The Jones Insurgency Model

As I look at this thing we call "insurgency" I offer simply this:

Motives and purposes of governance for the decisions it makes; or intervening powers for the reasons they intervene are absolutely moot, irrelevant and immaterial to the perceptions of the populace that determine for the sake of causation for insurgency rather governance is perceived as "Poor" or "Good."

So no, I will not rationalize bad behavior for what one convinces theirselves is necessary, mandatory, or even "existential" behavior.

One purpose of the model is to make this very point. "HOW" one goes about the pursuit of national interests is fully within their own control. Factors that contribute to perceptions of Poor Governance are often taken on simply because the decision makers have discounted (to their peril) the importance of those popular perceptions.

So, as I stated in the paper; I do not like bullies or victims either one. So any government that puts on the cloak of "victim" to rationalize behavior that contributes to poor governance is not justified in those actions. As they sew, so shall they reap. Same applies to those governments that bully others to compromise their relationships with their own populaces in order to appease a stronger outside power. The likely result has always been insurgent uprisings in that appeasing, bullied country. Today, however, it is also manifesting in acts of terrorism against the stronger, outside bullying country as well.

Welcome to Globalization. It is indeed a bold new world, and while the nature of insurgency remains constant the rules for intervention have changed.

COL Jones:

"Certainly when governments make bad choices they create conditions of poor governance." (Which can often lead to insurgencies.)

I agree that this BAD choice/POOR governance model can -- and often does -- lead to insurgencies.

My argument, however, suggests that, likewise, when governments make GOOD choices and apply GOOD governance this, also, and in equal measure, quite frequently leads to insurgencies.

As I noted in my explanation above, the problem of actually having to make a choice ("good" or "bad") will generally cause for grevience and alienation of one segment of the population or another.

I am terrible with historical examples, but let me give it a shot:

The American Civil War.

One could suggest that, in this instance, (1) the US government was forced to make a choice and that (2) the choice made by the US government was a GOOD one and constituted GOOD governance. This choice/governance, however GOOD, did not preclude but rather caused a rebellion/insurgency that threatened the viability of the state and society of the United States. This, due to irreconcilable differences.

My argument suggests that (1) this problem of necessity forcing choice = insurgencies occurs consistently throughout history and still today and that (2) even when governments make GOOD choices and exercise GOOD governance, they frequently cannot overcome but rather aggravate the problem of irreconcilable differences and, thereby, cause insurgencies. This is often unavoidable.

In such instances, these insurgencies cannot have been prevented and simply must be put down (often by way of speed, force, aggression and conflict) -- for the overall good of the state and society concerned.

Slap, I love ya brother, so before you fortify yourself in your basement with a Ka-bar, your .45, a case of Snickers bars and your set of Billy Jack VHS tapes, let me offer you this lifeline:

When it comes to "Poor Governance, "the certainty of Hope cures most ills. In the U.S. we have a tremendous advantage over most other contries, and that is that the U.S. was Born of Insurgency, and tempered in Civil War. Our founding fathers emerged from the Insurgency that freed us from the Poor Governance of Great Britain and set about to create a system that would ensure that no future government could ever again drift so far from the will of the people in this country. They codified Hope.

Not only do the three branches of Government balance each other; but wise men also argued for a Bill of Rights; 10 Amemdments designed specifically to ban governmental actions, and protect individual rights deemed most important for ensuring Good Governance. We are blessed in ways few Americans fully appreciate with gurantees of Hope.

Most populaces lack these guarantees. My assessment of the Afghan Constitution is that it in many ways codifies hopelessness. This is one of the primary purposes of the Jones Model, to help identify what the essential problems are, and to focus energy there.

1. What can we do to enable the perceptions of Legitimacy of governance in Afghanistan?

2. What can we do to enable improved perceptions of Justice in Afghanistan?

3. What can we do to enable improved perceptions of respect for all members of the Afghan populace?

4. What can we do to provide the people of Afghanistan with the certainty of Hope?

Any model I see... I have to test it myself, so I did an informal 4 question Jones Model poll with 10 people. Unscientific to be sure but very revealing if somewhat depressing.
Time for some music on Good Governance. Share The Land by The Guess Who....Oh no they are Canadian!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rLQJ4toj-JY

Certainly when governments make bad choices they create conditions of poor governance.

Examples: The King of England chose to select and provide governors for the Colonies without their input. It gave him the control he desired and he saw his actions as reasonable.

Currently in Afghanistan much the same situation occurs, and likewise President Karzai sees it as reasonable.

In the United States the government of many localities and states saw it as reasonable to separate Black from White, and to exclude the African American populace from full participation in society. They saw it as reasonable to apply different standards of justice, etc.

The list goes on and on. To rationalize poor governance as necessary for the security of the nation is usually, not always I am sure, but usually, total BS.

Does the model apply when poor governance is "necessary" or "voluntary" or even just because the government is lazy or ignorant of the effects of their actions? YES. It does not matter how good or bad the intentions of governance are, if the results are perceptions of poor governance, then insurgency is likely to follow. The tender is laid, all that is required is the spark of leadership, ideology, etc.

The U.S. often ratioalizes poor behavior in the name of national security or good intentions. That is all well and fine, I am not here to judge that behavior; only to share that any such behavior that can reasonably be perceived as sustaining in power despots elsewhere, can lead to "terrorist" attacks back home. There is a natural cause and effect in these things; and good intentions do not absolve poor governance of the likely consequences.

Somewhat off-topic - A Chairman Mao quote you don't hear everyday:

Chairman Mao: ... (Points towards the ceiling) And when I go to heaven to see God, I'll tell him it's better to have Taiwan under the care of the United States now.

Secretary Kissinger: He'll be very astonished to hear that from the Chairman.

Chairman Mao: No, because God blesses you, not us. God does not like us (waves his hands) because I am a militant warlord, also a communist. That's why he doesn't like me. (Pointing to the three Americans.) He likes you and you and you.

Secretary Kissinger: I've never had the pleasure of meeting him, so I'm not sure.

Chairman Mao: I'm sure. I'm 82 years old now. ...
[excerpt, Tuesday, October 21, 1975]

(From The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow, p.392)

http://www.amazon.com/Kissinger-Transcripts-Top-Secret-Beijing-Moscow/dp...

Longdaddy:
This just became mandatory reading for my students in Phase IV, 18A MOS, SFDOQC.
DOL-
Longdaddy, 18A SGI

First they need to watch "Born Losers" the original Billy Jack film....that is Basic CT- Counter Terrorism.

Second they need to watch "Billy Jack" that is basic COIN/Guerrilla warfare or more importantly basic Village Defense against an oppressive local government.

Better still read that paper by that Green Beret guy on the tribes....then watch Billy Jack and see if they "get it" It is nothing but "Basic Green Beret Stuff" as I was taught...."To raise and train indigenous forces and to be capable of carrying out missions beyond the scope of regular troops" if I remember correctly.

All these new words- are All skint up and stuff!

slapout9:

"It has no affect on what I am trying to get to with my work. My work is to attempt to understand the fundamental human dynamics at work, which I believe to be relatively timeless and universal; manifesting uniquely (like snowflakes, all formed the same way, yet all unique due to the environment they were formed in) based on all of the many environmental factors involved." by Col. Jones

In some aspects was this not what Kilcullen was talking about in one of his first articles where he went extensively into "Conflict Ecosystems" and systems analysis?

To indicate that his thinking is alive and well in academia this following article is really worth the read---maybe academia is not as hung up as the military when it comes to really analyzing ideas and driving further thinking on those ideas.

If anyone has followed my comments on "conflict ecosystems" and the definitions of Ecology of/Ecosystem of an Insurgency here at SWJ you will recognize a number of points that agree with my defintions and are voiced by Col. Jones in the quote.

It is and will always remain "about the eocsystem" and we can disguise it any name we want to and give it any name we want to, but we will fail in any COIN environment if we do not fully understand "ecosystems and the theories of open source warfare".

"When it comes to security, think 'natural'"
May 20, 2010

Security systems could be more effective if officials looked at how organisms deal with threats in the natural world, University of Arizona researchers suggest in the May 20 edition of the journal Nature.

The authors are working with security and disaster management officials to help put some of their recommendations - such as decentralizing forces and forming alliances - into practice.

"Anytime you have the illusion of full security, you get adaptation," said Rafe Sagarin, an assistant research scientist in the UA's Institute of the Environment who is the lead author of the opinion piece. "Terrorists figure out unexpected means of attack, hackers come up with new software to break through firewalls, and pathogens develop resistance to antibiotics."

Instead of relying on large, centralized bureaucracies that move slowly and often lag behind in addressing threats, the authors encourage officials to look to the natural world for principles that could prove less costly, more flexible and more effective at countering threats.

The security issues of modern human societies are analogous to those of many organisms, according to Sagarin and his co-authors. In nature, risks are frequent, variable and uncertain. Over billions of years, organisms have evolved an enormous variety of methods to survive, grow and proliferate on a continually changing planet. The key to their success is their ability to quickly adapt to rapidly changing threats, and change their structures, behaviors and interactions accordingly.

Avoid centralization

Unlike many security agencies or entities in the human world, the most adaptable and successful organisms avoid centralization. Instead, they distribute tasks among decentralized, specialized groups of cells or individuals.

Sagarin points to the octopus' camouflaging strategy to illustrate this principle: Its networks of pigment cells, distributed all over its body, react to and match the colors of the surroundings, blending the animal into the background.

"We can learn something from the octopus about the war in Iraq and Afghanistan," Sagarin said, specifically with regard to the threat from improvised explosive devices, or IEDs.

Just like the octopus' decentralized network of pigment cells, he pointed out, troops on the ground function like independent sensors that can assess a threat more accurately, more timely and more realistically than a large, centralized organization that is geographically removed from the action and largely follows a top-down approach of command.

"The individual soldiers in the war zone are the most adaptable unit out there," he said. "They are in a better position to recognize and address an emerging threat in time than a centralized bureaucracy."

Sagarin and co-authors point out that terrorist networks such as Al Qaida have recognized the advantages of this approach and operate a loose network of largely independent subgroups.

"About 1,500 soldiers had died from roadside bomb blasts between the time troops identified the threat and the time MRAPs (mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles) were deployed to deal with the situation."

Even after the blast-resistant vehicles arrived, they proved only moderately effective against a quickly moving threat that is constantly changing and rapidly adapting to new challenges.

"These MRAPs are huge, lumbering things that weigh 16 tons," Sagarin said, "The insurgents, on the other hand, drive around in small pickup trucks. They quickly figured out the MRAPs were limited to certain roads and started placing roadside bombs specifically along those routes."

Enlarge
The octopus relies on a network of pigment cells to blend in with its surroundings and escape detection. In a similar way, a decentralized network of ground forces may assess threats more quickly and respond more appropriately than a centralized command entity located far away from the action, UA's Rafe Sagarin suggests. Credit: Daniel Stolte, UA Communications

Let the attacker know you're ready

Another lesson could be learned by looking at how organisms deal with the constant threat from predators, according to the authors. A key feature is the capacity to reduce uncertainty and turn it into an advantage.

Hunting prey uses a lot of energy, Sagarin explained, which is why predators seek to ambush their prey. As soon as the prey is aware of their presence and ready to engage in defense, a pursuit might no longer be worth it.

Ground squirrels, for example, use alarm signals when a predator is lurking nearby, not only to warn their peers, but also to make it known to the attacker its cover is blown.

"When a prey species makes an alarm call of any kind, the game is up," Sagarin said. Suddenly, things have become a lot harder - if you're a hawk, you want to swoop down on a squirrel and not get scratched in the face."

Remarkably, ground squirrels use alarm signals that are very specific to the threat. If the predator is a mammal (which can hear), they utter alarm calls. If it is a snake (which cannot) they use tail-flagging to signal its presence.

The less specific an alarm call is, the less efficient it is in eliciting an appropriate response, the authors argue and point to the U.S. Homeland Security's threat advisory for national and international flights, which has remained at level orange (high) since August 2006. This static, ambiguous and nonspecific system creates uncertainty or indifference among the population that it is meant to help protect.

Form allies

Another principle often observed in nature is symbiosis, the formation of allies.

"Symbiosis is not always between friends," Sagarin said, pointing to the example of cleaner wrasses, small fish specializing in picking parasites off other marine animals, sometimes entering their mouths. The clients could easily swallow the cleaner wrasse while it is going about its job.

"But they don't," Sagarin said. "It's a mutual beneficial relationship in which the larger fish provides the cleaner fish with a food source and protection, and the cleaner keeps it free from parasites in return."

A lesson of how symbioses can successfully be applied in the human realm was demonstrated in Iraq in 2007, the authors note, when Gen. David Petraeus's strategy to form alliances with local leaders - including those who had been hostile - resulted in more tip-offs about IEDs and fewer American casualties.

Issue challenges

Two years ago, Sagarin and colleagues published a book titled "Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World." The research group has since begun to "make its observations more actionable for the people on the ground," as Sagarin put it. Working with emergency management coordinators, cybersecurity experts, soldiers, police chiefs, air marshals, homeland security officials, fire chiefs and public health officials, the group's ideas have generated a lot of interest.

"One of the main lessons we learned is that issuing challenges is more effective than giving orders when there is a need to develop security measures," Sagarin said. He pointed to the DARPA Grand Challenge as an example, in which the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense put on a prize competition for the development of a driver-less vehicle capable of navigating difficult terrain on its own.

"Anytime you pose a challenge, not only do you get a diverse population of problem solvers, but you get them to learn from each another."

However, despite decentralization, it is important to still have an overarching structure to provide guidance and encourage the development of new ideas.

"An octopus is still an octopus," Sagarin said, "not just a random collection of cells."

"The bottom line of all this is, you can't just put up a wall around something and expect it to protect it against every possible threat. Attackers will always figure out a way."

More information:
"Decentralise, adapt and cooperate," Rafe Sagarin et al., Nature, Vol. 465, May 20, 2010.
"Natural Security - A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World," Raphael Sagarin and Terence Taylor, University of California Press, 2008.

Provided by University of Arizona (news : web)

Schmedlap,

Ah yes, the BetaMax versus VHS counter-point is a good one, and I forgot to consider that in terms of marketing and advertising :).

The acceptance and institutionalization of ideas is an interesting study. Now, if COL Jones published it through an academic institution or a think tank, hmmm....

v/r

Mike

"Can time constraints -- relating to the very real interests, concerns, needs and agenda of a nation/great power -- cause a nation/great power to, reasonably and intelligently:" by BillC

BillC, until Col. Jones gets back I will take a stab at it. Time can be an issue but I don't see how it affects the model's validity.
The Carter doctrine is a perfect example. Many people forget that there were 2 parts to it.

One was to use Military force to guarantee access to Oil that Saudi Arabia had used as a weapon against us during the Oil embargo, hence his famous "Moral Equivalent of War Speech". His part 1 decision (use of force) matches all 4 Jones model factors for good governance.

His part 2 decision was to organize the resources of the USA to where we would never again be Dependant on the ME for energy security. In particular the Strategic Oil Reserve and yearly Oil import reduction targets. Again his part 2 decisions are not as well known. But they again get a positive response on all 4 factors of the Jones model for good governance.

He is the last President who at the end of his watch could say the USA was importing LESS oil than when he took office, hence we were more secure and he was leading a good government, no other President can say that.

