DoD’s Combat Exclusion Policies Limit Commanders and Strain Our Current Forces
As noted widely throughout the press, Army 1st Lieutenant Ashley White died on 22 October 2011 in Kandahar when the joint special operations task force to which she was attached triggered an IED. In a press release, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) stated that White "played a crucial role as a member of a special operations strike force. Her efforts highlight both the importance and necessity of women on the battlefield today."[1]
Despite the public praise and emphasis on the value of women on the battlefield, the fact remains that Ashley White should not have been in the company of that particular assault force on that day in Kandahar. In fact, unless U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) had granted an exception specifically for White to be assigned to that particular ground unit, she should not have been there at all. At least, not according to the DoD Combat Exclusion Policy and Army Regulation 600-13.
Combat Exclusion Policies
The Combat Exclusion Policy is based on a 1988 DoD restriction on women’s service that created the “Risk Rule” for assignment of women in the military. The rule excluded women from non-combat units or missions if the risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture were equal to or greater than the risk in the combat units they supported.
Based on the experiences of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, DoD concluded that everyone in theater was at risk and thus a risk-based policy was no longer appropriate.[2] As a result, the “Risk Rule” was rescinded on 13 January 1994 by then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and was replaced by the “direct ground combat assignment rule.” [3] The policy also permits the Services to impose further restrictions on the assignment of women when where the Service Secretary attests that the costs of appropriate berthing and privacy arrangements are prohibitive; where units and positions are doctrinally required to physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units that are closed to women; where units are engaged in long range reconnaissance operations and Special Operations Forces missions; and where job related physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast majority of women Service members.[4]
The rationale for these restrictions at the time was that there was no military need for women in ground combat positions because an adequate number of men were available. Additionally, transcripts of a 1994 press briefing indicate that DoD officials believed that the assignment of women to direct ground combat units “would not contribute to the readiness and effectiveness of those units” because of physical strength, stamina, and privacy issues.”[5]
Of course, the logic of combat exclusion policies, as currently written, turns on the conceptualization of the battlefield as a linear environment. Because the modern battlefield in increasingly non-linear and fluid, these policies are nearly impossible to apply, particularly in COIN environments that lack a well-defined forward area, such as Afghanistan. This fact was most recently noted by the March 2011 report by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission. At this time, its recommendation that DoD eliminate “combat exclusion policies” that prevent women from being assigned to ground combat units below the brigade level has not been acted upon. [6]
Female Soldiers in Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan (CJOA-A)
Female Engagement Teams (FET) are currently being employed in theater by U.S. and coalition forces to support their battle space owners’ COIN objectives by conducting key female engagements with the local population to build individual, group and community relationships, conduct information gathering, female searches and limited tactical operations. Similarly, Cultural Support Teams (CST), such as the one 1st LT White was a part of, provide direct support to Special Forces. The contributions currently being made by FETs and CSTs are receiving attention in CJOA-A and in the United States. From an information operations perspective, their value lies as much in their ability to engage with women and children (approximately 51% of the Afghan population is women) as to glean valuable population-centric information that men might not be able to get. Therefore, it is not surprising that women are viewed as valuable “battlefield enablers.”
Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (COMUSASOC) recently stated that “they [women] are in Afghanistan right now and the reviews are off the charts. They’re doing great.”[7] Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities (SOLIC) Michael Lumpkin said that commanders agree that the program has been a success. Current plans are consistent with these statements – the third group of CST women is about to begin training, and the tentative plan is to have 25 permanent Army CST teams by 2016. Lumpkin noted that "We're coming late to the table, but we've recognized the value (of the program), and I think this will transcend beyond Afghanistan. … I don't see them going away any time soon."[8]
Our conventional force leadership clearly agrees. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) recently published the Army’s Female Engagement Team Handbook (version 3) in September 2011 and there is a March 2011 Forces Command directive that requires each deploying brigade combat team to have nine FETs per brigade; providing three FETs for each of their maneuver battalions and two FETs for each Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). In August 2011, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) echoed the same requirements and units in theater are currently forming those teams.
Rationale for Lifting Combat Exclusion Policies
White’s death should serve as a catalyst for serious debate about the role of women in the military more generally. Most people are familiar with the equity-based arguments against combat exclusion policies. According to the Principal Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for Special Operations, female U.S. Soldiers have served and are currently serving in dangerous roles. Some have been killed and maimed. "Any day that they're walking into a village and engaging with the population they are at the same risk as those Special Operation Forces, battlefield they're detailed to… These women are on the front lines in very austere locations."
And yet their inability to formally hold a “combat position” affects their career trajectories. For example, the exclusion of women from specific requirements, such as combat service experience, translates into an inability to reflect their contributions on their officer evaluation report (OER), non-commissioned officer evaluation reports (NCOER) and both officer and enlisted officer’s record briefs (ORB/ERB). The merit of this service would provide women with a greater opportunity for promotion into the senior ranks, specifically general officer levels. While such equity-based lines of argument obviously have merit, they are usually consumed by the politics of gender and are dismissed before serious debate has time to emerge.
We argue, however, that the need to revisit DoD’s combat exclusion policies sooner rather than later is not primarily derived from any aspect of gender politics. Instead, we assert that DoD’s current policies regarding the role of women in combat is serving to tie the hands of commanders and place additional strain on our already overburdened forces.
Numerous defense officials have cited the tremendous stress placed upon our all-volunteer force by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Defense Secretary Gates said during a speech at Duke University’s Page Auditorium on 29 September 2010, “The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed tremendous strain on U.S. forces and their families. The all-volunteer force conceived in the 1970s was designed to train, prepare, and deploy for a major and quick conventional conflict…” During a 2009 Senate hearing, Army Vice Chief of Staff General Peter W. Chiarelli called the Army a “stressed and tired force” and noted that that 12- to 15-month deployments and the stress of repeated deployments play a role in the increase in Army suicides.[9] The Army already faces perpetual shortages of junior officers (2nd Lieutenant through Captain) qualified to deploy.[10] Without change, recruitment of soldiers capable to fill combat positions will become increasingly difficult and male soldiers currently facing multiple combat tours will see almost no change in their op-tempo.
In addition, on 6 January 2011, under the direction from the White House, Defense Secretary Gates announced that the Pentagon would cut projected spending by $78 billion over the next five years and shrink the size of the Army and Marine Corps.[11] With the Force Cap Reduction occurring in theater, we need to be more flexible in order to meet current operational needs. DoD’s current policy cripples the battle space owner’s ability to fully utilize female soldiers. By allowing women to serve in all roles, changes in combat exclusion policies would provide commanders at all levels the much needed flexibility to employ all of his or her resources to achieve operational objectives and reduce stress on the force.[12]
Experimentation for our Future Forces
The current COIN environment in CJOA-A provides an excellent opportunity to experiment and rapidly garner valuable lessons about the utility of FETs and CSTs and the challenges of integrating women into combat arms positions more generally. The results of such a trial effort could then be taken into account as we try to find intelligent ways to cut our current force structure and build our future forces.
Some of the important questions to be examined include:
- Are FETs and CSTs having a direct or indirect operational impact? Under what conditions and for what missions are they more (or less) useful?
- Is the type of information that FETs and CSTs gathering primarily useful at a tactical level or can it be aggregated for analysis/inclusion in command-level products?
- What are the primary variables that shape the effectiveness of FET and CST across the Regional Commands (RCs)?
- What does this tell us about how to structure and use this resource in the future? (e.g., mix of male to female, differences in mission, etc.)
- Do commanders believe that they would have more operational flexibility if they were able to place FET and CST members into combat positions?
- In consideration of the coming drawdown, is there a benefit to making further amendments to combat exclusion policies?
