Member Login Become a Member
Advertisement

SWJ Interview with BG Jim Huggins

  |  
03.11.2008 at 09:31pm

On 9 February SWJ conducted a phone interview with Brigadier General Jim Huggins, Deputy Commanding General (Manuever), of Multi-National Division – Center (3rd Infantry Division / MND-C). MND-C arrived in-country last March as part of the “the surge” and the new population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy directed by General David Petraeus, Commanding General of Multi-National Force — Iraq (MNF-I). MND-C’s area of responsibility are the security zones located along the southern edge of Baghdad and scales from the border of Saudi Arabia to the border of Iran.

A summary of highlights from the interview follow.

1. We continue offensive operations in the Southern Security Belts. These operations started with the Surge and are methodical, not in any way “whack-a-mole” style. As General Petraeus stated, we cannot “kill our way” through and out of an area, what this meant for us was the Division moving into an area to establish security followed by what is now called Sons of Iraq (formerly Concerned Local Citizens) who assumed security duties for a given area. As background, we believe the formation of SOI / CLC was a direct result of the Surge.

2. An integral part of our offensive operations is a refined intelligence-driven targeting process that has denied AQI sanctuary forcing a dispersion of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leadership and some of the Sunni extremists out of our area. The Division is now looking at exactly what this exodus means in terms of AQI capabilities as well as planning for capacity building and tying into overall Corps’ operations to further pressure AQI and build on success. Capacity building includes increasing Iraqi security force (Army and Police) capabilities as well as supporting other lines of operations to include governance, rule of law and very targeted projects to build the perception of security in all the small towns and villages — what we cannot do is ‘blow by’ areas and leave the Iraqis living in what can be called a ‘war zone’.

3. The Sons of Iraq has been an integral part of the improved security. When the Division first arrived AQI attacks averaged about 25 a day, now we are seeing an average of 3 or less as well as a 75% reduction in civilian casualties.

4. On the US side of the house our leadership; brigade, battalion and company commanders, are on their second or third tour and have learned how to do both the lethal and non-lethal aspects of counterinsurgency — simultaneously. This is important as every one of our soldiers must excel at the lethal even while conducting non-lethal operations because at any time, in a split second, a non-lethal situation may transition to lethal.

5. Turning to the outlook for the remainder of the year, post-surge, the division has given this a lot of thought and unfortunately does not have a crystal ball as far as what a possible draw-down may mean. What we are looking at though, are identifying opportunities — opportunities based on conditions we see and not on a time-line. The plan currently in place through the summer is doable in the Division’s area — our brigades and the increased contribution of Iraqi Security Forces and Sons of Iraq have shaped the current trend and laid the groundwork.

6. Along non-security lines of operation — governance, economic, and essential services — the bottom-up approach seems best suited for the Division’s area. The Division’s role is to act as a bridge — facilitating local grass-roots organizations to reach out and up. The key for the long term though is the ability of the National Government to eventually make those hard non-sectarian decisions to ensure Iraq reconciliation.

7. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are value added – “the keys to the kingdom” in terms of capacity building. The only down-side is we do not have enough of them.

8. On FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, unlike older doctrine that dictated “the battle drill’ or what to think — step 1, step 2, step 3…, FM 3-24 conveys “how to think” about COIN as well how to react to complex problem sets and adapt rather than teaching how to react from rote memory. Moreover, FM 3-24 will “morph” in the future as it is informed by our experiences here in Iraq and elsewhere.

Related Links:

SWJ Interview with BG Edward Cardon – 21 January 2008

DoD Bloggers Roundtable with MG Rick Lynch – 10 March 2008

About The Author

Article Discussion: