West Point Is Divided on a War Doctrine’s Fate
05.28.2012 at 09:37am
West Point Is Divided on a War Doctrine’s Fate by Elisabeth Bumiller, New York Times.
… the argument is whether the counterinsurgency strategy used in Iraq and Afghanistan – the troop-heavy, time-intensive, expensive doctrine of trying to win over the locals by building roads, schools and government – is dead.
I can find pros and cons in the positions on both sides of this debate. Most likely because the line between the debating parties is drawn between the wrong issues. We will need to get to a smarter understanding of the problem before we can have a more effective discussion of possible solutions.
As to Iraq, the point that seems so lost on the “Surginistas” as to why their concept appeared to work in Iraq, but is falling so short in Afghanistan is because what they thought worked in Iraq was not the key to the temporary successes that we accomplished there at all.
It was just dumb blind luck that our functional and physical boundaries for dividing up the area of operation coincided with the distinct “purposes for action” of the various aspects of the insurgency and guerrilla warfare that we faced. SOF and Conventional forces just happened to line up on and solve distinct aspects of the multi-party problem.
The Kurds were (are) a separatist movement, so we applied a separatist solution (giving them something they could call their own) that proved effective in that sector. The Sunni were a resistance movement, so we applied an approach of buying off tribal leaders and thereby removing the proverbial thorn from paw of that segment of the populace. AQ came to Iraq to conduct UW among that same Sunni populace, and focused CT against this external party proved effective in beating them down, just as the ineffectiveness of the guerrilla fighters that they recruited from various insurgent populaces across the region helped sour their influence with the Sunni resistance. Iran waged a more subtle UW campaign with the Shia populace and their revolutionary insurgency, and as counterrevolutionary approaches began to take effect Iran opted to wait for a more opportune time to press their agenda. Essentially “divide and conquer,” or more accurately, “divide and suppress” as little is resolved, but we did manage to quell the violence long enough and to the degree necessary to make an honorable exit.
Compare this to Afghanistan, where we refuse to recognize the clear distinction between the revolutionary insurgency between the Northern Alliance-based government that we elevated into power and whose monopoly we helped codify and protect, and the Taliban-affiliated populace/governance in exile in Pakistan. This is the beating heart of the insurgency and until the revolutionary issues are resolved there can be no true stability. There must either be some form of compromise and reconciliation, or the naturally stronger party must prevail. We refuse to make such reconciliation our priority, and we back the historically weaker side. I don’t see how we get to military success given that political/policy framework.
Then there is the Resistance Insurgency across Afghanistan that we attempt Clear-Hold-Build into submission. The thing with a resistance, however, is that the harder one presses upon it, the harder it presses back. One can certainly trim off the current fighters, but such actions only drive the roots of the resistance deeper into the soil of the populace, only to reemerge stronger than ever at some point down the road.
Our actions created and preserve the revolution, and then served to grow the resistance as well. We refuse to recognize the causal effects of our actions, and we cling to illogical concepts of “AQ Sanctuary” that make it as impossible for us to leave as it is for us to win; at least as we have currently framed the problem.
I am reminded of a favorite insight from Albert Einstein: “If the facts don’t fit the theory, change the facts.” He was not being flippant, he was simply pointing out that too often we are blocked from getting to clear thinking on some topic by deeply flawed concepts we have wrongly assumed as “facts.”
It is time to “change the facts” in Afghanistan, as only then will we be able to get to a more effective theory that can lead to a reasonably sustainable, more natural, Afghan stability.
Bob,
It’s been a year or two since we discussed these issues in your office in Kandahar.
This piece of your comment: “There must either be some form of compromise and reconciliation, or the naturally stronger party must prevail. We refuse to make such reconciliation our priority, and we back the historically weaker side.”, is just about all anyone needs to know about the current situation in Afghanistan.
One should acknowledge the fact that the general purpose forces will never do counterinsurgency at all well — nor should they be able to do so. Given that, with due respect to all the Colonels ‘involved’ in this debate, I think they’re rather badly missing the point. That point is really summed up by the last two paragraphs in the linked article:
No, it is not a different question.
It is the question.
Seems there is some confusion over what is being debated, the doctrine or the policy. Colonel Meese claims that COIN, “was broadly successful in being able to have the Iraqis govern themselves.” Maybe, but was that the only option to facilitate Iraqis governing themeselves? As soldiers we can comment on the policies, but we are obligated to salute and move out to execute them to the best of our ability. As Gian stated, that is our duty. What we’re professionally obligated to do is develop appropriate doctrine and constantly challenge and rechallenge it. Our COIN doctrine, perhaps more than other doctrine we have developed needs to be challenged. Our one size fits all approach of “clear, hold, and build,” has not demonstrated success beyond tactical victories that are often erased when the tide of change comes back in. It well past time to stop embracing this doctrine with a religious like zeal, and seriously question its shortfalls. While I frequently disagree with Gian, I’m glad our cadets were exposed to contrary opinion and that West Point encourages these debates. Hopefully they will now go into this conflict with both eyes open and make their own observations based on their experience instead of relying on dogma.