The ISAF Joint Command (IJC) FET Program Manager (PM) is currently working to examine some of these issues. Specifically, she is in the process of visiting FETs which are operating in six Regional Commands (RCs) in order to gather information through meetings, interviews and distribution of an IJC FET questionnaire. It is anticipated that a FET Comprehensive Assessment Report will be completed and sent to NATO, TRADOC, the IJC Commander and the RC Commanders by the end of December. She also plans to provide legal guidance on how to integrate FETs to a combat arms position in support of the conventional army and special operations and define the FETs relationship with NATO FETs and Gender Advisors.
Additional studies that focus on the operational imperatives for the integration of women into combat arms positions and the impact this would have on our force structure would be very useful.
Conclusion
In 1979, the repeal of a Dutch law led to the integration of the Dutch military, with no formal restrictions on women serving combat duty. On 27 September 2011, Australia’s government announced that female soldiers will soon be able to serve in front-line roles, removing the barriers of entry to women into seven percent of military specialties.[13] In October, the Mexican Congress voted to allow women to serve in the highest positions in the military. Other countries where women are able to serve in more active combat roles include Canada, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland.
In light of these events, rescinding or changing our combat exclusion policies makes sense because it will help all key players: ISAF, the U.S. Armed Forces writ large, battle space owners, and female soldiers. The Armed Forces will be able to use their current resources (women) to fill the gaps in areas affected by force reduction; women earn equal recognition, combat credit and greater opportunity to obtain senior level promotions; and commanders are no longer limited on how they have greater flexibility to employ their internal resources. The existing combat exclusion policies are outdated and limit not only women, but also the ability to maintain an agile and responsive force; it’s time for change.
[1] USASOC, “Press Release: U.S. Army Special Operations Soldiers Killed in Combat,” 23 October 2011.
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, “Information on DoD’s Assignment Policy and Direct Ground Combat Definition,” October 1998; MILDEC, “Women in Combat” p.2.
[3] Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, “Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule.” The memorandum defined the term “direct ground combat” as: [E]ngaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.”
[4] AR 600-13 is particularly restrictive. The Army’s definition of direct combat is broader than DoD’s in that it includes both the risk of capture and the repulsion of an enemy assault. In addition, the Army policy prohibits the assignment of women to units whose routine mission is to engage in direct ground combat, while DoD’s policy prohibits the assignment of women to units whose primary mission is to engage in direct ground combat.
[5]U.S. General Accounting Office, October 1998, p. 4.
[6] Military Leadership Diversity Commission, “From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century Military,” 15 March 2011. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Section 596) established the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC).
[7] Major General Bennet Sacolick, Commander, Army Special Warfare Center and School, Cultural Support Program Briefing, 15 September 2011. OPR: AQOJK-DRSE.
[8] Associated Press, “Death Highlights Women’s Role in Special Ops Teams,” 26 October 2011.
[9] US Medicine – The Voice of Federal Medicine, “Senate Committee Holds Hearing on Suicide Rate in the Military.” November 7, 2011, April 2009 < http://www.usmedicine.com/articles/senate-committee-holds-hearing-on-suicide-rate-in-the-military-.html
[10] In the Army, twenty percent of these ranks are filled by female Soldiers who could be drawn upon as a resource. Fifteen percent of West Point undergraduates are women, yet these potential leaders are precluded from career advancement due to their lack of combat experience is a discriminator. Associated Press, “Death highlights women’s role in Special Ops teams.” October 2011, 3 Nov. 2011 <http://news.yahoo.com/death-highlights-womens-role-special-ops-teams-195034667.html
[11] Washington Post, “Pentagon to cut spending by $78 billion, reduce troop strength.” January 7, 2011, November 7, 2011 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/06/AR2011010603628.html
[12] Exceptions to the DoD Combat Exclusion Policy may be granted on an individual mission basis after review by U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A). This is a step in the right direction
[13]The New York Times, “Australia Says It Will Open Combat Roles to Women.” September 27, 2011. November 7, 2011 <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/world/asia/australia-will-allow-women-to-serve-in-frontline-combat.html
Will any change to the current combat exclusion policy also include discussions about changing the requirements for draft registration? After all, if women are to be allowed to serve in all MOS’, including combat arms positions, then all US women ought to be registered for the draft so that they can be placed (voluntarily or involuntarily) in those positions should it become necessary.
For In the Know, can you relay some of the negative stories? Myself, I can’t think of too many.
Just like with males, females that don’t want to be there will not perform well. Females that do want to be there will be just fine.
Overall I do see males handling the combat load better, due to weight carried v. body weight and muscle mass. However, I’ve seen enough females that are capable that I think it warrants further examination at the least.
For me personally, the benefit I can gain from females being on the patrol outweigh the negatives.
Again, it is very difficult to attempt to create “need” based arguments for any particular demographic and their service in the military – because, fundamentally, there does not exist the need the authors purport to demonstrate.
First, the list of countries that use females in direct combat roles would be better left out of the argument entirely. One does not need risk offending the courage and ability of those particular militaries to note that they are hardly indicative of operationally experienced armies from which serious conclusions can be drawn.
Second, the presence of females in “direct ground combat roles” in order to mitigate perceived optempo issues is a misdirection. The source of high optempo among certain occupational specialties and units has everything to do with manning policies and force-to-tail ratios, and little to do with the nature of the individuals serving as the source of manning. It is worth taking a look at history and reminding ourselves that there was an almost catastrophic shortage of Army infantrymen in the ETO in 1944 while a vast surplus of rear echelon troops flourished. This state of affairs, manpower poverty among plenty, had nothing to do with qualifications and everything to do with decisions the Army made about the support structure required to support its combat arms units.
In the same vein, the force-to-tail ratio has certainly not lessened in the intervening half a century. The optempo issue of combat arms units remains, not as an issue of any particular demographics ability to serve or not serve, but on policies regarding what constitutes necessary support for combat arms units. About four years ago, the Marine Corps recognized that tens of thousands of its Marines had never deployed, while many others had deployed numerous times – this was manpower inefficiency in action, not demographic necessities, or endemic malingering.
An important aside is to note that the success of any particular individual in combat is directly related to the method of employment. In short, it is far easier to employ a heavy machinegun from a turret than it is to dismount it, carry it some substantial distance, elevation, or both, employ it, and repeat on a regular, sustained basis. It is an artificiality to pretend that one method of employment is more likely than the other – both must be done if required. It is this fact that ignited the debate about occupational specialty related physical proficiency standards that raged in the 1980s (for those who remember DARPA).
Which ties into this reality…the authors would have been better served, frankly, by arguing gender equality. The armed forces of democracies are not inherently efficient, they are inherently democratic. Often, this means they possess a certain amount of inefficiency, and quite often the people support the inefficiencies as the cost to be born for living their democratic ideals.
What this means in practical terms is that, if the American people desire that females have the opportunity to serve in direct combat roles, then females should be afforded that opportunity IF they can meet the requirements of the position. It is that “if” around which this argument should really revolve.
I reference, specifically, the experience of females integrating into the country’s fire departments as an example of how this would look. Despite attempts to use such tests inappropriately, by and large, fire departments established physical standards that accurately reflected the actual nature of the job. Carrying fire hose up five or so flights of stairs, actually handling the ladders found on the engines, carrying and employing life-saving equipment weighing in excess of 50 pounds, carrying fire victims, etc. Men and women who could meet the standards could become fire fighters, those that could not, did not. While integration is not without its issues, this is a democratic solution to what this democracy demanded of its emergency responders.
Further, what the fire services have witnessed is that there has not been a huge upsurge in the numbers of females in the firehouse. This is partly a reality of the physical requirements of the job, partly an issue of continued discrimination issues in a male-dominated field, but also due to a lack of interest among females. The point is that females who desire to serve as a fire fighter, and can meet the requirements, can serve.