That is why I say he was the last Strategic President we had. His 2 part Strategy would allow us to survive short term and long term regardless of what our enemies did or didn't do. That is good Strategy and that is Good "Governing Dynamics" IMO

"You might want to try to tweak and refine this model so that its scope is not just insurgencies in general, but insurgencies following state collapse and/or arising in nation-building/state-building scenarios and/or arising in societies whose politics align along tribal and ethnic lines."

I'm not sure if that is relevant with Jones' Model. He describes popular violence as a function of poor governance. Time is not in the equation. The elimination of a lifecycle or time allows for a broad model that could be used to describe insurgencies within a stable, unstable, or failed gov't. That's one thing that I like about it.

Let me pose the question as follows:

Can time constraints -- relating to the very real interests, concerns, needs and agenda of a nation/great power -- cause a nation/great power to, reasonably and intelligently:

a. Embrace speed, force, aggression and conflict as the only means available for securing its interests and achieving its goals in the time required, and

b. Reject patience, example and "good governance;" especially when it has been determined that such methods have not, cannot and will not allow the nation/great power to secure its interests and achieve its goals in the time available?

Or, in such instances -- wherein the lengthy application of patience, example and good governance is unfeasible -- must nations/great powers simply forego their security, their interests and their continued wellbeing?

Ack...date above should be 1870 and not 1872.

Or more specifically let Billy Jack(The Greatest green Beret Ever) explain it.

http://billyjack.com/index.php?menuID=Page&pid=38

Bill,

We'll just have to agree to disagree. IMO, what you propose will only make the challenges we face worse, our nation less secure, the instability in the Middle East greater; and quite likely lead to a weakening of the US that allows us to be surpassed by the EU initially, and ultimately by others.

Over the course of history Empires fade when they expend themselves attempting vainly to sustain a status quo that is favorable to them, and no one else. So everyone else seeks every opportunity to change and thereby advance their own interests. We live in an era of great change; we live in an era of strategic uncertainty; we live in an era where few things could be more dangerous than attempting to force everything around us to remain static and subordinate.

By embracing change, by accepting reasonable risk that comes with doing so in an era of uncertainty, we have the best chance of remaining out in front of competitors and sustaining our intersts globally.

You say we don't have time to do the right thing. I say we don't have time not to.

Let me try another angle on this:

I believe that it is just such "I'm in charge" Hubris that led to the conditions that gave rise to the current terrorist violence directed toward the US.

"Good Governance" cannot, by definition, be imposed on the populace of another as it will lack the most critical ingredient of all: LEGITIMACY

So I instead encourge more leadership by example, and adopting foreign policies more in touch with our founding principles as a nation that recoginize the primacy of populace over the governments (of what ever form) they select (in what ever fashion) to serve them.

If we are heading in the right direction, and doing the right thing, we will have far more supporters around the globe than if we appoint ourselves as "leader" of some sort of "international community" and set out to wage warfare on the oppressed populaces of the world in the name of "Global Insurgency."

That's all just a little to Orwellian for my taste. It's not wanted, and just as importantly, it is not needed either.

God help us if the 2000s are as war-like and bloody as the 1900s.

I don't buy the "era of persistent conflict"; particularly as it is based on the CT / FID-COIN intervention model to suppress insurgents rather than on the Jones Model use policy to fix governments instead, approach.

Remember, we didn't evolve from the Stone Age to the Bronze Age because we ran out of stones; we just figured out a smarter way to get things done.

Governments won't evolve because we ask them to; they will evolve because we will let them know that we will no longer protect them against their own populaces, and, in extreme cases, may actually side with their populaces if need be (thus why SF keeps the UW mission on the books).

Currently many don't evolve because they don't have to. With the US willing to employ our might, influence, and treasure to keep them in power, why change??

So, in short, the only society I feel compelled to encourage the transformation of is our own. The others can follow suit or face the wrath of their empowered populaces.

