The Real Plan B in AfPak
The Real Plan B in AfPak:
Keeping China Out, Bringing India In, Calming Turkey Down
by Tony Corn
Download The Full Article: The Real Plan B in AfPak
In response to a charge of inconsistency, British economist John Maynard Keynes once famously replied: “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?”
Keynes’s remark comes to mind when trying to assess the change of heart of the Obama Administration regarding Afghanistan in the past twelve months. At the risk of caricaturing: in December 2009, the Plan was to start withdrawing by July 2011; by December 2010, the Plan seemed to have become, stay “well beyond 2014.” While critics were quick to accuse the Administration of inconsistency, a more judicious approach is to ask: What facts may have changed, that led the White House to change its mind?
In Afghanistan itself, not much appears to have changed. At the tactical level, to be sure, the counter-terrorism (CT) component is producing some results. At the operational level, General Caldwell’s inspired leadership and management of the security force assistance (SFA) program has led to unexpected progress in a remarkably short period of time. At the strategic level, though, there has not been any noticeable improvement in terms of development and/or governance, be it at the national or the local levels.
The main “fact” that seems to have changed is the realization, on the U.S. part, that a) given the shortage of trainers and infrastructure, the majority of Afghan forces won’t be ready to take over until 2014, and b) the majority of Taliban will never be weakened enough to be forced to the negotiating table so long as the AfPak border is not sealed, so long as Pakistan continues its double dealing, and so long as NATO’s logistical dependence deprives the U.S. of any significant leverage over Pakistani elites.
In the Afghan neighborhood, by contrast, what has profoundly changed in the past twelve months is the diplomatic dynamics. In such a rapidly changing environment, the “fog of diplomacy” can become thicker still than the proverbial “fog of war,” and military analysts will naturally be inclined to confine their assessments to the operational level. In fairness, based on open sources alone, it is often difficult to get more than a fragmentary picture of the moves and countermoves of the various players. Within these limits, though, it should be clear to military analysts that two ongoing developments deserve careful monitoring:
On the one hand, due to China’s increasing assertiveness in the region in general, and in India’s own backyard (Jammu & Kashmir and the Arabian Sea) in particular, New Delhi seems to have finally realized that the presence of NATO in the area (both on land and at sea) is all benefit to India, and that the time has come to dispense with the Nehruvian theology of “non-alignment.” On the other hand, due to Turkey’s increasing self-intoxication with the idea of a “Global Turkey” in general, and its assertiveness with regard to the Sino-Pakistani axis in particular, not only has India never been so threatened with marginalization over Afghanistan as today, but America itself is in danger of losing the diplomatic initiative.
To the extent that there is a Plan B for AfPak, then, one could argue it is aimed above all at preserving optimal flexibility for the U.S. in the next three years, while keeping China out, bringing India in, and calming Turkey down.
Download The Full Article: The Real Plan B in AfPak
Dr. Tony Corn taught European Studies at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute in Washington DC. This is a follow-up to two articles: Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy with Chinese Characteristics and COIN in Absurdistan: Saving the COIN Baby from the Afghan Bathwater (and Vice-Versa). The opinions expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the view of the U.S. Department of State.
