Transition in Afghanistan
Transition in Afghanistan – Prepared statement by Dr. David Kilcullen, President and CEO of Caerus Associates, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan, 10 May 2011. Excerpt follows:
I would like to focus narrowly on the question of what, specifically, needs to happen on the ground in Afghanistan in order to enable a transition in 2014. The answer to this question depends on whether you believe the insurgency in Afghanistan is the problem, or is a symptom of a wider set of problems. My work in and on Afghanistan over the past seven years suggests the latter – that is, the insurgency arises from a wider set of causes, and just dealing with active fighters will be insufficient for effective transition.
In particular, I see the war as arising from a four-part cycle of instability:
– Corruption and criminality, arising in part from the drug economy and in part from the international presence and the contracting bonanza associated with it, creates a flood of illicit cash into the hands of elites, power brokers, local warlords and certain corrupt officials;
– This corruption enables and incentivizes abuse, in the form of expropriation of resources, denial of justice, physical abuse and violence, against ordinary members of the Afghan population;
– These abuses create popular rage, cynicism and disillusionment with the Afghan government, but also with the international community, whom many Afghans hold responsible for the behavior of abusive officials and elites;
– This empowers and enables the insurgents, who are able to pose as clean, just, incorruptible, and the defenders of the people, and can exploit popular rage to build support; and the insurgency in turn creates the conditions of instability, violence and lack of accountability that drive the cycle onward.
As I have previously testified, we have seen this cycle deepen and worsen over the past decade of the war, and our focus (at various times) solely on destroying the main forces of the enemy has been ineffective in addressing the wider drivers of the conflict, or has even made things worse.
To address this overall instability dynamic, we need four things: an anti-corruption campaign, a governance reform campaign, a process of political reconciliation at the district and local level, and a robust security campaign to suppress the insurgency while these other elements have time to take effect.
Transition in Afghanistan – Prepared statement by Dr. David Kilcullen.