The Strongest Tribe (Bumped)
Small Wars Journal has received an advance copy of Bing West’s newest book The Strongest Tribe. We will be posting a review and SWJ interview with Bing in the near future. The early pages and reviews indicate that The Strongest Tribe will be acknowledged as a classic work on counterinsurgency in Iraq — much like The Village defined COIN in Vietnam. The Strongest Tribe can be pre-ordered (highly recommended — 12 August release date) at Amazon. The publisher’s book description, video, several short endorsements and a Random House interview with Bing follow.
Description: From a universally respected combat journalist, a gripping history based on five years of front-line reporting about how the war was turned around–and the choice now facing America.
During the fierce battle for Fallujah, Bing West asked an Iraqi colonel why the archterrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had fled in women’s clothes. The colonel pointed to a Marine patrol walking by and said, “Americans are the strongest tribe.”
In Iraq, America made mistake after mistake. Many gave up on the war. Then the war took a sharp U-turn. Two generals–David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno–displayed the leadership America expected. Bringing the reader from the White House to the fighting in the streets, this remarkable narrative explains the turnaround by U.S. forces.
In the course of fourteen extended trips over five years, West embedded with more than sixty front-line units, discussing strategy with generals and tactics with corporals. He provides an expert’s account of counterinsurgency, disposing of myths. By describing the characters and combat in city after city, West gives the reader an in-depth understanding that will inform the debate about the war. This is the definitive study of how American soldiers actually fought –a gripping and visceral book that changes the way we think about the war, and essential reading for understanding the next critical steps to be taken.
“Balanced, panoramic assessment of the Iraq War by former Marine and Reagan administration veteran West, who heralds American soldiers as its unsung heroes amid the “fog of Washington”… A timely, eye-opening historical analysis that provides clarity around the difficult choices the next president faces.”
–Kirkus
“In this important new chronicle of the war in Iraq, Bing West reveals how America reached the brink of defeat in 2006 and then managed in 2007 to stage a stunning turnaround. With its vivid, on-the-ground reporting, his book is a fitting tribute to the honor, valor, and toughness of our soldiers. Notwithstanding numerous mistakes by their leaders, West shows that their sacrifices have made success possible–as long we do not withdraw prematurely.”
–Senator John S. McCain
“Sometimes the best way to support the troops is to criticize the generals. Bing West does both well in this book, showing a sympathy for our soldiers and Marines, but also a great ear for military truth and a determination to render events accurately. This is his third and most important book about the Iraq war. Read it.”
— Thomas E. Ricks, author of FIASCO: The American Military Adventure in Iraq
“A brilliant exposition. Based on extensive experience in the war zone, Bing West recounts how Soldiers and Marines showed the President and the Pentagon the way to solve the Iraq insurgency problem. Echoing the admonition that “all politics are local”, The Strongest Tribe convincingly argues that it was a grass roots strategy developed by on-scene officers who forged ties at the tribal level that brought stability to Iraq’s turbulent Anbar Province and provided hope for all Iraq.”
— Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor USMC (Ret.) Co-author of The Generals’ War
and COBRA II
“Some four decades ago I told Bing West that his book, The Village, would become a classic in counterinsurgency warfare. And so it did. “The Strongest Tribe” will surely be West’s second classic – a moving and detailed account of almost six years of war in Iraq.”
— Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, Secretary of Defense
A Conversation with Bing West, author of The Strongest Tribe
What does your title, The Strongest Tribe, mean? During the battle for Fallujah, I asked an Iraqi colonel why the terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, had fled, disguised as a woman. The colonel pointed to the Marines rushing past us and said, “Because Americans are the strongest tribe.”
What is the book’s basic message? Industrial Age armies, like in World War II, don’t fight us anymore. In future wars, our enemies will wear civilian clothes and hide among the people. Our soldiers are learning how to adapt; our society has not yet learned. We cannot treat tens of thousands of enemy soldiers as petitioners in our civil courts.
What was the main mistake in the war? Handing complete sovereignty to sectarian, incompetent Iraqi politicians, typified by the serpentine Mr. Maliki. Since we were dying for them, we should have controlled the promotions in their security forces. That would have shortened the war.