First, I would argue that "Global Insurgency" is both impossible, and a gross misnomer for the many distinct, unique insurgencies and subversive movements going on in the Middle East today. Each is rooted in its own unique conditions of perceptions of Poor Governance between a populace and a particular government / system of governance.

There are some common factors:

Most are in countries where the governance has been heavily influenced over the past several generations by Western involvement.

Most movements employ an ideology rooted in Muslim religion (what else would one use as an insurgent in these communities? Communist ideologies were tried and failed. Land ownership worked for Mao, but that was in an agriculturally based society, not grazing desert. Religion is the "go to" tried and true LOO for insurgent ideology, and is perfect for Middle Eastern society.)

Most are associated in some manner with Bin Laden's AQ Movement; who seeks to leverage the power of these many distinct movements to serve larger common goals IN ADDITION TO the nationalist base that drives each movement; rooted in throwing off overt Western controls, attaining good governance at the national level, and creating new, more powerful alliances, much like the EU, to prevent such outside dominance from happening again.

So, what would the Jones Model suggest?

1. Focus on why these many distinct movements buy into the message that they must break the support of the US to their current Poor Governance regimes in power first, before they can have success at home. Target not the insurgent movements in the name of CT; but instead target the perception that the US is the obstacle to attaining Good Governance. (See papers published here and on World Politics Review on "Populace-Centric Engagement" for more on this).

2. Declare an end to the "GWOT." It makes us look scared and pathetic; it puts a "war focus" on what should be a "policy focus" problem; and it weakens us as a nation in terms of influence, wealth, and ability to continue to deter major state-based threats effectively with a well trained and equipped, non-decisively engaged military.

3. Conduct a top down review of US Foreign Policy to identify and implement critical changes in approaches to the world that are more relevant to the globalized world we live in today, than the bi-polar US/Soviet dominated world that existed when most were originally designed and established.

4. Conduct assessments of critical populaces everywhere essential US national interests exist to determine status of perceptions of Poor Governance. This should become a major focus area for the US intelligence community (much as MG Flynn recently suggested changes for the intelligence community in Afghanistan). There is no state in the world today that can truly threaten the US (though many, friend and foe alike may take advantage of our over extended state); but small cells from the populaces of states that truly believe the US is promoting and sustaining the oppressive regimes they live under can, and have. We must shift our focus to better understanding what actually threatens us today, and develop new concepts of "deterrence" that works on non-state organizations.

While I was at it, I would consider scrapping the entire concept of seeing states as "allies" or "threats" and view them all as "competitors". Each of these competitors has shared and competing national interests with the US. The current construct blinds us to dangerous competing interests with "allies"; and also blinds us to major shared interest opportunities with "threats." The US is in competition with the entire globe, and that is ok, so long as we approach that competition holistically and objectively. Currently we are too focused on attempting to make some state fill the role of peer competitor that is essential for making the Cold War family of foreign policy function properly. It's time to move on. Empowered populaces mean more threats will be rooted in the concepts of insurgency than previously.

The last anonymous was me.....I got excited and stuff and forgot to type in my name....Ken White would understand.

Joshua,

What I meant to convey is that the surface dynamics of what has been going on in the world the past 10-15 years has been given many names: IW, 4th Gen, etc. Personally, I don't think the nature of warfare has changed much, nor has the nature of insurgency, which I think is better thought of as a civil emergency rather than as warfare. So, if one chooses to see the current dynamics as "irregular" or as "4th generation", fine, it has little impact on what the actual fundamental nature of insurgency is really all about IMO. I don't agree with those who crowd the market with new names for old things that look different today due to the information tools that empower them in new ways; but I won't argue with them either. I think these are all merely new labels insurgency in a globalized world, and are not "models" at all, as they don't help one to determine how to resolve the problems that they seek to describe.

