The Saudi Option
The Saudi Option
by Tristan Abbey and Scott Palter
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The year is 2012. Squadrons of F-15s, F-16s, and F-18s streak across the sky,
swamping air defenses and neutralizing other key Iranian installations. The next
wave targets the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Qom, the nuclear power
station at Bushehr, the conversion plant in Isfahan, and the heavy water plant at
Arak. Within hours the Iranian nuclear program is crippled. As the armada returns
to base, the head of state who ordered the attack readies to congratulate the pilots
who carried it out.
“Peace be upon you all,” King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz says to his men.
“Your bravery humbles me. The Saudi Kingdom will be forever grateful.
*
* *
Since the Bush administration forced the issue of Iran’s nuclear program to the
fore in 2002, debating the merits and perils of a preemptive airstrike has become
something of a favorite pastime. Amid all the chatter about narrow corridors and
Saudi “green lights” lies an inescapable truth: a surprise Israeli strike has never
been more unlikely.
The contours of the problem have remained largely unchanged over the years. The
United States risks too much by attacking Iran, while an Israeli strike is difficult
to achieve without American backing. None of the countries that could conceivably
grant Israel over-flight rights—Turkey, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia—relishes the thought
of being seen as complicit in a Zionist-Crusader foray against yet another Muslim
country. Logistical requirements, namely limited refueling capacity, restrict the
Israeli Air Force’s options to but a single multi-squadron assault of questionable
long-term effectiveness. Tel Aviv, essentially, has one bullet.
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Tristan Abbey is in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. Scott Palter, a professional wargame designer and publisher, is President of Final Sword Productions, LLC. Both are senior editors at
Bellum: A Project of The Stanford Review.
