The Jones Insurgency Model
The Jones Insurgency Model
A Tool for the Prevention and
Resolution of Insurgency
by Colonel Robert C. Jones
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Offered here is the simple proposition that insurgency happens when
governance fails. Similarly, foreign terrorism happens when one supports these
same failed systems.
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Not the kind of failed governance that draws so much attention to
countries like Somalia; which is probably more accurately described as a
rejection of forced western, Westphalian constructs of governance for forms
more acceptable to their culture and society.
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Not the kind of failed governance that draws so much attention to
countries like Bangladesh; where the lack of effective government services
and widespread poverty are largely seen as "normal" by the affected
populace.
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Not the kind of failed governance that draws so much attention to
countries like Liberia; where auspices of statehood are perverted to
criminal purposes.
No, the failures that lead to insurgency are far more fundamental, and often
so insidious that they are not even recognized or acknowledged by their equally
failing leaders; even when pointed out to them, often quite violently, by their
own populaces. What makes countering such insurgent causation even more
complicated is that these failures do not even have to be real; all that is
required is that some key segment of the populace reasonably believes them to be
true. The irony is not that this happens in countries like those described
above, but that it also afflicts the most developed, upright, and law abiding
countries as well. This is the paradox. This is why counterinsurgency is so
difficult: it can happen anywhere, its causation is rooted in perceptions of
governmental failure; and its resolution is rooted in governmental recognition
and resolution of those same perceptions.
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Colonel Robert C. Jones, U.S. Army Reserve, is a Special Forces officer
currently assigned as the Chief, Strategic Studies for U.S. Special Operations
Command; with duty in Kandahar, Afghanistan as the Chief, Special Operations
Planning and Liaison Element to Regional Command-South. The opinions he
expresses here are his own and represent no NATO, U.S. Government or Department
of Defense positions.
See also this article as published here in the ISAF Counterinsurgency Blog.
Anon:
Actually these point help to validate the model. The model is not a recipe for sustaining the current government in power and defeating insurgent. The model is for bringing stability to a populace by understanding and addressing the root causes of insurgency.
Sometimes, as history shows, the best hope at Good Governance comes from the insurgent. This was the case in the United States.
The challenge for US foreign policy is to devine how to not become mired in proping up dictators; or in enabling impunity of governance by our very support in the same. How to shift our focus to be more focused on the populace and tying our national interests to them, rather than any particular form of government or manning of government.
What we have to ask ourselves about Afghanistan, is what truly are the national interests we are protecting there, and how do we, in this emerging age of empowered poplulaces and networked, non-state UW actors (as AQ is), best accomplish this age old task?
The purpose of my model is to take us back to the timeless basics, so that we can more clearly assess what the TTPs for the emerging future should be.
Tough to do any form of goveranance when the the following comment comes out yesterday.
‘By day there is government. By night it’s the Taliban,’ says one Afghan tribal leader.” Referencing the first major push on the pop focused COIN efforts.
Until the debate over pop focused or enemy focused COIN gets resolved the Taliban continues to march along–personally not so sure it has been resolved.
So any discussion on the Jones methodology seems to be a mute point as any form of improved governance is being met by an equally determined insurgent counter COIN effort.
We can discuss the Jones method until we all drop, but until the issue of “nighttime control by the Taliban” is eliminated it is I think a waste of dicussion time and effort.
Doesn’t this model suggest that the higher the tolerance for violence, the less likely there is to be an insurgency? And the lower the tolerance for violence, the higher the likelihood of insurgency? If so, does a relatively bloodless insurgency really pose much a problem for us? Would we be unconcerned with a bloodbath that does not reach the level of insurgency?
Also, regarding the quote from Huntington – how does this jibe with Afghanistan’s history? Afghanistan was relatively stable during the rule of Zahir, arguably in large part because the state obtained more tax revenues from foreign sources and tariffs and thus antagonized the people much less by not imposing onerous taxes upon them.
The model is an attempt to capture an underlying essence, that is generally common to insurgency. An effort to get past the “noise” of the specific facts of culture, geography, specific government in power, specific ideology applied to rally the masses, etc; and to understand what it is that is fundamental to the relationship between those who govern, and those who are governed.
So, a level of violence that is seen as “insurgency” in one society, may well be considered “subversion” in another, and “business as usual” in another still. Just as some families are very physical as a matter of course, while others become physical when there is a major problem.
Frank Kitson described such movements that were relatively non-violent as subversion. It could also simply be the political process of a country. I think so long as the government maintains the populace in “phase 0” they are doing ok. If the government fails to address the failures that give rise to subversion, they will likely grow in violence as popular frustration spreads (Unless the leader of the movement opts for non-violent tactics [Dr. King and the Civil Rights Movement]; or the government acts to suppress with heavy hand any hint of violence as it occurs [Saudi Arabia today]).
The Huntington quote applys to the Oil rich nations of the Gulf, that collect no taxes, so do not feel compelled to grant any representation to their populaces. By comparison, during the time of the Zahir in Afghanistan not only were the Shura and Jirga systems quite functional in giving the people of Afghanistan a voice; they also had the position of Khan in each district that is currently missing. This was a leader selected locally, but recognized by the King. A perfect blend of bottom up popular legitimacy and top down governmental officalness that is sadly lacking in Afghanistan today.
Outstanding model. There are some folks in the USA that should be looking at this model to see what is really going on in our country before it becomes a “Civil Emergency”.
A major point of the model is that Civil Governments are essentially conducting “counterinsurgency” every day. The best time to “defeat” an insurgency is before it crosses into full insurgency and exceeds the capacity of Civil Governance to handle. The West is so focused on the Level I and II insurgencies in the Middle East that they are missing the growing insurgencies at home. By understanding the signs and the trends, they can be addressed early, without the need to bring in the military or foreign assistance.
The trend of labeling all political violence as “terrorism” is not particularly helpful either, as it tends to cause a victim mentality that externalizes the blame rather than recognizing it as a warning sign that the government may well be losing the bubble on one or more of the critical causal perceptions at home. Often this is coupled with supporting a failed regime abroad that has an immigrant populace within ones own borders that has not been fully incorporated into the larger populace, so still identifies with their oppressed kinfolk back in the old country.
