COIN

Journal Article | July 5, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(2)

Avoid the Charlie Wilson complex: guilt over the cries of ‘abandoning Afghanistan’ and deciding not to spend billions more of taxpayer’s money on a hop-scotch of social...

As Iraq appears to unravel, it is only right to continue the debate about counterinsurgency, the appropriate application of landpower, and  the expanding role of Special Operations in the US...

Journal Article | June 18, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(4)

Counterinsurgency is often a small-unit battle, with company-sized elements requiring organic intelligence capabilities to leverage information into tactical success.

Journal Article | June 18, 2013 02:30 AM | Comments(4)

Beware the lure of "credibility."

The Eid statements demonstrate an increasing sophistication in strategic messaging and understanding of international politics.

Journal Article | June 7, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(1)

In civil wars like Syria’s, strength is not necessarily a product of popularity; often strength actually produces popularity because compliance is more important than winning hearts and minds.

Journal Article | May 30, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(2)

Some of the major “lessons learned” by ISAF while conducting Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations in Afghanistan

Journal Article | May 22, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(20)

The Army has an unfortunate tradition of considering insurgent conflict a sideshow effort and relegating the study of insurgencies to the fringes of military science. The Philippines campaign is a...

Journal Article | May 10, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(11)

Cann’s book is very much a must read, especially considering the painfully limited Anglophone literature on the Portuguese Overseas War.

Journal Article | April 30, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(1)

Bringing time into the assessment of counterinsurgency warfare.

Journal Article | April 26, 2013 01:25 AM | Comments(7)

If we ignore village life – or try to bend it to our view of what it should be – we will fail in Afghanistan as we did in Vietnam.

Journal Article | April 24, 2013 01:25 AM | Comments(1)

Ten easy to follow recommendations to help you become an effective military advisor.

Unlike a certain mathematical solution counterinsurgency is a laden with human error and complexity.

Interoperability is a function of leadership, hardship, and time. To quickly achieve it, focus on individual personalities, understand that everyone has value, and exercise mission command.

Journal Article | April 18, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(33)

An interview with MIT Professor Roger D. Petersen.

Journal Article | April 17, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(9)

Understanding the correlation between an insurgency’s goals and their IED design is crucial to defending against the devices and forecasting IED threats.

Journal Article | April 16, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(1)

Guerilla warfare is not an “Eastern Way of War,” it is the universal war of the weak.

Journal Article | April 11, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(2)

One consistently wrong—but always convenient—prediction has been the improbability of ground wars and the declining utility of ground forces.

Journal Article | April 9, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(26)

The “U.S. in the Lead” COIN approach usually fails where security force assistance could succeed.

Journal Article | April 5, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(17)

Despite success at degrading Philippine terrorist networks, much of the security gains have been transitory, while the underlying socio-economic problems in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago...

Journal Article | March 28, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(13)

The Civilian Irregular Defense Group was one of Special Forces’ greatest success stories and by far the greatest example of how to fight unconventional warfare with an economy of force approach.

Journal Article | March 25, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(3)

While COIN remains the convention, to varying degrees, in post-conflict and steady-state operations, rule of law will be an essential part of the US security mission.

Journal Article | March 21, 2013 01:30 AM | Comments(6)

The explosive effects of rumors in Syria and insurgenceis around the world.

Journal Article | March 5, 2013 02:30 AM | Comments(23)

When Afghanistan failed, then COIN was seen as having failed too, having proved itself too risky, too time-consuming to justify its extraordinary investment in lives and treasure.

Journal Article | February 25, 2013 02:30 AM | Comments(11)

If the coalition consolidates on major bases along the ring road and attempts a Soviet-style hub and spoke concept, the result will be the same: defeat.