This is the appropriate way ahead for the authors. The “need” for any particular graphic beyond the male population is a dead end argument easily refuted. What is appropriate is that if the American people desire females to have the opportunity to serve in direct combat roles, there is a way to do this which provides the opportunity while not artificially modifying the standards required to perform the job.
It is very difficult to have this discussion without falling into demogoguery…but here goes an attempt. (For reference, my position on this is conservative.)
There are three lines of argument in this paper that are in my opinion the “crux of the matter”. 1. FET/CST/GWOT experience of women in combat zones 2. Career progression fairness 3. Foreign army experience. Eventhough there is brief mention of the male/female physical capability and unit cohesion arguments in the article, I would leave those for last. Also, they are partially addressed by the other three.
1. FET/CST/GWOT experience: The first thing that always gets ignored in advancing FET/CST experience is that these roles are by definition not combat, they just happen to be dangerous. As a scout PL in SW Baghdad I had plenty of occasion to take out females with me on patrol to a KLE, or while conducting a Check point, or raid. Never did I concider them an organic combat asset. I planned with them as an environemntal element in my battle space, as mission enablers, but not as maneuver assets. Even a combat camera female out on a raid was not there to help me succeed in my mission tactically. She had a task and purpose apart from the tactical mission. Their arms were for their self protection and only incidentally to boost my firepower in case of ambush. In either case, while I at no point doubted their ability to return accurate fire, I did not have the same confidence in expecting them to join a building-clearing team or to go charging across fields and canals pursuing bad guys. I expected that of my 19D and 11B soldiers and more.
In general, aside from impressive anecdotes of females in firefights, we have not had much by way of example of females on the front lines (read combat role) in the invasion of Iraq, take-down of Falluja, Sadr City and Tal Afar, patroling Korengal, etc. While females were present in all of these instances in some capacity, none of these examples and others have demonstrated a reliable pattern of tactical performance from females. Perhaps a case can be made for a test Inf BN to get posted to a Korengal-type environment for a tour. I, for one, would love to see that experiment. But to base an entire argument for integration on anecdote and non-tactical mission sets is a problematic to say the least.
2. Career progression fairness: This is a valid concern. The Army/Marine Corps are ground combat organizations. That is their raison d’etre. Having logisticians and intelligence officers beat the Infantry and Armor guys to manuever BN/BCT/Division command is an absurd expectation. So naturally, if we are to have females ordering tactical operations then they MUST be Infantry, Armor, Artillery officers (read: Manuever). The force is not served by having GO’s and senior field grades coming in greater numbers from CS and CSS backgrounds because they have had the occasion to encounter IED’s and firefights in their careers. A hundred IED’s suffered on a Logpac does not make for a better or even a practiced tactician. Planning and conducting raids, LP/OP’s, movement to contact patrols, taking bridges (e.g. Obj PEACH OIF 2003), even being on a platoon QRF shift, etc are the maneuver missions that breed practiced and competent tacticians and therefore BN/BCT/Division commanders. Making the argument about careers is a dangerous and, frankly, unprofessional argument. Make the case that women will make no difference, or at best improve the maneuver force by being included in manuever assignments.
Lastly, I will say that involving female MI/Signal/Log soldiers in battalion staffs is far less contraversial than having females as Inf, Armor, Sapper, SF, line artillery soldiers. Separating the two might well help advance women into career-boosting staff roles without getting as much resistance as trying to get female hooah-rangers on the ground.
3. Foreign Armies: This is perhaps the easiest to contest. It is an argument made often. The Canadians et al have been part of NATO missions in OEF for years. Yet we have not really seen reviews of their operational experiences with women in integrated squads/platoons/companies. I would note that most of these Armies are not experienced in any diagnostically useful way. They are peacekeeper Armies with very limited HIC experience, if any, with a very small professional force. Pointing to experiments in other armies that are still in test phase without researching and referencing their effects does not make for a strong argument. Lack of data on combat experience and the vastly different nature of size and operational strain that separate these armies from ours are obstacles to be overcome before one can take this line of reasoning seriously.
We have been in Iraq and Afghanistan going on 10 ten years. Why do we feel the need to bring this subject up now? FET is a Civil Affairs mission. CA Soldiers (female) have been conducting these types of missions in both Theatres as well as in other countries. FET is a line of effort. Unfortunately, we have Soldiers and civilians in Afghanistan trying to separate FET out because it’s viewed as the new “cool” thing, separate bullet or paragraph on their evaluation form or adding another article to discuss in an academic setting.
We have BCTs pulling internal females to perform FET operations without nesting any assets into CA/PRT/ADT operations. We have just added yet another enabler to the battlefield without proper training. The Afghan battlespace is littered with enablers stepping all over each other and we are still not accomplishing anything except wasting money.
To become a CA Soldier (NCO), your GT score must be at a certain level and the training is normally three months, For Officers, training is also three months. FETs/CSTs etc are normally not CA and do not receive as much training as a regular CA Soldier (Reserve/Active Duty). These Soldiers also do not get the opportunity to perform FET/CST but for one tour. A CA Soldier deploys multiple times and can draw, grow and train from past experiences.
We have Soldiers, both male and female moving throughout the battlefield. All jobs in a combat setting are dangerous whether we leave the FOB or remain on base to conduct business.
Bottom line – leave FET and other Civil Affairs business to those who are trained – a CA Soldier. When Iraq and Afghanistan are no longer the “cool” or “hottest” topics to write an OP ED, article or book, We (Civil Affairs Soldiers) as always will be deploying and working with 100% of the population.
Some commentors have indicated that the issue is between combat arms and non-combat arms. I disagree. There is a place in between, where FETs and the like can prosper, combat support. As a Psyop (MISO) specialist we were unable to field females on our tactical teams, however, they were present at the detachment level and were therefore far afield living in austere situations with the rest of us, doing pretty much the same work. However, we were unable to use them on tactical teams which, at times, severely impacted mission readiness.
Sure leave 11b and manuveur to men if it can be proven that females can’t meet the physical requirements, but leave them open to serve freely in any other MOS in a combat environment.
Lastly, CST and FET should fall under the control of MISO and/or CA. These are the missions that they are conducting.
Strength in Truth.
Rick
Dear Major Medeiros:
Maybe I am an old timer on SWJ but gosh it would be nice to hear your thoughts on some of these responses you have received instead of the simple repetitive response of thanks and ones comments will be considered.
So, really, what say ye about some of the things said?
.
I have have pondering this idea for 2 years. A little over a month ago, I coalesced my ideas into a proposal and published it on a wordpress site that I built (isthetimeright.wordpress.com) I focused on an area that I had experience with, Special Operations. Although it is not an intuitive choice for many, there are some advantages. First and foremost is that initial training in the special operations community is very intensive and focused on the individual. The development of human capitol is valued. I do acknowledge in my proposal that it will take women longer to reach the same physical standards to be on an operational team, but that investment is warranted and seen as a good long term investment. I also acknowledge that the recruitment plan for these women would be tailored for a small sub-set of women. My largest variance from the discussion on your site is that I recommend an all female unit. Feel free to read it. It is a bit lengthy.
Everyone should take a break to look at an ongoing MIT study being conducted on collective intelligence. Researchers made an unexpected finding about groups and their collective intelligence. Groups that included women were collectively more intelligent than all male groups across the whole range of task areas. MIT is conducting further research to understand what it is that women bring to the equation that raises a group’s intelligence. If we want our military to remain the best in the world than we better consider adding women to our small unit combat arms groups. Most of our allies have already done this.
I attended a Women in the Military conference a few weeks ago and was struck by a comment made by a Norwegian army officer. She said that listening to our discussions on this topic made her feel like she was in a time warp. She thought she had dropped back 30 years in time to when this debate raged in Norway. It is a mote point today.
Wow! How can I articulate this without you insinuating that I may be biased or incapable of listening, capturing and equally assessing each person’s perspectives whether they agree with us or not?
Your own article shows how biased you are. You have already concluded that the combat exclusion rule should be overturned because of the FETs- how will you go about being objective in gathering data if you have already concluded the rule should be changed??? And let’s don’t forget you are the Program Manager. Last I checked, PMs are the WORST people to give objective evaluations of their program by definition of them being the manager of the program!
Allow me to reassure you that all positive and negative comments are included in the assessment.
I hope I am wrong- but you sound like you are unaware of the issues you will have with gathering negative comments for the assessment. Suffice it to say we haven’t been able to get informative data on the Afghan Army- and here we are devoting resources to gathering data on the performance of women in combat there. As if there wasn’t a clearer example of how politics gets in the way of mission accomplishment, I don’t know what is. The bottom line is- if you truly want to be objective- you need to realize that it will be very difficult for you to get frank assessments on this subject and it will probably be just as difficult for you not to ignore the negative ones you do get.
Unfortunately, it probably has no merit with you because it is clear your mind set that I, the Program Manager, is naïve and short-sighted, so I’ll just say, “thank you very much for your interesting insight and I will agree to disagree with your opinion of me.”
I’m sorry you seem to have been offended by me pointing out what I thought was self-apparent: you have already arrived at a conclusion about FETs and the combat exclusion rule before your assessment is finished and thus are not coming across as too objective. That is the definition of bias. You might as well recuse yourself from the assessment at this point- as I don’t know who would believe anything your assessment concluded unless it was 180 degrees from what you have stated in this paper.
Finally, we will print out the all comments made on this article and address each one during our assessment.
Please do. But- more importantly, please attempt to seek out data from commanders and soldiers that disproves your thesis. It is literally impossible for you to prove that FETs have been successful or that the combat exclusion rule should be abolished. That is your hypothesis- so, if you want any respect I suggest, like any good scientist, you attempt to disprove your preliminary conclusions. If they stand up to rigorous testing and attempts to disprove them, then they won’t necessarily be true- but they will be stronger. If all you do is gather data and then conclude you were right- then you won’t get much buy-in from any critical thinkers that I know.
The bottom line is that none of these subjects- career progression, equality, fairness, or emotion- should be the logic behind incorporating women into combat units- unless you think the military exists for something other than securing the nation’s interests. This takes out the whole “if they can pass the physical standards, then they should be allowed in” argument. What should matter is: “does incorporating women into combat units make the combat unit more effective in the most dangerous type of combat that we can face- wherein the outcome could mean the difference between the end of our way of life or the continuance of it.”
Anything else may get emotional tear jerks, progressive support, and knee-jerk head nods, but it won’t do the folks at the pointy end of the spear any good. If we can’t guarantee that combat units will be more effective in high intensity conflict, then I don’t see the merit in forcing gender integration onto them. Hopefully we don’t think of really smart female potential general officers during this debate- but instead think of 17-21 year old kids- girls and boys- put together in very close physical proximity in stressful conditions and times of monotonous waiting- who- when called upon- must be able to drop everything and close with and kill the enemy. There’s probably a reason we don’t allow kids to drink alcohol and car insurance companies charge them way more than others- why would we think it would be easy to get them to live and work together and ignore all the problems that usually entails for high school kids, college kids, basic trainees, and support units???
I can offer plenty of anecdotal evidence of issues with overall and combat effectiveness when women are present, but obviously these are not as useful as scientific evidence. The problem in my experience is that it is career suicide to imply that women are a hindrance to mission accomplishment in the military. The result from that implication is usually one of two forms: either the leadership is blamed, or- more likely, the problem is framed as a “man” problem- and that women shouldn’t have to pay for men not being able to behave properly. This is not helpful- if we truly are after a more effective outcome in terms of national security and combat effectiveness- then we should try to investigate why women and men have such a hard time bonding at the small-unit team level, especially when they are below the age of 30- and craft policies that don’t ignore these politically-incorrect facts.
I’ll just end with this: the units I’ve been in that have had women attached or assigned have had serious morale, discipline, and health issues. Normally this hasn’t been a “women’s” or a “men’s” issue- both sexes were equally responsible for the problems. Instead, the issue was always the relationships between some of the women and some of the men. Leadership can only go so far: when you put young men and women together in a stressful environment, away from family controls and influence, relationships- both bad and good- develop- and these relationships have an, on average, more negative effect on the unit than if the unit was all-male. Does it mean that there are never instances in warfare where women could be used in some form in a combat-type role? No. Does it mean the all-male units are always perfect? No. Does it mean there aren’t some women who could excel in a combat unit? No. does it mean that some co-ed units wouldn’t be more effective? No. But, what it does mean is that- I hypothesize that, on average (75-90%), units would be less effective in most forms of combat if they were forced to be co-ed.
The trick, in my view, is to allow commanders at all levels to make their own judgment on when and how women can be used to get the most effective outcome possible in every situation. Blanket rules hurt us all. Never allowing women into a “combat role” (note- not “combat branch”) isn’t good. But neither is forcing all units to take in women. Until we all become “gender neutral” (I submit that will never happen), women and men, on average, will have serious issues bonding in an effective manner for mission accomplishment in the military- not just in combat or at the small unit level. And if there is a chance that more people die and/or our national security suffers- then I don’t think we should play social scientist with our force.
Now- for some specific feedback for you on your more troublesome passages and logic:
Her efforts highlight both the importance and necessity of women on the battlefield today.”
To say that a woman’s death in combat should highlight the necessity of women on the battlefield makes me shake my head. Why? A man’s death doesn’t highlight the necessity of men on the battlefield- maybe just the opposite, if anything. Ignoring the fact that she died- a not-so-good outcome- how can you make the leap to anything related to women being necessary on the battlefield? Our enemy obviously doesn’t agree with you- and looking at most metrics I’d say one could make the case that they are winning without using hardly any women at all.
In fact, unless U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) had granted an exception specifically for White to be assigned to that particular ground unit, she should not have been there at all.
Terrible logic- in Afghanistan it doesn’t follow that you will only be in one place because of the unit you are in. Logistics units, for example, travel all over the country. This isn’t such a big point- but, when one sees obvious flaws in logic, one starts to question ALL of the logic a little more carefully. I’d suggest avoiding spurious points in your assessment.
Of course, the logic of combat exclusion policies, as currently written, turns on the conceptualization of the battlefield as a linear environment. Because the modern battlefield in increasingly non-linear and fluid, these policies are nearly impossible to apply, particularly in COIN environments that lack a well-defined forward area, such as Afghanistan. This fact was most recently noted by the March 2011 report by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission.
This is untrue. The logic of combat exclusion policies has a much greater depth, history, tradition, and, therefore- logic. For one, it has been a long-thought assumption that civilized societies- if they have to go to war- shouldn’t teach their young women to seek out the enemy and kill, shouldn’t draft women into this type of job, and shouldn’t purposefully put them into this type of environment. It was also- and still is by many- that most women don’t naturally take to combat- seeking out and killing the enemy- as much as men do (and men don’t come about it naturally either- they must be conditioned). Any time spent in the military, in coed sports, or in anything coed should inform one of the differences between most men and most women. Then you go into all the physical issues between men and women. The argument that some women can pass the physical standards doesn’t mean men and women would be treated fairly- so the fair issue doesn’t get much traction with most critical thinkers that I know. And then you can get into all the issues of cohesion between men and women. Simply put: women and men react very differently to the opposite sex, on average, than they do the same sex- and that leads to difficulties building teams with cohesion enough to overcome the stresses in most combat (and in those times of preparing or waiting for combat)- actually in most any kind of sustained stressful situation- combat being the most destructive and serious. I could go on and on, but suffice it to say that seeing a linear battlefield is not the logic for the combat exclusion policies.