Liberal policies of enabling immigrants to retain their old languages and customs in distinct communities provide rich soil for the the growth of future insurgencies.
Are you arguing that the United States should start conducting a “preventive” counterinsurgency within our own borders?
If so, who should do it and how should it be done?
Gian,
No, I am not arguing for some special program of preventive COIN; what I am arguing is that Civil Governance going about its normal functions every day is what either prevents or causes insurgency, depending on how “good” or “poor” that governance is.
If there is insurgency in a country, it is not the populace that has failed the government, it the government that has failed the populace. What I am suggesting is that every government needs to monitor itself. Not in terms of how it sees itself, but in terms of how critical segments of the populace see the government. Not in terms of objective measures of “effectiveness,” but rather in terms of the fours causal factors of “goodness” defined in the model; as it is failure in these fours areas that appears to be at the root of insurgency.
When it comes to U.S. foreign policy, I am arguing that instead of helping allies whose failure is leading to insurgency among their populace to suppress the insurgent elements of their populace under the guise of “counter-terrorism,” or “COIN;” to instead apply carrots and sticks to encourage those governments to fix themselves. We help create leaders who act with impunity when we enable them as we currently do.
The Model suggests that a foreign policy developed during the Cold War rooted in controlling governance in critical countries in the name of containment, or access to critical resources and Lines of Communication should be modified to be more focused on Good Governance for the populaces of those same countries, rather than on sustaining a gang of thug leaders who are perceived to draw their legitimacy more from the U.S. than from their own populaces. A CT heavy approach is not the answer to defeating the resultant terrorism; nor is the current effectiveness-based “population centric COIN.” That our COIN efforts should indeed be populace based, but that our focus should be on creating perception of “Goodness.”
Lyndon Johnson did not offer the African American populace 40 acres and a mule to turn the corner on the Civil Rights Movement; he offered them a fighting chance at having a government they saw as Legitimate, a fighting chance at Respect, a fighting chance at Justice, and a sense of Hope for a better a future. At the end of the day, this is what Good Governance owes its populace. And at the beginning of this nation, our own Declaration of Independence recognized the unalienable right and duty of a populace to rise up in insurgency when a government fails in these same regards.
“Liberal policies of enabling immigrants to retain their old languages and customs in distinct communities provide rich soil for the the growth of future insurgencies.” by Col. Jones
Bob,That is some Strategic Stuff. It is Warden’s Ring #3 Infrastructure as it concerns Human Infrastructure based Insurgencies. Ring #3 is essentially concerned with what “connects” the systems togather….not just physical objects as it is often interpreted. Language is the most basic conection between person to person communcation Insurgencies. Customs and traditions again are the “connecting” SOP’s of Insurgencies/Gangs. Just had to through that out here….you understand. LOL
Robert:
Using this quote–how does one then explain the Taliban rise, fall, and re-arise? The whole thing cannot be as simple as civil governance?
“In the beginning of their war against Islam, [the Crusaders] had announced that one of their
main goals was to destroy the Al-Qaeda organization in Afghanistan; and now, look what
happened? Thanks to God, instead of being limited to Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda broke out
into the entire Islamic world and was able to establish an international expansion, in several countries, sending its brigades into every Islamic country, destroying the Blasphemersfortresses, and purifying the Muslims countries.
I would argue that there are far deeper ecosystems that exist within any country to include the US that governments tend to fail to understand. If a government could detect those ecosystems then in fact they could address the needs/wants of that ecosystem or ecosystems more effectively along the lines you write about before the ecosystem decides on it’s “common ventures”. They don’t simply because they are usually blind on one eye. “Hear no evil, see no evil”
“Ecosystem of an Insurgency:
An insurgent ecosystem is a system whose members (members defined as being either an insurgent group or groups) benefit from each other’s participation via symbiotic (mutually beneficial and self-sustaining) relationships.
The main goal of an insurgency ecosystem is to generate common ventures. It forms when many small and potentially diverse (origin, tribe, religious belief, etc.) insurgent groups join together to fight a common predator (the counter-insurgent or state).
Insurgent ecosystems attract and retain members (groups) due to network effects:
ââ¬Â¢ The benefits of the ecosystem (shared ventures) are so great that groups wont leave it (although temporary departures to avoid targeted pressure from counter-insurgents are possible).
ââ¬Â¢ The ecosystems features (i.e. immediate access to shared resources) make it easy for new groups to form and participate.
ââ¬Â¢ The growth of the ecosystem results in an exponential increase in benefits (i.e. more segmentation and specialization) for all of the member groups. IE Attacks by one group creates opportunities for other groups. The buying of resources (ie small arms, explosives) creates a market for groups to sell into and makes it easier for other groups to get access to the resources.
ââ¬Â¢ An ecosystem can have groups directly fighting each other through direct battles – but it can also have indirect fighting (or competition) between groups for access to resources (people, money, strategy etc).
Once an ecosystem is established in a particular region/area, it becomes very difficult for the counter insurgent to eliminate it. The presence of multiple groups means that the counter insurgent must divide its efforts. Operationally, a focus on one group leaves other groups to operate freely and success against one group yields very little overall benefit. Removing leadership does not mean that the group will cease to exist. The leadership may be replaced by other parts from the same group or other groups. Or a new group will move into the space left open by old group. Strategically, the diversity of the groups in the ecosystem (different reasons for fighting) means that it isnt possible to address a single set of issues or grievances at the national level that would reverse the insurgency (via negotiated settlement, repatriation, etc.).”
I wish there was simply a LIKE button for SWJ articles b/c I approve of COL Jones’ message.
We’re starting to get closer to the truth outside of the zero-sum nonsense between COIN and CT and the inability to differentiate between occupation and FID in this post-colonial world that others would espouse.
3000 years ago, King Solomon struggled with the same unknowns in Ecclesiastes. He laments,
“Again, I looked and saw all the oppression
that was taking place under the sun:
I saw the tears of the oppressed–
And they have no comforter;
Power was on the side of their oppressors–
And they have no comforter.”
Well Done Col Jones.
De Oppresso Liber
Col Jones,
Great article. Closer to the truth. The answer is somewhere in the middle. The answer is in the “grey.”
At the tactical level I have always believed that the battle is won PRIOR to first shot being fired.
