Strategic Communication Primer
Commander Steve Tatham, Royal Navy, who recently authored Tactical Strategic Communication! – Placing Informational Effect at the Centre of Command for British Army Review and republished here at Small Wars Journal, also penned Strategic Communication: A Primer.
The concept of Strategic Communication had, until late 2008, received only scant attention in the UK. However the production of the UK’s counterinsurgency doctrine (still to be definitively named but catalogued as Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40: Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution) presented an opportunity for this to be addressed in what was to be a chapter on military influence.
That the doctrine has still not been published, after nearly two years of development, is indicative of the difficulties the British Armed Forces are experienceing in articulating not just lessons learned from Iraq and on-going operations in Afghanistan – but also in applying the same to future scenarios. To assist the Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre in its work the UK Defence Academy’s Director of Communication Research; Commander Tatham, a media operations expert and author of the 2006 polemic study ‘Losing Arab Hearts and Minds: The Coalition, Al-Jazeera & Muslim Public Opinion; produced and published the Strategic Communication Primer in late 2008. This document attempts the first definition of strategic communication by the UK and considers some of the problems of communication in 21st Century conflict, settling on the pragmatic complexity model presented by Arizona State’s Consortium for Strategic Communication. Tatham’s primer has been followed by the roll out of a Strategic Communication education program across all UK Staff Courses. Trialed initially on the UK’s Tri-Service Warrant Officer’s course – where the concept was warmly welcomed – it has subsequently been rolled out to the initial (8 week) staff courses (for Lieutenants and Captains), the Advanced (1 year) staff course (for Majors and Lieutenant Colonels) and the Higher Staff Course for very senior officers.
Key in Tatham’s findings are the belief that Strategic Communication is not simply the tighter binding of Information Operations, Public Affairs, etal, but that Strategic Communication should be a core component of the Command function; that recognizing every action, however benign it may superficially appear, will generate an informational effect. That effect can alter perception and for many perception equals reality. Tatham advised Brigadier (now Major General) Andrew Mackay during his planning for 52 Brigade British Army deployment to Helmand. Mackay centralized the idea, from lowest private to the highest ranks, that popular consent was vital and the story of his preparation and deployment is told in the recent British Army Review article by Commander Tatham linked above.