Entire section on FETs
Your entire section on FETs attempts to make the argument that FETs have been successful and logically leads to a conclusion that the combat exclusion rule should be overturned. I don’t know what other evidence would point towards any greater bias on your part. How can you conclude that FETs have been successful- unless you’re going by the strictly tactical-? Surely we won’t know much of anything about our efforts in Afghanistan for several years after we’ve drawn down. But even if they have been successful- to make the leap in logic that FET success should mean the end of the combat exclusion rule seems to be stretching it just a bit.
White’s death should serve as a catalyst for serious debate about the role of women in the military more generally.
Again, why? Is the converse true- if no women died in combat there would be no need to debate women’s role in the military? I find this logic to be impossible to follow- surely there is a better reason to debate women’s role in the military than one person’s death- that, while surely tragic to those who knew her, means little more to women’s role in the military as any other death has.
And yet their inability to formally hold a “combat position” affects their career trajectories.
This is the silliest reason, in my opinion, to make this argument. If a male made the same argument about another aspect of the military he would- rightly IMO- be labeled derisively as a “careerist.” We have long held military service to be just that- a service to the nation- and if excluding women from combat units (or any other section for that matter) means that the nation is better served, then that is the sacrifice that some women should make. Why don’t we just open up more general officer jobs to non-combat arms positions- would that be an acceptable alternative for you?
The merit of this service would provide women with a greater opportunity for promotion into the senior ranks, specifically general officer levels. While such equity-based lines of argument obviously have merit, they are usually consumed by the politics of gender and are dismissed before serious debate has time to emerge.
I would say that they don’t become consumed by the politics of gender as much as the tradition of service- as mentioned before. Why do you serve- for yourself, or the nation’s security? Do you serve for gender opportunity, or for the nation’s security? A better thing to debate would be what the role of the military is- a force that ensures the nation’s security, or a force of social justice? I don’t have a problem with the military having the ancillary effect of social justice- but that shouldn’t be the reason it exists.
Instead, we assert that DoD’s current policies regarding the role of women in combat is serving to tie the hands of commanders and place additional strain on our already overburdened forces.
Based on what? I assert that DoD’s current policies regarding females in terms of EO place additional strain on an already overburdened force- and commanders have their hands tied attempting to undo social forces and natural human tendencies instead of concentrating on keeping their soldiers alive in combat. But- the same exact issues you will have in gathering data that does not agree with your assertion are the same issues that I would have in attempting to gather the same data for my assertion- it is politically incorrect to assert those things!
Without change, recruitment of soldiers capable to fill combat positions will become increasingly difficult and male soldiers currently facing multiple combat tours will see almost no change in their op-tempo.
This logic is seriously flawed and the citation does not back up the assertions. The Army isn’t hurting due to high OPTEMPO because women don’t get promoted and can’t go into combat arms- the Army is hurting because the force isn’t big enough- women and men combined- to support multiple conflicts due to few people wanting a life of continued and constant deployments. And I assert (since we’re all about assertions here) that women get out of the military in high numbers- not because of a lack of upward mobility- but due to the priority of having a family and wanting to spend more time than an Army career would allow being a mother. Changing the combat arms exclusion rule wouldn’t change that fact.
DoD’s current policy cripples the battle space owner’s ability to fully utilize female soldiers. By allowing women to serve in all roles, changes in combat exclusion policies would provide commanders at all levels the much needed flexibility to employ all of his or her resources to achieve operational objectives and reduce stress on the force.
Seems to me you’ve already decided on your conclusion before all the data is in. There is a huge difference between “allowing women to serve in whatever role a commander deems necessary”- which is the rule from my experience- and “forcing commanders to put young men and women together in combat units.” Maximum flexibility would mean they can do what they want- and I haven’t seen women being barred from serving where a commander thought they could add to the effort. I don’t see you advocating flexibility as much as wholesale INFLEXIBILITY as to the role of women in combat (seen from the perspective of the commander).
The current COIN environment in CJOA-A provides an excellent opportunity to experiment and rapidly garner valuable lessons about the utility of FETs and CSTs and the challenges of integrating women into combat arms positions more generally.
This is silly- use the effort in Afghanistan- as flawed as it is in attempting to change Afghan society- to experiment with integrating women more generally into the American Army. We could do this- assuming a politically objective atmosphere (which is an invalid assumption) at home if needed. Again- though- any resources poured into this effort takes from other efforts- and in an era of draw-downs, does this make sense? Only if you believe that integrating women into combat units will make the nation more secure- or that the military should exist mainly to provide opportunities for historically disenfranchised groups.
Are FETs and CSTs having a direct or indirect operational impact? Under what conditions and for what missions are they more (or less) useful?
The jury is still out about FETs and CSTs. Many combat arms guys who I’ve talked to who have worked with them tell of a mixed bag at the tactical level. Harder to measure, of course, is the strategic effect they may or may not have had. Conventional wisdom is that they help us engage with Afghan females- and therefore we win their hearts and minds too- and we get intelligence from them. Little-heard positions, however just as valid ones, are that the intelligence we get from Afghan women is overstated as most Afghan women don’t really know too much about what the men are doing, those who do become targets, it is a strategic loss as now the enemy can push the propaganda that we are influencing the women to be either non-Muslim or to set them up with American men, and- lastly, that any cultural influences we have on the women drive our overall efforts further away from Afghan men and the culture/society overall. Amazingly I heard this more from female European officers than American- and from females in general more than male officers. It seems that American male officers have been conditioned to never say anything negative about female military subjects.
What does this tell us about how to structure and use this resource in the future? (e.g., mix of male to female, differences in mission, etc.)
Sad that we’re even asking about a doctrinal gender mix for future conflicts— really??? Maybe it will go along with the COIN force to population ratio: “if we have 1 woman for every 7 men in our combat arms units, we’ll be successful in COIN ops…”–??
Do commanders believe that they would have more operational flexibility if they were able to place FET and CST members into combat positions?
What does this mean- “combat positions”?
In consideration of the coming drawdown, is there a benefit to making further amendments to combat exclusion policies?
Most would argue that when we have MORE personnel requirements we need more women- here you seem to be arguing that when we have LESS personnel requirements we need more women in combat arms units? I find this logic impossible to follow.
The ISAF Joint Command (IJC) FET Program Manager (PM) is currently working to examine some of these issues. Specifically, she is in the process of visiting FETs which are operating in six Regional Commands (RCs) in order to gather information through meetings, interviews and distribution of an IJC FET questionnaire. It is anticipated that a FET Comprehensive Assessment Report will be completed and sent to NATO, TRADOC, the IJC Commander and the RC Commanders by the end of December. She also plans to provide legal guidance on how to integrate FETs to a combat arms position in support of the conventional army and special operations and define the FETs relationship with NATO FETs and Gender Advisors.
It is pretty much a rule that a program manager is the LEAST objective person to do an assessment on his/her program. And establishing a new combat arms branch- if that’s what you’re arguing for: “Female Engagement Team” branch seems to me to be very short-sighted- as soon as we pull out of Afghanistan, will that branch be needed anymore? But, more importantly- should we then make every branch a combat arms branch- since they also have the potential to be in as much combat as the other branches in a COIN environment? This seems to me to miss entirely the concept of “combat arms”- which exists to close with and kill the enemy. This isn’t what a “FET branch” would do…
In 1979, the repeal of a Dutch law led to the integration of the Dutch military, with no formal restrictions on women serving combat duty. On 27 September 2011, Australia’s government announced that female soldiers will soon be able to serve in front-line roles, removing the barriers of entry to women into seven percent of military specialties. In October, the Mexican Congress voted to allow women to serve in the highest positions in the military. Other countries where women are able to serve in more active combat roles include Canada, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland.
Apples and oranges. The Dutch Army is so small and does such different missions that to compare it to the U.S. Army is very disingenuous. Australia hasn’t incorporated the change yet- so unless we just want to follow them down a potentially dangerous road- then that fact has no bearing on your argument. I could go on- but comparing the U.S. Army to these other armies is missing the bigger points that even if their policies have changed- this does not mean that they have been effective, that they would make us more effective, or that there forces do anything remotely like we do- and thus we should compare ourselves to them.
In light of these events, rescinding or changing our combat exclusion policies makes sense because it will help all key players: ISAF, the U.S. Armed Forces writ large, battle space owners, and female soldiers. The Armed Forces will be able to use their current resources (women) to fill the gaps in areas affected by force reduction; women earn equal recognition, combat credit and greater opportunity to obtain senior level promotions; and commanders are no longer limited on how they have greater flexibility to employ their internal resources.
Again- seems like you’ve already made up your mind- which means you’re about the most non-objective person to do this assessment. I’d have problems with you doing an unbiased assessment if you were only the Program Manager- but since you’ve already written a paper advocating a certain position- I think it is a hopeless exercise in already-arrived at conclusions.
I assert that every “positive” you mention here is false- the Armed Forces won’t need to fill gaps in combat arms with women during the drawdown because since there will be fewer positions- there will be fewer gaps, women won’t earn equal recognition due to social and natural conditions that cause them to get out of the military earlier and seek career fields for different reasons than men, and commanders would be limited in their flexibility to tailor their force to the mission- instead having to tailor it based on politically-correct policies.
It is a red herring to equate satisfactory and valued performance of the FET mission with demonstrated ability to perform all combat missions. Additionally consideration of career equality rightly takes a far back seat to consideration of combat effectiveness.
Instead of attempting to extrapolate from a single, specific and limited type of task to all battlefield tasks, the authors would be better served finding the closest equivalent possible to female members performing combat tasks in the environment they appear to advocate. An excellent example can be found in the Marine Corps with The Basic School in which all officers, male and female, train as basic Infantry Officers. A dispassionate analysis, without preconceived political bias, would provide significantly more value than the effort detailed above.
Like many others, I recognize that it would be career suicide to publicly disagree with the viewpoint that women are doing a great job in today’s combat zones and are the equal of men. Do women do a good job-Absolutely. Are they the equal of men in a combat zone-not even close. No matter how capable a woman might be physically, she will detract from those around her. Men will be men around women, and women will be women around men. That means sex (not at all conducive to good order and discipline in a combat zone), a competition for attention, and a lack of focus are present. When a Battalion CO or Regimental CO goes out on patrol with a squad, all the focus the grunts have is on keeping him alive. The same thing applies when women are on patrol. I have seen this first hand in Afghanistan. VIP’s, high ranking officers, and women distract those around them and they should stay on the FOB, or not come and disrupt things in the first place. To say otherwise is to ignore what happens in real life. The argument that women need to be in Combat Arms MOS’s to get promoted may be true, but that doesn’t mean it should happen. Life isn’t fair, and nothing gives you the right to put someone else’s life in danger. When you joined the military, you knew what the rules were and the way things were. Telling you up front what the situation is takes away any ability you have to complain when you don’t like the outcome.
I will grant that this attitude is service specific. I can think of nothing in the Air Force that a woman can’t do, as those deployments and operating environments are different. How the Navy deals with it on ships, and will deal with it on submarines, I don’t know. Army combat branches, and the Marine Corps-well, to put it mildly it causes major headaches at best and crippling issues at worst. I’ve been in the Fleet long enough to know that male/female issues, for which men are at fault half the time, constitue anywhere from 1/3 to 1/2 of the discipline problems in a unit.
I have also seen FET’s in action. Maybe I missed something when I saw them with my eyes, but they aren’t winning the fight in Afghanistan. Are there places in the world where they might work? Probably, but not in a Stone Age culture like Afghanistan. Women and their opinions just don’t count there, and to argue otherwise is to ignore fact. It is hard to gather relevant information from someone who is forced to spend her life inside a 25 meter by 25 meter fifteen foot tall mud walled compound.
The only way commanders hands are tied by the current policy is the insistence that women in a true combat zone (and I’m not referring to the massive bases like Bastion, Kandahar, etc. that are just like a garrison environment in the States) at the multitude of FOB’s and PB’s that dot Afghanistan are not a hindrance. Everything from heads to sleeping arrangements is an ordeal. Let women go to “combat” at Kandahar, or any one of the other giant bases where more than half our troops in Afghanistan are. Just don’t let them go to the real combat zones and pretend things are ok.
Just reading this and every post/article along the same lines at Best Defense it seems that the only reason for having combat “inclusion” is to insure promotions and career opportunities for women, that is it. Even the report to Congress on Diversity says the same thing and nothing about combat effectiveness. FETs and CSTs are not assaulting, do not provide anything except a few hearts and minds when they perform MEDCAPs but we do not need CSTs or FETs for that, just female medical personnel. The authors give nothing but the company line and we in the military do not have a good record of holding high standards when it comes to this topic (Females in the Military). I also see that the authors have not come back to debate any of the questions that many posters have put up.
Eric- you got your “room to maneuver” orders- lol… Wow- what a way to cut off debate. CEP is a “done deal”- now stop debating it and move on to “how”…
“How” about by waiting until Afghanistan is over (less than 2 years), and then the “requirement” is gone?? (I put “requirement” in quotes- because I don’t think an honest appraisal of the requirement has ever been undertaken. I submit it is an invalid requirement, or that we aren’t getting as much as we think we are out of the capability).
If they are still collecting data on their effectiveness (again- the bias shown by the authors means to me that data collection is over…), how about these non-attributive (due to retaliation) comments from those in theater working with them:
“In my recent experience with CST I felt the biggest issue that affected the team that I worked with was a constant lack of professionalism and immature behavior. This team still played on the ideas that were prevalent in the high school girl-boy relationship, the pet names, the playful touching, and the “can you do this for me, please….”
“Our team is working with a FET now. What a waste, their performance is completely worthless in every aspect. We have tried to get rid of this team but this program seems to be supported at the highest levels- and thus operational requirements are subordinated to politics. The sitreps that have been sent up paint a picture of the best thing since sliced bread. What a lie. It is even more painful to watch the infantry and CA guys fight over who gets to build them doors and shelves for their rooms.”
“The only thing worse than having to bend over backwards to accomodate these FETs and deal with all the inevitable “he-said, she-said” issues that arise is the politically-correct pressure to never send up any reports about anything bad about the teams. The assumption is that if anything bad happens- it must be the fault of all the guys- who just need more socialization classes.”
“All the sex that goes on when co-located with a CST actually wouldn’t be a bad thing- its a great stress reliever for some- but inevitably you get three issues that affect mission: fights over the girls since they are vastly outnumbered by the men, the few girls who don’t want any attention- or at least not from those who do give them attention- and the resultant sexual harrassment claims that eat up lots of time and resources- which is crazy in a combat zone- it effectively shuts down operations for weeks at a time, and lastly, the fights that break out between the girls and the guys… over other girls. This last one has been increasing lately and gets pretty vicious.”
“My commander was told in no uncertain terms that he was required to use the FETs on every mission except by exception with permission at the O-6 level- and that it would not be good for his career to report anything bad about them- even if he had proof of fact on film.”
“I am surprised at how many missions have been disrupted because of the CSTs. I figured some of our missions would be affected because they are forced on us- but now we are being affected by all of the brass who want to come out and visit them. Of course- if anyone says anything bad about them to visiting brass, we get quickly shunted to the side. It doesn’t matter- everyone sees what they want to see…”
“If there was any indication to me that the truth and real, meaningful- and independently verified metrics were being gathered about this program (FETs/CSTs), then maybe I would only be irritated with experiments in a combat zone. Instead- all I ever see is exaggerations, assumptions being treated as facts, gender politics and officer politics being inserted at every opportunity, and many times outright lies. There is no reward for being negative (honest) about this program- actually you get punished- but there’s every reward for stretching the truth on it.”
As the authors have stated- the conclusion is already done, so I’m not sure how gathering data anymore will help in the “how” (and rest assured- these data points WON’T be gathered). How do you make a change that for all indications seems to be doomed no matter how you do it? Well- maybe by making it political and telling everyone it isn’t allowed to fail. Everyone lies to each other and the troops on the ground- as usual- have to deal with the negative consequences. Go NDU and OSD!!
I love how they always cite what other countries have done… Don’t let something like the decades of experiance the Israelis have had get in your way ladies… During my first deployment to Afghanistan, I spoke with a company commander of the PPCLI. As we were talking I saw a Female PPCLI carrying a M240 and her AG. When I ask the CO how well she did, he said that he had the biggest guy in his company (I saw the dude he was Paul Bunyon) as her AG because she could do one of two things. 1. Carry the gun and one BL of ammo or 2. Carry her ruck (barely) and an C-7… If she was carrying the gun, the AG had to carry his own as well as her rucksacks, plus rifle, tripod, spare barrel and the other half of the ammo or more.
All this being said, I don’t discount woman in the service. I have met many who were and are true professionals and are extremely capable, but the average woman, compared to the average man just doesn’t have the strength. A lot of what SOF and Infantry units do involves long movements carrying heavy loads which the human body does not like and the female body handles even worse (so they get hurt more) than men (and even we get hurt.) Anyone do a study of the average number of days per year woman vs men are on profile?
Next thing is look at the problems found in mixed gender units… Do we need the added problems in units where we are actually looking for a fight? The Army will never do a study on this… Because it won’t support the politically correct veiw.
The bottom line Dr and Maj is this: I have a sister who runs marathons, does MMA and Iron man compitions. She is an excellent shot with a rifle, pistol or shotgun as well. She probably weighs 110 to 115lbs… Years ago when we got ready for the drop into Haiti my ruck/equipment alone was 127LBS without the parachute. My sis is extremely smart and fully capable mentally to do the job… But she isn’t going to do anything but sit on that rucksack… And unlike you two, she has the common sense to say the same thing. And we have guys we gotta get rid of because they don’t make the grade…
I have no doubt that a very few females can handle it at least for awhile. A very few have. At what point do we say the juice is not worth the squeeze?
Yeah I know all about female snipers in other countries… But there is alot of diffence in the way those countries operate and fight. They are not going to jump in overloaded and walk 50 miles, we have before and may again.
I am sick of the arguement that it affects promotion… EO is alive and well in todays military. Percentages are promoted, not the best qualified. The lesbian sisterhood (no I am not implying you are) will ensure you get your promotion percentage… And then some.
CEP is not a done deal yet. Until it is don’t we have other larger problems? Pushing your agenda while we are at war is frankly smacks of politics. I would expect that from the Docter… She is a civilian, but Maam you should know better.
Would clear, concise scientific and medical data, if shown to you prove that it would not work, change your minds? Or would you not let troublesome things like facts get in the way of pushing your agenda? Do you not realize that men treat men differently than woman and woman treat other woman differently than men? Are you not aware that both groups are genetically predisposed to do so? The reason I ask is because we are unable to depend on our morally weak generals and admirals to tell the truth… Moral cowardice and political correctness are the order of the day for them.
Look, I liked the shower scene in Starship Troopers too. But don’t let your fantasies carry you away.
Congradualtions to the Fems and Lesbians… Looks like you got what you wanted.
“[Focus] on issues like how to set standards, change training, etc”
“I don’t see why you get so emotional”
About the latter- the reason people get emotional over this issue is because lives are at stake and the fate of our nation. Military service has been traditionally looked at as service to the nation- as the nation sees fit- not as a right. That we look at it now as a right (for some) has broad implications- not the least of which is the transformation of the culture. That may seem good to people like you- but that is an assumption. The truth may be that we will be able to handle the negative effects (or, as I would submit- hide them) because we are in a position to. That may not always be the case. I’m also interested in the possible negative 2nd and 3rd order effects- which always seem to happen with any change the government mandates…
On your first point- okay- let’s look at that subject. Ranger School was reportedly recently told that they are a leadership school- and therefore there doesn’t need to be any physical standards that could possibly keep women from graduating. Pullups are therefore out. One wonders if carrying a 240 will now be out. Do you need to carry a heavy weapon to learn leadership? Maybe heavy rucks will be out too. My point is that it is very difficult to directly connect standards to combat requirements. It is not a logical, linear process – but because of poor articulation skills, political correctness, or the demand for linear justification for something that is not linear- standards will be done away with.
Already the word has gone out to start justifying ANYTHING we do that could possibly interfere with a woman doing it well. Do you see the change in focus? The focus used to be the mission. It is now “how to norm everything to guarantee women can do it”. We will couch the effort in terms that looks common sensical- but in the end standards will change because the logic behind them is both non-linear (and thus difficult to articulate) and traditionally tied to the average male (to field an army you have to have a certain # of folks- so to have the standard higher than the average male won’t get you the # you need…).
Regardless- I don’t think any of this means anything. Setting standards, changing training, etc.- should be focused on THE MISSION, not on EQUALITY. This change in focus is what many are lamenting. The assumption that equality will make the force better is such a shallow assertion that it is almost laughable. If we are to trust the military to gauge that- expect the politically correct brass to give strong approval to whatever the civilian leadership tell them to. But I don’t even think we should be talking about that. What I’m concerned with is the so-called epidemic of sexual harassment in the military. We have this huge problem, don’t seem to know how to fix it, and think it won’t interfere with combat arms units. Am I the only one worried about that?? Do we really think that more training (non combat training mind you), education, punishment, regulations, and policies will keep 18 year old girls and boys from messing around and creating problems for units and NOT interfering with preparing for combat? The reality in support units is that it IS a problem (although you’ll never know it due to it being politically incorrect to say so)- do we really think that will be good for combat arms units?
I submit until we are able to change 18 year olds and end the sexual harassment “epidemic”, we should not integrate women into any more units than they are already in.
So, all this talk about accepting it (which is not what the policy said- it is not a done deal- there are certain plans still owed, etc.) and talking about standards, etc.- it is all hogwash. It isn’t a done deal- but once it becomes a done deal I assert standards will change (they already have as noted above), effectiveness will be degraded, and the sexual harassment “epidemic” will spread to combat units and end more careers of good soldiers who might have saved others’ lives and protected the nation. The idea of the social-changers that we can change people ignores the possibility that the behavior is at least a little natural and the fact that our culture is going the other way (hyper objectifying people).
Mr. Swanson, this is a very informative piece and I can see how you have sympathy for the plight of our females in uniform. Your focus on FET and CST makes the reader assume females have been clearing bunkers along side their male counterparts. I for one disagree. I have personally served with all manner of FET, CST, etc. I worked with them before we gave them an acronym. Over the last 11 years of war, I have fought “along side” the opposite sex. At best, they aren’t a liability. Which is a good thing, and all I expect from them. All the anecdotal stories surfacing about girls kicking in doors or going on patrol don’t include the fact that they do this at the back of a formation.