This is also true at the strategic level.
Great work.
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim Gant
COL Jones,
I guess I would just add, regarding the Huntington quote, that in both Saudi Arabia now and in Afghanistan under Zahir, rather than providing representation to the people, the states established patronage systems. If the significance of the quote is that the states felt no need to give representation to the people, then I would disagree with the late Huntington while acknowledging that even at room temperature he is likely smarter than me. A piece of the action is no less a form of representation than a vote at the ballot box.
All,
I appreciate your feedback. “Understanding” is a journey, rather than a destination, and your comments all help guide me on my own personal journey. I hope this short snapshot of some of my thoughts can help others as well. The goal is to produce a tool that is as helpful for a platoon leader tasked to work some small section of Afghanistan, as it is for the President of the United States, and everyone in between. As usefull for helping my Mom to understand what is going on in the world today as it is for a Ph.D. candidate delving into some aspect of foreign policy.
For those who find comfort in constructs, such as “generational warfare,” or “Irregular warfare,” or even the ecology of insurgency described by Outlaw; if those constructs help you to understand, they all fit within this model. For me personally I had to get past the new labels and try to understand at the fundamental human level what is going on; what is timeless, and what is being accelerated and connected in new ways by the modern tools of information and travel.
As Mike Few points out, a man far wiser than any of us has pondered these same dynamics.
Beyond all of this, I love America, and what America truly stands for. I do not want to see my country become a victim or a bully either one; but fear and confusion can lead to rationalizing such behavior in the name of National Security or National Interests. I see a great future for America, a world of empowered populaces is not one that we need to fear, it is one that is perfectly suited for the principles upon which this nation was founded. We do not need to go around the world creating freedom for all; but neither should we inadvertantly allow ourselves to become reasonably perceived as being the obstacle to achieving such freedoms either.
A recent example of a “claimed” successful Civil Goveranance from Iraq.
Sometimes CG is not the only answer to insurgencies as it does not always answer the core reasons why insurgencies start.
“Last summer the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) closed one of its largest projects in Iraq, declaring that it had been a virtually unqualified success. The Community Stabilization Program (CSP), which cost $675 million over its three years of operation, has been lauded as one of the wars most effective counterinsurgency operations. Launched in May 2006, it was USAIDs chief contribution to the Bush plan of rescuing a tailspinning military adventure with a civilian surge and increased focus on economic development.
… According to several senior military and government personnel, however, this vaunted program was responsible for sending millions of taxpayer dollars to Iraqi insurgents via a complex web of contractors and subcontractors. These sources claim that although USAID was fully aware of the problem, it delayed acting for as long as possible, unwilling to pull the plug on a program that generated propitious statistics, even when it jeopardized American lives.”
Here’s a link to an article that addresses the issues brought up by Anonymous @ 2:13. Aiding the Insurgency by Luke Mogelson in The Nation.
Anonymous,
This is an example of what I speak to in my article when I say that:
“Development without equity is Apartheid.”
(granted, I intentionally selected phrasing to shock, and grab attention)
Foreign intervention is not Civil Governance, it is assistance to Civil Governance. One of the primary falacies I see in current COIN dogma is the belief that development can cure insurgency. Development executed improperly can actually make an insurgency worse. Just as imposing security and rule of law to an oppressed populace can drive a subversive movement into full blown insurgency (think King George sending the fleet to Boston to do just that).
The key, I believe, is to ask: How can our efforts (be they security or development) be employed to enable the Host Nation Civil Governance to improve the perceptions of Legitimacy, Justice, Respect, and Hope with the disenfrancised segments of their populace that are in rebellion specifically, and the entire populace in general?
Bottom line is that you can neither force, nor bribe, nor cajole a populace to simply stop feeling oppressed. They feel the way they feel. You must target those perceptions. Not saying security efforts or development efforts are bad per se, but they can be if inartfully applied.
Jones:
This confuses me:
“For those who find comfort in constructs, such as “generational warfare,” or “Irregular warfare,” or even the ecology of insurgency described by Outlaw; if those constructs help you to understand, they all fit within this model. For me personally I had to get past the new labels and try to understand at the fundamental human level what is going on; what is timeless, and what is being accelerated and connected in new ways by the modern tools of information and travel.”
I certainly don’t disagree with the last section there, but generational war, irregular war, and ecology models all have substantially different theoretical foundations – that is, even when applied to the same system, they tend to produce different pictures. Sometimes these pictures are close enough for us to pick out the “real” dynamics behind something; but often it really comes down to whatever model you prefer.
How can all these different models, which look at things differently, have different ontologies and foundations, and VERY different ways of examining conflict, be a part of your model? If that’s how you see it, your model is either so fantastically complex (like M-theory requiring the development of an entirely new mathematics to explain itself), or so general and vague that everyone who disagrees is still nevertheless on the team.
You *seem* to be saying the latter, but based on your comments, I also don’t think your model is quite so reductionist. Can you help a brother out?
Joshua,
What I meant to convey is that the surface dynamics of what has been going on in the world the past 10-15 years has been given many names: IW, 4th Gen, etc. Personally, I don’t think the nature of warfare has changed much, nor has the nature of insurgency, which I think is better thought of as a civil emergency rather than as warfare. So, if one chooses to see the current dynamics as “irregular” or as “4th generation”, fine, it has little impact on what the actual fundamental nature of insurgency is really all about IMO. I don’t agree with those who crowd the market with new names for old things that look different today due to the information tools that empower them in new ways; but I won’t argue with them either. I think these are all merely new labels insurgency in a globalized world, and are not “models” at all, as they don’t help one to determine how to resolve the problems that they seek to describe.
It has no affect on what I am trying to get to with my work. My work is to attempt to understand the fundamental human dynamics at work, which I believe to be relatively timeless and universal; manifesting uniquely (like snowflakes, all formed the same way, yet all unique due to the environment they were formed in) based on all of the many environmental factors involved.
To be an effective counterinsurgent one must understand both: The nature of insurgency, and the nature of the environment they are dealing with. To date, I believe most descriptions of the nature of insurgency to be too heavily colored by the environmentals (or symptoms); so often miss what must actually be addressed successfully resolve the insurgency and move on.
