack by the Japanese against Pearl Harbor resulted from strategic error on the part of President Roosevelt. That strategic error having been Roosevelt’s October 1940 transfer of the Pacific Fleet from their West Coast bases to Pearl Harbor intended to defer further Japanese aggression against China — lessons that should have value for those making strategic decisions today.

Without going into any detail, I would similarly argue US military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, at the scope and level of commitment into which both morphed, resulted from strategic error. Also, whether this Nation’s leadership is also proceeding in a strategically sound manner as concerns our relationships and plans for confronting Iran and China remain to be seen.

That said, in this day and age the US should never discount the influence of tactical systems capabilities to “attempt” to prevent military or terrorist style actions by those opposing our interests, but remember that those devoted to / interested in attacking an opposing entity will study their tactical capabilities and develop (what they believe) is a way around them. That is the nature of the attacker — whether it be a foreign nation or group or the US.