It has no affect on what I am trying to get to with my work. My work is to attempt to understand the fundamental human dynamics at work, which I believe to be relatively timeless and universal; manifesting uniquely (like snowflakes, all formed the same way, yet all unique due to the environment they were formed in) based on all of the many environmental factors involved.

To be an effective counterinsurgent one must understand both: The nature of insurgency, and the nature of the environment they are dealing with. To date, I believe most descriptions of the nature of insurgency to be too heavily colored by the environmentals (or symptoms); so often miss what must actually be addressed successfully resolve the insurgency and move on.

Anonymous,

This is an example of what I speak to in my article when I say that:

"Development without equity is Apartheid."

(granted, I intentionally selected phrasing to shock, and grab attention)

Foreign intervention is not Civil Governance, it is assistance to Civil Governance. One of the primary falacies I see in current COIN dogma is the belief that development can cure insurgency. Development executed improperly can actually make an insurgency worse. Just as imposing security and rule of law to an oppressed populace can drive a subversive movement into full blown insurgency (think King George sending the fleet to Boston to do just that).

The key, I believe, is to ask: How can our efforts (be they security or development) be employed to enable the Host Nation Civil Governance to improve the perceptions of Legitimacy, Justice, Respect, and Hope with the disenfrancised segments of their populace that are in rebellion specifically, and the entire populace in general?

Bottom line is that you can neither force, nor bribe, nor cajole a populace to simply stop feeling oppressed. They feel the way they feel. You must target those perceptions. Not saying security efforts or development efforts are bad per se, but they can be if inartfully applied.

A recent example of a "claimed" successful Civil Goveranance from Iraq.

Sometimes CG is not the only answer to insurgencies as it does not always answer the core reasons why insurgencies start.

"Last summer the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) closed one of its largest projects in Iraq, declaring that it had been a virtually unqualified success. The Community Stabilization Program (CSP), which cost $675 million over its three years of operation, has been lauded as one of the wars most effective counterinsurgency operations. Launched in May 2006, it was USAIDs chief contribution to the Bush plan of rescuing a tailspinning military adventure with a civilian surge and increased focus on economic development.

... According to several senior military and government personnel, however, this vaunted program was responsible for sending millions of taxpayer dollars to Iraqi insurgents via a complex web of contractors and subcontractors. These sources claim that although USAID was fully aware of the problem, it delayed acting for as long as possible, unwilling to pull the plug on a program that generated propitious statistics, even when it jeopardized American lives."

COL Jones,

I guess I would just add, regarding the Huntington quote, that in both Saudi Arabia now and in Afghanistan under Zahir, rather than providing representation to the people, the states established patronage systems. If the significance of the quote is that the states felt no need to give representation to the people, then I would disagree with the late Huntington while acknowledging that even at room temperature he is likely smarter than me. A piece of the action is no less a form of representation than a vote at the ballot box.

I wish there was simply a LIKE button for SWJ articles b/c I approve of COL Jones' message.

We're starting to get closer to the truth outside of the zero-sum nonsense between COIN and CT and the inability to differentiate between occupation and FID in this post-colonial world that others would espouse.

3000 years ago, King Solomon struggled with the same unknowns in Ecclesiastes. He laments,

"Again, I looked and saw all the oppression
that was taking place under the sun:

I saw the tears of the oppressed--
And they have no comforter;
Power was on the side of their oppressors--
And they have no comforter."

Well Done Col Jones.

De Oppresso Liber

"Liberal policies of enabling immigrants to retain their old languages and customs in distinct communities provide rich soil for the the growth of future insurgencies." by Col. Jones

Bob,That is some Strategic Stuff. It is Warden's Ring #3 Infrastructure as it concerns Human Infrastructure based Insurgencies. Ring #3 is essentially concerned with what "connects" the systems togather....not just physical objects as it is often interpreted. Language is the most basic conection between person to person communcation Insurgencies. Customs and traditions again are the "connecting" SOP's of Insurgencies/Gangs. Just had to through that out here....you understand. LOL