“It has no affect on what I am trying to get to with my work. My work is to attempt to understand the fundamental human dynamics at work, which I believe to be relatively timeless and universal; manifesting uniquely (like snowflakes, all formed the same way, yet all unique due to the environment they were formed in) based on all of the many environmental factors involved.” by Col. Jones
Solid gold!!Now that is Systems Thinking as I originally learned it. General theory principles that can lead to “Infinite Variety” a very important Systems Thinking principal. The system that can create the most variety inside a General framework/model will prosper/survive/win. The Enemy is not a country it is a system. Colonel Jones model can be applied to any “people governing system” regardless of state/non-state, public or private,peaceful or criminal.
The last anonymous was me…..I got excited and stuff and forgot to type in my name….Ken White would understand.
How might we apply our learning re: “The Jones Insurgency Model” to the following problem:
Today, our national and military leaders often suggest that the United States is:
a. The indispensable head of a new “international community” and
b. That this new international community today faces the problem of a “global insurgency” due to its critical need to
c. Transform entire nations and societies such that these nations and societies might better support and service the needs of this expanding international community.
The friction derived from this problem/process (of having to transform entire nations and societies — so that they might better provide for the “international communities” needs) causes our national and military leaders to see the future as one of “an era of persistent conflict” and “a permanent state of war” (primarily insurgencies?).
In light of COL Jones guidance, how specifically might the United States — in its role as the leader of the “international community” (1) do good governance, (2) achieve its mission of transforming entire nations and socities so as to meet the international community’s needs and (3) cause the global insurgency to go away?
First, I would argue that “Global Insurgency” is both impossible, and a gross misnomer for the many distinct, unique insurgencies and subversive movements going on in the Middle East today. Each is rooted in its own unique conditions of perceptions of Poor Governance between a populace and a particular government / system of governance.
There are some common factors:
Most are in countries where the governance has been heavily influenced over the past several generations by Western involvement.
Most movements employ an ideology rooted in Muslim religion (what else would one use as an insurgent in these communities? Communist ideologies were tried and failed. Land ownership worked for Mao, but that was in an agriculturally based society, not grazing desert. Religion is the “go to” tried and true LOO for insurgent ideology, and is perfect for Middle Eastern society.)
Most are associated in some manner with Bin Laden’s AQ Movement; who seeks to leverage the power of these many distinct movements to serve larger common goals IN ADDITION TO the nationalist base that drives each movement; rooted in throwing off overt Western controls, attaining good governance at the national level, and creating new, more powerful alliances, much like the EU, to prevent such outside dominance from happening again.
So, what would the Jones Model suggest?
1. Focus on why these many distinct movements buy into the message that they must break the support of the US to their current Poor Governance regimes in power first, before they can have success at home. Target not the insurgent movements in the name of CT; but instead target the perception that the US is the obstacle to attaining Good Governance. (See papers published here and on World Politics Review on “Populace-Centric Engagement” for more on this).
2. Declare an end to the “GWOT.” It makes us look scared and pathetic; it puts a “war focus” on what should be a “policy focus” problem; and it weakens us as a nation in terms of influence, wealth, and ability to continue to deter major state-based threats effectively with a well trained and equipped, non-decisively engaged military.
3. Conduct a top down review of US Foreign Policy to identify and implement critical changes in approaches to the world that are more relevant to the globalized world we live in today, than the bi-polar US/Soviet dominated world that existed when most were originally designed and established.
4. Conduct assessments of critical populaces everywhere essential US national interests exist to determine status of perceptions of Poor Governance. This should become a major focus area for the US intelligence community (much as MG Flynn recently suggested changes for the intelligence community in Afghanistan). There is no state in the world today that can truly threaten the US (though many, friend and foe alike may take advantage of our over extended state); but small cells from the populaces of states that truly believe the US is promoting and sustaining the oppressive regimes they live under can, and have. We must shift our focus to better understanding what actually threatens us today, and develop new concepts of “deterrence” that works on non-state organizations.
While I was at it, I would consider scrapping the entire concept of seeing states as “allies” or “threats” and view them all as “competitors”. Each of these competitors has shared and competing national interests with the US. The current construct blinds us to dangerous competing interests with “allies”; and also blinds us to major shared interest opportunities with “threats.” The US is in competition with the entire globe, and that is ok, so long as we approach that competition holistically and objectively. Currently we are too focused on attempting to make some state fill the role of peer competitor that is essential for making the Cold War family of foreign policy function properly. It’s time to move on. Empowered populaces mean more threats will be rooted in the concepts of insurgency than previously.
Is the requirement to transform nations and societies — so as to meet the international community’s needs — beyond the bounds of what “good governance” can provide?
(Thus, the acknowledgement of our new reality as “an era of persistent conflict” — and “a permanent state of war” — via the “global insurgency” [anyone who opposes the “international community” direction to transform].)
Or can the international community (with the US in-charge) — through “good governance” — reconcile a conflict between (1) those who require the transformation of other nations, peoples and societies and (2) those other nations, peoples and societies who are unwilling, or are unable, to transform?
God help us if the 2000s are as war-like and bloody as the 1900s.
I don’t buy the “era of persistent conflict”; particularly as it is based on the CT / FID-COIN intervention model to suppress insurgents rather than on the Jones Model use policy to fix governments instead, approach.
Remember, we didn’t evolve from the Stone Age to the Bronze Age because we ran out of stones; we just figured out a smarter way to get things done.
Governments won’t evolve because we ask them to; they will evolve because we will let them know that we will no longer protect them against their own populaces, and, in extreme cases, may actually side with their populaces if need be (thus why SF keeps the UW mission on the books).
Currently many don’t evolve because they don’t have to. With the US willing to employ our might, influence, and treasure to keep them in power, why change??
So, in short, the only society I feel compelled to encourage the transformation of is our own. The others can follow suit or face the wrath of their empowered populaces.
For clarification:
The “government” in the scenerio I have described above is the “international community” (the term of legitimacy, authority and implied legality used by our national leaders in recent years).
The head “governor” of this government is the United States.
Within this construct, the “global insurgency” is considered to be very real — as it is seen to be the sum of all persons, groups, nations, cultures and/or societies that would oppose the will of this global government (the international community) and global governor (the United States).
