Beyond FM 3-24

Beyond FM 3-24:

Readings for the Counterinsurgency Commander

by Joshua Thiel, Bryan Martin, William Marm, Christopher O’Gwin, Christopher Young, Gabriel Szody, and Douglas Borer

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Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, United States (U.S.) Army Green Berets were active in the international sphere. Organized in small, twelve-man teams known as Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA), these specially trained soldiers were primarily engaged as teachers of Counterinsurgency (COIN) to Host Nation’s (HN) military forces during Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions. They were expected to not only add value to the capacity, professionalization, and operational capabilities of the HN forces, but were also expected to be the COIN subject matter experts within the U.S. military. However, ODAs rapidly evolved from teachers of COIN to practitioners of the art during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

If one were to follow a randomly chosen ODA chronologically, the COIN techniques and methods used by that unit have changed in three general ways over the last ten years. The initial pedagogical role as teachers of COIN to foreign partners before 9-11, gave way for the first seven or so years in Iraq and Afghanistan to extreme instances of Direct Action in the new role as the “Primary Counterinsurgent.” In the third phase, many ODA’s have returned to a more nuanced approach today that reflects the Special Force’s original call to arms, “By, With, and Through.” Additionally, even as Special Forces has sought to reclaim its roots, the U.S. military as a whole, including conventional or general purpose forces, have also become much more COIN savvy over time.

Indeed, ODAs in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Trans-Sahel, and in Central and South America have traveled the full arc between primary teacher to primary practitioner and back again depending on the local rules of engagement. Likewise, many Army and Marine units have been assigned duties in Afghanistan and Iraq as practitioners of COIN, and Navy Seal Teams have often been assigned roles as COIN teachers in FID missions — assignments for which they have minimal formal preparation. In preparation for these difficult assignments, most junior officers today refer to the Army’s FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, a document which is weighted heavily towards preparing the U.S. military in the role of “Primary Counterinsurgent.” What additional readings beyond FM 3-24 might be useful to help prepare junior officers for the full array of COIN challenges facing America’s expeditionary units?

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Major Joshua Thiel is a United States Army Special Forces Officer and graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis and a graduate of American Military University with a Masters of Arts in Low Intensity Conflict. His undergraduate degree in Economics is from the United States Military Academy at West Point. He has deployed to Iraq, Thailand, and Papua New Guinea, and has served in both the Infantry and Special Forces. He is currently preparing to return to the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne).

Dr. Douglas A. Borer is Associate Professor and Associate Chair for Instruction in the Defense Analysis Department at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He teaches in the SOLIC and IO curricula and writes on the politics of legitimacy in war. He is a retired bear hunter from Montana.

Editor’s Note: In response to an RFI for lessons learned in modern counterinsurgency, a group of Special Forces officers and one defense analysis professor submitted this essay, a culmination of their three month study. This essay is important- pay close attention to how they describe the differing roles between FID and the Primary Counterinsurgent.