I think this article indirectly highlights the sad fact the United States is horrible at strategy, regardless whether it is regular or irregular warfare. The main problem is we see everything as a military problem and send the hammer out to put screws into place. Where are the other elements of national power? Where are the other agencies in Washington. Yes, I know State has some presence in Afghanistan, but it’s still relying too heavily on the military. Strategic thinking requires a civil-military partnership and COIN is the sort of warfare that needs that relationship probably more than any other. We have a divided political establishment more concerned with the election cycle than anything else. Until we figure out how to properly provide all of the things our civilian entities can do we are going to continue watching the military fumble around these kinds of tasks.
I would agree that our strategic and operational art capabilities are wanting. We seem to think that we can dictate a tactical/operational paradigm and it will fit all strategies. That we can connect a strategic objective to those tactics simply by extending the power point block arrow across the ppt slide. There is little logic or critical thought from what I’ve seen towards how to craft a strategy, distribute forces in time and space, and thus help guide the mostly successful tactics we employ. Instead we fool ourselves into thinking our great tactics and pre-formatted operational construct will win the day.
The same debates took place during the COIN manual re-write conference. Unfortunately we are chained to the paradigms that ruled the first manual. Although many noted the need to move beyond- we are unable to get much further than the chain will allow. I fear an utter lack of creativity in our military today- or, at least no taste for it in the current politicized environment.
The article didn’t impress me much. The best part about it is that Gentile’s got a book coming about.
I critique the piece here:
http://www.robertswope.com/home/2012/5/29/is-counterinsurgency-doctrine-dividing-west-point.html
The easiest way for me to understand and address the current counterinsurgency doctrine is to understand it, and to address it — not so much as “counterinsurgency,” per se — but, instead, as opposition to our goal of state and societal transformation.
Thus, the overall/overarching goal would seem to be — not to defeat the insurgency, per se — but to use the excuse, the opening, the opportunity presented by the insurgency as a means to press even harder at transforming these states and societies along western lines.
This being the case, let me re-phrase the central question so that it might become more consistent with my line of thought above:
Considering the problems, results, etc., presented in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, has the current strategy, methods, etc., proven to be a viable way to defeat those who would stand in the way of our achieving our goals (the old political, economic and social systems of these states and societies removed; our own political, economic and social systems put in their place; and the population happy with, accepting of and successfully operating within these changes)?
If the answer to this central question is “Yes,” then we would seem to be good to go.
If, however, the answer to this question is “No,” then its back to the drawing board for us re: ways and means to deal with those who would oppose us in transforming their state and society along western lines.
Bill C.,
None of our current doctrines, including our CT, COIN, and Stability Operations doctrines tells us how to facilitate societal change and modernize a state to become mini us. Our COIN doctrine, despite its many shortfalls, provides a proposed method for defeating an insurgency. Seems we forgot all about defeating the insurgency though, and instead we are pursuing national policies that propose exactly what you state, yet we don’t have a doctrine for transforming a society and modernizing it. We don’t have one because we don’t know how to do this, nor do we think it is an appropriate military mission. In lieu of doctrine we unfortunately have a lot of bad pseudoscience based on unfounded assumptions that are embraced as facts by a number of senior leaders with little critical thought, and now these ideas are infecting our younger ranks. I guess that is the beauty of faith, you don’t need evidence that something works or exists, you just need to believe it.
I guess an argument could be made that we need a whole of government doctrine for doing exactly what you suggest our COIN doctrine is (but isn’t IMO), which is a process for societal transformation and modernization. I suspect that when the authors actually develop the draft that they’ll hit brick walls when they try to get it approved. Reviewers will correctly point out that this doctrine is un-American, dangerous, and a number of other assorted negative adjectives. Yet, when it is the result of mission creep directed by policy wonks, we just row on and no one seriously questions it until a decade later? How does that happen?
There is an argument to be made that Western Civilization, at least, has been working this issue in a manner similar to Bill C’s description for sometime now (well before the centralized planning efforts of fm 3-24). Niall Ferguson does a great job of discussing the ‘six killer apps of western civilization’ in a Ted Talk at:
http://www.ted.com/talks/niall_ferguson_the_6_killer_apps_of_prosperity.html
He also has a recent program on PBS which goes beyond the typical military prism on this topic