A main goal of this government and governor is to cause certain of the more difficult nations and societies to be transformed — so that they might better meet the needs of the international community/United States.
The method used by the international community/United States — to achieve this transformation of various nations and societies — is via their local governments.
Thus if “good governance” is to be achieved in this scenerio, it would seem that this must originate with and be orchastrated by the government in-charge of these matters (the international community) and must be led by and be overseen by the governor in-charge of this government (the United States).
Let me try another angle on this:
I believe that it is just such “I’m in charge” Hubris that led to the conditions that gave rise to the current terrorist violence directed toward the US.
“Good Governance” cannot, by definition, be imposed on the populace of another as it will lack the most critical ingredient of all: LEGITIMACY
So I instead encourge more leadership by example, and adopting foreign policies more in touch with our founding principles as a nation that recoginize the primacy of populace over the governments (of what ever form) they select (in what ever fashion) to serve them.
If we are heading in the right direction, and doing the right thing, we will have far more supporters around the globe than if we appoint ourselves as “leader” of some sort of “international community” and set out to wage warfare on the oppressed populaces of the world in the name of “Global Insurgency.”
That’s all just a little to Orwellian for my taste. It’s not wanted, and just as importantly, it is not needed either.
The problem, it would seem, is time. Consider the following example:
In the later 19th Century, the United States determined that, in order to provide for its immedate and rapidly expanding needs, it would need to quickly tame and incorporate the West — and quickly transform, reduce and/or eliminate the American Indians.
At this time, the United States acknowledged that, because of the immediate nature of its needs, it would not be able to use the more humane method of applying significant patience, example and “good governance” to this problem.
Rather the United States accepted that only by way of aggression and conflict could the United States achieve its goals in the time required.
Today, the United States sees the immediate and rapidly expanding needs of the international community — and the problems of the Middle East and other such “backwards” areas of the world — in much this same light.
Thus, the acknowledgement that:
a. Significant patience, example and “good governance” has not — and will not — achieve the mission in the time required and that, therefore,
b. Only the application of more immediate, more aggressive and more decisive measures (resulting in an accepted “era of persistent conflict”) can hope to get the job done (in the time required).
Bill,
We’ll just have to agree to disagree. IMO, what you propose will only make the challenges we face worse, our nation less secure, the instability in the Middle East greater; and quite likely lead to a weakening of the US that allows us to be surpassed by the EU initially, and ultimately by others.
Over the course of history Empires fade when they expend themselves attempting vainly to sustain a status quo that is favorable to them, and no one else. So everyone else seeks every opportunity to change and thereby advance their own interests. We live in an era of great change; we live in an era of strategic uncertainty; we live in an era where few things could be more dangerous than attempting to force everything around us to remain static and subordinate.
By embracing change, by accepting reasonable risk that comes with doing so in an era of uncertainty, we have the best chance of remaining out in front of competitors and sustaining our intersts globally.
You say we don’t have time to do the right thing. I say we don’t have time not to.
Here is how I would apply the model.
1-If your goal/mission is illegitimate than change the goal/mission. Relative to the ME we need to focus our resources on total energy indepence…not changing people who don’t want to change. There is no military solution to the ME but we could have a political solution to ensure the survival of the US. The Carter Doctrine was and is still sound….he was the last Strategic President we had relative to energy Independence.
2-As it relates to the west (US) this was a classic case of failing to realize that the real problem was the larger system of Mexico…..not the Indians. And because of this we now have a case of a “suppressed insurgency” along our border according to Bob’s model. Just my opinion on using the model.
Or more specifically let Billy Jack(The Greatest green Beret Ever) explain it.
http://billyjack.com/index.php?menuID=Page&pid=38
Bill C,
Your example of the Indian Wars is flawed on a number of levels, but that has more to do with attempting to simplify it I think. And Slap, at the time Mexico wasn’t the problem at all. It didn’t really factor in from our perspective because conditions were different. Where Mexico came in was as a “safe haven” for hostile elements of many tribes…who in turn used the U.S. as a “safe haven” for their raids into Mexico.
Bill’s comment implies that there was a conscious decision made to seek a military solution to the issues on the Frontier. In fact there was no such decision made. Rather we saw a number of competing government and industrial interest groups pushing their own agendas forward, and policy (such as it was) grew from whatever faction happened to gain the most traction at any point in time. There were also a number of what might be considered non-state actors (mainly the Territorial authorities and local residents…and these were not always the same things) who could have a major impact on policy at any given time.
If you look at 1872 as just one example of this, the military happened to be the major diving force behind Indian policy at that time, and had almost succeeded in having control of some agencies (what are now called reservations) shifted to military officers and away from the Indian Bureau. All that came to a screeching halt after the Marias River Massacre, which led to outcry back East and a Congressional decision to not shift authority for agencies. This in turn led to Grant’s so-called “Peace Policy” where he sought more ‘neutral’ control for the agencies and in the end turned to the numerous church societies then in existence. The whole Marias affair started with agitation by Montana territorial authorities, and was exacerbated by factional divisions within the Bloods and Piegans (to include the incorrect identification of a friendly camp as hostile by a scout).
The above is a capsule version, and isn’t as complete as I might like. But it does convey the point that ‘policy’ during this time shifted frequently, and could be modified or sabotaged by any number of actors. Treaties could be negotiated and then fail due to Congress’ failure to make appropriations for rations and agency activities (or through blatant corruption and fraud at the agency level).
Frontier expansion was nowhere near as orderly or planned as the earlier example implies. To assume that it was allows us to miss many interesting lessons and observations from the period.
Ack…date above should be 1870 and not 1872.
“And Slap, at the time Mexico wasn’t the problem at all. It didn’t really factor in from our perspective because conditions were different. Where Mexico came in was as a “safe haven” for hostile elements of many tribes…who in turn used the U.S. as a “safe haven” for their raids into Mexico.” By Steve Blair
From a systems standpoint I would say that is a problem…..system boundry control. Which points to another point, at the time much of the areas in question were simply “territories” were they not? Statehood came later for many (could be wrong) but the point is the System “Governing Dynamics” helped to create the Comoncheros and we are still seeing this effect to this day. My analysis through the Lones model anyway.
