The 800-pound Gorilla and Stability Operations
The 800-pound Gorilla and Stability
Operations
by James P. Hunt, Major General,
USAF
Deputy Commanding General, MNC-I, April
09 — Jan 10
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Gorilla and Stability Operations
It’s early 2010, Baghdad, Iraq. At the New Embassy Complex, three Foreign
Service officers wait for the start of their meeting with officers from United States
Forces-Iraq. It’s a small room, seating about ten people, but with only three
Department of State representatives there should be plenty of room for the military
participants. The door swings open, and twenty officers walk in the room and
scramble for seats. One opens up a satchel and pulls out sets of briefing
slides—it looks like there are close to fifty slides for the briefing. After
lots of shuffling around, an officer starts the presentation. Today, he’s
talking about how the military will support the Provincial Reconstruction Teams;
he goes through the entire military planning process: Mission analysis, courses
of action, the results of the military’s war gaming, and which course of action
the military supports.
Throughout the hour-long meeting, the Foreign Service Officers listen politely
and ask a few questions. They ponder the complex diagrams, troop-to-task calculations,
logistics concepts. Their few questions are answered in sentences filled
mostly with abbreviations or acronyms. It’s as if questions or discussion
will ruin the rhythm and timing of the briefing. At the end of the meeting,
the senior military officer comments, “Thanks for listening to us today. We
think we’ve got a good plan here and are ready to support you. After all,
civilians are in the lead for improving civil capacity in Iraq, and we’re here to
help. Please let us know what you think, but we’re ready to execute right
away…”
After the military team leaves, the Foreign Service Officers look at each other
and sigh. They’ve just attended a meeting describing the military support
they’ll be receiving without being part of the planning dialog that led to the military’s
support plan. The stacks of briefing slides wind up in the burn bag.
They’ll meet with the military planners again in a week, but next time the military
will bring a 100-page operations plan full of objectives, metrics, and implementing
instructions. The Embassy was not part of the process that led to the plan
and wasn’t asked specifically what support it needed. They don’t necessarily
understand the plan, would spend staff hours they simply don’t have to make significant
changes to the plan, and would probably rather just be asked “how can we help?”
The military officers walk away frustrated because the civilians are not jumping
with joy over their excellent briefing and plan that took many man-hours to build
and sense their civilian counterparts would rather have no plan at all.
Download the full article:
Gorilla and Stability Operations
Maj. Gen. James P. Hunt was the Deputy Commanding General, I Corps, U.S. Forces-Iraq,
Baghdad, Iraq, from April 2009 to January, 2010. General Hunt was second-in-command
and was responsible for the Corps' coordination and integration at the tactical
and operational level with interagency partners, including the U.S. Embassy-Iraq,
the U.S. Agency for International Development and non-governmental organizations.
Maj Gen. Hunt was born in California and entered the Air Force in 1976 as
a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. He has held staff positions at the numbered
air force, major command, Air Staff and Joint Staff. The general commanded an F-117
squadron, a U-2 operations group and three wings, including an air expeditionary
wing in Afghanistan. He is a fighter pilot with over 3,000 hours in the F-4,
F-15, F-117, and U-2 aircraft.