You say General Petraeus didn’t turn the war around. (p 364) The war turned because the Sunni tribes came over to the American side before Petraeus arrived. Petraeus, a fine general, reinforced that success. But did not create it. The war was won from the bottom up due to the tenacity of our soldiers. It’s a dangerous delusion to believe any general can bring quick success. That belief allows the rest of us to feel we don’t have to commit or sacrifice in wartime. It’s up to the generals. That lets us off the hook, so we can vote for a war, and then disown it.
We’re doing well now. So why not pull out, as Senator Obama has proposed? We should pull out most of our forces. General Petraeus has earned our trust. He is best qualified to determine the rate of withdrawal. A fixed timetable is militarily rash. A fixed timetable doesn’t mean Iraq will fall apart. A timetable does tell al Qaeda when we are leaving — and from where. Al Qaeda will concentrate on the weak areas. The weaker Iraqi battalions will pull back, conceding sanctuaries. Al Qaeda, now on the ropes, will not be finished off. We must avoid saying we are leaving because the Iraqis have not done enough. That makes us look like quitters. If you quit, people treat you as a loser. Al Qaeda will be encouraged and the war in Afghanistan will be harder to fight.
In Iraq, the U.S. military became a nation-building force. Is this the future? A soldier is a rifleman. It is not a military mission to rebuild Islamic societies. Senator Obama says he is going to take the fight to al Qaeda in Pakistan and help Afghans grow their economy from the bottom up. If he’s serious, get ready for a long, bloody war and nation-building on a staggering scale. It is the wrong use of our military.
You write, “The greatest technical failure in the police war was the inability to identify the male population.” Why? (p 368) Iraq was a police war. Ten insurgents were imprisoned for each one killed. Our military do not understand police techniques and do not fingerprint the population. If we had done so, many of the insurgents in civilian clothes could have been identified, shortening the war. Our military does not understand how to act as police.
You are critical of the president. Why? (pp 167, 199) The president didn’t study. The US military wanted to hand off the war to the Iraqis to win or lose. The president wanted the US military to win the war, not hand it off. He let this basic contradiction in strategy go unchallenged for years. Contrary to the public image, he and Secretary Rice were indecisive, letting the war drift until 2007.
You write, “The president must have someone –the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or the Secretary of Defense — with responsibility for assessing risk, separate from the commander in the field.” Why was that overlooked? (p 363) Every military man has a “can do” spirit; he never admits defeat. So the reports up the chain of command are always positive. The president must insist on an independent risk assessor. President Bush failed to do that.
You’re equally rough on some senators. Why? (p171) For fecklessness. When we are at war, you support the troops. For a senator like Harry Reid to say the war was lost while our soldiers were fighting disgraced our country.
Why did our top generals believe that American soldiers were an antibody in an Arab culture that had to be removed fast? (p 78) That was shallow thinking. The real issue is whether you are providing security. For too long, in Baghdad our soldiers were living on bases. That allowed terrorists and militias to control the population. In Anbar to the west, the Marines were staying in the towns. The people got to know them and slowly the tribes changed sides. Then Petraeus did the same thing in and around Baghdad. No more commuting to work. Once the Americans provided real security, they were welcomed.
Has the $22 billion in US reconstruction funds been spent wisely? (p 369) It was thrown away because we never had a sensible plan. Are funds intended to help our soldiers by creating goodwill (I say yes) or to restructure the Iraqi economy? (I say no)
Are domestic politics causing us to deny what our soldiers accomplished? Absolutely. Today, despite the success of the military surge, 50% of Americans deny any military progress in Iraq. Why? Because they oppose the war. Ideology has overwhelmed facts. In World War II, the US military publicly hanged over 140 soldiers for rape and murder. The press never highlighted a single hanging. In Iraq, Haditha received twenty times the publicity of all the acts of valor in the war. In World War II, we highlighted valor. Today, we highlight mistakes. In the future, we will fight again. Will we be united? The evidence suggests not. That’s unsettling.