Let me pose the question as follows:
Can time constraints — relating to the very real interests, concerns, needs and agenda of a nation/great power — cause a nation/great power to, reasonably and intelligently:
a. Embrace speed, force, aggression and conflict as the only means available for securing its interests and achieving its goals in the time required, and
b. Reject patience, example and “good governance;” especially when it has been determined that such methods have not, cannot and will not allow the nation/great power to secure its interests and achieve its goals in the time available?
Or, in such instances — wherein the lengthy application of patience, example and good governance is unfeasible — must nations/great powers simply forego their security, their interests and their continued wellbeing?
No model is perfect, but some models are useful. Models tend to be most useful when they have a limited scope.
You might want to try to tweak and refine this model so that its scope is not just insurgencies in general, but insurgencies following state collapse and/or arising in nation-building/state-building scenarios and/or arising in societies whose politics align along tribal and ethnic lines.
“You might want to try to tweak and refine this model so that its scope is not just insurgencies in general, but insurgencies following state collapse and/or arising in nation-building/state-building scenarios and/or arising in societies whose politics align along tribal and ethnic lines.”
I’m not sure if that is relevant with Jones’ Model. He describes popular violence as a function of poor governance. Time is not in the equation. The elimination of a lifecycle or time allows for a broad model that could be used to describe insurgencies within a stable, unstable, or failed gov’t. That’s one thing that I like about it.
Mike,
The main reason I made that suggestion is that models are limited in their utility if nobody is willing to accept them. You can have the best model in the world, but if people aren’t willing to accept it, then it doesn’t get used. When your first pitch of your model is, “look, this explains everything!” then people simply aren’t going to listen. If you narrow the scope and say, “hey, in this situation, this seems to explain what’s occurring” then you get people listening. Later, after you’ve established some credibility, you can add in, “oh, by the way, it also seems to apply in these broader instances.”
New ideas are as much about innovative thinking as they are marketing. That’s why everyone has drank the kool-aid/snake oil/bong water offered up by cult that has formed around pop-COIN. They marketed better than others. Good marketing trumped strategy. Let’s hope the Afghans fall for it as easily as we did.
“Can time constraints — relating to the very real interests, concerns, needs and agenda of a nation/great power — cause a nation/great power to, reasonably and intelligently:” by BillC
BillC, until Col. Jones gets back I will take a stab at it. Time can be an issue but I don’t see how it affects the model’s validity.
The Carter doctrine is a perfect example. Many people forget that there were 2 parts to it.
One was to use Military force to guarantee access to Oil that Saudi Arabia had used as a weapon against us during the Oil embargo, hence his famous “Moral Equivalent of War Speech”. His part 1 decision (use of force) matches all 4 Jones model factors for good governance.
His part 2 decision was to organize the resources of the USA to where we would never again be Dependant on the ME for energy security. In particular the Strategic Oil Reserve and yearly Oil import reduction targets. Again his part 2 decisions are not as well known. But they again get a positive response on all 4 factors of the Jones model for good governance.
He is the last President who at the end of his watch could say the USA was importing LESS oil than when he took office, hence we were more secure and he was leading a good government, no other President can say that.
That is why I say he was the last Strategic President we had. His 2 part Strategy would allow us to survive short term and long term regardless of what our enemies did or didn’t do. That is good Strategy and that is Good “Governing Dynamics” IMO
One of the greatest Presidential speeches ever given and one of the greatest acts of Good Governance. It was and is “The Moral Equivalent Of War”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-tPePpMxJaA
Schmedlap,
Ah yes, the BetaMax versus VHS counter-point is a good one, and I forgot to consider that in terms of marketing and advertising :).
The acceptance and institutionalization of ideas is an interesting study. Now, if COL Jones published it through an academic institution or a think tank, hmmm….
v/r
Mike
This just became mandatory reading for my students in Phase IV, 18A MOS, SFDOQC.
DOL-
Longdaddy, 18A SGI
slapout9:
“It has no affect on what I am trying to get to with my work. My work is to attempt to understand the fundamental human dynamics at work, which I believe to be relatively timeless and universal; manifesting uniquely (like snowflakes, all formed the same way, yet all unique due to the environment they were formed in) based on all of the many environmental factors involved.” by Col. Jones
In some aspects was this not what Kilcullen was talking about in one of his first articles where he went extensively into “Conflict Ecosystems” and systems analysis?
To indicate that his thinking is alive and well in academia this following article is really worth the read—maybe academia is not as hung up as the military when it comes to really analyzing ideas and driving further thinking on those ideas.
If anyone has followed my comments on “conflict ecosystems” and the definitions of Ecology of/Ecosystem of an Insurgency here at SWJ you will recognize a number of points that agree with my defintions and are voiced by Col. Jones in the quote.
It is and will always remain “about the eocsystem” and we can disguise it any name we want to and give it any name we want to, but we will fail in any COIN environment if we do not fully understand “ecosystems and the theories of open source warfare”.
“When it comes to security, think ‘natural'”
May 20, 2010
Security systems could be more effective if officials looked at how organisms deal with threats in the natural world, University of Arizona researchers suggest in the May 20 edition of the journal Nature.
The authors are working with security and disaster management officials to help put some of their recommendations – such as decentralizing forces and forming alliances – into practice.
“Anytime you have the illusion of full security, you get adaptation,” said Rafe Sagarin, an assistant research scientist in the UA’s Institute of the Environment who is the lead author of the opinion piece. “Terrorists figure out unexpected means of attack, hackers come up with new software to break through firewalls, and pathogens develop resistance to antibiotics.”
Instead of relying on large, centralized bureaucracies that move slowly and often lag behind in addressing threats, the authors encourage officials to look to the natural world for principles that could prove less costly, more flexible and more effective at countering threats.
The security issues of modern human societies are analogous to those of many organisms, according to Sagarin and his co-authors. In nature, risks are frequent, variable and uncertain. Over billions of years, organisms have evolved an enormous variety of methods to survive, grow and proliferate on a continually changing planet. The key to their success is their ability to quickly adapt to rapidly changing threats, and change their structures, behaviors and interactions accordingly.
Avoid centralization
Unlike many security agencies or entities in the human world, the most adaptable and successful organisms avoid centralization. Instead, they distribute tasks among decentralized, specialized groups of cells or individuals.