Your insistence that we are behind the times is flawed by comparing us to other nations armies. First, there is a reason why we are the best fighting force in the world. Until recently, we have refused to allow our military to become a science project. Before we ask our military to gender integrate, why don’t we force the NFL to. Let that experiment prove mother nature was right. Second, your list of countries are red hearings at best. I have worked with most of the nations you listed over the years. They all say the same thing. Girls in the infantry are useless, dead weight. It just gives the rest of the guys more of a load to bear. A few of them you mentioned:
Britan- After integration the military did a study. This study showed female infantryman spent more time in sick call and on profile than actually on the job. Proving mother nature was right.
Canada- The Canadian military spent 250 million dollars recruiting women for the infantry. A few dozen made the cut and only one passed to graduation. That one quit after a year on the job, citing the daily rigors of an infantryman’s job. Proving mother nature right.
Isreal- Everyone knows the story. Integrated, war in 1948, till 2000, blah, blah, blah. The only Infantry unit that allows women is a coed unit that guards the Jordanian border, the safest post in the nation. Looks like someone put Baby in the corner. The Israeli’s don’t want mother nature to proven right….again
It’s always failed. But hey, we’re Americans. We can do anything we put our minds to. Except balance a budget.
Ms. Swanson,
(I will take this time to apoligize for spelling/typing errors, also Suzy is not a derogatory term)
You say I am emotional? Maybe I am. You see when if I screw up people die, if I do everything right they still might die. That being said I want every advantage I can get. Is that what work is like for you and the MAJ?
One more thing. You didn’t talk about Soldiers getting pregnate. It happens. I am NOT laying blame on anyone for it. But here is the deal: You will not get a replacement. You will not have that Soldier for deployment or she will not be available for train-up for the next deployment. The Light Infantry/SOF isn’t an office job even in garrison. If a troop in a Finace unit gets pregnate, she can continue to do her job in garrison. If you have a female troop get pregnate troop you better figure on not having them for 12 MONTHS, and thats if all goes well. Problems:
1. If Suzy is a private, you will not get a replacement. A rifle squad (at this time) is 9 troops. (This is too small in my opinion, but that is another conversation) so the squad deploys shorthanded. This means everyone has to cover down to accomplish the mission. Everyone has to carry a little more, sleep a little less etc. They haven’t been in their first contact and they are already short. And we are usually already short, from injuries, lack of replacements etc.
Heres another thing. PVT Suzy shows up to her first unit. A month later she learns she is pregnate. She can’t do Infantry stuff for a year, but she is smart so she takes classes etc. With promotion points so low she makes SGT in two years… But she only has half the experiance of the rest because she didn’t get time to do all the positions within the platoon.
2. If Suzy is a junior leader, you will not get a replacement. So troops deploy without their leader. So the unit deploys shorthanded. This means everyone has to cover down to accomplish the mission. Everyone has to carry a little more, sleep a little less etc. Lets say Suzy is a fire team leader… Now her team has lost 25% of its manpower. For a fire team this just about makes it combat in-effective… And they haven’t been in their first firefight yet… Let us also say it is her and her fire teams first first deployment, but she missed it.
Now lets say the fire team/squad/platoon returns with no KIA’s/WIA’s. Suzy resumes her role as the element leader. Do you really think those troops are going to listen to much of what she has to say? If it was a man it would be the same way.
At this time if you are a combat arms leader over the rank of SGT and you don’t have a combat patch/CIB, no one listens to you. You might be God’s gift to the Army but that dosn’t matter because you haven’t “seen the elephant” and it dosn’t matter what rank your are either. This is accross the Army and not just a combat arms thing either. In a time of peace maybe it will be less important, but for now it isn’t that way.
Now I have mostly talked about enlisted here but now lets talk about officers. Officers have a certain amount of time to do certain things in their paths. When a LT gets to his first unit he is made a PL for 12 or so months, if very lucky 18 months… Sometimes more, sometimes less. If he is good to go, maybe he gets a second specialty platoon.
What if LT Suzy reports to her unit and a month later finds out she is pregnate? She can’t be the PL (though she might be left on the books as one)for the train up. 6 months later the unit deploys. They return 12 months later. Suzy has missed her chance to be a PL… This is an absolutely CRITICAL part of an officer path in combat arms… Not many Battalion Commanders are going to want to make a CPT into a company commander if they haven’t been a PL… No good BN CDR is. Yeah there is a little more leeway when it come time to become a Company Commander because officers spend some time as CPT’s so a pregnacy could be worked around.
But what if she gets a company only to have to give it up because shes having a kiddo? But miss that PL time and she is screwed unless maybe her daddy is a general…
Here is another thing. The Army isn’t going to transfer a female CPT/MAJ/LTC etc into the Infantry/SOF just because it’s now open. Well I guess I shouldn’t say that, who know what the hell they will do, but they shouldn’t. And this isn’t because they are woman either. The Infantry is already having to deal with problems with non-Infantry commanders not understanding how to properly use them. SOF might even have it a bit worse.
Now lets talk about some things that don’t get talked about at cocktail parties, that you and higher either never thought of or refused to consider…
Most senior Light Infantry leaders will tell you it a good idea for the PL/PSG to share a hootch at base when deployed. Do you think after a 20 hour patrol, I am going to remember to knock to ensure my female PL is clothed? I am no prude… But she might be…
Or lets say its night, pitch black, no moon and I gotta wake up the female PL in her hootch, because the CO wants her… She is a heavy sleeper. You think she will be mad if I poke her with a stick to wake her?
What about hygiene issues? Do you have any idea where Light Infantry/SOF units take a poop when on patrol? It not private. Its in the middle of the patrol base or parameter in full veiw of EVERYONE. Thats the way it is. I am not going to be able to carry a porta-pottie around for a changing room. Ok, from the patrol base, now we got a 12 klick movement over the mountain, to the ORP. To prevent overheating going to have to take off the polypro. Oops we are tactical, hope you don’t mind being buck naked infront of everybody. Or what about when we have to wash off in a creek or pool of water? You ever been to Afghanistan Ms. Swanson? I spent a year with now shower… We would take a patrol to a nearby creek during the warm months to wash. No privicy. Had to have 3/4 of the unit on security, while 1/4 washed… again in full veiw.
What about Alaska (or any artic/cold area of the world), Ms. Swanson you ever been stationed there? In Alaska during winter, to prevent constipation and ensure hydration in an Light Infantry unit heres a fun thing you get to do as a leader. You get to take your team/squad out and watch them piss and poop. What fun. You have to do this to ensure they are drinking water, because no one wants to drink cold water when its freezing out. Why watch them poop? To ensure they do. When it’s 50 below no one wants to take their pants down to releive themselves. So they get sick or constipated and have to be evacated. Guess who gets to catch hell from higher if this happens? It isn’t the General.
You really think woman are not going to look at men and men are not going to look at woman? Are you in a hurry to go on patrol now? How long do you think it will be before a female complains about that? What do you think the Army will do? I will tell you. She will complain. The leaders will get in trouble/fired.
Do you honestly think the idiots, err I mean enlightened, all knowing leaders that approved this, even thought such things? The answer is no. Won’t be their problem, they don’t spend much time in a patrol base, LOL.
Do you think they are worried about it? The answer is NO. because they won’t have to deal with it. What do they care if a female complains and some men get into trouble? Long as it isn’t them, they will give less than a crap.
I am willing to bet not alot of Army females have done this. Look what you will get to do in the Light Infantry!!! Especially as we move back to full spec ops.
To my senior leaders, thanks so much for setting me up for success.
Ms Swanson, MAJ Medeiros,
I have not seen a reply… Did you not consider this area? Or is it too shocking? Or is it that you will never have to do it? Well it is what happens on patrols that last more than 12 hours.