Sagarin points to the octopus’ camouflaging strategy to illustrate this principle: Its networks of pigment cells, distributed all over its body, react to and match the colors of the surroundings, blending the animal into the background.
“We can learn something from the octopus about the war in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Sagarin said, specifically with regard to the threat from improvised explosive devices, or IEDs.
Just like the octopus’ decentralized network of pigment cells, he pointed out, troops on the ground function like independent sensors that can assess a threat more accurately, more timely and more realistically than a large, centralized organization that is geographically removed from the action and largely follows a top-down approach of command.
“The individual soldiers in the war zone are the most adaptable unit out there,” he said. “They are in a better position to recognize and address an emerging threat in time than a centralized bureaucracy.”
Sagarin and co-authors point out that terrorist networks such as Al Qaida have recognized the advantages of this approach and operate a loose network of largely independent subgroups.
“About 1,500 soldiers had died from roadside bomb blasts between the time troops identified the threat and the time MRAPs (mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles) were deployed to deal with the situation.”
Even after the blast-resistant vehicles arrived, they proved only moderately effective against a quickly moving threat that is constantly changing and rapidly adapting to new challenges.
“These MRAPs are huge, lumbering things that weigh 16 tons,” Sagarin said, “The insurgents, on the other hand, drive around in small pickup trucks. They quickly figured out the MRAPs were limited to certain roads and started placing roadside bombs specifically along those routes.”
Enlarge
The octopus relies on a network of pigment cells to blend in with its surroundings and escape detection. In a similar way, a decentralized network of ground forces may assess threats more quickly and respond more appropriately than a centralized command entity located far away from the action, UA’s Rafe Sagarin suggests. Credit: Daniel Stolte, UA Communications
Let the attacker know you’re ready
Another lesson could be learned by looking at how organisms deal with the constant threat from predators, according to the authors. A key feature is the capacity to reduce uncertainty and turn it into an advantage.
Hunting prey uses a lot of energy, Sagarin explained, which is why predators seek to ambush their prey. As soon as the prey is aware of their presence and ready to engage in defense, a pursuit might no longer be worth it.
Ground squirrels, for example, use alarm signals when a predator is lurking nearby, not only to warn their peers, but also to make it known to the attacker its cover is blown.
“When a prey species makes an alarm call of any kind, the game is up,” Sagarin said. Suddenly, things have become a lot harder – if you’re a hawk, you want to swoop down on a squirrel and not get scratched in the face.”
Remarkably, ground squirrels use alarm signals that are very specific to the threat. If the predator is a mammal (which can hear), they utter alarm calls. If it is a snake (which cannot) they use tail-flagging to signal its presence.
The less specific an alarm call is, the less efficient it is in eliciting an appropriate response, the authors argue and point to the U.S. Homeland Security’s threat advisory for national and international flights, which has remained at level orange (high) since August 2006. This static, ambiguous and nonspecific system creates uncertainty or indifference among the population that it is meant to help protect.
Form allies
Another principle often observed in nature is symbiosis, the formation of allies.
“Symbiosis is not always between friends,” Sagarin said, pointing to the example of cleaner wrasses, small fish specializing in picking parasites off other marine animals, sometimes entering their mouths. The clients could easily swallow the cleaner wrasse while it is going about its job.
“But they don’t,” Sagarin said. “It’s a mutual beneficial relationship in which the larger fish provides the cleaner fish with a food source and protection, and the cleaner keeps it free from parasites in return.”
A lesson of how symbioses can successfully be applied in the human realm was demonstrated in Iraq in 2007, the authors note, when Gen. David Petraeus’s strategy to form alliances with local leaders – including those who had been hostile – resulted in more tip-offs about IEDs and fewer American casualties.
Issue challenges
Two years ago, Sagarin and colleagues published a book titled “Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World.” The research group has since begun to “make its observations more actionable for the people on the ground,” as Sagarin put it. Working with emergency management coordinators, cybersecurity experts, soldiers, police chiefs, air marshals, homeland security officials, fire chiefs and public health officials, the group’s ideas have generated a lot of interest.
“One of the main lessons we learned is that issuing challenges is more effective than giving orders when there is a need to develop security measures,” Sagarin said. He pointed to the DARPA Grand Challenge as an example, in which the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense put on a prize competition for the development of a driver-less vehicle capable of navigating difficult terrain on its own.
“Anytime you pose a challenge, not only do you get a diverse population of problem solvers, but you get them to learn from each another.”
However, despite decentralization, it is important to still have an overarching structure to provide guidance and encourage the development of new ideas.
“An octopus is still an octopus,” Sagarin said, “not just a random collection of cells.”
“The bottom line of all this is, you can’t just put up a wall around something and expect it to protect it against every possible threat. Attackers will always figure out a way.”
More information:
“Decentralise, adapt and cooperate,” Rafe Sagarin et al., Nature, Vol. 465, May 20, 2010.
“Natural Security – A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World,” Raphael Sagarin and Terence Taylor, University of California Press, 2008.
Provided by University of Arizona (news : web)
“In some aspects was this not what Kilcullen was talking about in one of his first articles where he went extensively into “Conflict Ecosystems” and systems analysis?” by Outlaw7
Outlaw.
Yes, I believe it is. But I have been preaching Systems Analysis ever since I came here….way before Killcullen I might add. And I don’t know anything new. Most of it I learned in the 4th grade when it was called “The General Systems Theory” which is based on Biology. By the time I got to high school….the same theory was just called Ecology, had to keep it simple for the hippies you know.
To give you an example in the 4th grade in order to learn the I-P-O model (Input-Process-Output-to an environment) we had to learn why are Flamingos Pink??? The answer is they are not pink, they are white!!! they only become pink when they eat shrimp found in there environment. The point being all living systems use some type of I-P-O procedure but the final output is often shaped by the LARGER environment in which the system operates.
The main problem as I have also pointed out long ago is there is confusion over the Systems Engineering Theory vs. The General System Theory(Ecology Conflict System). One deals with living adapting systems the other with non-adapting machines which I was also exposed to at the same grade level because of the NASA moon mission. In fact this was one of the keep points that kids were supposed to learn in the flipping 4th grade!
Somehow over time everything got all messed up and it took people like Killcullen to revive the General Systems theory(much to his credit I might add)but it will take a Col. Jones to simplify it enough to where senior civilian leadership can understand it because “they got so much schoolin they don’t no nuthin.”
The reason….the very purpose of systems thinking is make things clearer and easier regardless of the specific system you are dealing with because it is based upon a single “General” model that can absorb unlimted “Environment Specific Inputs” and arrive at good answers.
Sound Good…LOL
Longdaddy:
This just became mandatory reading for my students in Phase IV, 18A MOS, SFDOQC.
DOL-
Longdaddy, 18A SGI
First they need to watch “Born Losers” the original Billy Jack film….that is Basic CT- Counter Terrorism.
Second they need to watch “Billy Jack” that is basic COIN/Guerrilla warfare or more importantly basic Village Defense against an oppressive local government.
Better still read that paper by that Green Beret guy on the tribes….then watch Billy Jack and see if they “get it” It is nothing but “Basic Green Beret Stuff” as I was taught….”To raise and train indigenous forces and to be capable of carrying out missions beyond the scope of regular troops” if I remember correctly.
All these new words- are All skint up and stuff!
I would never claim that this model “eplains everything,” in fact, as I said in closing on the short article I attached to the model, I will continue to refine my thinking and visualization of my thinking as I move forward.
I do believe strongly, however, that this model in its current form does help to UNDERSTAND many dynamics that are related to friction between populaces and their governance at all levels.
It’s a tool, if it helps, use it; if it doesn’t help, reach for something else.
(And for everyone, I really appreciate the feedback of all forms. Thinking is like anything else, you get stronger when you’re challenged; and there are few better places to be challenged then here in the SWJ Gym.)
Somewhat off-topic – A Chairman Mao quote you don’t hear everyday:
Chairman Mao: … (Points towards the ceiling) And when I go to heaven to see God, I’ll tell him it’s better to have Taiwan under the care of the United States now.
Secretary Kissinger: He’ll be very astonished to hear that from the Chairman.
Chairman Mao: No, because God blesses you, not us. God does not like us (waves his hands) because I am a militant warlord, also a communist. That’s why he doesn’t like me. (Pointing to the three Americans.) He likes you and you and you.
Secretary Kissinger: I’ve never had the pleasure of meeting him, so I’m not sure.
Chairman Mao: I’m sure. I’m 82 years old now. …
[excerpt, Tuesday, October 21, 1975]
(From The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow, p.392)
http://www.amazon.com/Kissinger-Transcripts-Top-Secret-Beijing-Moscow/dp/1565845684
Let me propose something of an alternative to the Jones Insurgency Model.
COL Jones offers “the simple proposition that insurgency happens when governance fails.” Thus, Poor Governance = Insurgency.
And he notes that “it is the duty of civil governance to maintain the internal peace to a society.”
I suggest that the duty of civil governance is — not to maintain the internal peace of a society — but to rather to maintain the overall strength, viability and security of a nation/society.
Herein, constantly and throughout history, governments, by various necessity, have been forced to make a choice; a choice which tends to alienate one segment of the population or another; this leading to an insurgency.
Thus, I suggest that insurgency happens when governance is forced to make a choice.
For example: A primary foreign policy focus of the United States today is to force certain nations to “transform.” This causes these nations to have to make a choice between:
a. Opening their societies up to the “modern” world and massive foreign influences and
b. Maintaining a more closed and more excluse society.
Herein, Good Governance or Poor Governance can only be determined by whether the choice made by the government ultimately:
a. Allows that the society is strenthened and remains secure or
b. Leads to the marginalizing, weakening and/or destruction of the subject state/society.
Thus, my alternative model suggests something alone the following lines:
Choice, Forced By Necessity = Insurgency.
Certainly when governments make bad choices they create conditions of poor governance.
Examples: The King of England chose to select and provide governors for the Colonies without their input. It gave him the control he desired and he saw his actions as reasonable.
Currently in Afghanistan much the same situation occurs, and likewise President Karzai sees it as reasonable.
In the United States the government of many localities and states saw it as reasonable to separate Black from White, and to exclude the African American populace from full participation in society. They saw it as reasonable to apply different standards of justice, etc.
The list goes on and on. To rationalize poor governance as necessary for the security of the nation is usually, not always I am sure, but usually, total BS.
Does the model apply when poor governance is “necessary” or “voluntary” or even just because the government is lazy or ignorant of the effects of their actions? YES. It does not matter how good or bad the intentions of governance are, if the results are perceptions of poor governance, then insurgency is likely to follow. The tender is laid, all that is required is the spark of leadership, ideology, etc.
The U.S. often ratioalizes poor behavior in the name of national security or good intentions. That is all well and fine, I am not here to judge that behavior; only to share that any such behavior that can reasonably be perceived as sustaining in power despots elsewhere, can lead to “terrorist” attacks back home. There is a natural cause and effect in these things; and good intentions do not absolve poor governance of the likely consequences.
Certainly when governments make bad choices they create conditions of poor governance.
Examples: The King of England chose to select and provide governors for the Colonies without their input. It gave him the control he desired and he saw his actions as reasonable.
Currently in Afghanistan much the same situation occurs, and likewise President Karzai sees it as reasonable.
In the United States the government of many localities and states saw it as reasonable to separate Black from White, and to exclude the African American populace from full participation in society. They saw it as reasonable to apply different standards of justice, etc.
The list goes on and on. To rationalize poor governance as necessary for the security of the nation is usually, not always I am sure, but usually, total BS.
Does the model apply when poor governance is “necessary” or “voluntary” or even just because the government is lazy or ignorant of the effects of their actions? YES. It does not matter how good or bad the intentions of governance are, if the results are perceptions of poor governance, then insurgency is likely to follow. The tender is laid, all that is required is the spark of leadership, ideology, etc.
The U.S. often ratioalizes poor behavior in the name of national security or good intentions. That is all well and fine, I am not here to judge that behavior; only to share that any such behavior that can reasonably be perceived as sustaining in power despots elsewhere, can lead to “terrorist” attacks back home. There is a natural cause and effect in these things; and good intentions do not absolve poor governance of the likely consequences.